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McNamara

R481

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings 3/4/77 881

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Friday, July 11, 1975

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)

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CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Friday, July 11, 1975

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m. in Room S-407, The Capitol, Senator Frank Church (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Baker Mathias and Schweiker.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Elizabeth Smith, Joseph diGenova, Charles Lombard, Frederick Baron, Patrick Shea, Robert Kelley and Michael J. Madigan, Professional Staff Members.

- - -

The Chairman. All right. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. McNamara, would you please stand and take the oath.

Mr. McNamara. Surely.

The Chairman. Do you swear that all of the testimony you are about to give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. McNamara. I do.

The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz will commence.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT S. McNAMARA

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. McNamara, I understand you have a prepared statement. Before making that could I just put a couple of things on the record.

First, your name and address, if you could.

Mr. McNamara. Robert S. McNamara, 2412 Tracy Place, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, further, as a procedural matter, we always go through this with all our witnesses and you know you have the right to counsel -- a right to counsel.

Mr. McNamara. I do.

Mr. Schwarz. And if you want to stop to obtain counsel at any time you have that right?

Mr. McNamara. I understand.

Mr. Schwarz. And you also have all of the Constitutional rights, including those under the Bill of Rights.

Mr. McNamara. I read the rules of the Committee and I

1 think I am familiar with them.

2 The Chairman. Your Constitutional rights are not ex-

3 tended by virtue of any committee action.

4 (Laughter)

5 The Chairman. But if you do have a prepared statement,

6 Mr. McNamara.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Do you have extra copies?

8 Mr. McNamara. I unfortunately don't. I gave one to the

9 counsel a few minutes ago. It is a brief statement, three

10 and a half pages.

11 The Chairman. Would you commence with the statement?

12 Mr. McNamara. Yes.

13 On June 6, Mr. Chairman, as you will recall, I wrote

14 to you saying, and I quote, "I want you to know that although

15 I doubt that I have anything to contribute to your investigation

16 if your staff or your committee wishes to question me about

17 my knowledge of the events you are investigating, I will be

18 very happy to respond."

19 My letter was written because my name had been associated

20 in the press with repeated discussions within the Government

21 in the summer of 1962 of a possible assassination attempt

22 against Premier Castro.

23 The Chairman. Did you mean to say repeated or

24 reported discussion?

25 Mr. McNamara. Beg your pardon. I meant to say reported.

It seems to me the seriousness of, the repeated or reported seriousness of, the charges your committee was examining outweighed any question of the appropriateness of my testifying, given my obligation as an international civil servant.

The first thing I want to say is that I have no knowledge or information of any proposal for the assassination of Premier Castro coming from President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy. In fact, I would regard such a proposal as totally inconsistent with everything I know about the two men.

Secondly, it has been asserted in the press that in a meeting I attended on August 10, '62, with Secretary Rusk, John McCone, then Director of Central Intelligence, and McGeorge Bundy, the question of assassination was raised and dismissed but that shortly after meeting a memorandum was circulated by Major General Edward Lansdale calling for a number of actions relating to the situation in Cuba, including the preparation of contingency plans for Castro's assassination; that when a copy of the memorandum recahed Mr. McCone he called me and I agreed with him that an assassination atttempt should not be considered and the item was in fact eliminated from the memorandum.

Other press stories appearing since my testimony was scheduled before you have quoted General Lansdale to the effect he had been requested by Robert F. Kennedy to develop assassination plans for disposing of Castro, and the project

envisioned the whole spectrum of plans from overthrowing the Cuban leader to assassinating him, although the then Attorney General it was said never used the word assassination. Lansdale was reported to have said he developed the plans without the knowledge of myself or Mr. McCone, but that we both had become aware of the planning later.

Later news stories state that Lansdale modified his statement to say "perhaps some place in the plans there was something to do about the leader who had threatened the lives of millions of Americans", and to claim that he, Lansdale, "ruled out assassination" because "that is not my bag anyway".

