

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF
SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

STAFF STATEMENT

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF
THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, my name is John F. Sopko. I am the Deputy Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee. Since 1982, I have been employed as a counsel by the Subcommittee. Prior to 1982, I was a Special Attorney for the Department of Justice. I have been assigned to conduct this Subcommittee investigation since its inception.

On the evening of Saturday, November 2, 1985, KGB agent Vitaly Yurchenko walked out of the Georgetown restaurant "Au Pied De Cochon" and into the annals of defector history. His subsequent interviews both at the Soviet embassy here in Washington and in the protective confines of Moscow detailed a curious though somewhat dubious litany of alleged United States government mishandling of his case.

The publicity surrounding Mr. Yurchenko's "last supper" in Georgetown continues to this day both in the controlled Soviet press as well as in the Western media. Particularly in the Soviet Union, the events surrounding his "escape" and "handling" have been expounded to illustrate the treatment that can be expected by any other fugitives from the Soviet bloc.

Not far from Yurchenko's memorable repast, just six months before, another event occurred which is just as relevant to the scope of this inquiry. It was the defection of a senior diplomat from an Eastern Bloc country. Although the diplomat neither knew Yurchenko nor anything about him, his treatment as a non-intelligence defector is just as important as Yurchenko's to our understanding of the importance of defection and the problems inherent to the resettlement of a fugitive from totalitarianism.

Little publicity surrounded the diplomat's leap to freedom because of security reasons as well as the desires of the diplomat in question. Although in possession of highly useful information, he did not defect to give us state secrets. Nor did he defect for monetary or personal rewards as with Yurchenko. This Soviet bloc defector left solely for the chance to live and work in a state of freedom that we in the West too easily take for granted.

As the Yurchenko case caused the American people to reassess the CIA's handling of intelligence officers who defect and brought about needed improvements, the handling -- or more accurately, the lack thereof -- of the diplomat-defector who is still here appears to call for needed reforms.

The staff found that defectors are not "squeezed like a lemon and thrown away" as commonly alleged in the Soviet press. Instead, most defectors seem to wish they had been "squeezed" a little more -- much could be done to better utilize and assist the non-intelligence defector. Not constrained by stringent physical security requirements such as new names and identities,

the non-intelligence service defector could more easily enhance our nation's understanding of the closed Soviet society which for the foreseeable future will be our country's primary protagonist in foreign and military affairs.

Yet our record so far with the handling of these defectors indicates the opposite. For example:

- Dr. Petre Nicolae, a high-ranking economist for the Romanian government attached to COMECON, spent over five years in New York running a laundromat and selling ice cream before he came to the attention of the Jamestown Foundation and others who are now attempting to find a way to put his storehouse of information on the East European economy to better use through writing, lecturing and research. His information and analysis have been acclaimed by those government researchers who only recently knew of his existence in the U.S. and were provided, for the first time, access to him.

- Alexandra Costa, the wife of a Senior Soviet Diplomat, was initially urged by a government representative to become a clerical worker. Fortunately due to her perseverance and the personal interest of a number of government officials, she was able to attend and graduate from the Wharton School of Business. Eight years after her defection, her insights into the Soviet society is now a best-seller here in the United States;

- Aleksandr Ushakov, a professor of Marxism at a naval college in Odessa, hiked for 19 days over the Caucasus Mountains to reach the West in 1984. He had been arrested for writing articles "slandering" the State. Fortunately, he was released by the KGB in hopes that he would lead them to other "co-conspirators." Additionally, the Soviets would not charge him until he had been stripped of his communist party membership. This peculiarity of Soviet "justice" allowed Ushakov to escape. However, once here in the United States, the fact that he had been a member of the communist party now bars him for an additional 5 years from becoming eligible for American citizenship. In addition, for two years he worked at various odd-jobs before he was able to find a way to tell his story to the American people.

- Vladimir Sakharov, a former Soviet foreign service officer who defected in 1971 was eventually assisted in obtaining a doctorate in international relations. He is now a prominent lecturer of Soviet affairs. But before then he had to endure a life of menial odd-jobs and was initially advised by government representatives to become a motel manager and forget about ever doing anything public about his experiences or about the Soviet Union.

- Andrey Sorokun, a Japanese area studies student from Moscow State University defected in 1983 while studying as an exchange student in Japan. Although proficient in three

languages -- Japanese, Russian and English -- he wound up washing dishes in a New York restaurant for three years until discovered by the Jamestown Foundation. Through their efforts, Andrey found employment as a translator in Washington where he is currently combining his work with research on the "children of the elite" of the Soviet Union.

- Tadeusz Kucharski, who defected in 1983 after serving 5 years as the Polish Commercial Attache in Angola was never even debriefed by the U.S. Government concerning Soviet and Polish activities in that troubled part of Africa. Since his defection, he and his wife have found successful employment in real estate and are assisting other Polish emigres to adjust to their new life here in America.

- Others have not been as persistent or as lucky. Within the last few months, two promising defectors returned home. Vladimir Kovnat, a Soviet TV correspondent, photo-journalist and film-maker who had worked extensively in the Middle East and Southeast Asia returned with his wife on July 31st to the Soviet Union.

- In addition, Bronius Venclova, a former Soviet interpreter who defected in 1985, could not withstand the pressure of the propaganda campaign engineered by the Soviets to secure his return. This August he returned after complaining that he could no longer take the constant telephone calls from his parents and siblings urging his return.

The negative effects of the current state of our defector program are numerous. We do not get their insights in a timely and systematic manner. In addition, the defectors have a hard time adjusting here, a fact compounded by their frustration in trying to get someone in the government, business or society to listen to them. And finally, their reception or lack of it, here in the West is closely monitored by the Soviet bloc and utilized for their purposes of discouraging additional defections.

This last point has been of considerable concern to the staff from the onset of the investigation. Well aware of the sophisticated propaganda capabilities of the official Soviet Bloc press, whose representatives are probably in the audience today, we were initially troubled with a public discussion of this issue.

The Subcommittee's decision for publicly airing the issue of defector treatment was three-fold: firstly, unlike the Soviet Union, "glasnost" or openness is not a recent phenomena in our country. We did not just discover it during the current regime nor after the last party congress. An open and frank discussion of problems within our government or society is as old as the constitution whose Bicentennial we just celebrated.² Such inquiries are an accepted way for the American people, through their elected representatives, to hold their government

accountable. It is our historic method for change and improvement.

Secondly, from every intelligence expert and Sovietologist that we conferred with, we heard unanimous approval for a thoughtful and public discussion of this issue. It was felt that such a showing of interest by the Congress would do far more towards encouraging the would-be defector than either a closed-door hearing or continued government silence. The message a public hearing sends to the World and particularly to those behind the Iron Curtain is that the Congress of the United States takes the plight of the defector seriously and is doing something about it. This is a message that every credible Sovietologist felt must urgently be sent to the Soviet bloc.

Lastly, these same experts as well as many of the defectors we contacted believed that it would be disastrous for Congress and the American people to be cowered into silence by what the Soviet Bloc press may or may not do with the facts garnered from a public hearing. To be silent would give them far more importance than they deserve and unrealistically assume that they even need a public hearing to present their tailor-made views to their audience back home. Silence by our government and Congress on this important issue is exactly what the Soviet bloc governments want.

Clearly, it is also important to state at this juncture, that no matter what our government and society does, some defectors and legal emigres will return to their communist homelands. Some just can not adjust to the freedom of the West. Moreover, others may well be "plants" sent here for intelligence purposes, or, perhaps even for the sole purpose of "re-defecting" in order to create a propaganda event for internal consumption back home.

But, for the bulk of the defectors and other emigres, who come to this country with useful knowledge and the intention to stay, the current system can be dramatically improved to better identify, utilize and more productively integrate these essential aliens into our society. This is the focus of our hearings.

II. The Investigation

At the direction of Chairman Nunn, the Subcommittee staff has conducted an extensive investigation of the handling of defectors by the government. The inquiry included interviews of a large number of defectors, government officials, former intelligence officers, non-governmental agencies and volunteer organizations.

In the course of this investigation, for example, twenty-nine defectors from the Soviet Bloc provided in-depth interviews and an additional thirty-two defectors and emigres

were interviewed informally concerning their experiences with resettlement.

Formal briefings were received from the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and by the U.S. Army's intelligence collection operations in Europe.

Non-governmental agencies that are involved in Soviet research were consulted, including the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS), the National Council for Soviet and East European Studies (NCSEER), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, the Soviet Interview Project of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and Delphic Associates.

Academics involved in the defector issues at Tufts University, Harvard University, Boston University, Georgetown University, University of Maryland, George Washington University, University of Kansas, University of Arizona, University of California at Berkley and Stanford University also contributed their expertise to the Subcommittee inquiry.

The views from some of the major voluntary refugee organizations were solicited. They included the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), the Tolstoy Foundation, Freedom House, U.S. Conference of Catholic Charities and the Jamestown Foundation.

Lastly, over twenty current or former intelligence officers were interviewed concerning their experiences with the handling of defectors as well as their recommendations for needed improvements.

Based upon these interviews and the significant body of work performed by both Intelligence Committees of Congress, it became apparent early in the investigation that a vacuum exists in current government programs for the systematic identification and productive integration of a significant group of defectors into U.S. public life.

The staff found that while a government system is in place for dealing with a very discreet type of defector who falls within the purview of the U.S. intelligence community -- the few, such as Yurchenko, who are judged vital to our national security and are eligible to receive government support -- there is no comparable system in existence for the bulk of defectors who do not meet these specific criteria.

Some of the defectors, at the other end of the spectrum, like the common seaman, Medvid⁵ -- if he had been permitted to stay -- the Subcommittee staff found to be covered by the

programs supplied by the various voluntary agencies that handle the over 60,000 refugees that annually enter our country. These programs are generally geared to the resettlement of vast numbers of people of various ethnic and social backgrounds, most of whom arrive here as legal emigres. The staff found those programs generally inadequate to handle the special, higher-level defector from the Soviet Bloc whose past close association with a totalitarian government often impedes his acceptance in U.S. emigre communities.

In focusing on this latter group and based on our investigation the staff made the following conclusions:

1) These individuals can make a useful contribution to our society and our national security by helping to fill important gaps in our knowledge of the Soviet Bloc as well as in projecting future actions of the Soviet Bloc leadership in the political, economic and military areas;

2) This unique resource remains for the most part untapped by both government and society in any long term, systematic and open way although a few underfunded and uncoordinated academic and government programs successfully utilize them on occasion;

3) Government assistance to defectors is limited to a very small group who currently must meet the stringent requirements of the intelligence community:

4) These defectors face unique problems in resettlement and integration into our society that are not currently being adequately addressed by the government and voluntary private organizations, sometimes leading to their return to the Soviet Bloc;

5) Due to the defectors' prior experience and position within the Soviet Bloc, they tend to find acceptance within those emigre groups that have already settled in the United States to be particularly difficult. Thus, the normal support mechanism for these individuals among previously established ethnic communities does not exist for them;

6) A concerted, sophisticated and intense program of harassment and intimidation meant to force the defector to return to the Soviet Bloc exists and appears to be expanding in the United States. Although it does not approach the violence, intensity or overtness of efforts in the 1950's and 1960's, its novel psychological methods for playing upon the defector's initial adjustment period are continuing;

7) All of the above directly and adversely affects our national security given the under-utilization of the defector's unique talents, the negative impact upon future defections, and the propaganda use that the Soviet Bloc makes of these failings.

These problems affect not only the number of future non-intelligence defectors but also the critically important defection of the intelligence officer or other essential alien since their treatment is inexorably intertwined to the would-be defector.

III. THE DEFECTOR PHENOMENA

A) Definition: Who Are They?

Unlike "political refugee," "asylee" or "immigrant" that have clear legal definitions and consequences, the term "defector" has been used to cover a wide range of activities and any number of individuals or events. Thus it has been used to describe the 1986 decision of American scientist Arnold Lokshin to move with his family to the USSR⁴, the 1960's⁵ espionage activities of Col. Penkovsky within the Soviet Union⁵, as well as the recent expulsion of known dissidents such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Yuri Orlov⁶.

Congress has provided for selective assistance to a very small number of defectors who are of special interest to the intelligence community. Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, (50 USC 403h), states:

Admission of essential aliens; limitation on number

"Whenever the Director, the Attorney General, and the Commissioner of Immigration shall determine that the entry of a particular alien into the United States for permanent residence is in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission, such alien and his immediate family shall be given entry into the United States for permanent residence.... Provided, That the number of aliens and members of their immediate families... shall in no case exceed one hundred persons in any fiscal year."

Due to the nature of their mission, these essential aliens are limited to an extremely small number of defectors who for clear national security reasons are afforded the protection and special handling of the Intelligence Community. For the most part, due to their special security problems, these defectors are unable or unwilling⁷ to enter the public arena under their real names or identities.

In practice only an exceedingly small number of people fall into this category. The staff found that the bulk of those people one would normally classify as "defectors" have tended to

fall outside of this definition, despite the fact that many of them are often privy to important and otherwise unavailable information that would be useful in the public domain for the analysis of Soviet and East European affairs.

Even when this type of defector is eager to contribute his or her knowledge to the analytical community, the staff found that few have been afforded that opportunity. While denying ourselves potentially useful information, we are also compounding an already difficult process of adaptation and integration into this society.

These individuals, unlike their intelligence community counterparts, could be helped to integrate "openly" into U.S. society and afforded an opportunity to publicly expand our knowledge of the communist systems they have left behind.

B) Public Knowledge: Another Vacuum

Despite the importance of defectors and the many problems occurring in conjunction with their treatment, surprisingly little examination has been conducted on this topic in the past. Indeed, the Subcommittee staff found that it was not until 1985 that the first attempt was made to comprehensively analyze this phenomena outside of the confines of the intelligence community.

That analysis, Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List, by Dr. Vladislav Krasnov, was based in part upon a KGB "wanted list" of Soviet Defectors, commonly called the Possev material. Having found his own entry among the Possev records and being convinced of its authenticity, Dr. Krasnov selected 470 cases of post-war defection from the Soviet Union (1945-1969) and subjected them to a computer-assisted statistical analysis. From public records he attempted to bring this analysis up to the present. The purpose of his work was to establish a public tally of defectors in order to determine their importance as well as their bona fides. He hoped that this would make the public and policy makers more aware of their unique needs and usefulness.

