

SECRET

BACKGROUND

In April, 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC) published their Final Report (Book V) which in essence faulted the CIA for its errors of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the Agency's on-going plots against the revolutionary government in Cuba and its attempts on the life of the premier, Fidel Castro. The Committee's rationale is detailed on pages 6-7 of its Findings, but one paragraph succinctly sums up their position.

"Senior CIA officials also should have realized that their agency was not utilizing its full capability to investigate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro connections. They should have realized that CIA operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they directed their subordinates to conduct an investigation without telling them of these vital facts. Those officials, whom the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, advised the Warren Commission that the CIA had no evidence of a foreign conspiracy." (p. 7, Book V)

Stung by the Senate criticism and the "rippling effect" that Book V occasioned in the media, the CIA prepared a comprehensive report in 1977 designed to answer, at least within the Agency, the critical questions posited in the SSC Final Report. However, even the CIA's 1977 Report tacitly recognizes the inadequacy of the CIA's narrow response to the Warren Commission's quest for all possible relevant information. ("Relevancy" is, of course, the "buyword" upon which both the Senate and Agency each base their position on the importance of the anti-Castro plots to the Commission's work.) On page 10 of the Agency's conclusions, the 1977 Report acknowledges that:

"While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to re-inforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms -- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination (JFK) because of tensions of the time.The Agency should have taken broader initiatives, then, as well." (p. 10, 1977 Report)

SECRET

0002149

0002141

**THIS COPY IS NOT
FOR RELEASE.**

180-10145-10205

SECRET

It is not the purpose of this analysis to detail the conflicting viewpoints of the SSC and CIA with regard to the significance to the work of the Warren Commission of the CIA's Castro assassination attempts and to resolve the parties controversy as to the operations' importance. Instead, this paper seeks to present a comprehensive review of all the facts, drawn from a variety of sources, of organized crime's involvement or potential involvement in the CIA operations against Cuba during 1960-1963. Certain influences and conclusions will then be drawn upon the nature, scope, and motivation of the syndicate participants in the operations.

INVOLVEMENT OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN CIA PLOTS
TO ASSASSINATE FIDEL CASTRO

The genesis of the utilization of the United States criminal syndicate by the CIA to attempt to assassinate Castro is placed by the 1967 Inspector General's Report as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell, and the Director of the Office of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards.** (1967 IG Report, p. ; Interim Report, p. 74) Edwards assigned the specific tasks of locating the right party to "eliminate or assassinate" Castro to James "Big Jim" O'Connell, who was the Chief of the Operational Support Division of the Office of Security. Both men agreed that Robert A. Maheu,** who had been previously utilized by the Agency in several sensitive covert operations, would be contacted to recruit the necessary personnel.

Although Maheu and O'Connell differ as to who initially brought up John Roselli's name for consideration, there was a meeting between Maheu and Roselli at the Brown Derby Restaurant in Los Angeles in early September 1960. (Interim Report, p. 75)

Comment: Maheu seems the logical person to have thought of and contacted Roselli for several reasons. In the

** Maheu's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell are detailed on pp. 74-75, Interim Report.

0002150

SECRET

SECRET

Office of Security file on Ed Morgan, Maheu's attorney, there is a memo to the DCI dated 19 November 1970 which reviews the Mafia operation. Paragraph 5 states that: "Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one John Roselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through other clients, but was given to understand that he was a high ranking member of the syndicate and controlled all the ice making machines on the Strip." Maheu reasoned that, if Roselli was, in fact, a member of the clan, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests.")

(Comment: Confirmation of the earliest Maheu-Roselli contact is found in Roselli's FBI file and consists of an alleged telephone call in 1959 from Maheu to Roselli.) (See Roselli Write-up)

(Comment: Maheu and Roselli had mutual contacts in Las Vegas prior to 1960, including Hank Greenspun, editor of the Las Vegas Sun.)

Roselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed to a meeting in New York City with Maheu and O'Connell to discuss further details. (Interim Report, p. 76; Office of Security memo from Morgan file, dated 19 November 1970) Although the Inspector General's Report placed the meeting at the Plaza Hilton on 14 September 1960, Roselli recalled that the discussion took place during Castro's visit to the United Nations which began on September 18, 1960.

(Comment: Tony de Varona admits going to New York City at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was in contact with Roselli at this time or (testimony of de Varona) that his visit had an assassination motivation. According to a 19 November 1970 memo to the DCI, it was at this September meeting in New York City, that Roselli "agreed to introduce him (Maheu) to a friend, 'Sam Gold', who knew the Cuban crowd.")

0002151 (Comment: The timing of the introduction of both Giancana ('Gold') and Trafficante ('Joe') is important to the analysis of the "true" role of the mob in the Castro assassination plots. According to the 1967 IG Report, the entrance of Giancana took place "during the week of 25 September 1960"... (1967 IG Report, p. 18))

In contrast, the SSC Interim Report at p. 76, does not fix a date certain for Giancana's initial appearance but (although it was "certainly prior to October 18." (p. 76)) because of conflicting evidence between the 1967 IG September date and Maheu's Senate testimony which set the initiation in November 1960. As a compromise, the Interim Report reasoned that Giancana had been introduced to Maheu "prior to October

SECRET

18" because (1) the Las Vegas wiretap occurred on October 30, 1960; and (2) DDP Bissell had received an FBI memo, dated 18 October 1960, which revealed an FBI ELSUR quoting Giancana as discussing his involvement in an assassination plot against Castro". (FBI memo dated 18 October 1960 from Hoover to Bissell, Interim Report, p. 79)

(Comment: Each of the dual reasons listed in the Interim Report on p. 77 are subject to critical analysis which will be dealt with separately below.)

(Comment: Although the 1967 IG Report stated that "Maheu pointed out 'Gold' to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either 'Gold' or 'Joe'", the Interim Report disputes this observation by apparently quoting from O'Connell's Senate testimony and stating that "the Support Chief, who was using the name 'Jim Olds'," said he had met 'Sam' and 'Joe', once, and then only briefly. (O.C. 5(30)75, pp. 26-29; Interim Report, p. 77))

(Comment: Conflicts appear also on several relatively minor points surrounding the September 1960 meetings in New York City and Miami. For instance:

1. Did Roselli know from the beginning that the operation was CIA?

a. O'Connell stated that Maheu told Roselli that they were representing international business interests whereas Roselli testified that Maheu told him that O'Connell was CIA (Interim Report, p. 76). Also, footnote 1 on page 76 indicates that Roselli told O'Connell "about three weeks after the New York meeting", which is during the Miami involvement of Giancana, that "I am not kidding. I know who you work for."

The importance of Roselli's recognition of CIA initiation is that it is doubtful if Giancana and Trafficante could have been enlisted unless they could be sure of government protection. This theme will be developed more fully below.

2. Roselli told his Cuban contacts that he was an "agent of some business interests of Wall Street that had... nickel interests and properties around Cuba..." (Roselli; 6/24/75, pp. 9, 17)

Cf. Jack Anderson column of January 19, 1971, which stated that "Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy?...None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings."

0002152

SECRET

In Anderson's sources for this article were Roselli and William Harvey, who was not privy to the details of Phase I, it is another example of serious discrepancies which exist between the CIA, Senate, and Anderson versions which all purport to depend, in varying degrees, upon Roselli.

3. The alleged "surprise discovery" by Maheu and O'Connell as to the true identities of "Sam Gold" and "Joe" is really suspect. First, although it is possible that the Senate Committee staff overlooked the specific Miami newspaper Sunday supplement (Parade) which purportedly included pictures of Giancana and Trafficante, thus graphically showing Maheu and O'Connell the nature of the people with whom they were dealing, it is a relatively easy matter to research Parade magazine for the months of October and November. It would appear that O'Connell and Maheu were looking for an ex post facto reason for continuing the operation after the introduction of two of the top Mafiosi in the United States. O'Connell testified that his discovery was after "we were up to our ears in it" which is difficult to fathom since the operation was in the embryonic stage and no pills were delivered to Roselli, et. al, until approximately March 1961. Whatever, the reason, the Senate staff insists it could not find the Parade article. (Interim Report, p. 77, fn. 1)

The principals in Phase I of the operation also disagree as to the roles which were to be played by both "Gold" and "Joe" in the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the operation.

"Although Maheu described Giancana as playing a 'key' role, (Maheu, 7.2.975, p. 34) and discussed his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the assassination", Roselli downplayed Giancana's part to that of a "back-up" man. (Roselli, 6/24/75, p. 15) (Whether Roselli received a "message" from Giancana's murder four days before Roselli's Senate appearance is open to question.) Roselli's Senate characterization of Giancana's role as minor is in contrast to his alleged recountment of Giancana's due to his "knowledge of the Cuban crowd" which the 19 November 1970 memo recorded.

Trafficante(s) involvement in Phase I is even more jumbled by the available evidence. The 1967 IG Report and Senate Interim Report state that "'Gold' identified 'Joe' to Maheu as a man who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there". (IG Report, p. 19; Interim Report, p. 77) To support the description of Trafficante as a courier, the Interim Report quotes p. 19 of the 1967 IG Report in stating that, "At that time, the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana on syndicate business".

0002153

SECRET

SECRET

(Comment: This factually unsupported assertion runs contrary to the evidence available through official government records of other agencies. As an example, State Department files reflect that Trafficante applied for a passport in Cuba on October 7, 1959, and received that document in Havana on February 2, 1960. (See Trafficante file, State Department) No records available to the Committee from INS, State Department, or FBI record any later 1960 travels even though the Bureau maintained decent surveillance on Trafficante during this period. In his Committee testimony, Trafficante recalled that he made two trips to Cuba after his release from prison in August 1959 and placed these sojourns within two or three months after his release from prison. (Testimony, pp. 4-53, Oct. 1, 1977) His testimony has some logical credibility in that all of the casinos in Havana were either closed or operating in the red by mid-1960, and law enforcement reports placed him in the Tampa-Miami area consistently during the pre-Bay of Pigs period.)

By the time of the Senate testimony of Roselli, however, Trafficante's role had diminished to a point even below Giancana's. He had been reduced from "courier" to a mere "translator" and was needed only to facilitate conversation between Roselli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual assassination. Interestingly, Trafficante and Roselli's 1975 and 1977 Congressional appearances dovetail well but remain in contradiction to the facts as they were being reported in 1963 by the principals.

(Comment: The Senate testimony of Trafficante and Roselli needs to be outlined with a view to contrasting the "courier vs. interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate did not vigorously cross-examine either man on this discrepancy nor did the Interim Report "hint" at the problem.)

Once the actors had been assembled for the launching of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the method to be employed to accomplish the foal. The Agency took the simplistic, straight-forward approach of shooting Castro, but this plan was rejected by Giancana. In a comment to its 1967 Report, the Inspector General noted that "Giancana was flatly opposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival and escape would be negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill that would be put into Castro's food and drink...Trafficante (Joe, the courier) was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters named their man inside as Juan Orta, who was then office Chief and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister, Castro. The gangsters said that Orta had once been in a position to received kickbacks from the gambling interests but had since lost that source of income and needed the money. (I.G. Report, p. 25)

0062154

SECRET

SECRET

(Comment: The observations quoted above of the 1967 I.G. Report are extremely significant in several respects. First, the poison pill modus operandi originated with Giancana, not the Agency, a point which is crucial to the final conclusions presented below. Secondly, Trafficante is identified as having access to and providing for the putative assassin in Cuba which is inconsistent with his self-serving role description of "interpreter". His ability to recruit Orta apparently was directly tied to his former gambling empire associations which formed a constant pattern for all his alleged conduct both during and after his Cuban days.) (See Trafficante profile.)

(Comment: Speculation concerning Orta's role arose during the Agency's 1977 Report when it was forced to address a problem raised by an April 23, 1975 article, concerning Frank Sturgis, written by Paul Meskill of the New York Daily News. Sturgis was quoted as saying, "the third (assassination) scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. I had access to the Prime Minister's office," Sturgis said, "I knew Fidels' private secretary, Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with the Embassy." (American Embassy in Havana).

What was disturbing to the writers of the 1977 Report was the fact that Orta's name had surfaced in connection with a Castro assassination plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia connection by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Report references news stories linking Sturgis with Trafficante and with a "gambling partner" of Trafficante's, Norman Rothman. (See Rothman profile) Coupled with Sturgis' alleged mob relationships is the allegation that Sturgis had a role in inspecting the gambling casinos in Cuba on behalf of the Castro government and could have developed an interest with Orta in receiving gambling kickbacks.

0002155

A second aspect of Meskill's news series concerned a claim of Marita Lorenz that she had acted on behalf of Sturgis in 1960 in attempting to poison Castro, which dovetailed with the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum on Giancana's electronically surveilled conversation in which he stated that "the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro's". (Memo, Hoover to DCI A.H., DD 10/18/60)

The tentative conclusions advanced in the 1977 Report are as follows:

(p.21) It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities...."

Additional considerations:

SECRET

SECRET

1. Criminal syndicate may well have had some independent activities of its own prior to CIA involvement in late 1960. Also, could have been on-going, when CIA reactivated plan in 1962, April.

2. Syndicate operators could have had activities such as these in New York Daily News stories in 1975 and 1976.

3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with, but not a member of the syndicate. Could well have been used by the syndicate.

4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source. He probably knew Orta in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Orta assumed role of assassin.

If there was an earlier operation with Orta, it was not CIA; could have been earlier operation of syndicate.

Sturgis could have known or been involved in syndicate operation, or picked up gossip from Miami in 1965 after Orta returned there.

Neither the 1967 I.G. Report or the SSC Interim Report can pinpoint the precise date on which the Agency processed the poison pills which O'Connell delivered to Roselli. (Interim Report, p. 80) The chain of custody, according to the 1967 I.G. Report was for the lethal pills to be delivered from Roselli to Trafficante. Although the next intervening steps remain a mystery, Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Orta in Cuba in late February-early March 1961. (Interim Report, p. 27; Interim Report, p. 80)

(Comment: The Senate Interim Report reported the version of Joe Shimon whose memory was that the money and pills for the operation were delivered at a meeting at the Fountainbleau Hotel on March 12, 1961 attended by "Maheu, Roselli, Trafficante and the Cuban." (Interim Report, p.81) Shimon's story is filled with vivid details, which are documented on p. 82 of the Report, but his credibility is subject to serious question as his account is not shared by anyone else connected with the plan nor is his relationship with Roselli, Giancana, or Trafficante appear as "cozy" as he would lead one to believe.

It is also apparent that Shimon was a source for Jack Anderson's column of January 19, 1971, which fixed the date of the passage of the poison at the Fountainbleau by Roselli as March 13, 1961, and contained the report that Castro became ill a few weeks later.

SECRET

0002156

SECRET

The Lansky influence using the Cellini brothers as a "front" is particularly interesting in light of Varona's admission that Jorge Pujol arranged a mutiny in Miami in approximately 1960 wherein Meyer Lansky offered to financially "back" Varona's efforts to "educate the American people about Castro, which may be a euphemism for anti-Castro plots. (See Varona transcript.)

The logical inference to be drawn is that both the Agency organized crime, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime, had settled upon de Varona, probably independently, as an individual who had the potential of uniting the multitude of exile groups who were in a continual internecine turmoil. De Varona was understandably pleased to permit both the U.S. Government and criminal syndicate to offer him support and asked no questions as to the source of the funds or the motives of his benefactors. (See Varona testimony).

Although de Varona has no specific memory of meeting Trafficante, the Tampa crime boss admits that he acted as an "interpreter" in several meetings attended by de Varona, Roselli, Giancana and other exiles. These meetings were arranged by Rafael "Macho" Gener, a Trafficante gambling partner from Havana who continued to serve Trafficante in Miami during the 1960's. Trafficante claimed that Roselli had previously recruited Gener, but this appears unlikely in view of Trafficante's long-standing friendship with Gener in Cuba, and Roselli's admission to O'Connell that Trafficante would provide the replacement for the ill-fated Juan Orta, who had escaped to the Venezuelan Embassy in April 1961.

(Comment: Paralleling the situation at the Senate hearings during 1975 when Roselli's description of Trafficante's role changed from his "courier" characterization in 1960-61 as reported by the Agency to Trafficante's "interpreter" statement, is the recent interview with Gener who agrees with Trafficante's Committee testimony that he was an intermediary with de Varona only for Roselli. The net result in both instances is to minimize Trafficante's exposure. (Cf. Fonzi interview with Gener, May , 1978 and Trafficante testimony, October 7, 1977.))