Since reading these press stories I have tried to reconstruct the actual sequence of events and I have refreshed my recollection from documents in your committee's possession, from conversations with other persons involved, and from a file memorandum written in 1967 that Mr. McCone was able to produce for me.

As I reconstruct it this is what happened.

Following the Bay of Pigs and extending throughout the spring and summer of '62, there was a good deal of concern within the U.S. Government about attempted subversion of Latin American Governments by the Communist regime in Cuba. To thwart these attempts the continuing program of covert activities directed against the Castro regime was mounted under the direction of an inter-Agency group. And I want to return

later to the question of the appropriateness of these actions before completing my statement.

I believe General Lansdale had been attached from the assignment in the Defense Department to serve as Staff Director of this group beginning sometime in late '61 or early '62. In August '62 several meetings of the group were held. On at least one occasion principals, including Secretary Rusk and myself, were in attendance.

In one or more of the meetings of the group the subject of assassination of Premier Castro was apparently discussed. Some news reports have asserted the subject was advanced at the August 10th meeting in Secretary Rusk's conference room in which I was present, and one news source asserts I raised the subject myself.

The report does not state whether I supported or opposed such action. I have no recollection of even discussing the matter.

No one of the senior officials present at the meeting with whom I have talked recalls me discussing it. Mr. McCone's recollection in his file memorandum prepared sometime five years later, on April 14, 1967, is that the subject was probably raised at another meeting in the JCS conference a day or two before the meeting I attended.

In any event, apparently everyone agrees the subject was dismissed. It appears, nevertheless, that General Lansdale

included a request for contingency plans for the assassination in the memorandum he later prepared in his capacity as Staff Director to the inter-Agency group and addressed to the CIA liaison officer, Mr. Harvey. I did not see the Lansdale memorandum when it was prepared and did not learn of its existence until Mr. McCone telephoned me about it when it was brought to his attention.

At that time I expressed opposition to any assassination attempt and I agreed with Mr. McCone no such planning should be undertaken. I understand the memorandum was modified.

I have no knowledge or information about any other plans or preparations for a possible assassination attempt against Premier Castro.

I believe now and I think Mr. McCone's memorandum supports my recollection, that I believed then that the U.S. Government should not undertake or encourage assassination openly or secretly as an instrument of national policy against people with whom we are not at war.

It may be argued that given the extensive program of covert action against the Castro regime in which the U.S. government was engaged at the time that it would only be a short term to attempted assassination but I can't accept that argument on its face. Bribery and industrial sabotage are not the same things as murder. But having said that I want to conclude this portion of my statement by saying that I

1 believe we completely misjudged the seriousness of the poten-
2 tial danger to this country from Cuba and that we overreacted
3 accordingly. In fact, I have serious doubts about the
4 value or the propriety of covert intervention in the affairs
5 of another country in almost any situation except as may be
6 incidental to the completion of essential intelligence.
7 Later, perhaps, Mr. Chairman, I would add two points to
8 this.
9 The Chairman. Mr. McNamara, may I just ask before you
10 continue, because the last sentence you have read happens to
11 so coincide with my own belief that I would like to reread it
12 and then ask you a question concerning it.
13 Mr. McNamara. Surely.
14 The Chairman. In fact, you read, "In fact, I have serious
15 doubts about the value or the appropriateness of covert inter-
16 vention in the affairs of another country in almost any
17 situation except as may be incidental to the completion of
18 essential intelligence."
19 Was that your belief at the time you were Secretary of
20 Defense?
21 Mr. McNamara. No.
22 The Chairman. That has come to be your belief since
23 that time?
24 Mr. McNamara. Yes. It is based, frankly, on both partici-
25 pation in approval of covert action designed to intervene