Two other scholars have since added their work to our understanding of defectors. Dr. Lawrence Martin-Bittman, himself a Czech defector, has initiated a study into the psychology of defection and its implications upon their treatment in the West. Etienne Huygens, the former Research Director of the Jamestown Foundation and the son-in-law of Zdzislaw Rurarz, the former Polish ambassador to Japan when he defected in 1980, has completed three monographs on the defector question.

Dr. Huygens, working with the same Possev data supplemented by the public media accounts concerning defections, has attempted to perform a review similar to Krasnov's for the other East bloc

countries. Dr. Bittman takes this research one step further into the treatment of defectors once they arrive in the West.

To the knowledge of the staff, these individual, under-funded efforts compromise the only public research being done on defection in the United States. No government or academic institution has supported larger-scale public research in this area. No data base or public clearing house for information on defectors has been created from which we could possibly learn more about this phenomena in a more systematic way.

As a result, little is known outside of the intelligence community by the federal government, the Congress and other policy makers about the importance of defection and the problems defectors face.¹³ The investigation of this Subcommittee is really the first public Congressional review of the overall defector issue.

C) Defector Trends: Some Useful Insights

All three researchers mentioned above agreed to share with the Subcommittee the results of their work, though limited in scope. Their research and the other information gained during the course of this investigation suggests the following:

1) Defections have plagued the Soviet Union and other communist countries since their inception.

2) Although the numbers of defectors per year have dropped significantly since the construction of the Berlin Wall, the annual rate of defection from the entire Soviet Bloc appears to have increased since 1980. The best estimate from the public data is that less than fifty Soviets successfully defect each year to the West of which the majority come to the United States. The number of attempts are far higher but even harder to document. The best public estimate places their figure in the several hundreds. The number of non-Soviet defections is even more difficult to determine since most finally settle in Europe where public coverage is intermittent.

3) On the other hand, the annual rate of defection for the Soviet Union appears to have fallen since 1980. According to Dr. Krasnov, this reversal is due chiefly to three factors: first, the improvement in Soviet social conditions has caused many would-be defectors to momentarily pause to wait and see; secondly, more mature, sophisticated and effective efforts of the KGB; and lastly, the failure of the U.S. Government programs on defector resettlement as exemplified in the Soviet press' coverage of Medvid, Yurchenko and others.

4) Unlike legal Soviet emigration which by definition has been limited to unique societal groups, defectors tend to

come from all walks of life as well as from all social, professional and ethnic groups,

5) Since 1961, members of the Soviet elite have displaced the conscript as the predominant defecting group. Although the data for the rest of the Eastern Bloc is insufficient for a similar conclusion, it appears to corroborate the Soviet experience.

6) Despite a sharp drop in the number of death penalties and the length of prison sentences given to defectors in absentia, almost all re-defectors face prison sentences upon their return. The severity of the sentence does not appear to have significantly decreased since the 1970's. Statistics are inadequate for determining the penalties meted out to Eastern Bloc defectors.

7) Following periods of internal reform, defections increase rather than decrease for a period of time. In part this is due to thwarted expectations after the "reform" period ends. It also has been suggested to the staff that it may equally be due to the loss of power and prestige by those who are replaced by the reformists. Thus, in the case of the current Soviet regime, whether Gorbachev succeeds or not in "reforming" the internal structure of Soviet society, in the long-run we should expect a noticeable increase in defections within the next few years from the Soviet Union. This may balance out the immediate short-fall in defections while those inside the system wait and see what will happen.

8) The current estimate of Soviet soldiers who have defected in Afghanistan range from 10 to 300. Although neither estimate comes anywhere near to the numbers of Soviet conscripts that defected prior to the completion of the Berlin Wall in 1961, their numbers appear to be increasing. If the war continues, sources caution that we should expect an increase in young, poorly educated working class and peasant conscripts desirous of fleeing to the West if given a chance.

9) The risk of a fake defector continues to exist. Although Krasnov was only able to identify one defector who was charged with espionage after defecting,¹⁴ the staff was advised that a few recent "re-defections" may have been planned. The threat of espionage obviously exists and must be recognized with appropriate cautions.

In conclusion, it appears that the trend of defection since 1961 has been relatively constant, although the numbers of skills of the average defector have improved. Internal reforms and subsequent repressions will usually increase the numbers of defectors as well as skew their backgrounds to include increased numbers from all walks of life. Based on the limited data available, we anticipate an increase in the number of defections from the Soviet Union simply because Gorbachev has embarked upon

an unprecedented public program of reform to the internal system of his country. The irony may be that no matter how successful in carrying out such a policy, the end result should be an increase in the migration of Soviet elite to the West.

If this prediction proves true, then it would appear that the West will be left with the challenge to develop a more coherent program than presently exists to fully utilize this new flow of talent from the East.

IV. DEFECTORS: KEYS TO A RIDDLE

A) Their Utility

The most obvious rationale for viewing the defector as important to the West was offered by a defector. Vladimir Rudolph-Shabinsky, who defected in 1947 and was the first employee of Radio Liberty told the staff that "if the defector wasn't important, why have the Soviets so persistently and severely struggled for so many years to prevent them from getting out and then getting those who did, back inside?"

One answer may be drawn from Winston Churchill's description of the Soviet Union as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." The Soviets prefer us to view them in that light and understand that the defector offers the West one of the best methods for fathoming the Soviet enigma.

The staff found a general consensus within the intelligence and academic communities, that as a whole, defectors can be extremely important to our understanding of the communist world. The reason for their importance is based upon their previous experiences in a society that is otherwise closed to the West.¹⁵

Dr. Murray Feshbach, the past president of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS), who served as the Soviet Specialist to Lord Carrington when he was the Secretary General of NATO, called the information gathered from those who have emigrated from the Soviet Union as historically the most important sources of information received by Western scholars about the Soviet Union.

Dr. Uri Ra'anan, Director of the International Security Studies Program at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, called defectors one of the most highly informative and sophisticated sources of information available to both American academics as well as government policy makers. As a result of their importance, Dr. Ra'anan and his associates have conducted extensive research into the decision-making process in the Soviet Union utilizing extensive interviews of important defectors and emigres in the West.¹⁶

Government analysts interviewed by the staff corroborated the importance of the defector in better understanding the communist world. Lt. General James A. Williams (Ret.), the former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, advised the staff that such sources are extremely useful to the analyst as well as the policy maker. Moreover, General Williams advised that the non-intelligence service defector can be just as important to the government as the ex-KGB agent. These individuals, just as much as the intelligence officer, offer first-hand insights into the inner workings of the system. They give the flesh and blood to the skeletal overview that the American analyst can develop from other sources.

Likewise, Rear Admiral William C. Mott (U.S.N. Ret.), Chairman of the Advisory Committee to the National Strategic Materials and Minerals Program told the staff that every high level defector/emigre has a better understanding of the workings of Soviet society than the most learned domestic Sovietologist. As examples of non-intelligence officer defectors that offer such insights, Admiral Mott cited Constantine Simis and Dina Kominskaya, two of the most brilliant Soviet jurists who were closely identified with the defense of the Soviet refusniks before their forced departure from the Soviet Union.¹⁷ The problem as the Admiral sees it, is in getting their knowledge into our educational and policy-making process.

Dr. Tonu Parming, the former Chairman of Soviet and East European Studies at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) of the Department of State views defectors as a unique and important resource that is being wasted by our government. From his experience at FSI he has found them to be immeasurable in educating his students. The defectors' area expertise in some areas can be far superior to that of American scholars and analysts. Parming believes a defector can give an entirely new perspective to certain areas of study that only an insider could possess.

Parming feels that most people in the U.S. government don't know about defectors or their areas of expertise. It is a "hit or miss" process in finding out about them through contacts in the intelligence community. In general, information about them is unavailable.

Parming continually repeated that defectors are an incredible asset to us that we are wasting. Parming says that the defector is currently only being debriefed for security purposes. The government fails to debrief the defector concerning his substantive expertise. This oversight angers the defector since he feels he is being ignored and also wastes their most important contribution to our country's collective knowledge of the communist world.

Dr. Andrew Marshal, Director of the Office of Net Assessment told the subcommittee staff that these individuals act

as an extraordinarily good "correction factor" to American analysis. Bringing the cultural context of the Soviet Union to their research, they ensure against the dangerous phenomena of "mirror-imaging" that can creep into western analysis. "Mirror-imaging" erroneously applies Western values onto another culture. Such an approach fails to take into account the fundamental "cultural" peculiarities of the Soviet society which is profoundly different from a Western or other "open society."

The importance of the Soviet "mentality" is extraordinarily important in not only the political arena but also in the analysis of military tactics. Both the Departments of the Army and Air Force have initiated specific programs to analyze strategic and tactical planning in light of the Soviet mind-set. In both cases, their planners advised the staff of the critical importance¹⁹ they place on the use of defectors and emigres in this endeavor.

Surprisingly to the staff, the Department of the Navy either does not have such a program or is unable to "find" it. After repeated unsuccessful attempts to locate such a program through the Navy Congressional Liaison Office, the staff was informed that a rather well-respected Soviet Awareness Program was eliminated during the tenure of Secretary Lehman.

By contrast, the Army has developed two unique programs that attempt to capitalize on the important insights that both defectors and emigres possess. A third program to utilize the defector for teaching Army intelligence officers is on the drawing board awaiting funding approval.

The U.S. Army Russian Institute (USARI) located in Garmisch, West Germany was developed in 1947 to conduct and administer the overseas training phase of the Army Foreign Area Officer Program for Soviet and Eastern European specialists. The Institute provides a two-year program of graduate-level studies on the political structure, ideology, economic system, history, literature and sociological characteristics of the Soviet Union. The Institute attempts to train the military specialists to "think like a Soviet". As such, they rely heavily upon the native expertise of a cadre of defector/emigre professors in the faculty.²⁰

In addition, the Army has recently embarked upon an in-depth analysis and research of open source materials on the Soviet tactical and operational levels of warfare called the Soviet Army Studies Office (SASO).²¹ The program, which only became operational in 1986, was necessary in order to deepen the Army's basic understanding of the Soviet way of conducting war. Again, a critical aspect of this program was the effective use of the defector/emigre in order to bring his unique insight into American analysis.

The Director and staff of the Army Intelligence School located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, also recognized the unique importance of defectors/emigres for national security purposes, viewing them as critical to the effective teaching of Army intelligence officers. They doubted that the typical western-educated Sovietologist could adequately sensitize students to the complexities of the Soviet mind, man and society. All of these elements are critical to the training of an intelligence officer since he is expected to understand how an adversary commander thinks, perceives and processes information and organizes his own command, control and decision-making efforts.

Their need for such critical analysis which, only a defector or emigre could provide, led to their decision to propose a program in which defector Vladimir Sakharov would be a professor at their school. Due to funding and civilian personnel requirements, the proposal failed to come to fruition.²²

In short, the staff found that defectors can make an extremely useful contribution to our nation's understanding of the Soviet world. They are unique, in this respect, since they are a product of the very conditions that shape the society and decision-making process that our own society needs to understand. In addition, many were so closely in contact with aspects of policy formation and implementation that they can act as sophisticated sources of insight on an ongoing basis far beyond their utility as sources of tactical intelligence.²³

B) Their Current Use

The staff reviewed the current system for identifying, debriefing and disseminating the unique information and talents of defectors. The staff determined the system to be limited and not systematic outside of the intelligence community.

Such a system does exist for the collection of intelligence information by the government. It involves the screening and debriefing of a distinct number of defectors and emigres for various lengths of time at various locations throughout the world. But, by definition, the scope of these debriefings are limited by the unique missions of the intelligence community.

Professor Ra'anani indicated to the staff that in the course of his "Oral History Project", he interviewed a number of defectors/emigres who had been previously debriefed by the government. They uninformatly indicated that the type and depth of his interview was superior to their previous experience. Some of those interviewed stated that they had been in the West for ten or more years and had never been asked those questions before. They added that they had not felt the initial interviews had been as extensive and thorough as the Oral History Project.

The defectors directly interviewed by the Subcommittee staff corroborated the Tufts interviews. As examples: Dr. Peter Nicolae, the Romanian economist, remarked that little of his previous debriefing had dealt with economics, his profession. A number of former diplomats and bureaucrats who did not wish to disclose their identities also indicated similar experiences.

Such limitations in the official government debriefings should not be viewed as a criticism of the particular debriefers or the agencies for which they are employed. Rather, it is significant only as an indication of a possible flaw in the overall system.

The agencies involved in original defector debriefings, by the nature of their work, are preoccupied with the search for "tactical" information. Their needs to prove the bona fides of the defector as well as to obtain time sensitive information are expected to be and are therefore given the highest priorities. They focus on the names and locations of adversary agents, the modus operandi of hostile networks as well as other specific and lethal threats to our national security. As one senior analyst put it, "we don't have the luxury of long-term sociological or politico-economic analysis, we're always faced with short-term crises."

The longer-term analysis of the communist system and the other "strategic" insights that the defector may bring with him are considered secondary.²⁴ However, to the defector, these issues are more significant since they usually involve his professional interests and his life-time experiences. Eugene Demchenko, who defected in 1971 after a career within the Ukrainian Communist Party investigating government and industrial programs, told the staff that most defectors believe they will find someone in the West who is interested in changing the Soviet system and who will, in turn, be interested in their insights and experiences.²⁵

Regarding the question of debriefing, the staff also found a number of instances where important defectors, currently living in the United States, had never been debriefed. They had totally slipped through the debriefing system.

Tadeusz Kucharski, a former Polish Commercial Attache who was stationed in Angola for five years, defected with his family in 1983. In order to avoid arrest by communist authorities, they traveled via Portugal on a tourist visa to the United States. Upon their arrival at Kennedy Airport, they asked for political asylum. Other than his initial contacts with the INS and FBI officials at the airport, Kucharski told the staff that no one from the government had attempted to interview him up to the time of the Subcommittee interview. This oversight deeply troubled and perplexed him, causing Kucharski to believe that the government has no interest in the defector's important experiences.

The staff was also informed by officials at the Jamestown Foundation of a number of other foreign diplomats and trade officials who had never been interviewed by our government, even in a cursory fashion.

Aside from those few who qualify for P.L. 110 assistance, contacts with the government for most defectors usually abruptly end shortly after their arrival in the United States. A defector is rarely re-contacted, and if he is, it will again be along the same "tactical" lines of the first interview. Andre Sorokun, a former Soviet exchange student recruited by the KGB before he defected in 1983, is representative of the majority of the defectors the staff interviewed. He commented that shortly after he defected in Japan he was told that he would be recontacted again once he got to the United States. He waited for months but never was, even though he was a trained Soviet and Japanese language and oriental area studies specialist who had worked with numerous children of the Soviet elite.