If ambiguity exists as to the specifics of the introduction of de Varona into Phase One of the Castro assassination plots, more confusion surrounds de Varona's actual participation prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. The I.G. Report indicates that de Varona attempted a second poisoning before the Cuban invasion but Roselli was positive that only one attempt (Orta's) was made. He was also positive that he delivered

0002159

SECRET

SECRET

both pills, money and supplies to de Varona which is corroborated by O'Connell during 1961. The conflict is resolved by the Senate in speculating "that only one pre-Bay of Pigs attempt was made, and that... (de Varona) was the contact in the United States who arranged for... (Orta)... to administer the poison.

(Comment: There appears to be no factual way to resolve de Varona's initial contribution to the poison attempts, especially since Varona denies ever having received poison pills from Rosselli or being involved in any attempt on Castro's life at any time. (See Varona transcript).)

(Comment: The Agency was aware of the possible dangers inherent in having de Varona participate in the mob's plots

However, "steps were taken to end his participation in the syndicate plan but (they) were apparently ineffective." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 32))

PHASE TWO

The debacle which marked the mid-April 1961 Bay of Pigs effort curtailed CIA efforts with the mob to assassinate Castro, and it was not until April 1962, when Bill Harvey assumed Agency responsibility for the task, were efforts made to re-establish contact with Rosselli.

However, the fact that the Agency was squeamish during the Bay of Pigs aftermath to continue to try to kill Castro does not mean that the mob shared their shyness. Indeed, both Harvey and O'Connell swore that Harvey "took over a going operation." (I.G. Report, p. 33) The exact details of what that operation might have been has not been uncovered, but Rosselli's ability to regenerate his forces in response to Harvey's contact in April 1962 was immediate. Once again the ubiquitous de Varona was to provide the individuals who would carry the lethal poison into Cuba.

However, there were some significant differences between Phase One and Phase Two of the operation which bear upon the ultimate question of the mob's motivation and seriousness in carrying out their part of the bargain struck in 1960 with the Agency.

0002160

SECRET

First: In Phase One, Rosselli, et. al., demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source, who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro to succeed. In contrast, the details of the modus operandi and the ability of the putative assassins was deliberately vague. After Harvey initially met Rosselli in Miami in April 1962, Harvey reported that "the manner in which the lethal material was to be introduced into Castro's food (which involved) an asset of Varona's who had access to someone in a restaurant frequented by Castro." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 47) By June, 1962, after Varona had received money and munitions from the JMWAVE station and had presumably sent the pills into Cuba, "Rosselli reported to Harvey on 21 June that Varona had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harvey said that they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt -- perhaps using the pills. Harvey never learned their names or anything about them." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 51)

(Comment: As the 1967 I.G. authors correctly observed, Harvey's tale of the "favorite restaurant" poisoning opportunity was familiar in that Edwards had described precisely the same plan." The fact that Varona related the exact modus operandi to Harvey as he had discussed with Edwards in Phase One (circa 1960-mid 1961) leads to the possibilities that:

1. Harvey was correct in assuming that he was taking over an on-going operation in April 1962; or
2. The mob had been using de Varona before, during and after the Bay of Pigs and permitted the CIA to provide logistical support and future protection against the Justice Department; or
3. De Varona was simply making up a story for the Agency to gain their financial backing or in response to directions from organized crime.)

Second: The cast of underworld characters changed. Harvey had insisted that Maheu and Giancana be dropped from the operation which Rosselli readily acceded to. Trafficante's "interpreter" role was assumed by "Maceo", a mysterious "Cuban who spoke Italian" and who sometimes used the names Garcia-Gomez and Godoy.

(Comment: "Maceo's" introduction into one of the most sensitive CIA covert actions in history, without any attempt made by the Agency to check his background or to ascertain his identity is extraordinary. Yet, the Agency apparently went blithely "to bed" with the top hoodlums in the United States without doing any basic background security investigation.

SECRET

0002161

SECRET

Although the 1967 I.G. Report characterizes "Maceo" as "Rosselli's man", it is probable that this individual was drafted by Trafficante who had provided all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who still possessed, in 1962, the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba.

The termination of the CIA-Mafia plots was slow and undramatic. Rosselli, in May 1962, reported to Harvey that the pills and guns which had been delivered to Varona in Miami in April had arrived in Cuba, and an unidentified three-man team had been dispatched in June to execute the plan. (Interim Report, p. 84)

During September 1962, Rosselli related to Harvey that de Varona was readying a second three-man team who were "supposedly militia men whose assignment was to penetrate Castro's body guard. During this period, the 'medicine' was reported as still in place and the three men of the first team safe." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 51) However, the second team never made Cuba and a series of alibis were constructed during December and January, 1963. Nevertheless, de Varona supposedly collected \$2,700 for the maintenance of these individuals from Rosselli who had received the payment from Harvey. (1967 I.G. Report, p. 52)

In mid-January, 1963 both Harvey and Rosselli agreed that "nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 52) Rosselli was instructed to ease his way out of touch with Varona which he presumably did. The last meeting between Harvey and Rosselli occurred in Washington, D. C. in June 1963, when he was Harvey's overnight guest. However, their meeting ostensibly was not directly related to any assassination plots.

Comment: Harvey and Rosselli continued their relationship in 1967-71

002162

CONCLUSION

The available evidence suggests the thesis which, in part, is tacitly assumed by the Agency in its 1977 internal Inspector General's Report wherein it states that, "It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way...In a sense, CIA might have been piggy-backing on the syndicate, and, in addition to its material contributions, was also supplying an aura of official sanction." (1977 I.G. Report, p. 20)

SECRET

SECRET

The relevant evidence is as follows:

- 1. FBI memo 18 October 1960 re: Giancana ELSUR:

...Giancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on three occasions...Giancana claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro. (1977 I.G. Report, p. 19)

Comment: Although the dates of initial meetings between Maheu, Rosselli, and Giancana are subject to different interpretation, it is clear that no plans were finalized between the parties until sometime after October 18, 1960, the date of the FBI's intercepted conversation of Giancana.

The poison pills, prepared by the CIA at Giancana's request, were not ready for delivery until late February-early March 1961, so that it is difficult to see how Giancana's November 1960 assassination plot could be a part of the CIA operation. Rather, it appears that the mob had its poison plan in progress, using a mistress of Castro, to accomplish the deed, when the CIA fortuitously happened along to offer its support. The mob was then in a perfect position. If their private plot actually worked, and Castro died, then the syndicate had enormous blackmail potential against the CIA which it could exercise at the opportune moment. However, if their intrigue back-fired, then their position would be that they were only attempting to execute the wishes of their government.

Additional Comment: The actions of Giancana's "hired hand", Richard Cain, raise some interesting possibilities. Given Cain's admission to the FBI that he had joined the Chicago Police Department and Sheriff's office while on Giancana's payroll, Cain's approach to the CIA Chicago Office in the fall of 1960 to volunteer information on the Cuban community appears a little more than coincidental. Then when FBI files disclose that he is planning to go to Cuba for Life Magazine (one story), and to "bug" influential Cubans in Havana ostensibly for ex-President Prio (second story), the coincidence becomes more suspect. The suspicion is that Cain was being sent by Giancana to supervise the poisoning attempt on Fidel Castro. Cain could be the "assassin-to-be" whom Giancana referred to in the FBI memo of October 18, 1960 or he could be the contact man for the operation.

(Tie in memo on Cain with Salerno's view which is strongly supported by the evidence, that Cain was the "missing

SECRET

0002163

SECRET

second man" in the Las Vegas wiretap of October 30, 1960. Maheu needs to be questioned on this point.)

Cain continued to "volunteer" information and assistance to the CIA during 1961-1963. In August, 1963, he offered information on the DRE Student Directory in Chicago to that office of the Agency. [redacted]

In September, 1963, Cain reported to the Chicago office of the CIA that DRE was in a deal to purchase a large arms shipment. He was told by the Agency to "get out of the picture", a directive which is subject to several interpretations, including the fact that the CIA was a willing participant in the deal.

Again, on November 27, 1963, Cain, now the Chief Investigator for Cook County Sheriff's office, gave the Agency some information that Oswald was in Chicago in April 1963 with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and had purchased the assassination rifle in March 1963.

2. Recruitment of the Potential Assassin(s)

In describing the putative poisoner, Giancana spoke in October 1960 of a "girl" who was close to Castro while the individual recruited for the CIA pills was Juan Orta, a secretary in Castro's Prime Ministry.

The identity of the "girl" referred to by Giancana can never be ascertained but Trafficante was clearly in the best position to recruit one of Castro's Cuban mistresses due to his multitude of contacts in the Cuban gambling and prostitution circles.

It was common for American gamblers to have Cuban mistresses and Trafficante, Rothman and Tourine were typical examples. Also, one witness told the Committee that Castro was accustomed to arriving at the Nacional Hotel (owned by Mike McLaney) unescorted on a regular basis to visit one of his paramours. Thus, it would have been relatively easy for Trafficante to have arranged for a young woman to service Castro and to attempt to poison him.

(Marita Lorenz is a confusing witness, to say the least, and her potential as a assassin recruited by Frank Sturgis has been previously discussed. However, she was also Charles Tourine's mistress and, thus, could have been solicited to activate the poison plot. Unfortunately, Tourine is totally uncooperative and Lorenz was not asked about her relationship

0002164

SECRET

SECRET

with Tourine in Cuba so that we do not know the dates match.

Comment: Juan Orta, the man identified to the Agency as the gangsters' contact in Castro's inner circle, was presumably enlisted by Trafficante, due to Orta's former receipt of gambling "kickbacks".

One fact is extremely bothersome, however, in attempting to gauge the depth of the mob's sincerity in using Orta to execute the assassination plan. According to the 1967 I.G. Report (p. 28), Orta "lost his position in the Prime Minister's Office on 26 January 1961, while planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and in Washington." According to the official version Orta receipted for the pills in late February-early March 1961 and "kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them". (1967 I.G. Report, p. 27) If the mob was close enough to Orta to have pills smuggled in and out of Cuba, then they had to know that Orta had lost his position of accessibility. The other possibility exists, i.e., that the pills never left the United States and thus were available to give to de Varona when he was brought into the plot.

The question arises, then, as to whether the mob was pursuing their own assassination plot and the CIA operation or, what appears more likely, simply using the Agency for the ulterior motives previously outlined.

Turning to Phase Two of the operation which began in April 1962, the same possibilities exist. If Harvey and O'Connell are correct in assuming that Harvey had walked into an "on-going operation", then it can be assumed that the mob's relationship with de Varona, which pre-dated CIA participation according to FBI memos of 21 December 1960 and 18 January 1961 had continued uninterrupted after the Bay of Pigs. With the resumption of the CIA's participation, funding and material support could, once again, be returned to the Agency although de Varona would continue to deal through his mob contacts, Rosselli and "Maceo".

Due to the loose structure of Phase Two in terms of the ambiguous nature of the operational means of attack, the lack of identity of the potential assassins, the complete reliance of Harvey upon Rosselli's word that activities were actually being carried out, the Agency's lack of interest or ability to corroborate Rosselli's information, the speculation arises that the syndicate was not seriously trying to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the solidification of Soviet influence on Castro's Cuba. Being solid businessmen, Trafficante, Lansky and other Cuba casino owners must have realized that the "golden goose" of Havana had laid its last egg, and that fortunes were to be made elsewhere. Certainly,

0002165

SECRET

SECRET

the evidence shows growing Lansky influence in the Bahamas, Las Vegas, and Trafficante projects in the Dominican Republic, and a new opportunity for ~~belong~~ operations in Florida with the tremendous influx of Cuban exiles. It was also abundantly clear that the new Justice Department program on organized crime would never permit the "wide open" Cuba of the pre-Kennedy era even if Castro and all his Communist associates could be eliminated.

Despite the relatively useless business sense in continuing the assassination attempts against Castro in a substantive way, there still was a percentage in "stringing the Agency along". First, there was no expense to the syndicate because the Agency was providing full logistical support for Varona. Secondly, there was the mounting pressure from the FBI and Justice Department which had to be blunted, if possible. No better weapon to accomplish this goal could be found than to use one agency (CIA) against another (FBI). A brief look at the record shows the employment of this strategy at moments of crisis for those who participated in the plots.

1. Robert Maheu

- Quashing of Long Committee subpoena in 1966. (Interim Report, p. 79, note 3; Interview Edward P. Morgan)
- Solidification of position with CIA and with Hughes Organization. (Hughes was definitely told of the project by Maheu in November 1960 and was himself in an alliance with the CIA which, in fact, occurred later when Maheu was Hughes' principal agent.) (Interim Report, p. 75, note 2; Maheu Senate Testimony ?)
- Dispute with Hughes. See memo 20 May 1971 in Office of Security file on Edward P. Morgan.

2. John Rosselli

- Avoiding criminal prosecution. (Interim Report, p. 85, note 4)
- Use in legal memo in March 1971 to attempt to reduce sentence.
- Attempt to delay deportation hearings with INS which included Jack Anderson's personal intervention with IRS. (See Anderson Interview; CIA Rosselli file; CIA Office of Security file re: Edward P. Morgan)

0002167

SECRET

SECRET

3. Sam Giancana

- October 1960 wiretap in Las Vegas where Giancana got Maheu to "take the heat" for him by claiming the tap was a result of the CIA plots.
- Early 1962, intervention with FNU Farrell of INS re: possible deportation. (See Tab C Rosselli CIA file, stating that only Edwards, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca and Houston know.)
- Attempts to ward off FBI surveillance in 1963. (1967 I.G. Report, p. 129)
- Conversation with Sam Papich on 3 May 1967, Sam commented that Giancana and Rosselli have CIA "over a barrel" because of "that operation". He said that he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about either Rosselli or Giancana because of "their previous activities with your people." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 131)

NOTES RE: JACK ANDERSON
"CASTRO RETALIATION" THEORY

March 3, 1967) Drew Pearson article
March 7, 1967)

Source:

1. 1967 I.G. Report:

- It is quite likely that Rosselli is the source, Morgan the channel, and Anderson and Pearson the recipients. (p. 126)
- We may now assume that Pearson's story is not patched together from nits and pieces picked up here and there. His ultimate source, Rosselli, knows more about certain details than we do, and he evidently has talked. (p. 126)

Impact

The Rosselli- contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports that Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination

0002168

SECRET

SECRET

in retaliation for U. S. attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do (CIA emphasis) know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Garrison may also know this. (p. 127)

Maheu

Does have good reason for not wanting the story aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose his lucrative client, Hughes. There might be some value to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach Morgan and perhaps Rosselli and urge discretion.

-- The Pearson story, which is now causing us so much distress, includes one detail that is only found in Phase Two: the three-man team.

Comment: Not necessarily since Varona was involved in Phase One also, he may have begun the three-man team initially and only briefed Rosselli on the concept in Phase Two or Rosselli just didn't mention the three-man team to Maheu or O'Connell during Phase One.

Comment: In figuring out "ulterior motives" for a leak to Pearson, Agency makes the following point:

-- If protection was what the source was seeking, he could be better assured of getting it by a direct approach to CIA for help. (p. 125)

Since Agency cannot figure an ulterior motive, they decide that Rosselli is drinking too much and talking to Morgan, who is also drinking and talking to Greenspun (and Pearson).

Comment: Drew Pearson has not yet, as far as we know, used two of his best goodies: the story of the pills and the fact of the State Department meeting. (p. 127)

Comment: See p. 112 wherein "Drew Pearson claims to have a report that there was a high-level meeting at the Department of State at which plans for the assassination were discussed."

I.G. speculates that Pearson is talking about the 10 August 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) which was attended by Harvey. (p. 112)

(RFK was not present.)

SECRET

0002169

SECRET

2. Other Sources

a. Memo re: 15 February 1972

DCI aware that Rosselli was going to expose plots. He "decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Rosselli or someone in his behalf furnishing Jack Anderson details of the incident." (Momo in Office of Security file re: Morgan)

3. Memo: 20 May 1971
Subject: Intertel

[redacted] (former CIA), now with Intertel, said Maheu and Anderson together on some oil mix deals...Recent exposure of Anderson re: Maheu's role in the Cuban Revolution was a deliberate exposure instigated by Robert Maheu using his son Peter, as an intermediary. [redacted] theory is that Maheu probably would "scare them off" (i.e., Intertel would not want CIA stuff to embarrass Hughes).

Morgan making noises to certain Hughes officials that they had better take it easy on Maheu because of his past involvement with CIA (Memo in Security file re: Morgan).

4. Memo - 19 November 1970

-- Harvey had contacts with Rosselli in November-December 1967 and January 1968 following Rosselli Conviction.

-- 17 November 1970

Morgan had received a call from Tom Waddin who represented Rosselli that Rosselli faced deportation and would blow story. DCI decided to ignore threat and Maheu agreed.

"Maheu further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity aa it affected him personally."

5. 19 December 1967

-- Series of conversations instigated by Harvey on Rosselli's behalf to get CIA intervention

SECRET

0002170

SECRET

directly or at least discover how good Government case against Rosselli was.