1 in the affairs of another country. This statement is based
2 both on the fact I did participate in authorizing that and in
3 observing the results which I think were small in relation to
4 the heavy cost to the country carrying this out, and particular-
5 ly the cost in terms of -- I am using a brief statement -- I
6 will expand on this if you wish -- cost in terms of eroding
7 the credibility of a Democratic Government with its own people.
8 The Chairman. Yes.
9 You don't have to expand on that for my benefit, I
10 agree with you, but I interrrupted you. Do you want to complete
11 your statement?
12 Mr. McNamara. The remaining points, Mr. Chairman, I
13 would prefer to defer until the end and they may not be
14 necessary at the time.
15 The Chairman. Very well, Mr. Schwarz, then, would you
16 like to begin the questioning?
17 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. McNamara, I want to call your atten-
18 tion to the meeting in August '62.
19 Mr. McNamara. Yes, sir.
20 Mr. Schwarz. And we have previously marked and I will
21 ask Mr. diGenova to put in front of you four documents: the
22 minutes of the August 10, 1962 meeting, which has been marked
23 as Exhibit A.
24 Does everybody know where these are by now in the books.
25 That is at Tab B in the Lansdale book, the section marked

Tab 38-B.

The second marked as Exhibit 2 is Mr. Lansdale's memorandum of August 13, 1962 which is at Tab 38-D of the Lansdale book.

The third marked as Exhibit 3 the August 14 memorandum from Mr. Harvey to Mr. Helms.

And finally, marked as Exhibit 4 Mr. McCone's memorandum to file of April 14, 1967, which is the second entry at Tab R of the McNamara book which you have just obtained, the thinner book.

(The documents referred to were marked McNamara Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Going back to your statement --

Mr. McNamara. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Why don't you pull them out so he has them all in front of him.

Going back to your statement, Mr. McNamara --

Mr. McNamara. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. -- would you state again whether you have any present recollection of the subject of assassinations coming up at the August 10, 1962 meeting?

Mr. McNamara. I have no such recollection. I should expand on that to say quite frankly I have no recollection of the meeting at all. And although I referred to it in my statement, my recollection or my reference, as I indicated, was based on a reconstruction of the events of the time by reference to documents that you and your associate have shown me and by conversations with certain of my senior colleagues who were reported to have been in attendance and by certain other conversations, including a conversation with Mr. McCone and reference to a memorandum which he had dictated in 1967, a copy of which he sent me.

Mr. Schwarz. I want to come back to what all those conversations were.

First, let me make clear what you do or do not now remember.

Apart from the August 10 meeting, do you now recall the

subject of assassinations being raised at any meeting?

Mr. McNamara. I have no recollection of that ever being raised in any meeting.

Mr. Schwarz. Didyou ever raise the subject of assassination, as far as you recall?

Mr. McNamara. I have no recollection of raising it at any time, and I have talked to four of the people who attended the August 10 meeting who said they had no recollection of my raising it.

When I say that I am aware you have a memorandum from Mr. Harvey you referred to a moment ago which indicates that I raised the question on August 10, but I have no recollection of doing so.

Senator Mondale. We have heard from John McCone who said that he thought he heard McNamara bring it up; is that correct?

Let's review the record.

I think what we have heard from some of the participants is slightly different than what you have said about the main principals; is that correct?

Do you want to bring this up in some other -- I think you ought to know what we have heard and you can react to that.

The Chairman. It is my recollection that McCone testified that the subject did come up and he thought that McNamara had brought it up.

Senator Mondale. That is right, and Harvey said that.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Harvey's memo says that.

Senator Mondale. Did he say he heard it in testimony?

The Chairman. Harvey was present in the meeting.

Mr. Schwarz. I think he confirmed his memo.

Can I check on Mr. McCone's testimony for a moment?

Senator Mondale. Yes, so you know what he said.

While he is looking, what did Goodwin say?

Mr. Schwarz. Goodwin is going to be examined on Cuba.

Senator Mondale. He hasn't talked about that. What have the others? Do we have any other direct testimony?

Mr. Schwarz. Rusk said --

Senator Mondale. Said he did not hear it.