No satisfactory mechanism exists for the defector to get access to an interested government agency with his information once he is in the United States. Moreover, there is no practical system for various government agencies to find and contact the defector even if it desired to do so. The staff was told by a number of government analysts that even if they know of a defector and would like to interview him, there is no central clearing house for locating that person. Even the Immigration and Naturalization Service is of no assistance since it eliminated the annual reporting requirement for resident aliens a number of years ago due to budgetary restrictions and lack of interest. As a result, the defector who is not resettled under the auspices of the intelligence community is soon lost to government analysts.

Faced with the necessities of learning a new language, finding work and adjusting to a new culture, the defector is preoccupied after his arrival here. Even if he is interested in contacting the government or other interested Americans to tell his story, his primary concern for financial security during his initial stage of adjustment, takes most of his time. Only if and when he is successful at resettlement, does the average defector find the opportunity to be heard -- usually via lectures or book contracts.

By that time, years usually have passed and insights lost or dated. In addition, publishers and lecture circuit agents are generally interested in colorful and dramatic material that seldom provides the refugee with the avenue that he, or trained analysts, would prefer for an in-depth and professional analysis of the area of his unique expertise.

What surprised the Subcommittee staff was that 5-10 years after their arrival, so many defectors were interested in still sharing their insights with the government. A partial

explanation for this phenomena was given by a number of the defectors themselves.

Dmitry Mikheyev told the staff that a distinguishing feature of the defector is that he feels he has a mission -- much like a convert to a new religion. He feels he must help his new country and the major way to do so is by sharing his knowledge of the old country.

Lev Alburt, a former Soviet Grand Master chess player, commented that until this "mission" is satisfied, the defector/emigre will always feel frustrated and unfulfilled. Other defectors have indicated that this desire to assist is borne of an intense longing to improve their former system. In essence, they find solace for leaving their homeland by knowing that their contributions to the United States' knowledge of the Soviet Bloc will in turn help their countrymen by better and wiser American foreign policy.

The staff found that the defector's desire to be heard, combined with his understandable ignorance of the vagaries of the American political scene makes him particularly susceptible to the manipulation of some political groups. A number of defectors told the staff that they had unwittingly given speeches or written statements for organizations that misused their information for their own political or philosophical ends. For example, Vladimir Sakharov stated that most defectors can't tell the difference between the American political mainstream and far right- or left-wing fringe groups. Driven by their desire to tell the American people what they know about the Soviet Union, they can unfortunately become unwilling tools for whichever group gives them a platform. He warned that such actions embarrass all defectors and lend credence to those Americans who criticize the defectors as being "extremists."

Regardless of the motives, a majority of the defectors indicated an earnest willingness to help the West. They wanted to pass on to American society an appreciation for Soviet Bloc society and its threat. Few, if any, found an outlet for doing so in our government. Some were able to write, but only a number of years after they defected. The few who have found an outlet to do so in academia, have first had to overcome the almost insurmountable hurdles of language and accreditation to get in. With employment opportunities extremely tight even for American trained scholars, it is becoming even more difficult for the defector to pursue an academic avenue.

Those programs mentioned previously in the military sector are limited in resources and mission. None were set up with the sole purpose of tapping this resource but rather have done so as a by-product of their intended mission. The Tufts University "Oral History Project" also has a limited budget and mission. It will cease operations at the end of its current funding. In addition, although its use of defectors is intensive it is only

temporary and does not provide a long-term outlet for them. Thus, to²⁶ a great extent, their stories and insights remain untapped.

V. RESETTLEMENT

A) The Current Programs: Another Vacuum

While any newcomer to the United States is faced with a host of difficult challenges, defectors often face additional and unique problems that are not currently being addressed by the government or by voluntary organizations.

For defectors not falling within the strict purview of the CIA Act, no government program currently exists designed to specifically handle their resettlement and integration into U.S. society. If assistance is provided at all, it is generally through the services of voluntary refugee agencies that provide resettlement assistance to all refugees coming to this country, and/or through one or two small, voluntary associations created specifically for this purpose but limited in funding and scope.

The major voluntary refugee agencies assisting these individuals include: the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), the Tolstoy Foundation, Freedom House, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Charities²⁷ and the Jamestown Foundation. With the exception of the Jamestown Foundation, these agencies handle the resettlement of all refugees to the United States -- from Vietnamese boat people, to Soviet Bloc ambassadors. With offices around the world, these agencies have long-standing relationships and experience with foreign governments. They are staffed by trained linguists and social workers who have worked for many years in the area of job placement and resettlement of refugees through offices located across the United States. Geared towards handling refugees from throughout the world, however, the amount of resources they can devote to Soviet bloc defectors and emigres is limited. The Jamestown Foundation, the only agency created specifically to assist Soviet bloc defectors, handles only high ranking defectors as determined by their Board of Directors. As the smallest and youngest of these organizations -- founded in 1984 -- it is limited in the resources and experience that it can offer to the few defectors it assists.²⁸

The Directors of all of these agencies emphasized that a significant number of defectors either fall through the cracks, or are provided inadequate assistance relative to their needs and their importance to U.S. policy makers and the U.S. public. Soviet bloc refugees, these agencies assert, face a number of additional problems of resettlement that are unique to their refugee group.

From the vantage point of strict resettlement, for example, the Department of State provides each of these agencies approximately \$650 per refugee for their resettlement. Without other means of support, all of these agency directors indicated that this amount is not currently sufficient to cover even basic resettlement procedures. As a result, they attempt to supplement this meager allowance through other state and local welfare programs or rely upon their donors.

This funding problem is only compounded among Soviet bloc defectors and emigres who tend to come from higher standards of living than most refugees to the United States and have even higher expectations. In the words of Vladislav Krasnov, with information "scant and distorted by Soviet propaganda,... most defect in the naive assumption that they will receive a hero's welcome in the West and be treated as cherished allies in a common struggle" against communism. These expectations are dashed not only when they find no hero's welcome, but further when the assistance provided them is barely sufficient to last them more than a few months.

B) Unique Problems: Usually Unfulfilled

In addition to these questions of expectations, the defectors also face a host of more fundamental emotional challenges that often extend well beyond those of their other refugee counterparts -- questions of guilt, suspicion, betrayal, harassment and fear. The emotional burden of having "abandoned their homes, friends, careers, and often their families, . . . in pursuing what they believe is right and necessary,"²⁹ for example, makes the human adaptation to their new surroundings more difficult, and the frustration more intense when resettlement does not proceed smoothly. Former Soviet pilot Victor Belenko's statement to the staff exemplified this problem, common to all defectors. Even though in his case, he was financially secure upon his arrival to the United States, he felt driven to return based upon this "crisis" that he felt every defector goes through.

Former KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko likewise commented on the particular problems of this "adjustment period." Its seriousness, in his opinion is compounded by the usual "lack of understanding of the moral, cultural and psychological ordeal that most defectors go through during their first years in this country." This lack of appreciation for the personal problems the defector faces by American officials or private individuals is further exacerbated by the cultural differences between an American and a Soviet. As he writes in his statement:

"It is not unusual that cultural differences lead to serious misunderstandings and misjudgments. Sometimes these officials (defectors) seek advice from psychologists or psychiatrists, not realizing that these

professionals also lack the understanding of such ethnic and cultural differences. Quite frequently these people forget that they are dealing with individuals who have spent most of their life under the dictatorial regime which proscribed them what to do, where to work, where and how to live. Most defectors had never dared to express their political views even to close friends, for fear of being persecuted. Unfortunately, many people in this country fail to realize that transition from being a slave of the socialist system to being a citizen of a free country can be an agonizing process.

All it takes to resolve this problem is to entrust contacts with the defectors to specialists on the Soviet Union, preferably Russian speaking, selecting people who are genuinely eager to help the defectors and to spend enough time and mental effort to understand their troubles. Formal, bureaucratic approach causes more damage than anything else."

Defectors and emigres alike carry a good deal of guilt since "their action, in the view of many, involves betraying a trust of their native country." Ladislav Bittman, a defector himself, who is in the process of studying the psychological trauma of defection, viewed this as one of the more serious problems faced by a defector. In his own case he felt it led to his own reluctance for years to intimately discuss with others his background, feelings, etc.³⁰

Likewise, although the defectors themselves may wish to assist the U.S. government, they, too, often view both government and volunteer agencies with a good deal of suspicion as well. Coming from a society where all large government agencies are viewed with suspicion -- and where all large agencies are in fact government owned and run -- defectors often find they view U.S. volunteer and government agencies in the same light.

Suspicion also plays a greater role among Soviet Bloc defectors than among legal emigres -- both the suspicion accorded them by others, and the suspicion with which they often view others, including defectors and emigres who are already settled in the West. Coming from the chief enemy of the U.S., and often having been closely tied in the past with a totalitarian government, they are often viewed with suspicion by other refugees in the U.S., and often by the U.S. public as well.³¹ Almost all defectors felt they were not accepted in emigre communities as a result of this. Thus, indirectly, the only support system available to them in the West is denied to them.

This is one of the most distinguishing features of the defector vis-a-vis other emigre groups. He has no community support network to rely upon. Unlike Germans, Poles, Vietnamese or even the Russian-Jewish emigres, there is no "defector" ghetto or neighborhood where he can live, discuss his problems and find mutual support. As Dr. Bittman told the staff -- unlike the rest of the immigrants to America -- "the defector is a loner by nature." Thus, when he is faced with the "crisis" that all of the defectors eventually go through, he usually has no one to turn to -- there being no program in existence to help him.

Victor Belenko mentioned to the Subcommittee staff this "crisis" and how it affected him. "Suddenly," he said, "something triggered a deep melancholia, a homesickness, a depression that turned him toward thoughts of redefection." If there is no helping and understanding person to turn to, the defector very easily could redefect. Belenko, in somewhat "gallows humor," said that the three ingredients for redefection are:

- 1) The crisis of depression,
- 2) An insensitive or unavailable resettlement official, and
- 3) Being within the Beltway (i.e., close to the Soviet Embassy).³²

His description of this scenario was confirmed by almost every defector and intelligence officer interviewed by the Staff.³³

Subsequent Soviet bloc actions often further compound the emotional difficulties of resettlement for Soviet bloc defectors. As many told the Subcommittee staff, Soviet bloc defectors are often subjected to harassment by Soviet agents -- through telephone calls, letters from family and friends left behind, accusations of being a KGB agent, or the like -- who try to make absorption into the U.S. difficult, and often try to encourage the Soviet bloc refugee to return home.

In the words of one defector -- Mr. Vladimir Rudolf-Shabinsky, who from his thirty year experience as a senior commentator for Radio Liberty interviewed most of the Soviet defectors to the West, -- "many of the defectors live in constant fear... Many look for an outlet in alcohol... or want to return to the USSR, where they will in turn be used for anti-American, anti-Western propaganda and afterwards sent to labor camps (as in the case of the sailors of the steamship 'TUAPSE')."

Two nights before speaking with the Subcommittee staff, Rudolf-Shabinsky received such a threatening phone call. In Russian, the caller cursed him and referred to him as "an enemy of the people." He commented that his own harassment has been a

constant experience since he published a story of his life in 1966.³⁴

Representatives of the Tolstoy Foundation and the International Rescue Committee commented on this campaign of harassment to the staff. They indicated that this campaign to encourage defectors and even emigres to return home has recently intensified. Leo Cherne, Chairman of the I.R.C., had formerly served on the Donovan Emergency Commission to investigate the extraordinary measures of the 1950's by the Soviets to encourage redefection. Although the current campaign is not as "deadly" and "intense" as then, to Mr. Cherne, it is serious enough to be a matter of great concern.³⁵

Some examples of this darker side of "glasnost" were given to the staff by the various defectors.

- Ushakov stated that on a number of occasions his car was tampered with when he was staying in Washington. On another occasion he saw some people who looked "like Soviet Embassy types" out in front of his house taking pictures of him and the house.

- As already mentioned, Bronius Venclova, who redefected in August, complained to friends at Radio Liberty that there was a program to get him to redefect that used his family in the Soviet Union.

- Another defector told of tape recordings of his family, pleading with him to return, being sent "mysteriously" to his new address.

- Some of the Soviet soldiers who defected in Afghanistan complained to Ludmilla Thorne of "Freedom House" about attempts by Soviet Embassy employees to entice them into the Soviet Embassy and Consulate by claiming they had letters from their parents and families there to be picked up.³⁶

- Lastly, it was alleged by a number of prominent members of the voluntary resettlement agencies that one or more self-proclaimed "Soviet dissidents" now living in the United States were actively involved in convincing one of the Soviet military defectors from the Afghanistan war to redefect. Although the staff was unable to confirm this, the "coincidence" of their location, travel and movements before and after the return of Nikolay Ryzhkov to the Soviet Union, where he is currently serving a 13 year prison term, remains suspicious.

The net result of all of these issues -- practical as well as emotional -- has been mixed. Some defectors have overcome these hurdles, and successfully integrated themselves into the professional world -- even when, as in most cases, this was done without the assistance of the U.S. government or other volunteer agencies, but was due to perseverance and luck. But many others

have had inordinate trouble finding jobs, homes, and careers, in some cases leading to their return to the very system they had fled.

It is the staff's conclusion that many of the most successful cases of resettlement have been due to the efforts of individual Americans who have taken it upon themselves to assist the defector. Mark Wyatt, a former intelligence officer, has done probably as much as any other individual private citizen to help the defectors. On his own time and with his own funds, he has arranged job interviews, found housing, made introductions and paid for their travel, and lodging. Yet even Mr. Wyatt acknowledges that this important responsibility should not rely for its success upon the "action of a few highly motivated individuals." He as well as the others who have acted "above and beyond" the call of duty for a private citizen feel that a government system should be set up in order to take the "luck" out of successful defections and resettlement.

IV. CONSEQUENCES AND CONCLUSIONS

Just as with the question of the utility of an individual defector, it is difficult to judge the specific consequences of a defector who does not teach or an emigre scientist who drives a cab instead of working in his true profession. Moreover, it is even harder to determine the cost to our society of unnecessarily delaying, or even preventing, the use of a defector's unique insight in the public domain.

The more apparent result of such actions seems to be in the adverse impact upon future potential defectors from the Soviet Union. All of the defectors insisted that poor treatment is put to good use by the Soviet press and by internal briefings given to Soviet Government employees, especially before foreign travel. Many intelligence analysts commented that Yurchenko is probably being put to good use by the Soviet government as a guest lecturer for audiences of career Soviet bureaucrats as a warning of what will happen if you defect. It is assumed that only after his usefulness as an internal propaganda tool is over that he will start to serve his "real" punishment.