- Calls from Rosselli began in October to Harvey. Rosselli knew what Agency had done for Maheu with Senator Long because Ed Morgan told Rosselli.
- Also, the Director (Helms) had sent Harvey a news clipping re: Agency use of Giancana (presumably the August 1963 Chicago story by Sandy Smith).

Rosselli said that the leak came from Senator Kennedy's office when Kennedy was still Attorney General.

6. Memo 28 April 1967

- O'Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source of Pearson story.
- Maheu admitted telling Morgan some of the Phase One operation due to Agency delaying on Long Committee subpoena.
- Maheu visibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson and asked if he (Maheu) had been identified as the "client" by Morgan because he was afraid of the publicity affecting his relationship with Hughes.
- Maheu denied discussing with Rosselli latter phase of ~~operation~~ and said he had no knowledge of operation after April 1962.
- Rosselli met Morgan through Hank Greenspun in the 1950's.
- Maheu recalled that Morgan and Rosselli met with Garrison in Las Vegas during March 1967. Under the impression that Rosselli seeking legal advice from Morgan but did not know the circumstances.
- Rosselli under pressure from FBI, drinking heavily and had a 19-year-old girl.
- Believed Morgan had done some work for Pearson and did know that Anderson had more than a passing acquaintance with Morgan.

0002171

SECRET

SECRET

-- Morgan also tight with Pat Cayne of NSC.

0002172

SECRET

0002173

(SSC)

In April 1935, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities published their Final Report (Part II) which in essence faulted the CIA and to some extent for its errors of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the Agency's ongoing plots against the revolutionary government in Cuba and ~~its~~ ^{its} attempts on the life of ~~the~~ ^{the} premier, Fidel Castro. The Committee's report is ~~found~~ ^{discussed} on pages 6-7 of its Footnote but one paragraph succinctly sums up their position.

"Senior CIA officials also should have realized that their agency was not utilizing its full capability to investigate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro connections. They should ^{have} realized that CIA operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they directed their subordinates to conduct an ~~extensive~~ ^{extensive} fact-gathering effort from of these vital facts. These officials, whom the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, advised the Warren Commission that the CIA had no

P 7
Foot II

have

SECRET

P 10
1977 ~~Final~~
Report

taken broader initiatives, then,
as well."

Conflicting

to the work of
the Warren
Commission

It is not the purpose of
 this analysis to detail ~~and~~ the
 viewpoints of the SSC and CFA
 with regard to the significance
 of the CFA's Castro assassination
 attempts and to resolve ^{the parties} ~~the~~
 controversy as to ^{the operations} ~~the~~ importance.
~~Rather~~ Instead this paper seeks
 to present a comprehensive
 review of all the facts, drawn from
 a variety of sources, of organized
 crime's involvement or potential
 involvement in CFA operations
 against Cuba during 1960-63.
 Certain inferences and conclusions
~~to~~ will then be drawn upon
 the nature, scope, and motivations
 of ~~the operations~~ of the syndicate
 participants in the operations.

0002109

SECRET

Involvement of Organized Crime in
CIA Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro

SECRET

The genesis of the ^{utilization} ~~use~~ of the United States criminal syndicate of the ~~CIA~~ ^{attempt} to assassinate Castro is of the 1967 Inspector General's Report as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, ~~was~~ Richard Bissell, and the Director of the Office of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards.⁺

[1967 IG Rpt. p. 74; Intern Rpt p 74; sec 20.1] Edwards assigned the specific task of locating the right party to "eliminate" or "assassinate" Castro, to James "Big Jim" O'Connell, who was the Chief of the Special Support Division of the Office of Security. Both men agreed that Robert A. Mahan⁺ who ~~has~~ had been previously utilized by the Agency in several sensitive cover operations, would be employed to recruit the necessary personnel.

⁺ [Mahan's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell are detailed on pp 74-75, Intern Report]

0002181 Although Mahan and O'Connell differ as to who initially brought up John Rosselli's name for consideration there was a meeting between Mahan and Rosselli at the former's duty station in Los Angeles in early September 1960

[Intern Report, p 75]

SECRET

[Comment: Mahan seems the

SECRET

logical person to have thought of and contacted Roselli for several reasons. In an office of Security file on Ed Morgan, Mahan's attorney, there is a memo to the DCP dated 19 November 1970 which reviews the mafia operation. Paragraph 5 states that "Mr. Mahan advised that he had met one John Roselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through other clients, but was given to understand that he was a high ranking member of the syndicate and controlled all the ice-making machines on the Strip. Mahan advised that, if Roselli was in fact a member of the Club, he undoubtedly had extensive dealings with the Cuban gambling interests."

quotes?

0002182

[Comment

Confirmation of ^{see} Mahan - Roselli contact is found in Roselli's FBI file and consists of an alleged telephone call in 1959. [See Roselli write-up]
from Mahan to Roselli

[Comment

date

Mahan and Roselli had mutual contacts in Las Vegas prior to 1950. Mahan sent newspaper, editor of the Las Vegas Sun.]

SECRET

0002183

Rosselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed to a meeting in New York City with Mahan and Council to discuss further details.

[Fitzgerald Report p. 76; Office of Soviet Memo from Morgan file, dated 19 Nov. 1970]

Although the Fitzgerald Report places the meeting at the Playa Hotel on 14 September 1960, Rosselli recalled that the ~~event~~ discussion took place during Castro's visit to the United Nations which began on September 18, 1960.

Comment

Tony de Valona admits going to NYC at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was in contact with Rosselli at this time or [Fitzgerald] de Valona, that his visit had an assassination motivation.

According to a 19 Nov. 1970 memo to the D.C.I., it was at this September meeting in New York City, that Rosselli "agreed to introduce him (Mahan) to a friend, 'Sam Bold', who knew the Cuban crowd."

Comment:

The timing of the introduction of both ~~Sam~~^{Sam} (Bold) and Traffim ("Joe") is ~~an~~ important to the analysis of the "true" role of the mob in the Castro assassination plot. Accordingly

that "Mahan pointed out "bold" to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either "bold" or Joe", the Intern Report divulges this observation by apparently quoting from O'Connell's Senate testimony and stating that "The Support Chief, who was using the name "Tom Jhs," said he had met "Sam" and Joe, once, and then only briefly. S.O.C. 5/30/75, pp 26-29; Intern Report 75

COR-

0002186

Comment
~~Statement~~

Conflicts appear also on ~~a variety of~~ several related minor points surrounding the September 1965 meeting in N.Y.C. and Miami. For instance:

1) Did Roselli know from the beginning that ~~that~~ the operation was CFA?

a) O'Connell stated that Mahan told Roselli that they were representing international business interests where Roselli testified that Mahan told him that O'Connell was CFA (Intern Report 75

Also, footnote 1 on p. 26 indicates that Roselli told O'Connell "about 3 weeks after the New York meeting", which is during the Miami involvement of Bourne, that "I am not kidding, I mean what you work for".

The ingenuity of Roselli's recognition of CFA ~~is~~ ^{SECRET} ~~is~~ ^{is} that it is doubtful if Bourne and Tappan

could have been enlisted unless they could be sure of government protection. This theme will be developed more fully below.

2) Roselli led his Cuban contacts that he was an "agent of some summer interests of Wall Street that had... nicht interests and properties around Cuba... (Roselli, 6/24/75 pp 9, 17)

CF. Jack Anderson column of Jan. 19, 1971, which stated that ⁽⁴⁾ could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy? ... None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings.

Jack Anderson's sources for this article were Roselli and ~~William~~ William Henry, who was not party to the details of Phase F, it is another ^{example} of serious discrepancies between the CIA, Senate, and Anderson versions which all purport to depend, in varying degrees, upon Roselli.

3) The alleged ~~discovery~~ "surprise discovery" by Mahon and Cromwell as to the ^{possible} identification of "Sambo" and "Joe" is really suspect. First, ~~at~~ although it is

possible that the Senate Committee Staff overlooked the ^{specific} Miami newspaper

Sunday supplement (Panda) which purportedly included pictures of ^{prominent} and ^{influential} ~~their~~ ~~activities~~ Mahan and O'Connell ~~etc~~ ~~the~~ the nature of the people with whom they were dealing, it is a relatively easy matter to research Panda magazine for the months of ~~October~~ and November. It would appear that ~~they~~ O'Connell and Mahan were working for an ~~explicit~~ ~~facto~~ reason for continuing the operation after the introduction of two of the top Mafia in the United States. O'Connell testified that his discovery was after "we were up to our ears in it" which is difficult to fathom since the operation was in the ~~sub-spying~~ stage and no ~~file~~ ~~was~~ ~~delivered~~ ~~to~~ ~~him~~ ~~at~~ ~~all~~ until approximately March 1961, ^{whatever the} reason, the Senate staff insists it could not find the Panda ^{file} ⁱⁿ ^{the} ^{Senate} ^{files} ^{at} ^{all}.

7. ^{Whatever the} reason, the Senate staff insists it could not find the Panda ^{file} ⁱⁿ ^{the} ^{Senate} ^{files} ^{at} ^{all}.

The principle in Phase D of the operation ~~was~~ ~~also~~ ~~disagree~~ as to the roles which were to be played by both "Gold" and "Joe" in ~~Phase~~ the pre-Play of Pigeon phase of the operation.

"Although Mahan described Bonnona as playing a "key" role,

0002101

even below Biancanis, ^{He} had been reduced ^{from "courier"} to a mere "translator" and was needed only to facilitate ~~communications~~ ^{communications} between Rosselli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual assassination. In Truffante and Rosselli 1975 and 1977 Congressional appearances done tail, well but remain in contradiction to the ~~my~~ facts as reported in 1973 of the journalists.

they were being

Comment 8

The Senate testimony of Rosselli and Truffante needs to be outlined ~~separately~~ with a view to contrasting the "courier is interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate did not rigorously cross examine either man on this discrepancy nor did ~~they~~ the Defense Report "hint" at the problem.

Once the actors had been assembled for the launching of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the method ~~of~~ to be employed to accomplish the goal. The Army took the simplest, straight forward approach of shooting Castro but this ~~plan~~ ^{SECRET} was rejected

00021.93

which is crucial to the final
 conclusion presented below.
 Secondly, Trappante is identified
 as ~~providing~~ ^{providing} having access to, and
 providing the assassin in Cuba
 which is in consistent with
 his "self-saving" role description
 of "in the pocket". His ability to
 recruit into operations ~~as~~ was
 directly tied to his former
 gambly empire associations
 which formed a constant pattern
 for all his ~~delegated~~ ^{delegated} conduct for Trappante both
 during and after his Cuban days.
 [See Trappante profile]

Comment

note

Speculation concerning this
 arose during the Agency's 1977
 Report when it was forced to
 address a problem raised by
 an April 23, 1975 article, covering
 Frank Stupis, written by Paul
 Marshall of the New York Daily News.
 Stupis was quoted as saying,
 "The third (assassination) scheme
 involved planting a bomb in Castro
 office. I had access to the Rome
 Minister's office," Stupis said, "I knew
 Fiddie's private secretary, Juan de la
 I recruited him to work with the
 Embassy. I ~~know~~ ^{know} Embassy in Havana.
 What was ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~purpose~~ ^{purpose} to the

0002194

writings of the 1977 Report was the fact that Onta's name had surfaced in connection with a Castro assassination plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia connection by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Report references news stories linking Stugis with Truffante and with a "gambling partner" of Truffante, Norman Rothman (see Rothman paper). Coupled with Stugis' ~~other~~ relationships, is the allegation that Stugis had a role in ~~an~~ inspecting the gambling casinos in Cuba on behalf of the Castro government and could have developed an interest with Onta in running gambling "hit pads".

A second aspect of Miskil's ~~the~~ news series concerned a claim by Anita Jorey that she had acted on behalf of Stugis in 1960 in attempt to poison Castro who dove failed with the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum on domestic electronically surveilled currencies in which he stated that "the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' ^{SECRET} some drink or food of Castro" (Memo, Hqs to DCI, SA, DOR, 10/19/60)

The tentative conclusions advanced in the 1977 Report are as follows:

It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities...

Additional considerations:

1. Current syndicate may well have had some independent activities of its own activity prior to CPTA involvement in late 1960. Also, could have been Agency aware of CPTA activities prior in 1962 April
2. Syndicate operators could have had contacts such as those in New York Daily News story in 1975 and 1976.
3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with, but not a member of syndicate. Could well have been used by the syndicate.
4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source. He probably knew Ota in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Ota assumed role of assassin.

If there was an earlier operation in Ota, it was not CPTA; could have been earlier operation of syndicate

Sturgis could have known or been involved in syndicate operation, or picked up gossip from Miami in 1965 after Ota visited there

Neither the 1967 Feb Report
 or the SSC Interim Report can
 pinpoint the precise date on which
 the Agency processed the prison pills
 which O'Connell delivered to Rosselli
 { Interim Report, p 83. The chain of
 custody, according to the 1967 I-O-
 Report ~~was~~ was for the lethal
 pills to be delivered from Rosselli
 to Truffante. Although the next
 intervening steps remain a
 mystery, Rosselli reported to O'Connell
 that the pills had been delivered to
 Ota in Cuba in late February - early
 March 1961 { Interim Rpt, p 27; Interim Rpt p 8

Comment:

The Senate Interim Report reported
 the version of Joe Shimon ~~whose~~
~~story~~ whose memory was that the
 money and pills for the operation were
 delivered at a meeting at the Fontainebleau
 Hotel on March 12, 1961 attended by
 "Mahan, Rosselli, Truffante, and the
 Cubans." { Interim Rpt p 15. Shimon's
~~memory~~ story is filled with
 vivid ~~and~~ details which are documented
 on p 2 of the Report, but his credibility
 is subject to serious question as
 his account is not shared by
 anyone else connected with the plan
 and nor is his relationship with

SECRET

0002198 Roselli, broncano, or Trafficante appear as "copy" as he would lead me to believe.

It is also apparent that Shuman was a source for ~~John~~ ~~William~~ column of January 9, 1961, which fixed the date of the passage of the poison at the Fontainebleau ^{by Roselli} as March 13, 1961, and contained the report that Castro became ill a few ~~days~~ weeks later.

The real problem with Shuman's story is that the pills were returned to the CIA for a few weeks because Ota could or would not, attempt the poisoning; a fact apparently unknown to Shuman before his "leak" to ~~William~~ and his Senate testimony.]

Comment

One additional fact concerning Ota's inability to carry out the mission ties in with the final lines of this report. Ota lost his position in Castro's office on 26 January 1961, while ~~the~~ planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and Washington.

It would seem though, that the gangster did know that Ota had already lost his access to Castro [~~1967~~ ~~5~~ Report p. 27]

SECRET

0002199

With the failure of Onto
 to produce the desired results,
 the project was at a standstill
 until, once again, Santos Truffante
 assumed command. Roselli has
 stated that "Truffante believed
 a certain leading figure in
 the Cuban exile movement ~~was~~ might
 be able to accomplish the mission."
 [File 1167 PB Ex 10 29, Parker Pgs 88]

Comment:

The exile leader was, of course
 Tony de Varona, ~~the~~
 who was the subject of speculation
 in an FBI memorandum of 11 June 1961
 connecting him with receiving financial
 aid from American agencies for
 anti-Castro activities which were
 the CIA operation.

At the time of his introduction
 into the CIA mob jobs, de Varona was already
 being funded by the Agency through
 the Revolutionary Front and was being
 involved in CIA planning for the
 Bay of Pigs invasion which was
 imminent.

De Varona was also ^{being} exposed
 by Mike McKernan whose ~~admission~~
 agency was ~~not~~ engaged in
 promoting Varona's image in
 collaboration with McKernan from

SECRET

in 1960-61

0002260 ^{to} "Cullini" or "Chullo" Mendezal Mendez
is described in Trappenberg's FBI files
as a close Cuban associate.