The Chairman. Incidentally, Mr. Secretary, we have no purpose and no intention to try in any way to entrap you or any other witness and we would prefer to the best of our recollection and ability to recount to you other testimony we have received so you can comment on it and help us try to ascertain what the truth may be.

Mr. Schwarz. I think I ought to say with respect to McCone's testimony, at page 33, you asked Senator Mondale, who made that suggestion to which you refer in your memo, and you will recall that McCone's 1967 memo does not attribute the suggestion to any particular person.

McCone answered, according to the record it was Mr.

1 McNamara according to Mr. Harvey's record --

2 Senator Mondale: Do you recall who made the suggestion?

3 Mr. McCone: No, I can't recall it from memory. I can

4 only reconstruct it from the record.

5 Senator Mondale. Is that the only reference?

6 Mr. Schwarz. I am going ahead and doublechecking

7 with McCone.

8 Senator Mondale. Here it is on page 51. He said he

9 just doesn't know.

10 Can you testify it was not Secretary McNamara?

11 McCone: No; it could have been.

12 "You just don't know?"

13 Mr. McCone: "I don't know".

14 Senator Baker. On page 32 there is another colloquy

15 on the same point you might turn to.

16 McCone: "I am not sure that McNamara used the word

17 assassination, he could have used another word, elimination or

18 removal. And Mr. Harvey in preparing this memorandum

19 for Helms, who was then Deputy of Plans and Information used

20 the word assassination rather loosely."

21 Might that be the rationale for the situation, might

22 your views --

23 Mr. McNamara. I don't think it is and I think you

24 should be very careful in concluding that Mr. McCone recalls

25 that I raised the subject at all using the word assassination

or elimination. The reason I say that, at the risk of diverting you for a moment to show you why this is a matter of great importance to me and why I asked for careful and precise action by this committee, let me say that I perhaps more than anyone else, other than Robert Kennedy, have been charged with approving the concept and/or planning and/or action related to the assassination of Castro. I don't believe I ever did approve any of those things. I don't believe I ever suggested it. None of my senior associates whom I have talked to can reall it. But I have here a set of clippings from the press in Belgium, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, France, Italy and England, which states that I did.

And I have here a statement of the U.S. press, an article in the Time Magazine of August 30, which states that McCone and another man present, that is to say, at the August 10 meeting, remember McNamara raised the question of disposing of Castro. And it goes on to imply that I did.

The AP report indicates that Lansdale was my assistant and presumably acting under my instructions when he wrote the memorandum you referred to.

The New York Times quoting the AP five days later, by the most unbelievable error, says I wrote the memo to CIA instructing them to plan the assassination.

Now, this is serious to me as an individual. It is much

more serious to the World Bank as an institution as to my role in the Bank. So, I must ask your forebearance today if I attempt to be unusually precise on matters. And I want to conclude by saying that because of the Time Magazine article it said McCone remembered, I raised this matter, I called McCone on June 25, and I have given a copy of the memo of conversation I made after that to members of your staff. And in that conversation, after I related to McCone everything I knew up to that point which had come from Belin off the Rockefeller Commission and the press and others, including a reference to the Harvey memo and all the rest of this -- the memo is in front of you, I asked John if he could add to my knowledge what took place during or after the August 10 '62 meeting of 54/12 Augmented took place in Dean Rusk's conference room to consider reports.

He remembered the elimination of Castro was discussed during the course of the meeting but does not recall whether or not I raised the subject.

Now, I have read the press that McCone states he recalls that he told me. He doesn't recall it.

Senator Hart of Michigan. I think in the exchange between Senator Baker and Senator Mondale the point is made by Mr. McCone he has no memory, that all he is reconstructing is from the fellow Harvey. This is consistent.

Mr. McNamara. This is exactly my understanding, sir.

The Chairman. That is borne out by the transcript.

Mr. McNamara. I think the transcript indicated I insisted asiing this be repeated on the record because I am facing some very serious problems around the world because of lack of understanding of that particular point, and I think misquotes of JOhn McCone in Time Magazine.