As University of Kansas, Vice-Chancellor Jerry E. Hutchenson comments in his statement for the record:

"If those who come to the United States find the assimilation process to be a salutary one, then others will be encouraged to follow. If the experience is a negative one, highly educated Soviet citizens may reconsider defection or choose to immigrate to other countries. Thus, from a political viewpoint, it is in the best interest of the United States to make the transition to the

American culture an expeditious and positive experience."

In sum, the cost to our society can best be described as that of "lost opportunities." Although totally unquantifiable since we will never know who "would have defected but for the news of a Yurchenko, etc.," it seems obvious that a system that ignores a defector's unique talents as well as his or her unique problems bears a serious cost in terms of our national self-interest.

¹For a more detailed description of the Soviet propaganda use of redefection as well as the return of Soviet emigres, see the monograph prepared for the Subcommittee, by Etienne Huygens entitled Return To The Motherland: A Study on Redefection and Reimmigration to Soviet Bloc Countries, as well as Appendix A of this staff report which includes the translations of sample articles recently published in the Soviet Bloc press on this topic.

²The power to probe by Congress on behalf of the American electorate is almost as old as that document; going back to 1792, when Congress embarked upon its first oversight inquiry into the disastrous failure of Major General Arthur St. Clair's expedition against the Miami and Shawnee Indians.

³On October 4, 1985, Miroslav Medvid, an electrician on the USSR bulk carrier Marshal Konev, successfully jumped ship in the port of New Orleans but was forceably returned by U.S. immigration officials. A detailed analysis of this case is found in the Report of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, May 1987.

⁴Washington Post, October 9, 1986 at p. A29

⁵See generally, "The Defectors" by Col. Vernon Hinchley (1967)

⁶For an extensive discussion of the definition of defector, the Subcommittee received a monograph from Etienne Huygens entitled "The Notion of Defector: Attempt to Define and Compare", which is introduced into the hearing record as a separate exhibit.

⁷The "essential alien" that is the subject of Section 7 of the CIA Act of 1949 is commonly referred to in the intelligence community as a "P.L.110" due to the public law number of that section.

⁸The official title of the KGB Wanted List is "The Alphabetical List of Agents of Foreign Intelligence, Traitors to the Fatherland, Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Collaborators and Other Wanted Criminals." It is commonly called the Possev List because of the name of the Soviet emigre magazine published in Frankfurt, West Germany, which received the smuggled official KGB document in 1977.

It is far more than a mere alphabetical list but rather gives detailed physical descriptions of defectors in the West, their last known addresses and employments as well as the criminal offenses they committed in defecting and the prison sentence they received in abstensia. Its mere existence gives added credence to the concerns expressed by some of the defectors toward their

safety.

Although the Possev List is dated 1969, informed sources advised the Subcommittee staff that there is evidence to assume that the Soviet government and the other communist regimes currently use similar "watch lists" to keep track of defectors and prominent dissidents.

⁹Dr. Krasnov is also a defector, having fled from a trade conference in Sweden in 1962 while serving as an editor at Radio Moscow's Foreign Broadcast Division. He is currently a Professor and the Coordinator of Russian Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California. His entry in the Possev file with translation is attached as appendix B.

¹⁰For greater detail, see the prepared statement for the record of Vladislav Krasnov and his book, "Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List" (Hoover Press, 1985).

¹¹Dr. Bittman has submitted a statement for the hearings.

¹²Ambassador Rurarz has submitted a statement for the hearings.

¹³Attempts have been made to study the three emigre movements of 1917-1926, 1945-1950 and 1970s. The Harvard Project or Inkeles Study, named after its director, Dr. Alex Inkeles, was funded in the 1950's to interview some of the second wave emigres. Currently the Soviet Interview Project conducted by Dr. James R. Millar is underway to attempt to interview a large sampling of the Jewish Soviet emigres of the 1970's. However, no government entity has deemed it important to do the same with the smaller but critically important group of defectors who trickle in every year.

¹⁴Ivan Rogalsky, a 34-year old former Soviet seaman who had jumped ship in Spain and came to the United States in 1971 was indicted for espionage in 1977 and later found mentally incompetent to stand trial.

¹⁵See also, statements for the record of F. Mark Wyatt and Tom Polgar for the intelligence officer's point of view on this subject.

¹⁶See, statement of Dr. Ra'anan presented at the hearings for a more detailed discussion of the "Oral History Project".

¹⁷For a more detailed description of their lives, the Soviet legal system as well as the importance of the "second or black" economy in the Soviet Union, see Final Judgement: My Life As A Soviet Defense Attorney, by Kaminskaya (Simon & Schuster, 1983) and USSR-The Corrupt Society by Simis (Simon & Schuster, 1982).

¹⁸See statement of Dr. Marshal introduced into the record of the hearings.

¹⁹A pamphlet describing the Air Force Soviet Awareness Program is attached as Appendix C.

²⁰Lt. General William E. Odom, Director of the National Security Agency will discuss the USARI program in greater detail during his testimony.

²¹Dr. Bruce Menning, Director of SASO, will submit a statement on this program for the hearing record.

²²See statement of Major General Julius Parker, Jr., Commander/Commandant, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School introduced into the hearing record.

²³For a concise yet complete delineation of the important contributions a defector can make to government and society, see the statement of former KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko which is introduced into the hearing record.

²⁴Such analysis would appear to the staff to fall within the natural purview of the Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Unfortunately, it appears that the Department of State abdicated much of this responsibility years ago in response to budget considerations. A return to such an effort would appear to be an appropriate endeavor on the part of State.

²⁵Mr. Demchenko's interesting career, which would be comparable to the staff of this Subcommittee if the Senate wielded as much power as the Communist party does in the Soviet Union, is fully developed in his statement which is made part of the hearing record.

²⁶An example from the private sector of what can be done to better tap the unique resources of defectors exists with the operation of Delphic Associates. Gerald Guensberg, the President of Delphic explained to the staff that he attempts to match-up an emigre/defector with an interested government or industry contractor for research. Delphic has successfully done so on a limited basis since 1980. Unfortunately, it does not provide steady, full-time employment to the emigre nor does it specialize in the socio-political and foreign affairs arenas. However, it does offer an ideal model for further review by the Subcommittee. See, statement of Gerald Guensberg submitted for the hearing record.

²⁷See separate statements of these voluntary refugee agencies for a description of their programs.

²⁸It should be clearly noted, that nothing in this statement should imply any criticism, whatsoever, toward these or other voluntary refugee agencies. With minimal government assistance they have tirelessly performed excellent work successfully resettling thousands of refugees. If anything, the staff

complements their outstanding accomplishments and the strong support that their volunteers and generous donors have contributed to alleviating the plight of the new arrival to the United States. But even the voluntary agencies acknowledged the need for greater assistance of those refugees from totalitarianism regimes due to the additional problems they face here in the West.

²⁹See statement of F. Mark Wyatt who bases his views upon over thirty years of experience with defectors.

³⁰See statement Ladislav Martin-Bittman submitted for the record.

³¹This public view is enormously tied to the term "defector" itself. To many, it implies a "defect" or someone who is "defective." This led former CIA Director Allen Dulles to refer to them as "volunteers" in order to overcome this pejorative label. See The Craft of Intelligence, (Harper & Row, New York, 1963).

³²For a more detailed description see Mig Pilot: The Final Escape of Lt. Belenko by John Barron and Victor Belenko, (1980).

³³For example, see statements of Wyatt and Polgar for an intelligence officer's view point as well as Krasnov, Costa, Bittman, Belenko, Levchenko, Sakharov, Sorokun and Rudolph-Shabinsky statement for the defector's description of this crises scenario.

³⁴See Parallax, by Vladimir Yurasov (aka Shabinsky, Vladimir Rudolph), (W.W. Noton, N.Y. 1966).

³⁵See Etienne Huygens monograph Return to the Motherland, introduced into the hearing record, for a more detailed description of this redefection campaign of the 1950's and how the current program closely follows the stages of the earlier Soviet efforts. Huygens argues that the current program is similar to the initial stages of the 1950 endeavor but is just more sophisticated.

³⁶For a discussion of the unique problems faced by the Soviet defectors in Afghanistan, see the statements of Ludmilla Thorne and former Soviet Sergeant Nikolay Mouchan submitted for the record.

SAMPLE SOVIET BLOC PRESS REPORTS ON DEFECTOR AND EMIGRE TREATMENT IN THE WESTMOSCOW TV: TUMANOV QUESTIONED ON RADIO LIBERTY

LD034318 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1740 GMT 3 Jun 88

["Roundtable discussion" with Oleg Aleksandrovich Tumanov, "former head of Radio Liberty," entitled "The Truth About the Corporation of Lies" with Moscow Radio's D. Biryukov as moderator and the following participants: Viktor Ponomarev from TASS, Viktor Gribachev from ZHURNALIST; Yuriy Dmitriyev from TRUD; Aleksandr Mozgovoy from SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA; Pavel Kuznetsov "representing" the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting; and Vladislav Sarkov and Aleksandr Lopukhin, who are not further identified; date and place not specified -- live or recorded with video showing the participants sitting at tables arranged in a circle]

[Text] [Biryukov] Today representatives of a number of the organs of the Soviet press are meeting Oleg Aleksandrovich Tumanov. He worked for over 20 years at Radio Liberty. Tumanov, having long realized the error of his youth, decided to return to his homeland. It was in this connection that he collected confidential documentary materials about the subversive and intelligence nature of the activity of Radio Liberty and its use by the U.S. services for purposes hostile to the Soviet Union. Upon his return to the homeland, Tumanov handed these documents over to the competent Soviet bodies. Taking into account Tumanov's sincere repentance of what he had done, his voluntary acknowledgement of his fault, his desire to expiate his guilt by taking part in the exposure of the activity of foreign ideological subversion centers and the importance of the information he had supplied, the decision on Tumanov's return to the Soviet Union was made. A representation was sent to the Supreme Soviet for Tumanov's release from criminal responsibility through a pardon.

Today, Oleg Aleksandrovich, we will be asking you some questions about the activity of the radio station and those who work for it. Vladislav Sarkov, first please, arguments and facts:

[Sarkov] Oleg Aleksandrovich, I would like to hear about how Radio Liberty is used to conduct various kinds of anti-Soviet actions and examples of them. I also want to ask what you can say about the links of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe with the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Finally, what is the attitude of the present administration of the United States of America and Congress toward these subversive radio stations?

[Tumanov] Well, all the activity of the radio station is in principle subordinated to anti-Soviet propaganda. There are, however, broadcasts and there are what we correctly called campaigns which, so to speak, are conducted on a permanent basis. On a permanent basis, since about 1967, there has been a campaign in defense of human rights in the Soviet Union. At one time the radio station, having established contact with the NTS, [People's Labor Alliance] obtained Samizdat documents through the NTS. At that time they were the first such documents and some of them were actually prepared at NTS; that was not even concealed. That was the beginning. Later, the radio station started trying, so to speak, to get all existing truths and untruths via all possible channels, sometimes prompting these channels and Soviet citizens to send some materials. It started getting Samizdat materials, mainly devoted to the situation of human rights in the Soviet Union.

What began as a weekly program turned into a daily one. The program is given a lot of attention at the radio station. President Reagan spoke about it and the problem of human rights, at the request of the radio station.

Yes, part of the material for his speech was prepared at the radio station, so that we could hear... I mean the radio station wanted it from the mouth of the President.

That was your first question. The second question, as far as I remember...

[Sarkov] About links with the embassy.

[Tumanov] About links with the U.S. Embassy: One could say that this could even be linked with the first question, because it is via the embassy, the diplomatic mail, that all this material from the Soviet Union finds its way to the radio station. There are people at the U.S. Embassy for this purpose -- the selfsame human rights attache -- who meets various kinds of dissidents, dissenters and gathers the necessary material. The embassy also has a special fund, and part of this money is allocated by the radio station, incidentally, to pay for the services of certain people in whose information the radio station is interested.

[Biryukov] Thank you. Viktor Ponomarev of TASS:

[Ponomarev] Oleg Aleksandrovich, the first to respond to your press conference in Moscow was Redlich, an official of Radio Liberty. He declared, for the umpteenth time, that Radio Liberty has nothing to do with the CIA. The emigre newspaper RUSSKAYA MYSL immediately afterward played on people's naivete by asking how espionage could be conducted sitting at a microphone. How would you comment on this, and, a second question, could you name the CIA officials at Radio Liberty by name and the departments most strongly linked with intelligence?

[Tumanov] Well, Robert Redlich, he is the liaison officer with foreign press organs, mainly with West German newspapers and Deutsche Welle. In principle, he would, of course, be fired straightaway if he said that we -- Radio Liberty -- actually collaborated with the CIA.

Few people know that Robert Redlich himself is an experienced employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. At one time he was head of a military intelligence school in the West German town of Baden Wurttemberg. But what can one say about him as a person? Well, in the West they have this word "playboy" and, as you know, this sort of activity requires a pretty large financial outlay, and at one time, because of misuse of finances, he was all but fired a few years ago from the radio station. But, it seems that some kind of higher authority was set up -- it may have been his command at Langley -- and he stayed at the station.

As far as the RUSSKAYA MYSL newspaper is concerned, first of all I will say a few words about the paper itself. Some 80 percent of the material it publishes is material from Radio Liberty, some of it comes over the air and some from the station's research department. So, in principle RUSSKAYA MYSL is an offshoot of the radio station. And of course, it, protects the radio station in everything it writes.

How can one engage in espionage while seated at a microphone? We must not forget that only a tiny minority of the station's employees actually sit at the microphone -- those who speak directly over the air. It may be that not all of them, say, are actually engaged in espionage activities -- they are journalists, journalists we may say of another hue, and of a different mentality, specially trained, but still, journalists.

[Ponomarev] Oleg Aleksandrovich, excuse me but, in connection with this, what was this intricate organization, this Sparta's bureau, you mentioned at the press conference, could you comment in detail about this?

[Tumafov] Yes, I will now really tell it all. This is very important. On Boulevard St. Germain, house No 193, there is a so-called Audience Research Department. At least that is its official title. A number of people work there. But that is just a part of it, a subdepartment, that is, to the main department. It has its own subdepartments in many towns of Western Europe and the United States of America, say, in Vienna, Salzburg, Copenhagen, Rome -- I could continue this list. What are this department and its subdepartments specifically engaged in? It is headed by Gene Parta, a trained American intelligence officer, and Charles Allan also a trained American intelligence officer, although his cover is that he is an Oxford graduate. Never mind.