Completing the picture of
support for Varona in the promotion
efforts of the Dins and Eddie
Cullini, McHenry and Ramsey Busenick,
associated, who were reportedly
working through a Washington DC,
public relations firm, Edward
& Moss and Associates. Moss had



was supposed acting as a courier
for funds supplied by the Cullini
benefactors with the understanding
that their group would receive
"privileged treatment" in the
Cuba of the future. Attempts
to verify these reports were
unsuccessful [1967 FBI Report
p 30]

The Ramsey influence
using the Cullini brothers as a
"front" is particularly interesting
in light of Varona's admission
that Jorge Pujol arranged a
meeting in Miami in ~~the summer of~~
1960 wherein Ramsey offered to
financially "back" Varona's
efforts to ~~assist~~ "educate"
the Cuban people about Castro,
which may be a euphemism for
anti-Castro plots. [See Varona transcript

77-1

0002201

The logical inference to be drawn is that both the Agency ~~and~~ ^{and} other persons interested in removing the Castro regime, had settled upon de Vanna, as an individual who had the potential of uniting the ~~various~~ ^{various} multitudes of exile groups who were in a continued infernal feud. de Vanna was understandably pleased to permit both the U.S.

government and criminal syndicate to offer him support and asked no questions as to the source of the funds or the motives of his benefactors

(See Vanna testimony -)

Although de Vanna has no ^{specific} memory of meeting Truffante, the Tampa crowd has admitted that he acted as an "intermediary" in several meetings attended by de Vanna, Rosselli, Casanova, and other exiles. These meetings were arranged by Rafael, "Macho" Jener, a Truffante's former partner from Havana who continued to serve Truffante in Miami during the 1950s. Truffante claimed that Rosselli had previously recruited Jener but this appears unlikely in view of Truffante's long-standing ^{SECRET} friendship with Jener on Cuba. And Rosselli's admission to

7
810

SECRET

0002203

attempt, (Ortiz) was made. He was also positive that he delivered both pills, money and supplies to de Vaura which is corroborated by O'Connell ~~points~~ during 1961. The conflict is resolved by the Senate in speculation that only one pre-Opay of Pigs attempt was made, and that... [de Vaura] was the contact in the United States who arranged for... [Ortiz]... to administer the poison.

Comment

There appears to be no factual way to resolve de Vaura's initial contribution to the poison attempts especially since Vaura denies ever having received poison pills from Roselli or being involved in any attempt on Castro's life at any time. (See Vaura transcript)

Comment

The Agency was aware of the possible dangers inherent in having de Vaura participate in the m's plots [redacted]

However, "Steph ^{was} stated to end his participation in the syndicate plan but [they] were apparently ineffective" (W.I.C. Report, p 32)

SECRET

Phase II

The debacle which marked the mid-April 1961 Bay of Pigs effort, curtailed CIA efforts with the mob to assassinate Castro, but it was not until April 1962, when Bill Harvey assumed Agency responsibility for the task, were efforts made to re-establish contact with Roselli.

However, the fact that the Agency was squeamish during the Bay of Pigs aftermath to continue to try to kill Castro, does not mean that the mob shared their opinion. Indeed, both Harvey and Council swore that Harvey "took over a going operation". I.E.O. Rept p 3. The exact details of what that operation might have been ~~cannot be discerned~~ has not been uncovered, but Roselli's ability to regenerate his forces ~~was~~ in response to Harvey's contact in April 1962 was immediate. Once again the ubiquitous ~~de Vanna~~ was to provide the ~~individuals~~ who would carry the lethal poison into Cuba.

However, there were some significant ~~important~~ differences between Phase One and Phase Two of the operation which bear upon the ultimate question of the mob's motivation and

GOC2205

success in carrying out their part of the bargain struck in 1960 with the Agency.

Fact In Phase One, Rosselli et al had demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro to succeed. In contrast, the details of the matter operated and the ability of the ~~source~~ ^{perpetrator} assassin was deliberately vague. After ~~Harry~~ Harry contacted Rosselli in Miami in April 1962, Harry reported that "the manner in which the actual material was to be introduced into Castro's food & water involved an asset of someone who had access to someone in a ^{restaurant} restaurant frequented by Castro." By June 1962 after the Vienna had received money and munitions from the GOMWAR station and had presumably sent the goods into Cuba, ~~the~~ "Rosselli" reported to Harry on 21 June that Vienna had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harry said that they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited will to make the attempt - perhaps using the pills. Harry never heard

their names or anything about them"
 [1967 DO Report P 513]

Comment

As the 1967 DO author correctly observed, Harvey's tale of the "Favorite restaurant" poisoning apparently ~~was the same plan that Edward~~ was familiar in "that Edward had decided precisely the same plan". The fact that Vauma related the exact words of Edward to Harvey as he had discussed with Edward in Phase One (circa 1960 - mid 1961) leads to the possibilities that:

- (1) Harvey was correct in assuming that he was taking over an ongoing operation in April 1962 or
- (2) the plot had been underway at Vauma before, during, and after the Bay of Pigs and prompted the CIA to provide logistical support and future protection against the Justice Department; or
- (3) de Vauma was simply making up a story for the Agency to gain ^{their} financial backing or in response to directives from organized crime.

Second

the cost of underworld

character changed. Harry had insisted that Mahon and someone be dropped from the operation which Roselli readily acceded to. Traffante's "infiltration" role was assumed by "Marco", a mysterious "Cuban who spoke Italian" and who sometimes used the name Juan Bonny and today.

Comment

"Marco" introduction into one of the most sensitive CIA covert actions in history without any attempt ^{by the Agency} to check his background or to ascertain his identity is extraordinary. Yet, the Agency apparently with ~~the~~ ^{approval} of the top brass in the United States without doing any basic background security investigation.

Although the 1975 Report characterizes Marco as "Roselli's man", it is probable that this individual was ~~never~~ drafted by Traffante who had provided all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who still possessed, in 1962, the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba.

SECRET

0002208

?

termination of the CPA -
 mafia ^{was} plots slow and undramatic
 Roselli, in May 1962, reported to
 Hany that the plots are given which
 had been delivered to Varma in Miami
 in April had served in Cuba, and an
 three-man team had been dispatched
 in June to execute the plan [Inform Report
 p845]

unidentified

7.

During September 1962, ~~and~~ Roselli
 related to Hany that de Varma ~~cross~~
 readying a second three-man team
 who were "supposedly military men
 whose assignment was to penetrate
 Castro's body guard. During this period
 the 'medicene' was reported as still in
 place and the three men of the first
 team safe [1967 Inform Report, p515]
 However, the second team never
 made Cuba and a series of alibis
 were constructed during December and
 January 1963. Nevertheless, de Varma
 supposedly collected \$200 for the maintenance
 of these individuals from Roselli
 who had received the payment from
 Hany. [1967 Inform Report p525]

supposedly

In mid-July 1963 both
 Hany and Roselli agreed that "nothing
 was happening and that there was
 not much chance that anything would
 happen in the future" [1967 Inform Report p525]
 Roselli was instructed to ease
 his way out of touch with
 Varma ~~whom~~ ~~he~~ ~~was~~ ~~supposedly~~ ~~did~~.
 The last meeting between Hany

SECRET

0002209

and Roselli occurred in Washington
D.C. in June 1963. when he was
Haver's ~~guest~~ overnight guest. Hence
their meeting ostensibly was not directly
related to any assassination plots.

SECRET

CONCLUSION

SECRET

0002210

in part,

The available evidence suggests ~~that~~ the thesis which is tacitly assumed by the Agency in its 1977 internal Directorate Periodic Report wherein it states that, "It is possible that CIA singly found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way. ... In a ~~sense~~ ^{sense}, CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate, and, in addition to its material contributions, was also supplying an aura of official sanction." [1977 PB Rpt p 208]

The relevant evidence is as follows:

1. FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 re Biancana ET SUR:

... Biancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's announcement would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the mission to be on three occasions. ... Biancana claimed that everything has been perfected for the benefit of Castro, and that the mission had arranged with a girl, not further named, to drop a "girl" in some boat or food of Castro. [1977 PB Rpt p 195]

Comment

SECRET notes of

Although the central meetings between Mahon, Prindle, and Biancana

SECRET

are subject to different interpretations,

it is clear that no plans were finalized between the parties ~~by~~ until some time after October 1960. The date of the ^{FAPS} intercepted conversation between Biancana.

The grain pills prepared by the CIA at Biancana's request were not ready for delivery until late July - early March 1961, so that it is difficult to see how Biancana's November 1960 assassination plot could be a part of the CIA operation. Rather, it appears that the mob had its own plan in progress, using a mixture of Castro, to accomplish the deed, when the CIA fortuitously happened along to offer its support.

intrepid

The mob was then in a perfect position. If their ~~private~~ private plot actually worked and Castro died, then the syndicate had enormous blackmail potential against the CIA which it could exercise at the opportune moment. However, if their ~~plot~~ back-fired, then their position ~~was~~ would be that they were only attempting to violate the wishes of their Government.

Additional Comment

The notion of Biancana's "hired hand" Richard Cain ~~was~~ not to raise some interesting possibilities. Brian Cairns Admison

SECRET

0002212

to the FBI that he had ~~been~~ joined the Chicago Police Department and Sheriff's office while on ~~prisoner's~~ payroll. Cain's approach to ~~the~~ the CPTA Chicago office in the fall of 1960 to volunteer ~~his services~~ information on the Cuban community appears ~~as a little more than~~ ^{a little more than} coincidental. Then when FBI files disclose that he is planning to go to Cuba for Life magazine (and on stay), and to "buy" influential Cubans in Havana ostensibly for ~~at~~ ^{at} Pedro Prio (second stay) the coincidence becomes more suspect. The suspicion is that Cain was being sent by someone to supervise the poisoning attempt on Fidel Castro. Cain called ~~me~~ the "arranger to be" when someone refused to in ~~the~~ ^{the} CPTA, 1960 or he could be the contact man for the operation.

[Tie in memo on Cain with Salinas' view which is ~~by~~ strongly supportive of the evidence, that Cain was the "missing second man" in the ~~Los Vegas~~ writing of Oct 30, 1960. Mahan needs to be questioned on this point]

Cain continued to "volunteer" information and assistance to the CPTA during 1961-1963. In August 1963, he offered information on the DRE Student Directory in Chicago to the office of the Agency.

0002212

In September 1963, Cain reported to the Chicago office of the CIA that DRB was in a deal to purchase a large arms shipment. He was told by the Agency to "get out of the picture" ~~with~~ a directive which is subject to periodical updates. It includes the fact that the CIA was a willing participant in the deal. Again, on November 27, 1963, Cain, now the chief investigator for CIA, Cooney Sheriff's office, gave the Agency some information that Oswald was in ~~the~~ Chicago in Sept 1963 with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and had purchased the mass murderer rifle in March 1963.

2. Recruitment of ~~the~~ ^{the potential} Assassins

In describing the putative poisoner, ^{in October 1960} Brannana spoke of a "girl" who was close to Castro while the individual recruited for the CIA pills was Juan Ota, a secretary in Castro's Prime Ministry.

The identity of the "girl" referred to by Brannana can never be ascertained but Trafficante was clearly in the best position to recruit ~~the~~ ^{one of} Castro's Cuban ministers due to his multitude of contacts in the Cuban gambling and publication circles.

000221A

It was common for American gangsters to have Cuban mistresses and Trafficante, Rottman, and Tourene were typical examples. Also, one woman got the committee that Castro was accustomed to arriving at the Nacional Hotel (owned by Mike McManis) came on a regular basis to visit one of his paramours. Thus, it would have been relatively easy for Trafficante to have arranged for a young woman to serve Castro and to attempt to poison him.

El Maria Torony is a complicitous witness, to say the least, and her potential as an assassin recruited by Frank Stupin has been previously discussed. However, one interesting point is that she was also Thelma Tourene's mistress and, thus, would have been solicited to activate the poison plot. Unfortunately, Torony is totally uncooperative and Torony was not asked about her relationship with Tourene in Cuba so that we do not know the dated match.

Comment

— Juan Orta, the man identified to the Agency as the gangster's contact in Castro's inner circle, was presumably involved by Trafficante, but to date former receipt of gangster "handouts". One fact is extremely bothersome however, in attempting to gauge the depth of the mob's security in using Orta to execute the assassination plan. According to the 1962 FO Report 1962

Ota "lost his position in the Prime Minister's Office in early 1961, which played for the operation was still going on in Miami and in Wash DC". Acordy to the official version Ota accepted for the pills in late Feb - early March 1961 and kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them" [1967 FBI Rpt p 273]

7.7. If the mob was close enough to Ota to have pills smuggled in and out of Cuba, then they had to know that Ota had lost his position of necessity. The other possibility is that the pills were left in the US and then were available to him at a time when he was brought into the plot.

The question arises then, as to whether the mob was pursuing their own assassination plot and the CIA operation or, what appears more likely, simply using the going for its ulterior motives previously outlined.

Turning to Phase II of the operation which began in April 1962, ~~there is~~ the same possibilities exist. If Kany and Conrad are correct in assuming that Kany had walked into an "ongoing operation, then ~~it is~~ it can be assumed that the mob's relationship with de Verna, which per the CIA participation account is the FBI Ministry 21 Dec 1960, and 18 Jan 1961 had continued uninterrupted after the Bay of Pigs ~~with~~ the revolution.

it can

0002217 business sense in continuing the paramilitary attempts against Castro in a subterranean way. There still was a percentage in "stringing the Agency along." First, there was no expense to the syndicate because the Agency was provided full logistical support for Vietnam. Second, there was the mounting pressure from the ~~State~~ FBI and Justice Department which had to be blunted, if possible. No better weapon to accomplish this goal could be found than to use one agency (CIA) against another (FBI). A brief look at the record shows the employment of ~~the~~ strategy ~~at~~ at moments of crisis for those who participated in the plots.

1. Robert Mahon

- Quarry of Long Committee subpoena in 1966 [Intern Report, p 79, note 3; Intern ^{Edward} _{P Morgan}
- solidification of position with CIA and with Hughes Department [Hughes was definitely told of the project of Mahon in Nov. 1960, and was himself involved in an alliance with the CIA which in fact, occurred later when Mahon was Hughes' principal agent] [Intern Report, p 75, note 2; Mahon ^{Sancti} _{Torture} ?]
- Dispute with Hughes; See memo 20 May 1971 on office of Secy ^{File on Edward P Morgan}

2. John Roselli

- evading criminal prosecution [Intern Report, p 55, note 4]
- use in ~~legal~~ moves in March 1971 to attempt to reduce espionage
- ~~was~~ attempts to delay deportation hearing with DV's which included

0002218

Jack Anderson's journal intervention
with PR 5 (See Anderson interview, and
CFA Roselli file; ~~see~~ CFA office
of Security full re Edward P. Morgan.)

3. Sam Giancana

- October 1960 wiretap in Las Vegas
where Giancana got message to take the heat
for him by turning the tap was a
result of the CFA plots.

- Early 1962, intervention with FIVE
Farrell of FNS re possible deportations
[See Tab C, Roselli CFA File,
stating that ref. E. Swab, Osborn, Stephen
Locca, & Houston know.]

- attempts to ward off FBI surveillance
in 1963 & 1967 F.B. Report p 129]

- Conversation with Sam Pupich
on 3 May 1967, Sam comments that
Roselli and Giancana have CFA
'over a barrel' because of "that operation".
He said that he doubted that the FBI
would be able to do anything about either
Roselli or Giancana because of their
previous activities with your people."

(1967 F.B. Rpt p 137)

SECRET

Notes re Jack Anderson
"Castro Retaliation" theory

0002219

March 3, 1967 }
March 7, 1967 } Drew Pearson Office

Source:

1967 I.O. Report:

1) It is quite likely that Rosselli is the source, Morgan the channel, and Andum and Pearson the recipients
(p 120)

- We may now assume that Pearson's story is not patched together from bits and pieces picked up here and there. His ultimate source Rosselli, knows more about certain details than we do, and he evidently has talked

(p 120)

- Fraguet

The Russell-Burnham contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly interesting. It lends substance to reports that Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination in retaliation for US attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do (CIA emphasis) know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Burnham may also know this (p 121)

- Mahan

SECRET

does have good reasons not wanting the story aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose his secret source

SECRET

092221

Client, Hughes. There might be some value to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach Morgan and perhaps Roselli and urge discussion

- The Pearson story, which is now carrying so much distress, includes one detail that is not found in Phase Two: the three-man team
Comment

Not necessary since Pearson was involved in Phase One also, he may have begun the 3 man team initially and may have used Roselli on the concept in Phase Two or Roselli just didn't mention the 3 man team to Mahan or O'Connell during Phase 5
Comment

- In figuring out 'ulterior motives' for a leak to Pearson, Agency makes the following point -

If protection was what the source was seeking, he could be better assured of getting it by a direct approach to CIA for help Eq 12:

Since Agency can figure an ulterior motive, they decide that Roselli is drinking too much and ~~is~~ talking to Morgan who is also drinking and talking to newspaper & Pearson

Comment

SECRET

Don Pearson has not yet, as far as we know, used two of his best gordies: the story of the job

and the fact of the State Dept. meeting.
SECRET
GOC2227
P 1275
Comment

See p 112 wherein "Drew Pearson claims to have a report that there was a high-level meeting at the Dept of State at which plans for the assassination were discussed."

I.e. speculate that Pearson is talking about the 10 September meeting of the Special Group (Soyuzdetfilm) which was attended by Harvey. (p 112)
E R F K was not present

2. Other Sources

a) Memo re 15 Feb 1972

DCP aware that Russell's was going to expose plots. He "decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Russell or someone on his behalf furnishing Jack Anderson details of the incident."