Mr. Schwarz. The most contemporaneous record, however, is the August 13 memorandum from Mr. Lansdale which, as you know, tasks Mr. Harvey with developing a paper concerning, among other things, the liquidation of leaders.

Those words were crossed out.

Mr. McNamara. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. And the August 14 memo about Mr. Harvey that tells us those were the words. It says it was foolish to put it in writing. It says the matter was brought up at the meeting and was brought up by you.

Now, there isn't any evidence that this matter led to anything. Indeed, the CIA in their own study of the whole Castro assassination matter specifically wrote that the August 10 meeting didn't lead to any of the actual events. So we are concerned, it seems, with the single issue of what was the attitude toward assassination expressed at the meeting, because that does bear upon other ultimate questions we have to deal with. The attitude is important.

Isn't the best evidence of what happened at the meeting

1 the contemporaneous memorandum?

2 Mr. McNamara. I am sure that written statements carry

3 more weight than faulty memories. My memory certainly is

4 faulty over a period. But even the written statement of

5 Harvey, as I have seen it -- I do not have a copy of it but I

6 have seen it, your staff showed it to me.

7 Mr. Schwarz. It is marked as --

8 Mr. McNamara. In advance of the hearing.

9 Mr. Schwarz. Marked as Exhibit 3.

10 Mr. McNamara. Even the statement of Harvey's memo

11 doesn't say I proposed assassination of Castro. It says the

12 question of assassination of Castro was raised or was up, to

13 be precise.

14 I don't wish to try to read into that more than is

15 appropriate, but it doesn't say I proposed it, and I am not

16 about to say I proposed it. I have no recollection of it.

17 The four senior associates I have talked with, Messrs.

18 Taylor, Bundy, Gilpatric and Rusk, have no recollection of me

19 raising it. It is entirely out of character with what I believe

20 I thought at the time and I do not read into that those words

21 a statement I did propose it.

22 Senator Baker. Could I say a word?

23 I think page 33 of the McCone testimony is helpful in

24 this respect.

25 As the Chairman says, we are not trying to push anybody

in a corner, trapping the witness, we are trying to find the baseline minimum of what was said with respect to assassination or elimination of leaders. My interpretation of the record so far is that it is alleged, and I believe proven with good evidence, both verbal testimony and documentary evidence, that the subject proposale came up at that meeting, but not beyond the shadow of a doubt that it was said by the Secretary.

Let me tell you why I said that.

Page 33 of McCone's testimony is as follows:

"I take it then that according to your best recollection the subject of liquidating Castro and possibly other top Cuban leaders did come up at that meeting and you did take strong exception to it?"

McCone: "Yes."

So it seems clear to me McCone does remember independently the subject coming up.

To continue with McCone's answer:

"I was not alone in that. Mr. Murrow took exception. I rememver that very clearly."

It seems to me the baseline minimum is that apparently the subject did come up and was shot down. We have only the remaining question of whether or not the witness before us now brought it up or someone else did.

Then the question I will put to Mr. McNamara, do you remember it coming up?

Mr. McNamara. I do not remember it coming up.

Mr. Schwarz. One further question I think, was it shot down or not at the meeting, and in that connection Mr. Lansdale did send out a memo tasking the CIA?

Do you believe Mr. Lansdale would have sent out a memorandum tasking the CIA to investigat as a contingency liquidation of leaders if the matter had in fact been shot down at the meeting?

Mr. McNamara. Mr. Schwarz, I would rather not answer that. I have certain knowledge of Mr. Lansdale, General Lansdale, but I would rather not comment upon whether he would or not. I will report to you what I know with respect to that memo based on what Mr. McCone told me what his memo says, but I would rather not speculate on Lansdale's willingness to independently suggest that.

The Chairman. Mr. McNamara, I think it is important for the committee to at least have the benefit of your opinion on an issue that is as central to our inquiry as this, because we are confronted with a memorandum that Lansdale wrote soon after the meeting in which he instructs or directs CIA to at least inquire into schemes for liquidating foreign leaders.