In recent years a number of citizens have left the Soviet Union in order, say, to reunite with their families, to Israel, but not all of them go straight to Israel, some of them go to the United States. In these cases these people settle for a while either in Vienna or Rome, where they are, so to speak, checked over by American intelligence. It is not just a check over, but a gathering of information. Parta's bureau has people in these American intelligence departments in Vienna and Rome and also uses information in the sense that it gathers information required by the radio station. This is where they get hold of it, but in some of their other bureaus they gather material for intelligence, that is they provide the material. Some of this material is needed by the radio station with the purpose of gathering information about the quality of the broadcasts, what sort of programs are successful, which should perhaps be axed.

But at the same time -- I saw these questionnaires -- people are asked questions on quite different issues which, in principle, the station should have no interest in whatsoever. These could be questions -- there are questions -- of a military nature, in particular; there are also questions about the development, say, of the road network in the Soviet Union, that also comes into the military field. And immigrants are subjected to obligatory questioning. Delegations come in from the Soviet Union, individual tourists arrive, and these people -- Soviet citizens -- may also be approached and introduced. All the people who work with Parta speak excellent Russian, and perhaps indirectly they gain their confidence, perhaps all different kinds of methods are used, but nevertheless they try to get information that they obtain, say, from emigres. Of course, this might be a minimum of information, but the fact is that in all -- every particle of this mosaic gathered together on one canvas -- provides a very accurate and clear picture of certain events in the Soviet Union.

But one might also say that Parta's bureau in Paris on Boulevard St. Germain is equipped with a special computer, thanks to which information is also summarized along certain parameters, including those which interest the American [word indistinct] military.

In addition, the radio station has a number of departments that operate directly for the Central Intelligence Agency. At the Foreign Ministry news conference I was asked about some of these departments. Among these were the Red Archives, which exists at the radio station. What does it do? People sit there slicing through the Soviet press and placing news items in separate files, filling cards, and keeping card indexes. Nevertheless, all this material that is gathered and sorted in various parameters provides the opportunity to make judgements about many things in Soviet life, for instance about the development of the Soviet economy; about changes at the top in party leadership; and even forecasting, perhaps, these changes sometimes; to speak about foreign policy and forecast, perhaps, future foreign policy. All this material is registered and sent to Washington in the form of a special dossier.

Then there is the Research Department. The Research Department is more specialized and works to order. That means that instructions might come from Washington and material may be prepared, say, on how the research people at Radio Liberty assess the prospects of, say, the 27th congress.

PONOMAREV DESCRIBES 'SAD FATE' OF DEFECTORS

PM061025 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Jan 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS Observer Viktor Ponomarev article written for IZVESTIYA: "The 'Diminishing Returns' of Treachery"]

[Text] "I want to get to America, where I'll be able to say what I like and live as I like." This is what, according to his recollections, Murat Karimov, a former Soviet citizen who fled abroad, told the Turkish border guards about his reasons for appearing on their coast. Soon afterwards he was transported to Munich, where CIA staffers checked and interrogated him for 3 months in a safe apartment under reliable guard. He was convinced that, being a serviceman, he would be able to "offer" something to the Americans and would receive an "appropriate reward" in return. He was assured that in New York there is a "Tolstoy Foundation" which would help him to learn English, find him somewhere to live, and supply him with pocket money.

Now, months after his arrival in the United States, he sits with (Peyman Pedzhmen), correspondent of THE WASHINGTON POST NATIONAL WEEKLY EDITION, and laments his fate: He has neither a job nor the promised knowledge of the language to enable him to earn anything and is up to his neck in debt, since he borrows spending money from a friend. Aside from the monthly rent for his apartment and \$40 to set up home, Karimov sighs, he has received absolutely nothing from the foundation.

"Ah yes," the U.S. journalist bitterly echoes him. "Many refugees find the promised land highly inhospitable."

That is the phrase he used for the headline of an article describing the collapse of the illusions of former Soviet citizens who have broken away from their motherland and whom he met in America.

Yet another eloquent admission of the unenviable fate of the "former citizens"? We have already seen a television movie about them, penetrating in its tragic, bitter truth, and have heard the confessions of those who were once deceived and have returned home. It would seem that THE WASHINGTON POST has nothing new to add, and Mr. (Pedzhmen's) tears over the "sad fate" of defectors [perebezhchiki] who have betrayed the motherland would hardly be worthy of attention were it not for an article by our old acquaintance David Shipler, which appeared in THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE in early December. "Old acquaintance" because until quite recently Shipler worked as a correspondent in Moscow and was close to people who love to complain about everything "Soviet" and to gossip about life over there, across the ocean. So he has firsthand knowledge of the essence of the problem.

In the last few years, Shipler writes, defectors from the Soviet Union and East Europe have discovered that the U.S. Government does virtually nothing to help them adapt to life in America... [paragraph continues]

They start in unskilled jobs totally unrelated to their vocational training... People wash dishes, clean typewriters... They find out that they can rely only on themselves and feel lost in the middle of what they perceive as an endless sea of opportunities...

"What they perceive as" is an extremely apt journalistic proviso. Where is it, that "sea of opportunities"? Let us hear what those who have plunged into it have to say according to, for example, THE WASHINGTON POST. And we quote:

"A refugee from the Soviet Union says: 'The rosy picture presented to you by certain radio stations like VOA while you were still in the USSR suddenly turns into something like a castle in the air or a house of cards collapsing before your very eyes. I recall hearing a VOA program describe how cheap a pound of meat was in the States compared with the Soviet Union, and how some refugee or other had obtained a wonderful job and started living in luxury as soon as he got to the United States. They never directly say to you: Fine, Mr Russian, come to the West and we'll give you everything you can imagine. But I would say that they keep on dropping hints to make people think of taking such a step.' What happens afterwards? 'Both you and good old America are left with a mass of opportunities, except that you haven't the slightest idea on whose door to knock and how the local system works...'"

But it must be said that the system works very well! Here is what THE WASHINGTON POST has to say about it:

Aleksandra Kosta, a diplomat's wife, says that she has "difficulties in relationships" since people do not understand her potential and her needs. She is told: You have children, you are not young, and you will not make a career in the business world. Be a secretary!..

Another woman who left the USSR and who was "pumped" for information for several months in Vienna before being given a visa says that, although she used to be a university lecturer, she was placed in the charge of a refugee organization in New York, where she was offered a job on a farm...

What about the "of opportunities" and the "mass of opportunities"? Here is what the actual "bosses" who deal with refugees have to say. Take for example (Leon Marian), executive director of the Tolstoy Foundation. If he is to be believed, as THE WASHINGTON POST notes, this organization is in no way "legally bound to bear financial responsibility for refugees and deserters appealing to the foundation." According to an unwritten agreement between ourselves and the Department of State, (Marian) says, we are morally obliged to keep an eye on our clients for 90 days, but that is all! Of course, we receive \$560 per refugee from the federal government, but the money is spent mainly on...administrative costs, he adds with embarrassment. As for any promises, according to (Marian), who is extremely competent in his field, these hopes stem from "misunderstandings and lack of information."

Washington lawyer William Geimer read a similar lecture to a NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE correspondent. He heads the "Jamestown Foundation" private organization, founded in Chicago in 1984, which is concerned with "diplomats and members of the intelligentsia" from East Europe. He subsidizes 25 of them! One of them repairs typewriters, another is still harried by lawyers and creditors... In general, there are quite a few concerns, but as for opportunities...they are just like in another similar organization. That is the "International Rescue Committee" in New York, which issues defectors with...\$45 each. So, Murat Karimov should not complain: Others are not getting any better "breaks":

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"I often telephone the Department of State," (Leon Marian) says, "and loudly persuade them not to promise escapers, deserters, and refugees that they are going to the promised land. Time and again I ask them not to promise these people anything, because as soon as they arrive here these promises simply evaporate, and this creates problems for all of us..."

But maybe this applies only to the "pawns"? There are also the "big guns" who are looked after by congressmen, parliamentarians, public figures, and — finally — the CIA with its "unlimited opportunities..."

Looked after! For a while...

"There is a grave problem of lack of understanding and aid for refugees encountering various personal and psychological difficulties. They could give serious food for thought in the next decade or so to any Russians who may be wanting to flee to the United States" — this is what worries one of those who fled to the United States and is in the pay of the CIA in return for betraying the motherland and his relatives. There are no pangs of conscience regarding the suicide of his wife, who could not bear the shame of his betrayal, and no concern at all about the "other Russians"! He is scaring his masters because he has run out of money and has been refused further subsidies. This is why the "problem of lack of understanding" has arisen...

The "sea of opportunities" proves to be, even for the "big gun," not as vast as it appears to be from afar. It is rather a tiny pond which dries up quickly and irreversibly. As, for example, in the case of Irina Grivnina, whose fate was reported a few days ago by the Netherlands newspaper HAAGSCHE COURANT.

It is exactly a year since she left the Soviet Union amid scandal, clamor, and hysterics. Ed Nijpels, leader of a liberal party faction, made a great show of "adopting" Grivnina and her two daughters at that time. Robert van Vooren (also known as Johannes Baks), a CIA agent from the so-called "Bukovskiy Foundation," shuttled as a courier between The Hague and Moscow under his real and assumed names. She was still living here and had not composed a single poem, but the magazine ELSEVIERS had already proclaimed her to be "a famous poet and essayist" and listed her as its "correspondent in Moscow."

A year passed. In a rundown apartment in Amsterdam furnished by the Salvation Army she complains to correspondent Meuninghoff: "I was used." This is also the headline of his article. Her interlocutor describes her confession as a sobering-up process and an inevitable eye-opener. It is worth a more detailed study to hear at first hand about the "freedom" and "sea of opportunities" offered only to people who have abandoned their motherland. Here it is, as narrated by the Netherlands journalist.

The first thing that a person finding himself in the West can do is tell all sorts of scurrilous stories about the Soviet Union. The propaganda apparatus lines up interview him for 2-3 weeks. He gets the impression that he will continue to be listened to with great attention. It soon becomes clear, however, that this is a misconception. The "blaze of publicity" diminishes day by day. He finds himself in a society that is not particularly interested in him. There are even sounds of irritation when yesterday's "hero" tries to get attention once the storm of passion around him has abated. This is what happened with Amalrik, HAAGSCHE COURANT writer. The very same is happening with Grivnina. The West had "a completely incorrect and extremely distorted and inflated impression" of her. Members of parliament tried to get into her good books, and she was treated as a colleague at a festive cocktail party at the editorial office.

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But the euphoria was soon over. "I should have adapted sooner in order to become master of my fate here," Grivnina smokes nervously while conversing with the journalist, "but instead I let myself be dragged all over the place to appear as a dissident..."

She recalls how she went off in hysterics at the Geneva press center during the summit meeting:

"I was inexperienced. Some people wanted me to create a scandal there, and I gave out of emotion."

"You were exploited by politicians, ELSEVIERS, and the 'Bukovskiy Foundation'?" -- the correspondent clarifies.

"I fully agree with that."

Only 6 months had passed. She ran out of fresh mud to sling at her former motherland. Suddenly her "adoptive father" Ed Nijpels disappeared. She was told at the editorial office that she was totally incapable of writing and her contract would not be extended. CIA agent Vooren, also known as Baks, also disappeared and therefore she was no longer in contact with the "Bukovskiy Foundation."

Grivnina smokes nervously: How quickly the "pond of opportunities" dried up! But she will "try" again... She has been offered "support" in Bavaria, where she has been promised she can "live almost for nothing in the home of a successful anticommunist..." For a few weeks. The "diminishing returns" of treachery are a defector's fate and lot.

"They squeeze everything they can from these people, and then cast them off," Shipler of THE NEW YORK TIMES was told by an American in close contact with defectors. They that means the CIA, the newspaper explains so as to leave no doubts at all, and Robert Gates, first deputy director of the CIA, who is named by the correspondent -- and the "Jamestown Foundation," we would add for our part. After all, its Vice President James Williams told Shipler that neither the CIA nor any other U.S. special service can be held responsible for the fate of defectors in general. Williams is another well-informed person -- former director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency! They are incapable, he said, of providing "social services."

Why? And we quote:

"People there believe that anyone who becomes a defector is a traitor from any point of view, and they treat defectors like dirt."

TUMANOV CLAIMS U.S. ESPIONAGE AT RADIO LIBERTY

LD021903 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 2 Jun 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Television and newspapers have received many letters requesting a fuller account of the subversive activity of Radio Liberty, the Russian-language service that was headed by Oleg Tumanov. Tumanov recently spoke at a news conference in Moscow. Central television has held a meeting between Oleg Tumanov and representatives of Soviet press, television, and radio:

[Begin Tumanov recording] Radio Liberty as such is headed by Dr Vaslev. Dr Vaslev is a regular officer of the U.S. military intelligence service. The Russian-language service of Radio Liberty is directly headed by Golskiy, Konstantin Vladimirovich Golskiy. He is a regular intelligence officer, a U.S. military intelligence officer, a specialist in the methods of conducting psychological warfare. He is a major. At the radio station there are several sections working directly for the CIA. [end recording] [Video shows Tumanov speaking to eight men seated around a table; the namecards Ponomarev (initials indistinct), D.D. Biryukov, and V.A. Starkov are visible.]

[Announcer] Oldg Aleksandrovich Tumanov, who worked more than 20 years at the radio station, in an effort to put right the mistake he made in his youth, collected confidential material over a long period of time that unmasks the activity of the subversive radio station. Following his return, he handed this material over to the relevant Soviet organs. You will be able to see in full the program "The Truth About the Corporation of Lies" tomorrow immediately following the "Vremya" program.

TASS Report

LD032228 Moscow TASS in English 2219 GMT 3 Jun 86

[Text] Moscow June 4 TASS -- Radio Liberty was set up under the CIA auspices and is still operating under its guidance, Oleg Tumanov, a former editor of the radio station's Russian service, has revealed. A videotape of his meeting with representatives of several Soviet press bodies in Moscow was shown on Soviet television on Tuesday.

According to Tumanov, no one could be hired by Radio Liberty without a thorough vetting by U.S. special services. The radio station was directed by Nikolay Vaslev, an American career military intelligence officer, he said.

In Munich, the "security department" was headed by Richard Cummings, a CIA officer.

Robert Redlich, in charge of Radio Liberty's relations with the press, Vladimir Golskiy, head of the Russian service, Nikolay Petrov, assistant director of the Russian service, and many other senior and rank-and-file employees of the radio station were serving at American intelligence departments, Tumanov revealed.