(Memo in office of Security File re Morgan)

3. Memo: 20 May 1971

Subject: Internal

Mr [redacted] [former CIA] saw with [redacted] said Mubari & Ibrahim together on some oil mix deal. ... Recent exposure of Ibrahim re Mubari oil on the Cuban Revolution was a deliberate exposure instigated by Robert Mubari using his son Peter, an oil intermediary.

theory is that Mahan probably thought that such publicity would "scare them off" (re. Felt's w/ a new CIA staff to interview Hughes).

-Magan makes notes to caution Hughes officials that they had better take it easy on Mahan because of his past involvement with CIA
 E Memo in Security File re Magan

4. Memo 19 Nov 1970

7
 7
 - Harry had contacts with Roselli in November - December 1967 and January 1968 following Roselli's conversion.
 - 17 Nov 1970

Magan had received a call from Tom Wadden who requested Roselli that Roselli find deportation and would slow stop. DCP decided to ignore threat and Mahan agreed.

"Mahan further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it affected him personally."

5. 19 Dec. 1967

- Series of conversations instigated by Harry on Roselli's behalf to get CIA interested directly or at least discover how good court case against Roselli was.

- Calls from Roselli began on October 6 Harry. Roselli knew that Harry had done for Mahan with Sen. Long because Ed Magan told

Roselli

- Also, the Director Belmont had sent Harry a news clipping re Agency use of binoculars (primarily the Bryant 1963 Chicago story of Sandy Smith)

Roselli said the leak came from Senator Kennedy's office where Kennedy was still Acting General.

6. Memo 28 April 1967

- J. Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source of Rumson story

- Mahan admitted Kelly Morgan some of the Phase 7 operation but to Agency delaying on long committee subpoenas

- Mahan visibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson and asked if he (Mahan) had been identified as the "client" by Morgan because he was aware of the propriety of the relationship with Hayes. with Roselli

- Mahan denied document latter phase of Rumson & said he had no knowledge of operation after April 1962

- Roselli met Morgan through Kent Reenspurn in the 1950's

- Mahan recalled that Morgan and Roselli met with Gamm in Las Vegas during March 1967. Under the impression that Roselli sought legal advice from Morgan but did not know the circumstances

- Roselli under pressure from FBI during hearing had a 19 yr old girl

- Beland Morgan had done some

SECRET

work for Pearson and did believe
that Anderson had more than a
passing acquaintance with Morgan.
- Morgan also fought with
Pat Coyne of N 82

SECRET

John Handman
Review of Office of Security File

SECRET

Jan 16th

15 Jan 1977

0002225

Memo re request of Dade City
investigator for information on
8 Cubans:

1. a. Ramon Dom Estevan
- b. Rolando Masferrer Rojas
- c. Luciano Nieves
- d. Jose de la Torre
- e. Jose Quintana
- f. Joaquin Antonio Cortijo
- g. Manuel Artimes
- h. M.L.H.

2. Two of the 3 Cubans mentioned in
Roselli (SSCP) testimony.

Two names mentioned in a Dec
1970 Office of Security memo.

v. No background investigation done on
Roselli or Brancusa

vi. Sporadic contacts, direct and indirect
between Roselli & Agency officials requested
approx. 1971.

vii. O'Connell has always been informed
by Dade City.

viii. Office of Security has no such
evidence that Cuban Fulbrights have ever
been involved or Cuban agents in Miami area
during time of his death.

SECRET

0002225

Nieves

c. Released in March 1965 after serving approx 16 months of a 20 yr sentence for anti-Castro plot; went to Spain briefly where he was of interest to [redacted]

- August 1965 entered US
- Nov 1965 to Jan 1966 of operational interest to DDO

Shannon

He is mentioned in the John Roselli file as a personal friend of Roselli. It is further noted that Shannon knew Roselli but nature & extent of their official/social relationship is unknown

30 August 1970 report by S/A Edward C. Rudiger, [redacted] [redacted]

- Cuban contacts of Roselli

1. Juan Ota

was an official of the Castro Govt circa 1960-61 and was a contact of Santos Trafficante. Ota was reportedly selected by Trafficante to make the assassination attempt against Castro.

2. Tony Varona

When Juan Ota was not successful in carrying out the mission against Castro, Trafficante suggested Varona be used. Roselli contacted Varona. Varona was to use

assets of his son to carry out the mission. Varona also reportedly used his son, in-laws to assist him in this effort but there is no identifying info in regard to the mission.

3. Roselli had a man, also presumably in Miami, known to Harvey as "Maceo", who also used the names Garcia Gomez and Godoy. Harvey was unable to identify Maceo, who was described as Cuban who spoke Italian.

517-339-3523
 F. No info in regard to death or welfare parents agent Roselli or Cuban in G/L or Mexico, Panama - Trawl, SUMON, or Magon in G/L

3. Memo 15 Feb 1972

4. This Agency was aware that Roselli intended to expose his participation in the plot should we not intervene on his behalf. The DCP decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that might occur by the presence of his stay. This was subsequently done by Roselli or someone on his behalf furnishing Jack & William details of the incident.

0002229

Memo 20 May 1971

Subject: Enter Tel

OPS

Magan had been engaged by Hughes Tool during the Mahan efforts. He [redacted] [former spy] and [redacted] now, said Magan may advise to certain people officials, but they had better take it easy on Mahan because of his past involvement w/ CFT

[redacted] in 1962-64 was in touch w/ Mahan & [redacted] working out details

[redacted]

For past several Magan had been quite [redacted]

In May 10, 1971 [redacted] said Mahan

[redacted] were involved together in some [redacted] deals. I would [redacted] into this [redacted]

[redacted]

0002239

19 Nov 1970

For: DCI
Subj: Roselli, Johnny

2. In August 1969, Mr. Richard M. Bissell advised
Col. Jeffrey Edwards to inform if the office of
Security had assets that may assist in a
sensitive mission requiring gaseous-type
action. The mission target was Fidel Castro

5. Mr. Mahan advised that he had met
one J R on several occasions while visiting
He did know him casually for a while, but
was given to understand that he was a
high ranking member of the 'syndicate' and
all of the old money members on the staff.

Mahan seemed that, if R was in fact a
member of the club, he undoubtedly
had connections leading into the Cuban
gaseous units.

6. Mahan to approach R who knew M as a per
son. hardly private's frequent.

7. Pitch made on 14 Sept 1960 at Hilton Plaza
His initial reaction was to avoid getting involved
but, for M's purpose, he agreed to introduce
him to a friend Sam Gold who knew the
Cuban crowd." No money required or paid.

8. During the week of 25 Sept, Mahan
introduced to Sam Stagg at the Fontainebleau
It was several weeks after his meeting
with Sam and Joe, who was assigned

SECRET

0002232

to him [redacted] operating between Havana & Miami that he saw photos in Sunday "Supplement" of Parade 9. In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing this mission Sam suggested that they not resort to ferreting out if he could be furnished some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink, it would be a much more effective operation. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving back-back payments from the quarterly amounts, who still had access to Castro and was in a financial bind.

11. Joe delivered the pills to Orta. After several weeks of reported attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet & was kicked out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts without success.

12. Joe then indicated that Dr. Gregory Vroman had become disappointed w/ the apparent intellectual prowess of the Orta and was willing to handle the mission thru his own resources.

13. He asked, as a prerequisite to the deal, that he may be given \$10,000 for organizational expenses & \$100 for compensation.

7 Feb 62

SECRET

scout boyd R.F.K on ~~circumstances~~ ^{ways up} to make ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ report on work. At our agent ~~proceeds~~ ^{dropped}

17. May 1962 Harry told me as Case officer it is not known by this office whether R was used ~~openly~~ ^{fully} from that point on

0002233

17. [Redacted]

18. 2 Dec 1968 R advised of FIAS on.

19. Harry reported to office of ~~my~~ ^{my} his contacts w/ R in Nov - Dec 1967 & Jan 1968. It was his belief that John was ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ contact with the Agency ~~for~~ ^{for} assistance in deportation unless he actually found deportation. R expressed confidence that he would win an appeal.

20. 17 Nov 1970.

Mahn called O Connell to advise that Mahan's attorney, Ed Morgan, had received a call from Tom Wadden who stated appeal exhausted & R faced deportation.

If someone did interfere on R's behalf, he would make a complete expose of his activities in Agency

21. 18 Nov 1970. DCF lawyer's direct not to arrest R. Mahan was so pleased by Agency's position & he was a complete opponent w/ our stand. He further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity in it ~~appearing~~ ^{publicly}.

London 18/11/70

to attorney's ~~should~~ ^{just} ~~letter~~ ^{letter} on a

SECRET

rooftop; last of Feb or first of March 1963
 CLO2233: March 13, 1961 R delivered capsules to his
 contact at Fontanelle
 - a few weeks later contact ill

Feb 23, 1971

Once he called on the racket boss
 Sam Giancana to line up a contact.
 The confidential files report that he had
 "gambly interest and an interest in the
 slump business in Cuba". However, the
 Chi gangster tests no direct part in the
 assassin plot.

19 Dec 1967.

Memo For Record

Telephone conversation Harry & Howard Osborn
 2. The first revealed Dir of Security
 the subject of our last Sunday conversation
 re J.R. the validity of the Justice Dept case
 against him; & whether or not the Agency plans
 to consider any possible information on
 his behalf

3. Harry indicated that he thought the
 policy of "sitting tight" might be alright,
 but that he felt it would be a simple
 matter for the Dir to see Howard personally
 & determine on an unopposed, one-off basis
 what actual case the Justice Dept had.

Osborn - speculates Harry might
 find out validity of case for purpose of
 (Harry to work for Osborn)

SECRET

Page 0002234
not in this folder

0002236

11 Dec 1967

1. Harry reported London meeting w/ Pagan on 8th Dec. & Osborn on Dec 9th
2. 20 Nov. 1967 R calls Harry who met him at Madison Hotel for 3 hrs.
- 27 Nov, they "bumped" into Tom Pugh's Harry called R as "Mr. Ralston."
- 28 Nov. spent 11 hours at Bethesda County Club.
4. Harry to Harry, R in town to see Morgan re a radio station in San Jose. Not would re visit which he brought. - R said he had not seen someone since 1965 (Papich checking & may respond to Harry)
- R I/n state or imply that he wanted help from Agency.
6. Golly told Harry re London meeting w/ Col. Edwards in 1964 & they met w/ 'Council' had w/ Madu & R in Cal when he refused your duty in France.
7. Harry insists that he must know status of case. If it is a good case, Harry feels the Agency must exert influence to have the matter "handled". If it is not a good case, Harry will tell Golly & he will walk it over.
10. Harry independent as negotiator his interest was more than to protect Agency

SECRET

0002237

He had my the highest regard for ~~Harry~~
and the way we had handled his problem.

8 Nov 1967

2. Harry is source

R called on Oct 27th & 27th. but
Harry refused to answer R's attorney

- R wondered why ~~Harry~~ would not
do as much for him as it did for ~~Mahm~~.
Ed Morgan knew what ~~Harry~~ did for ~~Mahm~~
w/ Sen. Long & had told ~~John~~ about this.

4 Oct 67

Osborn & Harry at lunch.

- R quite vehement & bitter re
Mahm indirectly Mahm would "sell anyone
down the river to protect his interest."

- Dor had sent Harry news clipping
re use of banana. R said leak came
from Sen. Kennedy office when ~~he~~ was still ~~to~~

Eye on Mahm

28 April 67

1. ~~Conrad~~ - ~~Wagner~~ allegedly contacted some high level
officials in art indirectly he had a client
who had been involved in an ~~operation~~.

~~Wagner~~ ~~recalled~~ & said he had told ~~Wagner~~
when ~~Harry~~ ~~delivered~~ on Long subpoena.

2. Mahm possibly upset to find if he
had been identified as client source

0002238

publicly on his relationship w/ Hayes.
5. No knowledge of mission after April 1961
& never discussed latter phases w/ R
6. Mahan - R met Magan thru Pearson
in 1950's when Magan was legal work
for Lee Kuan Yew.

R & Magan in Vegas some time in
March. Jim Cannon in town "it was Mahan's
recollection that these individuals spent
some time together. He was under the
impression that they sought legal advice
from Magan but did not know nature of their
conversations.

7. Claude R had daughter rapidly
dwindling; 14 yr old girl & account of ^{Sheriff} ~~her~~
for father to register. R pretty promise
for Mahan to hire his funds.

8. Believed Magan had done some
work for Pearson & did know that Friedman
had more than a passing acquaintance w/
Magan.

Magan fight w/ Pat Coyne for
NSA.

9. Knows Jolly heavy problem at the
FBI but don't know details.

10. It is evident that Mahan is deeply
concerned about possibility of being identified
w/ Castro project. but placed cooperation in
a heavy context

1002239

Sen Long Mahan

S. Shonker, Long's personal staff, told me
that Mahan would be here.

7 June 66

Mahan reported by Morgan in detail
w/ St. Louis staff, a personal friend of Long,
re Mahan's appearance.

3. Fensterwald. had identified some
names, etc by name to O'Connell &
Col. Edwards.

In the case of Sam, Ed Dubois
& a couple of his technicians now were
of Mahan's file-in w/ Francisco.

31 May 1966

Mahan asked if "Sam grant" was in
the unit

12. Morgan had advised Mahan that he
knew Long's personal staff who exerts great
influence on Long. They flew to St. Louis
& then the 3 men flew to D.C. & met
w/ Long & Fensterwald. Fensterwald
wanted Mahan as his "ace in the hole"
so that Mahan's contacts have great appeal
for T.V. He said that Mahan was not just
enough to make a deal. Under Long's eye
14. Fensterwald would proceed

13. Mahan claims some of Long's

SECRET

Sam thru a series of circumstances
that will proceed at our request.
The Hon. R.B. RFX was orally
briefed on the background that led up
to Mahan's involvement & a Top Secret
document furnished to Justice Dept
which served as a backup of the
copy

000000

000000

July 14

1967 Feb Rpt

0002242

SECRET

P3

Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing Govt attitude toward the Cuban reg.

a. Prior to August 1960

All of the identifiable schemes prior to Aug 1960, w/ one possible exception, were aimed only at directly curtailing Kennedy's freedom or by delaying his appearance

b. August 1960 to April 1961

Plots aggressive pursued; views of at least some of participants as one aspect of effort to overthrow regime ultimately in BOB

c. April 1961 to late 1961

Major scheme begun Bay of Pigs was called off after BOB's removal pursuant to secret agreement

d. Late 1961 to late 1962

Particular scheme reactivated in early 1962 & pushed vigorously in era of Kennedy

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After missile crisis & collapse of Project Mongoose, aggressive scheme began Aug. 60; revised in April 1962; were finally terminated in early 1963

P6

Drew Pearson column of 2 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Castro.

He also has info:

- a) State Dept meeting at which assassination discussed
- b) team actually landed in Cuba w/ gifts

SECRET

5. If syndicate identity is now
questioned, tends to reinforce thought
that details named above have
character of diversion or security device
CIA Oct 1942 report.

per Ford Report requires that sub-
plots have no relation to a previous
theory

Ruby - Traffante

1 thru Report Assassination Proposals

5 report messages were identified that
made reference to plans to kill Castro or
proposing such action. Three of the
messages related to the same operator
the other two relating to separate
proposals; there is no indication
that any of these proposals were the
result of CIA initiative.

[MARONC/5] viewed 29 May 1942
and was viewed 30 August 42. He has
been reported as never admitting that
he was a CIA agent. His name not
given to me. Three other were

0002243

SECRET

AMKASH

COC2244

SECRET

SSC

1) inferre that AMKASH a custo agent
with the mission of providing a plot agent list
so that custo had participation for release;

or

2) AMKASH so intricate the details could have
been known thru providing custo

whats should have been reported to US

Agony - the character of the relationship
between CIA and AMKASH, prior to Oswald
murder of President Kennedy, was so insular
and in confidence that it would not have
AMKASH to feel that he had any kind of
CIA support for plotting against Castro.

... there was little for him to
report or leak.

Comment p 5

Over a year passed between August
1962 and Sept 1963 when he was not
contacted by CIA. In terms of the
relationship that he had with CIA the
critical period, since is therefore between
5 Sept and 22 Nov 1963.

Reason for hiatus is Cuba.
CIA p 13
Found report AMKASH If a name Cuba, he was
recontacted due to his potential.

SECRET

14 Nov 1954 WHIP reported that [redacted] satisfied w/ policy considerations but unhappy over fact he had not been given technical assistance. He also understood why he had not been given "Curtis small piece of equipment which provided a final solution to the problem".

