

13 August 1980

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
PROCESSING UNSOLICITED CORRESPONDENCE  
AND SUSPECT MATERIAL

1. **PURPOSE:** To provide guidance and establish procedures for processing nonofficial or unsolicited correspondence and suspect packages or material.

2. **APPLICABILITY:** This regulation applies to all DIA elements.

3. **SUPERSESION:** This regulation supersedes DIAR 54-13, 3 June 1975.

4. **GENERAL:**

a. Since the intelligence mission and relationship to DoD are indicated in its title, the DIA frequently receives unsolicited inquiries, complaints, or suggestions from non-DoD affiliated personnel or organizations. Most of these correspondents have a legitimate and valid purpose for communicating with a representative agency of the U.S. Government, and their letters should be processed in a manner appropriate to the contents. If a letter reflects a request, inquiry, or solicitation that is within the scope of the Freedom of Information Act, Title 5, U.S. Code 552 as amended by Public Law 93-502, the letter should be expeditiously referred to the attention of ESO (FOIA).

b. Occasionally, the DIA receives correspondence or material which appears to be the product of a hoax, prank, or delusion, or is originated by persons who are overenthusiastic or overactive in some particular field or cause. This type of correspondence is usually addressed to either a person of national prominence or to a position title that has been identified in the various news media. Frequently an attempt is made to process such correspondence through normal channels and to make a rational response. This often causes confusion, wastes personnel resources, or disrupts the orderly functioning of management. For reasons of efficiency, economy, and safety all such correspondence or unusual material will be referred directly to the Policy, Plans, &

Programs Branch (RSS-1A), Counterintelligence Division for evaluation and special processing. RSS-1A is designated as the central point of contact for such material within this Agency.

5. **RESPONSIBILITIES:**

a. DIA personnel will forward all unsolicited material, publications, or correspondence, as described above, from nonofficial or unidentified sources directly to RSS-1A for appropriate action.

b. RSS-1A will review all such material and refer to the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or other appropriate agency any such correspondence reflecting a threat or malice by the correspondent toward the addressee or other members of the U.S. Government. Direct contact or communication by other DIA elements or individuals with the USSS, FBI or other Federal agencies is not authorized in these matters.

6. **PROCEDURES:**

a. Processing of such unsolicited correspondence, material or suspect packages should be conducted within the guidelines stated below:

(1) The accompanying envelope or wrappings, to include string, tape, or other bindings, will be retained and forwarded to RSS-1A with the correspondence or material.

(2) Recipients of such correspondence or packages should not place any marks, comments, or extraneous notes on the material. If an explanation is necessary, a memorandum or note should be made on a separate piece of paper to accompany the correspondence. The person who opened the correspondence or package, or has knowledge of how it was received, should be identified in this note.

(3) Some unsolicited letters or packages may contain explosives or other dangerous substances. No

attempt should be made by DIA personnel to move, open or disarm a suspected letter bomb or explosive parcel. If there is reason to believe that explosives or other dangerous substances are enclosed in a package, the office and adjacent area should be cleared of personnel, and the emergency bomb threat and building security procedures should be initiated.

b. The U.S. Postal Service normally screens all mail passing through its facilities; however, it is possible for mail to be received which has not been examined or screened for dangerous or explosive material. A bomb or dangerous package may be indicated by one or more of the following:

- (1) The absence of a return address.
- (2) Unusual thickness or rigidity of an envelope.
- (3) Use of waterproof or oil-treated wrapping paper.
- (4) Unusual odors, stains or sounds emanating from a parcel or envelope.
- (5) Instructions for opening only by a specific person.
- (6) Erroneously addressed (e.g., Commander, DIA; Chief of Intelligence Operations, DIA).
- (7) Delivery by an unidentified means or to an unusual place (package or letter unexplainably appears or is left outside an office).

c. Unsolicited packages or correspondence forwarded to RSS-1A will be reviewed to determine appropriate action based on the nature of the contents. RSS-1A actions may include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) Referral to USSS, FBI or other agency, if correspondence reflects malice or threats of violence against persons holding public position or office.

(2) Annotation of identifying data on a 3 x 5 inch card, which is forwarded to the Pentagon Counterintelligence Force (PCF) for inclusion in their indices of such correspondents. Copies of correspondence may be retained by the PCF as deemed appropriate.

(3) Reviewing files that relate to such material to determine if information had previously been reported on the same correspondent or subject.

(4) Preparing a brief summary (when specifically requested by appropriate DoD/JCS/DIA recipients) of the correspondence or other information relevant to the correspondent.

(5) Referral to the appropriate DoD, JCS, or DIA office for processing if the contents appear to be from legitimate or otherwise bona fide correspondents.


(6) Initiating an investigation by the appropriate Federal or DoD investigative agency if contents indicate there is criminal, counterintelligence, or security interest.

(7) Destroying without further action or referral. Normally RSS-A will destroy such material within 30 days of receipt or after all appropriate action has been completed.

7. ORIENTATION: Supervisors at all echelons will insure that personnel under their supervision understand the procedures and responsibilities contained in this regulation. Supervisors should provide appropriate instruction or guidance necessary to implement precautionary measures for the processing of correspondence or packages by DIA elements.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

OFFICIAL:



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