Radio Liberty, he went on, had departments gathering information about the USSR: "Research Department", "Red Archives", and "Samizdat Archives".

In Paris, there operated a department studying the audience, headed by Jean Parta and Charles Allen (both CIA officers). The department had branches in many Western European cities.

Tumanov said that there existed a special "Censorship Department" headed by CIA official Sam Lion.

Radio Liberty maintained close contacts with branches of U.S. military intelligence having headquarters in Munich and its environs, Tumanov pointed out.

These were intelligence schools specializing in espionage against the USSR. "There are two such schools in Bavaria. One is at the McGrow barracks, the other is in Garmisch-Partenkirchen. Students at the two schools have free access to the Radio Liberty area, to the station's classified materials and files, while RL employees deliver lectures at the schools. They train the students, tell them how to behave in the USSR and East European countries, how to establish contacts with Soviet citizens for spying or other subversive purposes. The students then move on to Langley, the Pentagon, and not in the last turn, to the embassy and other missions of the U.S. in the USSR."

YUGOSLAV CITIZENS ENTERING U.S. ILLEGALLY VIA MEXICO ✕

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 20 Apr 86 p 7

[Excerpts] The small town of Tuzi, not far from Titograd. The starting point for many young Albanians from this district near the border, who, using the so-called Mexican connection, depart for the United States without entry visas. Illegally! Just recently, 20 young men aged 17 to 25 departed for Mexico, from which they will endeavor to enter the "promised land."

Because this is a very profitable business, special guides-smugglers will await them at the U.S.-Mexican border, and after receiving \$5,000 from each youth, will attempt to get them across the border. Many will long remember their walk through this roadless area as a difficult golgotha. If it happens, as it sometimes has in the past, that the U.S. Border Patrol catches them, each will have to pay an additional \$5,000. The Americans return those who cannot pay this amount to Mexico, where a new, no less difficult test awaits them. Unable to endure all these enormous strains, some kill themselves on their journey, and their graves will never be found, which is the most tragic aspect of all this.

"My son arrived in America via the Mexican connection, and when he wrote to me later about all the horrors of that journey, I wept for days," a villager from Vukasin-Lekici on the Yugoslav-Albanian border tells us.

The large-scale exodus of youths to America is a big problem in the district, which, if the present pace of departure persists, will be left without young inhabitants, and it is known what that would mean. Emigration is an old phenomenon in this area, but since the end of 1984 the rate has increased dramatically. The exact number of those who have departed is unknown, but the figure 3,000 is mentioned. Demo Pepic, a member of the Presidium of the Opstina Conference of the Titograd SAWP and a delegate to the Vranj Communal Assembly, estimates that about 2,500 young people have emigrated.

And Djerdj Berisa, teacher of history and former director of the intermediate school, who was among the first to publicly warn about the harmful consequences of this emigration, reports that this plague has affected even elementary school students; they can hardly wait to finish school while hoping for a trip across the ocean.

"Previously young people went to America with their parents. Now they go alone. Anyway, air passage to Mexico and certain other services cost about 200 million old dinars. I think a business has arisen around all this which some of our people in our country are participating in. It is my impression that everything is conducted in an organized manner, from agitation among the youth to their departure from Tuzi. Who knows how many stations there are on that road. Upon their arrival in Mexico these young people fall into the hands of suspicious characters who try to extract as much money as possible from them, even by extortion. Five thousand dollars are no longer enough for crossing the Mexican-U.S. border; because of the favorable conditions, the price has gone up."

One of the four sons of Pasko Dresaj, 56, an agricultural producer from the vicinity of Tuzi, departed for America via the Mexican connection 19 months ago and now lives in Detroit.

"When he left, I felt terrible. However, he was genuinely ill until he left. What could I do? I gave him the money and wished him a safe journey. I have only a little land, and if I divided it into five parts none of us would have any place to keep a cow. Nonetheless, I would have preferred it if my son had remained at home. I know that a difficult life awaits him there. He lives illegally; he does not have a work permit. People like him to the dirty jobs, dodging the police, for if they are caught without residence permits, they will be expelled, as some from this area have been. Their difficulties last for 3 or 4 years, until they obtain work and residence permits. One must wait for that," says Pasko, who was recently in America and witnessed in person the hard lives of many young people from this area.

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COMMENTARY ON LETTER TO REAGAN REGARDING KUKLINSKI

LD191834 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1730 GMT 19 Jun 86

[Text] Alojz Mazewski, chairman of the Congress of the American Polonia [Poles living abroad], was offended by the Department of State statement on Kuklinski, an American spy, which, we quote: Does not answer many questions important to Poles and Americans of Polish origin! In connection with this, the Voice of America reports, he sent a letter to President Reagan in which he asked why Kuklinski could not find a job after his arrival in the United States; why U.S. broadcasting stations have not yet interviewed him; and finally, why solidarity was not warned about the planned declaration of martial law.

Had Mr Mazewski acquainted himself with the Polish Government press spokesman's statements, he would not have had to pretend to be absolutely naive and would have understood Washington's embarrassment. However, one ought to agree with one statement by the chairman of American Polonia, namely, we quote: The trust and friendship of the Polish nation toward America has been undermined! Let us add: Toward the U.S. Administration, and not for the first time.

WASHINGTON 'SILENT' OVER KUKLINSKI AFFAIR

LD112325 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1700 GMT 11 Jun 86

[Report by correspondent Grzegorz Wozniak from New York]

[Text] Not having any convincing arguments, official Washington has fallen silent in the so-called Kuklinski case. However the weekly press has returned to the case. TIME underlines that the State Department has been unable to deny that Kuklinski was a U.S. agent. He was evacuated from Poland by the CIA before the introduction of martial law and he is staying in the United States under an assumed name. TIME also quotes another extract of a statement by State Department spokesman in which he admits that the United States did indeed have information about the activities of the constitutional authorities of Poland, and TIME repeats the spokesman's statement that this information was incomplete.

When confronted with facts -- facts which the State Department also cannot deny -- this last thesis is clearly false, while the activities of the United States in the latter months of 1981 are politically and morally repulsive.

КСБ
DEPUTY CHIEF ON 'ANTI-SOVIET ACTIONS'

141219 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2314 GMT 13 Jun 86

[Text] Moscow, June 13 (TANJUG) -- First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB) Filip Bobkov has disclosed that around 3,000 anti-Soviet actions were undertaken in the past year, which he said required a higher alertness on the part of Soviet citizens.

In article published in the party magazine POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE (POLITICAL SELF-EDUCATION), Bobkov writes that the perpetrators of the anti-Soviet actions were "anti-Soviet emigre, nationalist, and Zionist organizations". The actions, as he notes, included the planting of explosives and fires, the use of fire arms, bribes, and violence.

The first deputy KGB chairman notes that "numerous Soviet citizens were threatened or humiliated, beaten or robbed", and singles out the provocations staged during guest tours abroad of Soviet artists.

Bobkov writes in the article that the foes are trying to paralyze Soviet institutions working abroad, and that Western intelligence services "have been showing an increased interest in the Soviet scientific-technical, military, and economic potential".

He reports that "in the past few years, criminal proceedings have been instituted against a whole range of employees of Soviet foreign-trade organizations for receiving bribes and betraying the interests of their country".

The first deputy KGB chairman also makes note of attempts to fan inter-nationality discord, naming, in addition to Western radio stations, Iran radio, which, as he says, is spreading "pan-Islamic propaganda" in the Soviet Central Asia and Kazakstan.

RETURNED EXILES CRITICIZE U.S. WAY OF LIFE

LD282038 Moscow TASS in English 1717 GMT 28 Oct 86

["Fleeing From the Statue of Liberty" -- TASS item identifier]

[Excerpt] Moscow October 28 TASS -- News analyst Aleksey Grigoryev writes:

The great Russian writer Ivan Turgenev once said that Russia can manage without each of us while each of us will never manage without her.

These words invariably come to my mind when I learn about the return of yet another "has been". Mikhail Gorokhovskiy, born in Soviet Ukraine, spent abroad almost nine years ("No", he specifies, "exactly 5,020 days"). An ordinary driver, maybe he never knew these lines from Turgenev but in Washington he would come to the Soviet Embassy with a poster reading "One can live without one's father or mother, but life is impossible without one's motherland".

After experiencing all the "unlimited possibilities" of the American way of life -- unemployment, exploitation, rightlessness and cruelty -- Mikhail Gorokhovskiy was permitted by the Soviet authorities to return to his homeland.

Israel Glikman, a former resident of the Black Sea port of Odessa, was met at Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport by his wife and nephew. His daughter could not come because of her two small children. Glikman did not have any grandchildren twelve years ago when he was leaving for Israel and then on to the United States. "How right was my wife Sonya when she flatly refused to go with me", he said.

Aleksandr Belikin arrived on the same flight from New York after ten years in the United States, or "ten years in prison" as he described them.

Human lives, difficult human lives. These people did not leave the Soviet Union for the sake of unifying families. Many of them, like Glikman, left without their wives and children. The promises of Western propaganda made them giddy. Many, like Gorokhovskiy and Belikin, lost their families in the West.

Why had they left the Soviet Union? "I fell for Zionist propaganda and lost my senses," says Gorokhovskiy. "He gave in to the persuasions of a relative and was deceived by him", said Glikman's wife.

But that is only a part of the story. It is not by chance that only on finding themselves in the West, in the shadow of the Statue of Liberty that these people had really come to appreciate what they had in the Soviet Union, took for granted and did not appreciate: genuine rights, and not just rights on a piece of paper, to work and housing, to education and medical treatment, relations of human concern and mutual assistance. They took it all for granted as something as natural as the air, water and the sun. "All this simply must exist in America as well which is also a land of 'unlimited opportunities,'" they reasoned.

Everything turned out to be different. This was the topic of a recent press conference at the Soviet Embassy in Washington held by former Soviet citizens who were permitted to return home. They spoke at length and in detail but the coverage of this press conference in the American press was very scant and limited mostly to words about nostalgia, about a longing for friends and relatives, birch trees and the Black Sea. For the American press to quote the words of the participants in the press conference about the cruelty of the "free" society, its hypocrisy, the money cult and abasement of the individual would be tantamount to passing sentence on that society which, incidentally, is capable of wrecking the lives not only of those who have grown up in a different social environment.

The Western propaganda is now trying to hold these people responsible for their recovery of sight and presenting them as good-for-nothings incapable of finding a place for themselves in the world of free enterprise. [passage omitted]

SOVIET SEAMAN DISCUSSES NEW ORLEANS 'PROVOCATION'

LD040945 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GNT 3 Mar 86

[Text] Four months have passed since the American authorities in the port of New Orleans staged a provocation against the Soviet seaman. Radio Moscow's Anatoliy (?Ilchinko) has met with the 26-year-old seaman, Miroslav Medvid, and sent in this report.

Miroslav was born and spent his childhood in the Ukraine. Now he lives in the city of Lvov. He says he hasn't recovered yet from what he experienced in the American port last October. About his condition he had this to say:

"I'm still undergoing medical treatment, staying at home, trying to forget everything. I lived through as a result of the provocation. I spent 2 months with my parents in the village of (?Solets) in the Trans Carpathian Ukraine. My mother is working in the local farm cooperative and my father is a miner. He began working in the pit almost 30 years ago. Meetings with relatives and friends have been the best medicine. I was so psychologically depressed that only positive emotions could pull me out of the crisis."

What led to the crisis happened on 24 October last year. The Soviet ship Marshal Konyev arrived at the port of New Orleans to take grain on board. In the evening Miroslav, an electrician, was checking the lighting. One of the searchlights on deck was out of order; Miroslav tried to reach it, but slipped and fell overboard.

An American motorboat was passing by and fished the seaman out, returning him to the ship. It seemed nothing extraordinary had happened, except that Miroslav was bruised when he fell and was taken to the sick bay. However, a few days later the American authorities arrested the ship. They did not explain why. Here's what Miroslav Medvid recalls:

"On 28 October, when I felt better, representatives of the American authorities arrived. They said they wanted to take me to a Red Cross clinic. I said no I wouldn't go. They said they would ask me questions at some other place. They insisted I go with them to an American vessel to talk. I said I would if my fellow countrymen accompanied me. As a result, two men from our embassy in Washington -- the captain, the doctor, and myself -- went to a U.S. Navy launch. There I was treated in a high-handed way, with a light shining in my face. There were many reporters around me, and probably 30 if not 40 policemen behind me. I could not understand what was happening, and I was again beginning to feel bad. I had a splitting headache; I limped in my right leg and had an injured arm."

However, Miroslav quickly understood what the representatives of the American authorities were driving at when they began to persuade him that he had deliberately jumped off the Soviet ship to escape and ask for political asylum. At the same time, they tried to persuade him to defect. He was promised all the boons of life in America. When he said he was a Soviet citizen and was not going to remain in the United States, the Americans pretended not to hear. But hard as they tried to provoke the Soviet seaman, they failed to achieve what they wanted; so they had to lift the arrest of the Soviet ship and let Miroslav go home. Nothing came either of the provocative noise raised by emigrants of Ukrainian origin. They all were former criminals who collaborated with the Nazis during the Second World War and who had found refuge in the United States after the war. But what about Miroslav? What plans does he have for the near future?

"I'd like to resume work as soon as possible, and also I'd like to enroll at Lvov University to study law."

U.S. 'ESPIONAGE' ACTIVITIES IN USSR DETAILED ✕

PM241609 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jun 86 Morning Edition p 6

[V. Vladimirov Article: "The Fall Meeting Will Not Take Place: Failure of a Pentagon Intelligence Agent"]

[Text] Moscow, Kastanayevskaya Street, 7 May 1986. The twilight is rapidly deepening. The woman standing by a car with a diplomatic license plate from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow glances timidly from side to side. She looks tensely in the direction from which the man she is waiting for should appear. She is Ursula Sites, an American. She is waiting for Eric Sites, her husband, a professional intelligence agent listed on the U.S. Embassy payroll as a civilian assistant to the defense attache. She is waiting for his return from a spy meeting in order to immediately deliver him and the expected "catch" to the premises of the intelligence department at the American Embassy, which are reliably protected by the Marines.

Ursula will be waiting a long time, hoping desperately, before she realizes that Eric Sites is not going to return to the rendezvous with her on Kastanayevskaya Street...