Comment

In essence he [redacted] was told there would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then only if he was successful. While that may not seem a very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow of a govt, it is directly relevant to the question of what [redacted] was told and what he understood. It is contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (p. 18) to the effect that it was not clear how [redacted] interpreted the part of the [redacted] after July 1954. The Report states that [redacted] was unhappy with CIA response and Asst. Secy had refused to support [redacted].

19 Nov 53 Fitzgerald "approved" policy [redacted] he would be given a cache inside Cuba. The cache

could, if he requested it, include...
high-power rifles w/ scope...

19 Nov. Wink tells CFA he is
returning to Cuba.

Request by headquarters to ask him
to delay for 1 more meeting.

Wink agrees "if it is something
important"

p 19 SSC speculates that this is fact
indicating he might return specific supply
Army - at best a piece of highly
speculative analysis, not supported by
the evidence.

[Fails to mention per w/ Wink
Opinion

M HJ read.]

p 24

9A"

"unaware of WINK'S 1963 association
with CFA

No info at least 1 1/2 years
after death of JFK; no idea of 1963
CFA ties w/ Wink's what was
my inclusion

SECRET

0002251

c. CIA twice (first in early 1961 & again in early 1962) supplied to that pills to US gambly syndicate members. . . . The 1961 plot aborted & pills were recovered.

These furnished in April 1962 pursuant of gambly rep. to a Cuban wife leader in Fla who in turn, had them sent to Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962, the wife leader would that a team of 3 men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the operation.

cf. . . . "while the events described of the Cuban did occur & are subject to being patched together as the one complete story, the implication of a direct, causative relationship among them is unproven."

Q18: During the week of 25 Sept 1960, O'Connell's Makin went to Miami where Roselli introduced my Makin to "Sam Gold" at a meeting in the Fontainebleau Hotel. "Gold" said he had a man whom he identified only as "Joe", who would serve as a courier to Cuba & make arrangements there. Makin provided contact "Gold" to O'Connell from a address but O'Connell never met either "Gold" or "Joe".

Q19: At that time the gambly career was still operating in Cuba. Truffante was making regular trips between Miami & Havana as syndicate runner.

SECRET

p. 24 Despite the dilemma that a poison in liquid form would be most desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets.

00022524

Comment - Giannini was fully apposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival's escape would be negligible. Giannini stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink. Trujillo (see [redacted]) was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and personally of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangster named Trujillo was Juan Ortiz who was then Officer Chief and Director General of the office of the Penal Institution. The gangster said that Ortiz had once been in a position to receive bribes from the gangster interests, had since lost that source of income and needed the money.

inside

p. 27. Late Feb - March 1961

As passed the pills to Trujillo. Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Captain Ortiz. Ortiz is understood to have kept the pills for a couple of weeks before using them. According to the gangster, Ortiz got cold feet.

Comment Ortiz lost his position on 8/1/61

SECRET

SECRET

officer on 26 Jan. 1961, while getting for the
operation was still going on in Miami & Wash DC.

0000

0002254

He took refuge in the Singapore Embassy
April 1961...

... It would seem that, that the
gangster did know that Cota had already
set his access to Castro.

p 30. The Cuban brothers were believed to
in touch with Varona. Some Mossad were
reported to have offered Varona large sums
of money for his operations against Castro, with
the understanding that they would receive
privileged treatment "in the Cuba of the future".
Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful.

p 31. Traff appeared Varona and told him
that he had clients who wanted to do work with
Castro & that they would pay big money for the
Commit.

Roselli said as a loyal American he would
whenever he could & would never divulge
the operation.]

p 31. R wrote deliver money to Varona for expenses.
- O'Connell recalls 50,000; Edwards recalls
25,000; Pennington recalls 25,000

p 32 Roselli gave the jills and money to Varona. When
Roselli dealt

[Redacted] signed Varona

SECRET

p. 32 ²² Edwards recalls something about a contact who worked in a restaurant frequented by Castro.

0002255

p. 33 (O'Connell) believes that there was something going on between April 1961 and April 1962 but he cannot now recall what. He agrees with Bill Harvey that when the operation was under way in April 1962, Harvey took over a "gongy operation".

p. 34. O'Connell believes he must have received the pills, but he has no specific recollection of Harvey doing so.

p. 49. Roselle needed Gran. & Troff in the first phase as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba. He did not need them in the second phase because he had Valera. However, it would be naive to assume that Roselle did not take the precaution of informing higher ups in the syndicate (but he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate).

p. ~~47~~⁵¹ June 1962 Harvey said they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt. ^{perhaps using the pills.}

SECRET

Harry never named their names or anything about them.

p. 52 Harry says Roselli wasn't badly hurt. He agreed with Harry that nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future.

p. 201 RFK - I trust that if you ever ^{try} to do business with organized crime - with gangsters, you will let the Attorney General know before you do it. Houston quotes Edwards as replying that this was a reasonable request.

p. 66. The Attorney General's copy of the memo for the record of that meeting (May 6 or 7, 1962 by Edwards & Houston) is in Archiver of the AG's office.

p. 67. Mayor Sun-Toner's letter of 16 August 1963 cites Justice Dept belief that Oswald never did any spying - merely pretended to go along "in the hope that the Justice Dept done to put him behind bars might be slowed or at least affected - by his use of co-operation w/ another govt agency."

Trick puts his cooperation from 1959 to some time in 1960 - long before the abortive rebel invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Reports McBain's buggering incident.

p69 20 August 1963 Chicago Daily News

FBI agent talking bear who allegedly says:

Why don't you fellows leave me alone?
I'm one of you.

Person pictured as being approached by
CIA but denying

00002258

- 079 AMLSH
- DR took Presidential Palace where they refused to surrender to Che; Che did to Fidel
 - Cuba believed to be one participant in assassination of Lt Col Antonio Blanco Pico, head of Batista's military in Havana
 - DR quite apart from 28th of July but signed a treaty just

⇒ ... Agency was primary involved in helping Cuba's action in [MIA PRON] program directed against Cuban military leaders, with receiving but plus for technical assistance in an assassination attempt. The obvious project files and info furnished us by Nestor Sanchez, Cuba's case officer, do not wholly support these recollections. The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for Cuba's attempts.

087 14 Sept 1963

Cuba wrote Tuzendino - "I don't intend to see (be interrogated by) your friend again! whom you should tell them," so they don't

make the top: I want to get away from politics completely!

1992 Sandy says that, while Cuba was anxious to do away with Castro, Cuba was not willing to sacrifice his own life in exchange for Castro's. What Cuba really wanted was high-powered, silenced rifle w/ an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards. Cuba finally said that, as a doctor of medicine (which he was) he was quite sure that we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try."

The Drew Pearson Story

<p>a) <u>Published Details</u> Robert Kennedy may have not approved an assassination plot</p>	<p><u>The Facts as we know them</u> not true. He was briefed on Phase 1 after it was over - He was not briefed on Phase 2</p>
---	--

<p>b) Three (3) men assassins were caught in Havana; one still in prison</p>	<p>It tells Kung on 21 Jan 67, that Kung says 3 men included. We do not know their identities or what may have happened to them. We have no proof that they were actually disabled. Most of the arrested captives and execution during this period of this year</p>
--	---

Who saved enough at ~~that~~
to bleed the # was ready to kill
him. He is reported to have

SEAL This report has come out
in the volume investigation. It
was also stated by Castello in
the Philippines under secret
investigation. We have no

independent corroboration of any sort. (No
that version met w/ Records
in Las Vegas March 1965)

0002260

SECRET

1977

SECRET

9 May 1967

Beamboroff apparently to be used as a source
of information to show Oswald a CIA agent
& was to be used to account. Castro. Cause
alleges he has letters signed by CIA reps
or by Sen. RFK asking within America
to work with Cubans for removal of Castro.
This memo is intended to work out
such letter never signed a Houston could
not be in Gamm's possession.

0002261

SECRET

Request

SECRET

0002265

- Richard Cain aka Robert Scully Cain
Richard Scalzette
DOB OCT 1931 Chicago

FBI memo

- 21 Dec 1960 not found after

- 18 Jan 1961
identified individuals

- Identity of WI ROBERT

- April 61 to public ^{000 203} status

- ~~some~~ "something going on"
independent of Agency.

- RFT security called on 4 March 67
to obtain memo; already saw article
of 7 March 67

- 15 March 65

Bango in Madrid & claims group
in Cuba ready.

Jailed in July 62

1 March 66 arrests in Cuba

Trial refused up to 10 to full 64 & 65
w/ Airline meetings

SECRET

10 Jan 64 "Paper" Brubaker's approach The WH.

SECRET

0002266

O'Connell interview of Madam in May 1960

- Additional info on S.T. JR or SB contained in material previously shared for review on Sturgis

- Chicago Trib

Dec 28, 31, 1973

- Cain

- Fall 1960, contact in Chicago

- Summer 1961 Mexico City

- April 1962 Mexico City

- 4 June 62 departed

- 19 Aug 63 Chicago

- 26-30 May 63 Infr - re Student Directory, Miami

- 12 Sept 63 DRF arms purchase

- toll to get out of picture

- 1 May 1972 disappear.

27 Nov 63

- Fair Play met in Feb 63 at 907

~~S. S. Spaulding~~ and brother Michael Criley

- LHO purchased rifle March 63

- Strong suspicion LHO in Chicago April 1963

SECRET

1. [Redacted]

DOB

[Redacted]

2. [Redacted]

DOB

[Redacted]

3. [Redacted]

4. [Redacted]

5. [Redacted]

DOB

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

6. [Redacted]

Edward Prescott Morgan DOB

[Redacted]

TAB B

(2-9-78)

SECRET

0002268

Morgan

[Redacted]

[Redacted] negotiation for School of Howard
Duff Studios & John Hopkin Wars.

Amended & Approved March 1951 to include

Morgan

[Redacted]

[Large Redacted Area]

Discard

Cain

According to De Mar, Cain in
Mexico 1941 into 1942

-1964-65

SECRET

SECRET

0002269


7-Mar-35
St Pauli Minn
36 yr

Bredly Earl Ayers
Eglin AF Base Fla.

April 17, 1971 Post

April 27, 1971 Post

Sunday April 18 1971



Tracing sites
Palo Alto Key
Upper Key Camp
Card found in edge of P. [unclear]

Date 10 Aug 1964
Security Approval

Referral 23826 (DDP / WTH / SH)

Case No. 366085

Request For Recusal Refuse

Serial No
366085

Nature
Separation Return to Parent SUC 12-15-64

Organized Disruptors;
DDP / SHS
US Field Office
Forward operator [unclear] - JM WAVE
Paramilitary Branch Section [unclear]
Resistor C R C Indiv Pol groups

SECRET

ZR/RIFLE

All (cable) traffic being ZR/RIFLE to be delivered in sealed envelope to Chief FI/Dev. D, 15024 Bldg only

- Personally approved of DD Plans

Harry
Chief FI/Dev D

19 Feb 1962

To Harry re authorization of ATWR for ZR/RIFLE activities thru Dec 1962

Because of sensitive nature of this activity, accounts for funds will be of general category & of your category

2. Salary \$500 per yr; 750 in addition to salary

3. Items to be considered in lieu of project & constitute authorization for all travel, per diem, operations & other expenses

4. Eyes only

Rich. D. Helms.

Hand written notes

Morgan - Roselli - Mahan - Gamm

- Mackin Las Vegas

Morgan & Jack Hudson

- 1) Prior to Aug 60
- 2) Aug 60 to April 61 (BOS)
- 3) April 61 to late 61
- 4) late 61 to late 62 (Custom misste error)
- 5) late 62 to mid 63

Rodli op started in Sept 66
(Mahn to Rodli to Craven)

to Supd 7 May 67

Taylor became chairman of FCS
on 9 Aug 67

Rush, McNamee, Taylor, Bundy,
O'Dowen, Silpatuck, Lamelle,
Murray, McCone

Memo For Record

Rept at request of DCF; assigned
to FO on 23 March 67

The one stayback been copy (FO)
all notes, & other derived source material
destroyed 23 May 67.

Memo: Chug WtH (Dare)

From: Dir of Security

Subject: WtH (Security Paper)

Final account of memo reported on
a sensitive paper of interest to DDIP, Chug WtH
& Dir of Security

Disburment.

25 Sept 1960 by TO Contact
6 Feb 1961

SECRET

0900.

11 Feb 1961 To Puerto Rico 1000
 31 Jan 1961
 14 Feb 61 CMMMO Symposium 1043
 26 Sept 1961
 Hwy
 12 Feb 1961 993

Page 3
IO Rpt

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After missile crisis Oct 62 & collapse of MWoods, aggressive scheme that was begun in Aug 1961; covered in April 1962, was finally smashed in 1963

Two other plots were organized in 1963 but were impracticable & nothing came of them

P 9

b. 10 August 1962

Meeting of Special Group (Assignment) wherein McNamara brooded subject of liquidation of Cuban leaders.

Result - Project MWOODS memo by Lansdale

31 Jul 64

Discussed at Special Group of a Chamberlain serves memo of special plot to kill Castro; CIA had refused to fund. who had no money.

see (c)

and Ossetian


P 2 Gonzalez Ballanterra

Press Release
9 March 1966

Missory
Page

- program of ~~SECRET~~ for intelligence; not
 truth to form support
 - Jose ROBERTO, Alberto Blanco Ramon and Tapedo

Should have
been deleted.



rod in ~~Florida~~ with Odom Agency

SECRET

0002273

Late Sept 1960

Edward O'Connell, Bessell of James
Ingraham; 15 Swords then brief
Allen Dulles & General Cabell.

Maher called O'Connell & pointed out
Paradise sector sunny Gold & Joe
(Presumably not home, Maher & O'Connell
know names)

[redacted] to Cuba & make
arrangements there re entry to Gold

Traff making regular trips to Havana

7 Jan '59 - casino closed

13 Jan '59 - Casino reopened & opening

17 Feb '59 - Casino reopened opening

30 Sept '61 - last casino closed

P 23

Technical Clue TSD

4 approaches: (1) highly toxic like shellfish
poison to be admitted in a pin (Cuba's Communist
Roosevelt's suit was supplied to Gary Powers
(2) bacterial material in liquid or (3) cigar
(4) handwriting

P 29. March April 1961

Roselli told O'Connell that Traff knew a
man high up in exil movement. (Visual
Rpt from ~~SECRET~~ suggest sun Traff

Man Valmoo.

at 21 Dec 1960 FBI memo re gangster financing Cuban activities to overthrow Castro of 18 Jan 1961, amounts to work with these schemes. Had hired Moss as a fund-raiser

CIA had contact in Miami but no indication of any involvement in Cuba.

[March 1959 for use in NR Down as consultant to Indian Embassy

- Nov 62 by CIA Staff under 20 MATJOC a program for exploitation of political consultants.]

Roselle to deliver \$ to H.V. Estimated very but Esterline says 10,000 + 100,000 of communication as per secret memo.

Comment - V one of 5 key figures in Rev. Front & many involved in BOP. Steps taken to end his participation in operations plan but apparently ineffective.

People who knew:

1. O. O - original man to poison
2. A V -
3. son-in-law of H.V.

Phase 2

SECRET

6002275

Harry briefed by authority of Bissell
in Feb 1961 in connection with a general
stand-by capability for Executive action

Harry had already discussed problem
w/ [Arnold Silver] Sidney both before
both parties probably cut in to Cuba
project.

Helms briefed on general concept but
not on ongoing Cuba plot.

[in Congo;] QJ WIN account of [insert] ⁱⁿ use
Justin O'Donnell summit out

ZRRIFLE covered as a FID operation
(ostensibly to develop a capability to enter safe
& kidnap carriers)

15 Nov 61 - Harry discusses applicability of
ZRRIFLE to Cuba; initiated by Bissell
to run syndicate operation

Unrelated - Helms puts Harry in
charge of Agency's Cuba task force

Late 1961 - Early 1962 Harry busy

Early March 62

- March 62 Harry takes over Castro
- Harry view

came to threat of Castro operation &
ZRRIFLE as being synonymous.

- Exec Adm is synonymous w/ QJWIN
- ZRRIFLE ~~is~~ ^{is} related to Exec Adm
ZRRIFLE alone meant Castro

Harry's
interpretation

A review of his correspondence was unrevealing.

[redacted] should Castro operate
 & L/N use any of assets being developed
 in ZR RIFLE

- Memo of Hany after he left Task Force W & going to [Rome] on 27 June 1963 to Chief FI Staff that ^{organised} ~~was~~ ^{was} to help QJ W in no longer work & support ~~himself~~.

- Records [OLLA-1974,] 24 April 64 show termination of [a wiretap station] on 21 April 64.

Copy of [redacted] in no indication in the file that the Exec Room copy of ZR/RIFLE/QJWID ever used.
 Edwards -

- No activity after B of P until Hany met Rosell & recontacted April 62.

- Edwards inf contact w/ RFK over McBuire wiretap

- 14 May 62 - Hany called Edwards & indicated he was bringing Rosell from Cuba via

742 Hany - took me a "judy" question. since he described plan for getting position to a favorite Castro restaurant. The restaurant was identified to those described by Edwards and as reported in Phase one's

- O'Connell thinks "something gray on" before April 61 & April 62 but can't remember

0002277

April 8th 1947

- Harry met w/ Rosell & O'Connell
- O'Connell pointed Mahan there
- Harry says he would have recognized Mahan; saw him socially once or twice after 1947 when Harry came to Agency; not since '52 when Harry sent to [Berlin]
- Edwards, ^{deliberately} did not mention Mahan when he first ^{briefed} Harry

p45

O'Connell out of June '62 when he was assigned PCS to [Olema]

p47
18 April 62
O'Connell gets
p48 for Rosell
meeting w/ Harry
in Miami

O'Connell says operation going on when Harry took it over altho he cd be remember when I reactant.

Harry specified that bean not to be brought in for 2nd phase & sources Roselli should report.

Roselli right that bean used here what was going on; R replied "nothing" bean - too bad

p48

Macco - whether a Vannocato kind Antonio MACEO Mackle who Harry probably would have known. Also, it's clear Macco was "Roselli man".

Roselli mentioned to 2nd phase as a contact to Valona.

p 49. When the jobs were given to Vanna from [unclear] Vanna reported arms and equipment needed for his end of the operation.

6002278

SECRET

April 1962

- a) explosives
- b) detonators
- c) 20.30 caliber rifle
- d) 20 45 cal. handguns
- e) 2 radios
- f) 1 boat radio

V reported arms & support & Roubil' passed word to Harry. With help of Shaddy, chief of TMDAHS, about 5M of weapon & equipment.

Harry & Shaddy went U-Haul. & put truck in parking lot for delivery to Maco, U, or via sea in Can. Harry & Shaddy set up watch on do Roubil' & Conall.

Shaddy not aware of plan.

230

May 62 - Roubil' reported that the job was in Cuba & at the restaurant regularly used regularly by Castro.

Jan 62
V had ^{disparous} 3 men from to Cuba Sept 1962

Harry saw Roubil' in Miami on 7-11 Sept. Another 3 men from of militia men assigned to penitentiary - Castro's body guard but never happened. "Medicine" reported safe still in place and first from safe

Sept 62 - Jan 63

Harry in Miami. 22 Dec - a son & saw Roubil' & Maco several times. Gave Roubil' 2700 to V for return of 3 militia men who never left (in Fla Keys)

Feb 63

Harry left word for Maco in Miami 11-14 Feb that nothing new & looked as if dead off. (Just how Harry left this word for Maco is not clear)

p 51
militia men
used to
take off

Delay due to
at conditions inside
of JCF missile crisis

SECRET

April May 63

Helms approved a last meeting
w/ Harry Roselli before Harry left
for [Rome]

People who knew
P 55 [Bruce Chiver] (Harry left 1962)
knew Harry meeting w/ gangster in
Reno in winter of '62

May 62

Sluf Edwards & Lawrence Houston brief
RFK "all the way". RFK agreed not to
pursue writing case but wanted to be
informed of Agency work w/ "gangster" again.
RFK asked for a memo of
the meeting via a phone call; memo
prepared on 14 May 1962 by Edwards & Houston
NO briefing of McLean, ^{General} Carter, or Helms

RFK not told that Phase II had
begun; that V had jitters & arrived late to Hall.

On 14 May 62 Harry briefs Helms;
advises against briefing McLean & General
Carter. Writes Edwards that Roselli
is not going to be used

Comment

RFK's secretary called on 4 March 67
to obtain Edwards memo. He knew

SECRET

0002280

of Pearson article of 7 March 47 &
apparently wanted to check his recollection
of what he had been briefed upon.

Helms had been with RFK
& allowed him to read memo. He
did not have a copy.

1954-55 Mahon served by Neardness
to offset Onassis control of Saudi oil shipments
World at top levels of U.S. & British govt
& met at least once w/ Nixon.

O'Connell rept'd that during negotiations
w/ Long Committee, Mahon stated he
might buy his attorney to investigate
in past activities.

SECRET

9 March 61
P28 [redacted] met w/ Cubela
in Mexico City, arranged by [Carlos]
[Tepedino] (AMK/BSA), a long-time
friend. Cubela then [redacted] from
Havana where he was once assigned.

Cubela and leader of DR
are like group of leftist students, signed in
1956 to fight Batista; N for Sandberg - case officer.

28 March 61

Both Cubela & Cota wanted to
defect; according to asset of Miami Station.

Ex-filtration called off as report
that Cuban police aware of Cubela's
desire to defect & his departure plans.
(Comment:)

First of 3 names sent with [redacted] & Cubela -
unknown if Cubela consented to meet in Cuba!
Other two names are even more suspicious

~~15 Jan 62~~ 14 August 61

message from aviation store (good friend)
[Tepedino] that Cubela group in Paris &
wanted to talk to [redacted] ^{under end of [redacted]]} no indication of any
meeting.

15 Jan 62

[Lucia Echevarria Branci] told
an asset [AMK/BSA] that Cubela group
to Helsinki & wanted to defect.

SECRET

Would stop in Paris to see [Tepedino]


0002283

27 June 1962

[Tepedino] approached FBI in Miami on 11 June with idea that Cubela wanted to defect. FBI sent a detailed memo to CIA since they knew [Tepedino] to be a CIA asset.

8 July 62

[Tepedino] dissatisfied w/ CIA handling of Cubela's "defection" in Paris in 61 so he contacted FBI. Stated his success & info on reasons for defection were



30 July - August 62

[Redacted] met w/ Tepedino a Jewtherin NYC & both went to Helsinki. Cubela talked into being recruited in place but not defecting.

Cubela wanted to blow up oil refineries; kill Castro, Carlos Rodriguez, & Soviet leaders.

7-9 August 62

Meetings in Stockholm because Helsinki too risky. Cubela stated that he told 4 of his Cuban associates that he met [Tepedino] in Helsinki.

SECRET

10-11 August 62

SECRET

[redacted] Tarduno & Cubela in
Coventry's [redacted] 60022
& Cubela insisted [redacted]

14-23 Sept 62

Cubela Tarduno [redacted]
[redacted] from [redacted] met in Paris

Cubela given S/W financing & supplies; shown a demolition document. Refused to be photographed.

[redacted] cables that no physical elimination mission be given as a requirement but he might do it on his own initiative. Headquarters strongly advise that no physical elimination mission be given Cubela.

5-8 Sept 63

Brayil - met by [redacted]
[Tarduno] Nestor Sanchez who became case officer.

Cubela demand 2 S/W managers but only 1 rec'd. afraid of social consequences that height of [redacted]

[AMTRUNK-10] who was badly injured [redacted] who had been sent to recruit [redacted]

SECRET

14 Sept 63

From Brayil Cubela flew to Paris & was going to tell Castro after the fact

SECRET

that he was taking a vacation.

0002286

3 Oct 63

Sandy arrives in Paris to meet w/ Cubela who had written [Tepeduo] saying that he didn't want to continue.

[CIA had to tell French that contacts were for purposes of defense, French unilaterally keeping Cubela under surveillance.]

11 Oct 63 Sandy cables that Cubela insists on meeting w/ RFT; promised Cubela going to try an attempt in Castro even w/out US support.

29 Oct 63

Fitzgibbon, Ury, SAs, go to Paris & get approval from Helms.

Fitz states he told Cubela that US would have no part in attempt in Castro's life.

Winton went from Sandy in contact

14 Nov 63

19 Nov 63

Sandy memo states Fitz assumes that Cubela would get enough of rifles w/ scopes inside Cuba, on request

22 Nov 63

SECRET

Sandy arrives in Paris on Nov 22 after getting gen w/ ~~Robert Kennedy~~ from

Sandy says Cubela accepted gen but stated he would not take it to

Cuba with him. SECRET

0002287

Cubela asked for a cable of arms to be placed at [AMTRUNK 10] [2 high-powered rifles w/ telescopic sights; 20 grenades; 2000 rounds of ammo]. As they left meeting, heard JFK shot.

Sandy stated he received an OP in cable from Fitzgerald that everything is "off" but nothing in AMTRUNK fell.

Cubela will take S/W with him to Prague
1 Dec 63

Cubela returns from Prague to Cuba
19 Feb 1964

JMWAVE to have 2 caches in place in March.

Done on 17-21 March 64 on [AMTRUNK VII]

24 April 1964

[Tegedino] had been brief to meet [Carlos Jorge ROBERTO Murray] who has message from Cubela.

3 May 64 [Roberto] says Cubela wanted a silence
30 August 64

Artome record info thru Madrid that a group of dissident members of Castro regime wants to ~~be~~ establish direct contact. 7 Oct 64, Artome sends

Alberto BLANCO Romariz.

13 Nov. 64. SECRET

Artome agrees to talk to AMTRUNK-1 if it turns out he is contact man for internal dissent group. Artome

Think if AM205A-1 is chief of disident
group we can forget about operation
4 Dec 64

Sanchez prepares a memo for [6570] for
Arteme to maintain contacts w/ disident
groups' reps in Prague. Arteme does
6-5 Dec 64

Sanchez meets Cubela in Paris & was
told group to continue his plans
Told US. could not be involved.
10 Dec 64.

Arteme did know not Cubela
that CIA in direct contact with them.
Rather SAS continued to put both
men together.

CIA did want to put silver
weapon in ~~the~~ Cubela's hands directly
but could do it. Here Arteme
27 Dec; 30 Dec (mb line)

Cubela & Arteme meet in Madrid.
Arteme reports to Sanchez that Cubela
had requested a silver for FAT rifle
but Americans w/n gave him one.

Arteme to come up w/ silver or
different rifle in Cuba.

11 Feb 65

Cubela to receive pistol w/ silver
& Belgian FAT rifle w/ silver from
Arteme's secy. ~~SECRET~~ Both weapons come
from ~~the~~ U.S. & are now in Madrid.

Conflect

12 Feb 65

SECRET

0002289

Artemio has never talked to Cubela in Madrid.

4 March 65 - Cubela in Havana; source is friend of Tepedencio who tells him

15 March 65

Rafael Garcia Bango Director
arrives in Madrid from Cuba & informed
[a state officer.]
Probably close friend of Cubela; & claims
to be in touch w/ group of wealthy business
men to donate Castro.

Jack in July 62 for sup. Trip
as lawyer for Copia Hotel. Trip - as lawyer.
[Another name - Mike]

June 1965 [Former FBI agent who was arrested as a militant
on 20 March 1961, contacted FBI's new chief
FBI on 3 June 65.]

Esquivas told he had never letter
from a friend in Paris urging him
to meet w/ Albert Flores who had a
message from Cubela who wanted it delivered
to CIA

Message - Cubela in a position to help Castro
& would CIA & US Govt be willing to support them
by "yes"; then details on what he needed.

SECRET

Cubela had wanted money in Paris
on 1 Feb 65. Travel down & report -

16 Feb 65

game hints.

0002290

7,000 in NY C.

SECRET

23 June 1965 - Headquarters sent cable Kennedy contact. 'convincing proof that evidence from [redacted] group insurance, Semedo RSP

1 March 66 - Cubela & bair arrested for activities w/ CIA

Jose Luis Gonzalez Ballarreto, Alberto Blanco Romany, Juan Alena Navarro. Confined

Also appearing - Guillermo Cuenhill Alvarez, Angel Hermes Udey

Gonzalez Ballarreto - attempts in Spain in contact of James Noel ^{was "reiner"} ~~official~~ official in US Embassy in Madrid.

Cubela met w/ Arteme in Spain in Feb. 1965.

Arteme sent baggage to US to get Selencio's sign & sender. Delivered to Blanco Romany who delivered it to Gonzalez Ballarreto then to Cubela the day before he left Madrid.

Tasco

Said in Cubela's residence were Selencio's sign, FHT reflect. 9 March 66

Castro sent personal letter that death sentence not be asked. 10 March 66

Cubela testimony:

Selencio did not break; I threw it away because it was burning my hands

SECRET

000229 I spoke to Fidel in January. He opened the door to me ^{SECRET} but I did not have

the courage to tell him
(Comment)

Trial studies confined to trip to Europe in mid 64 & early 65 to meet w/ Hoffman. No mention of Meade at this Nov 65 contacts w/ Agency.

No hint of poison pen Nov 63.

Speculate

If full details would have come out, Castro would have little to complain about. & probably would not have taken so much in earnest.

2 brief - level
intelligence meeting
where Castro
was usually
discussed

Special Group (August)

18 August 62 (probably one described by Pearson)
State: Dean Rusk, Alexis Johnson, Edwin
Martin, Richard Goodwin, Robt Hurwath
White House

Maxwell Taylor, McHenry Bundy (RFK absent)

Defense:

McNaman, Belmont, Tenenbarger, Lansdale
CIA - McCone Harvey

USIA - Edward Munn, Donald Wilson

Secy - Thomas Parrot

Parrot's notes & in main agreement
but Munn & Harvey would McNamara ~~was~~
causing it & Munn's comment.

No one raised exception to McNamara
"happy agreement" ~~...~~

Lansdale wrote memo on 13 August
to Harvey, Hurwath, Munn, & Wilson which

SECRET

Lansdale memo among drafting papers
for various subjects related to Cuban
operation. A portion excised from CIA
copy of memo was "evidently elimination
of leaders". Lansdale repeatedly tried to
raise assassination of Castro in Hong Kong over
next several weeks but Hong did not.

0002292

It met 5 people in Lansdale's office
from MWAVE to Lansdale re: information
assassination as part of it.

30 July 1964

303 Committee met in Situation Room
of White House.

McBryne Bundy, Vance, Malone, Thomas
Hughan & Des. Fitzgerald for a discussion
of Cuba.

~~Thomas~~ Peter Jensen as secy.

18 June 64 memo from DDJP to Don
re Mafia plot to assassinate Castro.

Price was 150,000 w/ 10,000 4 pass.
Cuban exile; Jose Maria "Pepin" Bosch,
Bacardi Rum, to contribute 50,000. He opposed
JMWAVE for US participation. Refused to sign

19 August 64

DCT (McConnell to Bundy) re
FBI interest w/ all participants

SECRET

Probably Peasner's info re a high-level meeting was 10 Sept 62

O'Connell interviewed Mahan in May 67 & wrote a report:

- 1 - Mahan taught Morgan in Phase I
- 2 - Never heard of Phase II from Roselli or anyone

0002293

- 3. Roselli started to Morgan by Greenspan
- 4 - Mahan suspects Roselli in chart of Morgan
- 5 - Roselli definitely heavy; Morgan in Vegas recently "in success"

6 - Garrison, Morgan, Roselli in Vegas in March. ^{business} In truck w/ Roselli; so was Morgan

It is our impression that Greenspan also involved in the conversation.

^{prob} Point finger to Roselli as source of info. and to confirm Morgan as Peasner's source.

EO Rosell Mahan are the only non CPA participants with immediate knowledge of the Robert Kennedy quest

^{prob} Summer of 62 - Edwards, Mahan, & Roselli had lunch & Edwards said he told Roselli he in front RFK of Roselli's contribution.

Peasner's story seems to rely on that phase. Could be Harry if ref, source.

Probably from 2 sources:

State Dept meeting + mob organizer so Roselli chief suspect.

Defense: Roselli deny to Mahan & Morgan deny & talk to a newspaperman friend (Morgan)

0002294

Publicity has not run its course:

- a) Pearson has not yet used the pills & fact of State Dept meeting
- b) Baum has not revealed full case; CIA should be promptly displayed when he does
- c) P wants to remain in custody & will be deported

Pearson stay in chuds, i detail found only in O here to the 3 man team.

put in it best light - that there is no other motive in speedy stay

P 127. We do not know that Castro would try to retaliate, but we do know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Pearson may also know this.

P 129. Mahan says that Taylor fell on Tampa. Credit is prima non grata in her Dept, very upset & requires ^{with police} some help in form. None of them would have connections about staying in his CIA connections when he was picked by law enforcement author. Pearson has already done it when the FBI was working him in 1963, credit appears to depend on his conversation with Marguerite Baum.

P 131. Search - 3 May 1967

Comment: Red base over a period

Tab A

SECRET

6002295

24 July 75 memo

Sarita Tropp

4. ST advised person full to agent who had access to Castro

When this attempt failed, T suggested another candidate (cancelled re BGP)

- Make formal contact subject w/ Office of Security
- Rosselli conviction

Nov 1967 - illegal entry

Dec 68 - Fingerprint

Serrato Staff 7-8-June 1975

Ad Hoc Staff

No 838-75

9 June 75

4. Report to Maxwell Taylor made by Dick Bissell on 8-10 Dec 1971. DDO

(made on company the active capacity)

5. Who is (yet another alleged Castro assassin) DDO

6. - WIRECUTS operated aliases?