At that time Eric Sites, civilian assistant on the apparatus of the defense attache, has quite different concerns: He has been caught red-handed during a conspiratorial meeting, carefully prepared for by the U.S. special services, with an agent recruited by American intelligence, and is watching in anguish as the tools of the spy's trade are removed one by one from the blue bag he was intending to give to the agent. Here is a "Kharkov" electric razor -- in reality adapted to act as a container for storing spy equipment. The most thorough external inspection will not arouse any suspicions. That is the intention: Nobody must have any idea that there is a secret compartment inside that can conceal a mini-camera the size of a tube of toothpaste designed for photographing secret documents. Here is a little cardboard box with a souvenir writing implement manufactured at the Moscow Writing Materials Plant named for Sacco and Vanzetti. In this, too, the American espionage "craftsmen" have fitted a secret compartment. It is in a little depression covered by a metallic plate, designed for a mini-camera.

phial is taken out of the bag: Our pharmacists sell vitamins in these phials. Inside are tablets designed for invisible writing; they have to be dissolved in water. Envelopes with addresses in the United States are laid on the table. Ordinary envelopes such as can be bought at any kiosk. In them are letters in English, harmless in content; the authors share their impressions of a tour of our country, they like our historical and cultural monuments. Similar letters, but written by American tourists, leave our country by hundreds and cross the ocean. But these two are special. They were to have provided the cover for espionage reports to the intelligence center. The addresses on the envelopes are genuine, the address are one (Rudi Komak) in Brookfield, Wisconsin, and one Arnold (Iston) in (Bvern), Texas. The agent must enter an encoded text on the margins of these letters or between the lines, in invisible ink. If the report is important, American intelligence instructions advise duplicating the letters and dropping them in different mailboxes. It seems that the fatherly dressing-down which the U.S. Congress once delivered to the special services about interference in the private lives of American citizens has already been forgotten.

Finally, a notebook appears, in no way remarkable in appearance, except the cover is slightly swollen, as if it had absorbed moisture. There is another secret compartment in the cover. American intelligence instructions to the secret agent are concealed there. They give instructions on organizing future meetings, detailed diagrams, and calls for special vigilance.

On the pages of fine script, the most important thing is the American intelligence service's list of topics of particular interest. The intelligence leaders ask the agent for information about the tactical and technical characteristics of aircraft, the location and purpose of defense facilities, and the personnel working there. "We wish you a pleasant summer and await a meeting with you in the fall." These words complete the message from the U.S. intelligence center to its agent in the Soviet Union.

The evening of 7 May. Malaya Priogovskaya Street. The twilight is thickening still more over Moscow and the breeze carries a scent of poplar resin. There are quite a few people on the street. Sites is in the yard of Apartment Block No 22. The spy meeting is to take place here. The passers-by and the inhabitants of the block who are sitting on the benches on this warm May evening hardly pay attention to him. Eric Sites is indistinguishable from a Musovite: He wears jeans, a check shirt, a zippered jacket, and a cap bought in a Moscow store. He carries the blue bag that by now is familiar to readers. Sites looks nervously from side to side. It seems there is nothing suspicious. At exactly 2115 a man appears carrying a rolled-up newspaper: that is the sign. Sites approaches him, gives the password, hears the answer, and invites him to take a walk... Caught red-handed, Sites stands deathly pale, as if thunderstruck. He will remain in that state for a long time.

As for the Soviet citizen, who is an American intelligence agent, he has been arrested, and an investigation is in progress. There is no doubt that he will get what he deserves. That is really all we can say about the failure of this major espionage action by American intelligence and the ignominious end of the latest "crusader" from the Pentagon.

As for Eric Sites, a resolute protest was conveyed to the U.S. Embassy and that country's defense attache about his espionage activity. Sites was declared persona non grata and quickly dispatched to the United States.

The Washington administration, White House Deputy Press Secretary L. Speakes stated, will not comment on the accusation of espionage against Sites. Yes, the case is so obvious that commentaries, as they say in these cases, are superfluous. That was evidently what the official American spokesman meant.

Let us spare Larry Speakes this unpleasant duty. Let us comment ourselves on what happened.

Reporting Sites' expulsion from the Soviet Union for espionage, American news agencies noted that prior to him, Embassy Second Secretary Michael Sellers had been the last American with a diplomatic passport told to leave the USSR for similar reasons. This is not an exhaustive list of exposed American intelligence agents expelled from the USSR recently. U.S. Embassy employees, Third Secretary Peter (Bogatyr), attache Lewis Thomas, First Secretary Richard Osborne, Second Secretary Paul Stambaugh, and Lon Augustenborg and Richard Muller, employees at the U.S. Consulate General in Leningrad, were expelled for espionage. Third Secretary (D. Makmekhen), Counselor Peter Semler, Second Secretary Joseph McDonald, and Alex (Grishchuk), civilian assistant to the defense attache, were exposed. Intelligence agent Martha Peterson, who used the diplomatic cover of an embassy secretary and archivist, was detained while carrying out an act of espionage. Vincent Crockett, special assistant to the U.S. defense attache, was caught red-handed.

American intelligence agents do not lack cynicism and blatant self-confidence. U.S. Assistant Naval Attache Lipscombe, who was detained while carrying out an act of espionage, stated unceremoniously that he was operating on the direct instructions of his leadership, which had tasked him with ... "monitoring the situation at Leningrad industrial enterprises."

The basest methods were demonstrated by U.S. Assistant Air Force Attache Wolf, who with the assistance of a Canadian colleague stole official [sluzhebenyy] documents from an Inturist worker's desk in Kazan when she left her "visitors" alone in her office for literally a minute.

As in the case of Mr and Mrs Sites, American intelligence agents Assistant Military Attache Reppert, Assistant Naval Attache Henry, Vice Consul Augustenborg of the U.S. Consulate General in Leningrad, U.S. Embassy First Secretary Osborne, and others, who enlisted their wives in espionage activity, demonstrated an original form of "family espionage" to the world.

The Italians say that two coincidences make a phenomenon. But what if we are talking about dozens of incidents that become more frequent with every passing year? This is a trend compelling serious thought.

The conclusion is unequivocal: The United States is attempting to expand intelligence activity against our country. According to American press information, it is planned to allocate \$24 billion to the U.S. special services from the budget in fiscal 1987 (by comparison they received \$10 billion in 1979, and it is believed that this figure will reach \$30 billion in 1990). The main resources and efforts of the American special services are directed against the Soviet Union. U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger spoke at closed congressional hearings some time back. The defense secretary, THE WASHINGTON POST writes, named the biggest recipient of intelligence information. It is the Pentagon.

The American special services have joined frantically in the "crusade" against our country. They are hotly pursuing our defense secrets. However, it would do the new-found "crusaders" no harm to remember how such crusades end. The Sites episode provides further confirmation. The "fall meeting" will not take place.

WOULD-BE EMIGRES DECIDE TO REMAIN, CITE REASONS

Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 19 Mar 87 p 3

[Article by SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA special correspondent A. Kurbatov: "'Please Return my Application to Emigrate...', or Several Interviews at the Final Boundary"]

[Text] An old detached building on one of the quiet streets in the center of Moscow. In the reception line, there is a man of about 50 and a man and women of the same general age. Closest of all to the door of an office, where an employee of the visa administration will see the visitors, sits a no-longer-young, loudly-dressed woman. In well-delivered tones she is informing her neighbor and, it turns out, everybody else as well that: "I have been living "in refusal" for two years. It's not so terrible! Good people will always help. The main thing is to fight until you win." Is she buoying up her neighbor or sharing experiences? I already knew what a "refusednik" is --this is a person whose request to emigrate has been refused. The reasons are varied: some have been connected with work, the nature of which touches upon the security interests of our country, others have aged parents who are dependent upon them and need their help, or minor children... With us, as in other countries, people have not only rights, but also responsibilities.

Receiving hours still have not begun. Hushed voices, half whispers. It seemed to me at first that I had landed in a line where everybody knew each other well. I now have the impression that I am in home where ... there is a dead person. The faces of the people reveal now fright, now confusion, now eerie curiosity -- it is frightening and, at the same time, you want to watch them.

Somebody in the line is now talking about acquaintances who have settled themselves very well "there" -- and hope flares up on the faces. But, somebody drops the rejoinder that "Mikhail Isakovich has not been lucky"., and the faces of everyone grow long. And it seems that many of them want to get up then and there and leave the reception room...

I ask my neighbors about the recent television broadcasts of the film "Byvshiye" (The Have-Beens). They have seen it, and they watched the press conference with those who had returned to the motherland. From the way that they answered me, from certain of their rejoinders, I realized that these

people, in general, are greedily searching out any information that come "from there". But...

"Your television exaggerates everything!" This was the rejoinder thrown by a man of 35 years who, with seeming detachment, was studying an English-language textbook for upper school students.

Reception hours begin. And I go up the second floor, to the office of the deputy chief of the visa and registration administration (UVIR), A. Zinchenko, in order to obtain telephone numbers of people who have withdrawn their applications to emigrate from our country. There are getting to be more and more such requests every month. They told me to select any telephone numbers I wanted from two large piles of file folders, which had been prepared for sending to the archives.

The first call. Aleksandr Vladimirovich N. decisively refuses to meet with a correspondent:

"I would like to bury the past," he says. "We are trying to forget the stupid thing that we almost did with the entire family."

"Perhaps your experience will help others," I say.

"You don't know much about the psychology of those people who are bursting to go abroad," laughed my telephone conversation partner. "You won't stop them with words." "They consider that the choice of a future is an especially individual thing. They don't need advisors."

"And what caused you to stop?"

"Various thoughts... If a person is not a fool and not an adventurer, he won't want to play the lottery. For us, you know, things are somehow calmer. A genius, you are not; everyone has the possibility of living normally. And there, if you don't want to take chances, you may end up under the hoofs."

Next Call.

"You know, I am a member, for sure, of that category of unrecognized geniuses, of which there are many among the people who are leaving. It seemed to me that, on the other side of the ocean, they would be able to judge my capabilities according to their worth." says an engineer at one of the plants in Moscow, Georgiy Konstantinovich M.

"And now it doesn't seem this way to you?"

"Do you want an honest answer?"

"Yes."

"I really am capable of a lot. But I was frightened of the loneliness. I sometimes receive letters from friends who went there earlier. There is a mortal melancholy in them. They have turned their apartments into dormitories

-- if only to have company, their tears flow over gypsy songs in cheap bars... And what do I need all this for? And, in general, a letter I received from a close lady friend, who would now like to return to the motherland, made a very strong impression on me. Do you know what shook her most of all in the United States? The reaction of parents to attention paid to their children! For us, it is a usual thing to praise an unknown child, to smile at him, but there, this is a danger signal: aren't they playing with him so as to steal him? This vexed her to the point of tears, because she loves children, is drawn to them. For some, and for me personally, this fact has been etched in memory, and I have understood that there we, who have grown up in a completely different environment, would simply be like people from another planet."

I call another number. Lidiya Davydovna Klyuzner also agreed to answer my questions.

"What drew me abroad? My children. They left for Israel several years ago, then moved on to the United States. Do I need to say how much I missed them? And so, somehow I made the decision and was getting ready, but then I thought it over: what awaits me there; who needs me, other than my children? And is it possible to be happy in a home where a foreign world lies beyond the threshold? Here I have an apartment, a decent pension, people who are close to me, with whom I can get together and talk in my native language. The motherland, don't you know, doesn't make changes and doesn't make choices."

Still another call. Savelii Mikhaylovich Linnik is in mourning -- he recently buried his wife. He could meet with a correspondent, but it would be better in about two weeks, in a month.

"I have to get myself together. Such a loss. But I have something to say to those who have frivolously agreed to leave for abroad. No matter what golden promises they made us there, we couldn't leave our motherland. I and my wife wrote this in our request to remain. And, indeed, we were a special case.

"My wife was hopelessly ill -- cancer. Her sister, who lives in the US, wrote that she needed to try change in climate, to be seen by a foreign specialist. We grasped at this straw and submitted an application to UVIR to leave. But, later, we thought it over: how would we feel outside our own home, in which even the familiar walls help? My wife and I lived a long life together. We had something to remember and to understand, which we would lose. I once spent 3 weeks on an assignment abroad. The first week, it was interesting for me. The second went by -- I had an irrepressible urge to return home. The third week was torture... And it will be this way with every normal person, particularly one who has grown up in our environment. Here, in our country, there are differences in the material well-being of people, based on their work. But this differentiation is insignificant in comparison to the capitalist world. You know, a normal person needs only to see the fashionable store windows there, with an impoverished child on the sidewalk next to them, in order for him to understand everything: where social justice is real, and where it is imaginary. Is it really possible for everyone to live equally in a society where they consider inequality to be the norm?"

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SAMPLE ENTRY OF THE KGB WANTED LIST (VLADISLAV KRASNOV)

КРАСНОВ Владислав Георгиевич, 1937 года рождения, урож. г. Перми, русский, образование высшее, бывш. редактор шведского отдела Государственного комитета при СМ СССР по радиовещанию и телевидению. Среднего роста, волосы русые, лицо овальное, рот большой, губы тонкие, нос прямой, основание носа широкое, ноздри большие, носит очки. Отец Краснов Георгий Николаевич. Мать Краснова Екатерина Ивановна, брат Краснов Герман Георгиевич, сестры Краснова (Зонтова), Зоя Георгиевна, Краснова (Кокинская) Любовь Георгиевна, зять Кокинский Валерий Борисович проживают в г. Перми.

Находясь в Швеции в составе группы советских туристов, 26 октября 1962 г. обратился к шведским властям с просьбой о предоставлении ему политического убежища. 22 января 1963 г. в г. Стокгольме выступил на пресс-конференции перед представителями буржуазной печати с клеветническими заявлениями о советской действительности. В Швеции проживал до января 1966 г. С 1966 г. проживает в США, где учится в университете и преподает уроки русского языка. Имеются фотокарточка и образец почерка.


Розыскное дело в УКГБ при СМ СССР по Пермской обл.

KRASNOV Vladislav Georgievich, born in 1937 in the city of Perm, Russian, university graduate, former editor of the Swedish Department of the State Committee of Radio and Television Broadcast at the SM of the USSR. Medium height, light brown hair, oval face, large mouth, thin lips, straight nose, wide at the base, with large nostrils, wears glasses. Father Krasnov Georgii Nikolacvich, mother Krasnova Ekaterina Ivanovna, brother, Krasnov German Georgievich, sisters Krasnova (Zontova) Zoya Georgievna, Krasnova (Kokinskaja) Liubov' Georgievna, brother-in-law Kok'inskii Valery Borisovich reside in the city of Perm.