- who was WIZARD 14 (John Stein's memo)

- 2 young officers who conducted WIRECUTS DDO

- want to know John Stein on all WIRECUTS file by Walt Elder

SECRET

SECRET

Memo

5 May 1967

July - Wm K. Harvey

G002296

1. ~~Harvey~~ ^{Bill} Harvey contacted Payson to report to Payson some contact he had w/ "gangster" and offer his copy to FBI. He expanded to Payson ---

16 May 67

Tab B ^{Attorney Samuel Cohen} ^{from Dumbo} ^{in Dade City} 7 April 77

Morgan associated w/ Harvey circa 1951 as a lawyer "cut out" in matters of interest to DDO.

Stuart Pierpont Morgan

DOB 28 May 1913 St Louis

Richard Scully Cain

MCA - Richard Scalzette

1969 Texas Kansas Tex (Reg No. 17169-TT)

In May 1964 Boldin refused to testify before Warren Com. in absence of counsel George Howard.

SECRET

Chicago American for 26 Nov. 1963 in column Daily Day by Maggie Day - rumor that assassination planned w/ FBI of Cohen

SECRET

1 Sept at issue of life

Garrison a guest of Mario Maurino,
a bookman of Marcella, as far as
Garrison denied knowledge of Maurino's contact
to Marcella.

TO Chief SRS
Sulz. Carr

9 Oct 1947

TAD
B

Info re meeting of Fair Play
under Richard Criley (# 346 116)

[Source of info on Guillermo WSCOBOR
who was 'ml of Horace Speeds' (SAS)
leads obtained from Ralph PEREZ (444265)
Speed # (199499)

WSCOBOR recruiting Cubans for Communist
Party in Chicago.]

0002297

SECRET

10580
File

9 Dec 1970 DCT for Doc of Secy

Ruselli, Jolley

9 August 1976

SECRET

Brief memo "Sally" Jolley-Ruselli

0002298

Tab B o c

Added info re Traff, Ruselli, & Bruner contained in material previously released for review re Sturgis.

21 May 1975 Memo by Bruckner re Arthur Ballitto & Fred Hume

1. 12 Jan 1961 memo told FBI he recommended DuBois to an A atty whom he will disclose

2. A Hays is James Cantillon per a 13 March 1961 report.

3. 22 May 61 FBI memo re interview w/ Col. P Swain who said he contacted Mahan in fall of 1960 for use as a "cut-out" for Havana. Swain gave any indication to Mahan he would attempt to accomplish some clandestine efforts in Cuba.

10 Jan 1974

Memo: Chief Warden Hampton Downer

Subj: Salvatore Bramanna & Richard Cain

Re Chicago Tribune Articles of 28 and 31

Dec. 1973

Richard S. Cain # 272141

DOB Oct 1931 in Chicago.

Left Vice Squad in 1960; Accurate
Laborer.
a F.I. man

CIA contacts

SECRET

0002299

A. Fall 1960

Cain contacted contact in Chicago office
& obtained info on Cuban cell groups in
Chicago area.

B. June 61

Contacted Lohmann of Chicago Field office
re a Mr. Krougansky who was met w/
President of Panama's Investigative Commission.

C. Summer 61

Cain met in [Mexico City by CIA staff]
identity & purpose unknown

D. Oct 1961

Cain wrote to Lohmann from Panama
offering his services

E. April 1962

Cain makes unannounced visit to Hong
Kong. Warden Scott & [Warden Dean in Mexico City]
says he had an investigative agency w/
branches in Chicago & LA which he used to
provide training to Mexican Secret Agents

F. 4 June 62

Reported from Mexico for board review
has handles & impersonated Mexican official
& working

G. 19 August 63

met in Chicago at Lake Shore Drive Athletic
Club & Ralph Club of [Grace Speed] Post
Doc staff officer & Chief of Chicago DCP office

He would like to work overseas
for CIA

Cain worked for Cook Co Sheriff
& was in contact with Cubans in Chicago
area & would provide info on underworld
activities of Cubans particularly Pablo Sierra
H. 26-38 Aug 1963

Cain informs the Student Directory,
a Cuban exile group in Miami

- Miro Cordoy's infant is
possessing arms

12 Sept 63 J. DRP people who had questioned
arms. [Rosa Speed] from Washington Chicago
told Cain to get out of the picture
H. 1967

FBI investigating Cain's arms with
& reconfirmed CIA sever contact

H. 15 April 1972

Cain returned to Chicago from Mexico
City; then disappeared May 1972 says he
was going to Latin America. Involved
in illegal arms deals (international) &
on various occasions stated he was CIA
M. 16 May 1972

FBI agent in [Mexico City] used
[Mexico City Station for] traces on Cain
Eastern Airlines job ed. Cain as
Seymour who fled from Honduras. 5 May 72

27 Nov 63

By ROBT B. P. Lohman

1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Feb-63 met at 937 S. Spaulding Chicago under direction of Michael Wiley, Secy Chicago Chapter. Assassination of Rev. Dr. King
3. LHO provided info in March 1963 Shuff's office had not interviewed LHO at Feb meeting but strong suspicion he was in Chicago in April 1963 & responsible for firing the officer of UPT
4. Shuff advised in like FBI so had "officially" asked FBI for info on Fair Play for Cuba. If they developed anything definite they would notify inform FBI.

~~Could not recall~~ "that early in 1963 the Chicago folks over apartment in U.S. for Fair Play

15 August 63

Sandy Smith Chicago seen Turner following up a lead that he call e/h re report Bureau would get info from Cuba but no info of value.

Said he did not show info to Ed Butthorn. but to someone in Butthorn's office (justified)

Buchenridge memo to Dad of request

1. Passes in Sec H of paragraph 3 is contained in one of volumes of material
2. Section B lists 3 American citizens. Contact is minimal
3. Quarter in Section C B 1 is Arteme; Also used by Mafia in custo operations

Detectives have already interviewed a couple who is referred.

TAD C

1. Tamm Don Eustevy Dimonquy (shortly)
DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1936
2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas family
DOB 12 Jun 1948
3. Luciano Nieves (shortly)
4. Jose de la Tormenta (shortly)
5. Jose Quintana DOB 3 Oct 45
reporta report by name to Dad
6. Joaquin Antonio Cortijo DOB 10 Jan 45
7. Manuel Arteme

TAB c

SECRET

0002303

14 March 1974

Meeting w/ Terry Deninger

Frank O'Malley referred Hunt to
Bob Mullen of the Mullen Group.

- O'Malley knew Hughes is client of
Mullen's; this information picked up in
course of a casual relationship between
O'Malley & Mullen in early 60's in connection
with Fair Cuba Committee.

Hunt & Mullen met in Paris during
Marshall Plan

- when Mullen decided to hire Hunt
possible insight on cover placements and
circumstances.

- Hunt approached O'Malley for an
introduction through Mullen & Mullen only stated

- Thomas C. Amato apparently refused job.

- Houston

- Paul G. intervened w/ Farrell of
ISNS re possible departure of Brennan

- only people who know well P. Inwood,
Osborn, Angleton, Rocca, & Houston

SECRET

1977 Report

SECRET

0002304

AMTRUNK

Designed to identify & later use suspected
personnel in aerial forces in Cuba.

Part 63. Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez

& [redacted] developed Fernando

Plan to overthrow Castro.

Moreno defects in April 1961 & assoc. w/
George Volshy; Cuban citizen of Polish origin.

Presumably USSR & then in Polish Air Force under

[redacted] Married Cuban & moved in
Miami May 61.

Volshy contacts Ted Szyulo & met with

copy 63

[redacted] & Herwitch (State). CIA assigns plan
to Miami Station & it is known as AMTRUNK

Never progressed very far & by Sept 61
had 3 sources including Guin

Moreno in Oct 63 was removed from
AMTRUNK due to indiscution. He was going to
appeal to JFK thru Volshy & Szyulo

Had some contacts but no real action
capability; In '65 Guin & Piny arrested.

Szyulo & Volshy both Polish & met in Cuba
in 195-60

SECRET

Jose Ricardo RABEL Nurey

suspected agent who defected Dec 62 &
joined AMTRUNK; returned to Cuba on her own

x in 65 to infiltrate his family. Arrested & given 30 yrs. but freed in 67.

Accusation RHPZ a Cuban agent as early as July 1963.

Possibility -

HMPRANK might have been an influence Cuban plan from the beginning. Inf action was saying Cuba & some info's infiltration.

M.D.

NY Daily News 20-25 April 1975 by Paul Masell, - quotes Sturgis on assassination attempts including using Juan Mata to bomb Castro. I recruited him to work w/ the embassy (US)

Sturgis' id of Mata, prior to its disclosure by external investigator, raises question as to what he knew.

Office of Security memo memo on 1975 noting connection between Sturgis & Rothman in 1962 citing FBI reports.

(made in conjunction w/ Daily News story)

Biancone in FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 indicated he had met w/ assassin-to-be. & pills in Castro's food or drink.

Since CIA pills not until Feb 1961, seems that mat had their own plan

SECRET

- Loreny known Sturgis recruited her in 1960

Verna

SECRET

30 C
0002307

FBI 21 Dec 1960

- MRS support for exile

FBI 18 Jan 1961

V receive some of that support

Stugis could have learned of Cuba's
role after Gato settled in Miami in 1965

FBI report

14 August 1964 would a statement by a
person jailed in Cuba by Troff.

Other Proposals

1. May 1975

Cuban exile who came to be a
contract employee stated that in Feb 1961 he
was given a rifle & a memo to kill Castro

Tried to enter Cuba 3 times & failed

2. May 1977 Anderson column re
Antonio Veciana

On 3 occasions (Dec 1960, July 62, Hydco
he proposed to CIA. The unsuiting Castro

In 1970 report he made a proposal to
an AID employee at an overseas post.

5 Agent Messages in 1961

SECRET

1. 3 of messages involved same group of agents

so probably same plan

0002308

1. 27 March 1961 [AMBROSE 15]

Plan to sabotage electric company in Havana & hit Castro at Sports Palace

2. 29 March 1961

same idea with different
driver on 30 March but no comment on
assassination

3. 5 April 61

only runs for 50 min; would try
9 April but need military aid.

a) [AMBROSE] infiltrated several times
& finally executed 30 August 62 after May
62 arrest. Reported as some identity to was
CIA; & not mentioned in McBrewn Book

b) [AMCOX 11] ^{the} ~~both~~ persons in

c) [AMPUB 11] touch w/ [AMBROSE]

d) [AMPANIC 17] & mentioned in McBrewn book, Doug

30 yr sentences

All 3 people sentenced prior to Bay P. &
none had assassination mission. Only
[AMBROSE] mentioned that!

4. 4 June 61 Moratori of Italian Embassy
claimed he had plans for invasion within
30 days after killing Fidel.

Reply was that info was
untrue & Moratori condemned.

SECRET

SECRET

5. 3 May 61

0002309

- from a member of Revolutionary
Recovery movement saying they would try to
kill Fidel today"

- Reply was "Lay low"

- Maybe [HMPUB 1]

Tab D

AMKASH

- Rejects notion that AMKASH a Cuban agent.

- No contact between August 1962 and
Sept 1963.

- 7 Sept & 9 Sept cables indicate that
AMKASH is a "spoiled brat"; hopeless as intel
performer; but approach in chief com quarters
allowed to recruit his own cohorts."

Boite V leaves inference that Castro's
speech to Dan Harker after AMKASH leak
Summary's Findings but CIA had not probed anything at that
time. & CIA must wait until 3 Oct 63

Nov 19, 63 AMKASH told CIA officer
he was returning to Cuba. On 20 Nov
he was reported to delay until Fidel's arrival
"of something important" AMKASH

p 26 SSC Found Rpt.

SECRET

On 24 Nov Mexico Station responded to a
Headquarters request for names of known
contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico City

Purpose was to determine significance
LHO's contact w/ Soviets

But HMLASH/1 name was included
in reference to contact between a member
of the Soviet Embassy & a Cuban cultural
attache. NOT a report of a contact between
HMLASH/1 and the Soviet

"H" role - clearly did not know of
HMLASH 1963 associations w/ CIA

TABLE E

24 Nov 63 Subj: Cuban Recruitment Agency
Assessment of Pen Kennedy

28 Nov 1963 DIR 85657 (C/WH/3)
John Wilson - Hudson

29 Nov 63

Acting on FTP report, Agency reports Almeida
be turned out to Mexican authorities.

12 Dec 1963 CSCF-3/779,048 (C/WH/3)
Subj: Wilson, Carlos John

30 Jan 1964 CSCF-3/779,814 (CI/SCC)
Subj: Jack Ruby - LHO

SECRET

20 March 1964 CSCF-3/780/612 (SR/CF/R)
Photos of individual identified as LHO

SECRET

10 June 1964 CSCI - 3/781,841 (CJ/R&D)
Info re Ruby

6 Oct 64 CSCI - 316/61446-64
[U/ADUCT] interview on 9 Sept 1964
His comments on 7 Photos Forwarded ~~7/64~~

WC Doc. 1054 Ruby & Associates.

0002311

SECRET

June 21, 1978

1977 D.C. Report

SECRET

0002312

1. Comments on Provo

The contents of the CIA are based on
sums of information of low value and
shall not be used, and on the assumption
of various Agency officials that the
SSC Final Report would have been referred
to the Warren Commission.

2. A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that
the operators of the intelligence apparatus against Cuba
exercised a negative influence on the quality of
their support for the U.S. overthrow.

"If your research ... indicates p 2
they should have ... facts ... p 7
Certainly ... information. p 7

A central feature of the rationale in the
concept that if Castro had succeeded in these
activities it would have provided serious
evidence against Pres. Kennedy. The SSC
Final Report makes it clear that if such
facts they should have been pursued
and accepted at the time of the intelligence
agency not to mention the WCI and a
review of the various anti-Castro programs
to see what it might reveal.

Agency review of the program they in
the Final Report a part from of the

Paul Carter learned of H. The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make the KMTASTH operation actually fit the theory for which the SSC's presentation seemed to be tailored!

Tab C

KMTASTH

The Agency had not a tentative willingness with this man saving Paul Kennedy's life, altho the SSC Final Report - in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so extensively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate article in the paper at Tab D. The key point is that prior to Paul Kennedy's death this willingness ~~to~~ with KMTASTH was unproven and without substance. Paul Carter learned as it he could ~~not~~ learn only that there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an understanding.

p14 New Consideration on the Septulante Operation

In a series of stories by Paul Marshall in the New York Daily News, of April 20-25, 1974 it quoted sources as follows:

The head Comintern scheme involved planting a broadcast: Castro's offer. I had

access to the Prime Minister's office," Stueger said. "I know Fidel's private security guard Ota. I recruited him to work with the Embassy (mission embassy in Havana).

"He (Stueger) has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relationship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

"Ota was the director of the office of the Prime Minister, which gave him ^{access} to the information that would make it possible for him to pass lists. The plan failed because Ota lost his position, and with it his access, in late June 1961. This was just to delivery of the prime gifts to him in late Feb or early March 1961. Ota's role in this campaign was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He was allowed to leave Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in Feb. 1965.

and on 13 June 1974
 Same news source discuss a possible relationship between Stueger and [redacted], also mentioning a minor relationship as a family partner of [redacted]. [redacted] of [redacted] wrote a memorandum in 1975, stating

a connection between Sturgis and Putnam in 1960, citing FBI reports.

Putnam that Sturgis reports to her had a role in gambling and. In fact availability due to her "lost profits." One could deduce that Sturgis and Putnam could have known one another because of their connections with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with the men behind the gambling operations.

June 1976 Sturgis reports claim by Maria (Marie) ^{ETA} Lorey that she acted on behalf of Sturgis in 1960 re poor pills in jar of face cream.

Quotes - FBI memo on "Bismarck":
 "This seems to confirm some job involving a woman to kill Carter with poison. Known, the delivery of poison does not fit the time frame known to CIA. While consideration had been given to various schemes, there were no CIA pills for selling until February 1961. It suggests that the syndicate may have been moving ahead on its own."

SECRET

In fact, it is possible that Maria already was involved in independent

agreements with the central syndicate when first appeared prior to 1942 in Mexico to carry out the United States, the 1947 DO Report refers to two FBI reports that bear on this. One of them, on 21 Dec. 1940, indicates support by the central syndicate for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on 18 Jan. 1941, suggests that Varna was one of these receiving that support, altho' this was not confirmed.

... to late in June 64 another group plot in Mexico for 150,000.

Speculation that when undertaken in April 1942 can appear felt "there was something already 'ongoing'."

It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way.

In a sense CIA may have been simply backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contribution was also supplying an aura of official sanction.