While visiting Sweden with a group of Soviet tourists, on October 26, 1962, turned himself in to Swedish authorities asking them for political asylum. On January 1963, appeared at a press conference before representatives of the bourgeois press with slanderous statements about Soviet reality. Resided in Sweden until January of 1966. From 1966 has been residing in the USA where he studies at a university and gives Russian-language lessons. A photograph and handwriting sample are on file.¹²

The
Air
Force

Soviet
Awareness
Program



The U.S. audience sits motionless as the Soviet colonel chides them saying: "You do not know what war is; you have not had your towns bombed; families murdered in front of you; and mothers, sisters, and wives raped by Nazi soldiers." The emotion with which he speaks is chilling. The colonel goes on to say that such thoughts are alive in every Soviet citizen over the age of 45 and are kept alive for future generations by the efforts of the party and the people. He then berates the audience by ascribing virtually all the ills of the world to America and all the positive influences to the USSR. When the tirade is finished, the American audience is stunned and angry.

The scene described above seems unlikely until you know that the Soviet colonel is actually a USAF officer at a USAF Soviet Awareness Program. The USAF officer, in his role playing, is trying to educate an American audience on Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Soviets' perceptions of the world. Everything said in the lecture is an accurate portrayal of Soviet stylized propaganda and is derived from Soviet writings. Far too few Americans are aware of these perceptions and, as a result, are often easily duped by Soviet propaganda, or put on the defensive in a conversation with a Soviet citizen.

The USAF was the first of the services to create a program to make its members more aware of who the Soviets are, how they think and why they think so differently from us. The program was begun in 1976 at the direction of the USAF Chief of Staff, General David C. Jones, who agreed with a task force assessment that most Air Force members and their families knew little about the U.S.'s prime adversary. The program from its inception has dealt with the historical, socio-economic, and military factors which bear upon the actions and decisions of the USSR.

Colonel Lloyd T. Moore, Jr. is the Director of this program, which is now headquartered in new facilities: building 1304, Bolling AFB.

The Soviet Awareness Program has tried to reach as many Air Force members, their families, and friends as

The USAF

Soviet Awareness

Program



Capt. Jack J. Nettis Jr.

— an AFIS
mission

by Capt Jack J. Nettis, Jr.
AFIS/INC

Photos by Sgt. Robert Chambers
Det. 4, 1361st AAVS/Bolling AFB



Lt. Col. James M. Simpson and MSgt. Russell A. Logan Jr.



Dr. Robert Moore

Maj. Orr Y. Potebnya, Jr.

possible through two basic means: the spoken word and the written word.

Soviet Affairs Publications Division

The written portion of the Soviet Awareness Program is delivered by the Soviet Affairs Publications Division (INCF), headed by Major Orr Y. Potebnya, Jr. This division is also unique in the US Government since it is the only body whose primary focus is the translation of Soviet military writings. The Soviets have numerous professional military journals and newspapers which openly discuss Soviet military life-styles and, more importantly, their doctrine and tactics. These works are screened and selectively translated for publication in a bimonthly periodical known as *Soviet Press Selected Translations*. Recent articles of special interest include a four-part series, "New Features of Air Combat," a Soviet analysis of how air combat has evolved due to the influences of modern aircraft and technology. Other articles have addressed such important topics as the U.S. Army's new Reconnaissance/Destruction Systems and the Strategic Defense Initiative. We often think of the Soviet press as so "controlled" that it is of no analytical use; however this is definitely not the case.

In addition, INCF also is extensively involved in the translation of whole books mainly from the Soviet Military Officers' Library. These books, which the Soviet Officer is expected to read, are part of the "Soviet Military Thought" series (see pages 6 and 7). Some of the books, such as *Military*

Psychology, the Officer's Handbook and the People, Army, and the Commander, give a rare look into Soviet tenets of leadership and what effects and problems can be experienced by subordinates in various situations, including during operations in nuclear environment. Another book, *Fundamentals of Tactical Command Control* discusses their view of the command and Control management function. These publications, plus the



others which the division produces, are used extensively both within DOD and throughout the academic community. (The Directorate of Soviet Affairs is an anomaly in DOD in that it has produced revenues approaching \$1 million over the years.)

Soviet Military Power Lecture Series

The oral presentations are delivered by the Directorate's Soviet Awareness Division, headed by Lt. Col. James M. Simpson. Over the past ten years, the Soviet Military Power program, an 8-hour set of lectures, has been given to every major Air Force base worldwide, reaching over 150,000 members. The lecture series, given at the SECRET level, attempts to reach all levels of Air Force personnel from

airman basic to general officer; and ranging from the civil engineering troop and fightline mechanic, to the medical technician and intelligence specialist.

The program begins with a discussion of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The audience hears the same statements and arguments currently used in Soviet propaganda. The audience finds it very enlightening to see how the Soviets view history and the United States. For instance, few Americans realize the xenophobic concerns of the Soviet people. Just in this century, the Soviets have fought two major wars (WWI and WWII) a revolution, and a civil war. In WWII their loss of 20 million people (the U.S. losses in WWII were approximately 300,000) left their citizens and leadership with a very deep concern for defense. They see themselves surrounded by potential enemies — China and the NATO countries. Every Soviet citizen, after years of being reminded by his government, is quick to tell Americans that after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 it was the British, French, Japanese, and also the Americans who invaded their country trying to eliminate the new Bolshevik Government.

However, the Soviet view of history is not always accurate nor complete. For example, their heavy losses during WWII can be attributed to many causes which they brought upon themselves, such as eliminating their senior military staff during Stalin's purges prior to the war. Also, Stalin failed to heed warnings from his own

intelligence network of the impending Nazi attack because he didn't believe Hitler, with whom the USSR had signed a secret pact in 1939, would attack the USSR. Furthermore, in their darkest days during WWII, the U.S. sent large amounts of military equipment to help them fight the Nazis. However, when a Soviet confronts an American, few Americans are able to respond to Soviet rhetoric because Americans are simply ignorant or unaware.

This discussion of Soviet ideology is followed by two hours of talks on their society and economy. It is difficult for us to appreciate the size of this country and the associated management difficulties. You probably know it is the world's largest country; but just how large is it? It covers one-sixth of the world's land surface, stretching across 11 time zones — as the sun sets on one border it soon begins to rise on the other. Within this vast area the Soviets are rich in natural resources, not nearly as dependent as the U.S. on imports. However, much of what they have is trapped in the difficult Siberian frontier. Dealing with the harsh weather there is a major engineering feat. Temperatures can range over a year from 100°F to -60°F in the same area, and when the ground does thaw, a muddy mire makes travel difficult. In many of the areas only the top several feet completely thaws. This frozen-earth condition is referred to as permafrost — requiring special engineering for the building of roads, pipelines and towns. Before this system of engineering was developed roads literally disappeared and buildings sank. Moreover, as the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union expanded over this vast territory, they engulfed approximately 60 different nationalities speaking over 100 different languages with many different customs and religions. Today the Russian nationality, which has always been dominant, is losing ground as its birth rate declines.

The USSR is still quite backward when compared to the U.S. and other developed countries. In villages you still see women washing their clothes in the rivers. Food rationing occurs

"Americans . . . are often easily duped by Soviet propagand.



Maj. Martin L. Raynor makes an adjustment to the Soviet display case.

during years of poor harvest and Soviet people wait in long lines for virtually all consumer goods. There are many reasons why they have these economic problems, but the biggest is their centralized economy. Totally rejecting the familiar laws of supply and demand, the Communist Party dictates what will be produced, by whom and in what quantities. Historically, the Soviet military has been the prime beneficiary of this centralized planning.

The second part of the program deals with Soviet military. For example, military officers are among the highest paid members of Soviet society (even more highly paid than doctors, lawyers and engineers). This high stature is a good indication of the importance of the military in the USSR. In discussing the military, we not only look at the tactical and strategic weapon systems, but also at how the USSR says they will be employed. The Soviets produce some of the best




James M. Simpson assists.

military equipment in the world and certainly more military equipment than any other country — much more than they need for their own defense. As a result, they use primarily the military aspect of their national power in their efforts to project their power abroad. This is where the discussions are concluded with a look at the Soviets' use of economic, political, ideological and military means to project their influence around the world.



Shirley Burns, Directorate secretary



TSgt. Richard L. Johnson

When travelling and visiting the bases, the Soviet awareness team also gives a 2-hour condensed program for the dependents, so that husbands, wives, and children can better understand why the member must occasionally work late, go TDY, participate in an ORI or go overseas. Once a month, this Soviet Military Power Day is expanded into a 5-day Soviet Military Power Week given at the Directorate's new facilities on Bolling AFB. The week is presented with a

good balance of lectures, videotapes, and guest lecturers.

The Directorate of Soviet Affairs is the focal point in the Air Force for disseminating information about how the Soviets think, why they think so differently from us, and why it is such a mistake to "mirror-image," i.e. to assume that because we think or act in a certain way, they will also. For ten years, the directorate has been "getting the word out" to Air Force members worldwide.



The director's post script

by Col. Lloyd T. Moore, Jr.
Director, Soviet Affairs

The Soviet Awareness Program began shortly after I returned from Moscow. After studying the USSR for many years, and then living there as an assistant air attache, I was keenly aware of how Soviet society operates and I had a good idea of their state intentions. However, I was also very disturbed and frustrated about the total ignorance the vast majority of Americans displayed in regard to the "other" superpower in the world. In 1976, when I first heard of the establishment of the Directorate of Soviet Affairs, I was very interested in this project which I felt was a much needed, long overdue program. Over the next eight years I watched the program develop and grow. I knew the people assigned to the directorate were all top-notch experts and the feedback I was receiving from Air Force members worldwide was also very complimentary. It was evident that both the lecture program and the transla-

tions of Soviet military writings were accomplishing their goals — awareness.

In 1984 when the opportunity arose for me to become the Director of this program I, quite naturally, jumped at the opportunity. My expectations proved to be well founded; the people are knowledgeable and very dedicated to "getting the word out." The principal negative aspect, from my point of view, was that we weren't able to get our program before the true policy makers of the Air Force and the US Government.

For the future, therefore, it is our intention to broaden even further the audience for our program. In my opinion, we cannot begin to feel sanguine until virtually all the opinion makers and policy setters in America understand more completely the realities of Soviet society and the concomitant threat which it poses to our way of life.

PUBLICATIONS

SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT

Translations of major military writings on doctrine, strategy, tactics, and other topics. These volumes may be ordered by title and stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Prices are subject to change.


The Offensive, Sidorenko, Col A. A. 008-070-00329-5 (\$6.00). Praises the offensives as the only type of combat operation that attains the complete rout of the enemy.

Marxism-Leninism on War and Army, Author collective. 008-070-00338-4 \$7.00. Discusses doctrine, modern military power, and the revolution in military affairs.

Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs, Tomoz, Col Gen N. A. (Ed.). 008-070-00340-6 (\$7.00) Describes the impact of science and technology (including nuclear weapons) on military movements.

The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics, Savkin, Col V. Ye. 008-070-00342-2 (\$7.00). Presents the "essence of the laws of armed con-

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Soviet T-72 tanks (DoD photo)

Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War, Milovidov, Maj Gen A. S. and Kozlov, Col V. G. (Eds.). 008-070-00343-1 (\$7.00). Glorifies communist ideology and outlines the Party approach to problems relating to war, the armed forces, and military affairs.

Concept, Algorithm, Decision, Druzhinin, Col Gen V. V. and Kontorov, Col D. S. 008-070-00344-9 (\$7.00). Integrates ideas from philosophy, psychology, social science, mathematics, and linguistics for the military commander and his staff.


Military Pedagogy, Danchenko, Col A. M. and Vydrin, Col I. F. (Eds.). 008-070-00352-0 (\$7.50). Discusses Soviet political, combat, and technical training to increase combat readiness.

Military Psychology, Shelyag, V. V., Glotchkin, A. D., and Platonov, K. N. (Eds.). 008-070-00353-8 (\$7.50). Appraises man's psyche under both



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nuclear and conventional warfare conditions to gauge effective ways to indoctrinate personnel.

Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, Radziyevskiy, Col Gen A. I. (Senior Lt.). 008-070-00360-1 (\$6.50). In effect, a small military encyclopedia that defines Soviet military terminology. Compiled by the General Staff Academy faculty.

Civil Defense, Yegovov, P. T., Shlyakhov, I. A., and Alabin, N. I. 008-070-00382-1 (\$7.00). Provides a comprehensive overview of the Soviet war survival program.

Selected Soviet Military Writings 1970-1975. 008-070-00392-9 (\$7.00). Soviet writings on the international situation, theoretical foundations of Soviet military thought, the command structure and military organization, and theory in practice.

The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, Grechko, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. 008-070-00379-1 (\$7.00). The late Soviet Minister of Defense's most comprehensive work, covering the development and essence of Soviet military power.

The Officer's Handbook, Kozlov, Maj Gen S. N. (ed.). 008-070-00396-1 (\$7.00). Aids Soviet officers "in broadening their outlook and in resolving many practical problems related to the training and education of subordinates."

The People, The Army, The Commander, Skirido, Col M. P. 008-004101 (\$5.50). Examines the political, moral, administrative, and leadership factors that, according to the author, bring victory in a thermonuclear war.

Long-Range Missile-Equipped, Vasil'yev, Maj Gen B. A. 008-070-00428-3 (\$4.25). Lauds the heroic deeds of Soviet Long-Range Aviation and emphasizes the undiminished role of aviation in general.

Forecasting in Military Affairs, Chuyev, Yu. v. and Mikhaylov, Yu. B. 008-070-00456-9 (\$6.50). Provides a broad review of recent thinking in both the USSR and the West on military planning, forecasting, and decision making.

The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, Kozhevnikov, M. N. 008-070-00490-9 (\$6.50). Presents a participant's picture of the role of the command, staff, and General Headquarters in the recovery, reorganization, and direction of operations of the Soviet Air Force in World War II.

Fundamentals of Tactical Command and Control, Ivanov, D. A., Savel'yev, V. P., and Shemanskiy, P. V. 008-070-00514 (\$9.00). Discusses basic principles, organization equipping, support, and monitoring of command and control activities, as well as information acquisition and processing, decisionmaking, and battle planning and management.

The Soviet Armed Forces: A History of Their Organization Development, Tyushkevich, S. A. 008-070-00524-7 (\$14.00). Outlines Soviet military history from the formation of the first Red Guard detachments to the development of the modern Soviet Armed Forces.

STUDIES IN COMMUNIST AFFAIRS

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
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


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Soviet aircraft carrier Novorossiysk (DuD photo)



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