Wasn't that the term?

Mr. Schwarz. Liquidation -- including liquidation of leaders.

The Chairman. Including liquidation of leaders.

1 Will you read the whole sentence?

2 Mr. Schwarz. You have to put the two together. But it

3 would read:

4 "Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

5 Mr. Harvey, intelligence political (splitting the regime,in-

6 cluding liquidation of leaders,) economic sabotage limited."

7 The Chairman. Do you have that before you?

8 Mr. McNamara. I do.

9 The Chairman. Notice at the beginning of this Lansdale

10 memorandum is the following. The first sentence is "In com-

11 pliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10

12 August policy meeting of operation MONGOOSE".

13 Then he goes on to instruct Mr. Harvey as indicated.

14 Now, we know the words that are deleted from this

15 memorandum have been since supplied to the committee, were the

16 including liquidation of leaders.

17 Now, if General Lansdale thought that the group had

18 given him such authority, that could have been based upon a mis-

19 understanding of the group's intentions, or it could have been

20 an enlargement of his instructions. We don't know for sure

21 what it was. But there it is and I think you ought to respond

22 to the question as best you can.

23 Mr. McNamara. Well, I should tell you that at the moment

24 I am so personally annoyed at General Lansdale for what I

25 consider loose and irresponsible and at times contradictory

1 testimony in the press, in the whole matter in the last three or
2 four weeks, I don't feel I can speak in a fair manner with
3 respect to him and I don't propose to.
4 The Chairman. Then can you tell the committee apart
5 from --
6 Mr. McNamara. I take it those in the room will hold this
7 in confidence.
8 Ed Lansdale is a fine human being. I am damn annoyed
9 at the damage he has done to dead people. I am not an unbiased
10 reporter on Ed Lansdale's motives.
11 The Chairman. I can understand your feeling.
12 But apart from General Lansdale and any feelings you
13 may have toward him, can you give the committee any explana-
14 tion, any other explanation of why such words should have
15 appeared in that?
16 Mr. McNamara. No, I cannot. It seems to me inconsistent
17 with what McCone has told me and what your record shows McCone
18 said and what McCone reports Ed Murrow as having said, and
19 the general tone of the August 10 meeting as it has been
20 reported to me. I can give you no explanation.
21 Senator Mondale. Did you say earlier that you had call[illegible]
22 McCone when you saw the Lansdale memo and objected to that
23 language and it was then deleted?
24 Mr. McNamara. No; I reported that when I read the Time
25 Magazine report dated June 30, 1975 --

1 Senator Mondale. Then you called him?

2 Mr. McNamara. That reported McCone as saying that I or
3 he recalled that I initiated a suggestion relating to the
4 elimination of Castro. I called McCone and at that time he
5 told me that he had brought this matter to my attention after
6 he, McCone, had seen the Lansdale memo in 1962, and that he,
7 McCone, objected to the language in the Lansdale memo, and
8 McCone reported to me in 1975 that I, too, objected very
9 strongly and vigorously to it in 1962.

10 Concurrently with McCone talking to me in 1962, Harvey
11 was apparently talking to Lansdale, according to McCone,
12 and as a result of Harvey's discussion with Lansdale the
13 words were excised from the memorandum. But in any case
14 McCone and I, so McCone says, agreed that there would be no
15 action of the kind contemplated by the Lansdale memo, no
16 planning of any such action.

17 Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. McNamara, in refreshing
18 your own recollection you referred to a conversation, your
19 recent conversation with Mr. McCone, and in that connection
20 the fact that he had done a memorandum for the files, I think
21 you said April 14 or August 14 '67 --

22 Mr. McNamara. April 14, I believe.

23 Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you know in what connection
24 he did that memorandum?

25 Mr. McNamara. I can relate to you what he told me

1 relating to the memorandum. This is from a memorandum I
2 made of my June 25, 1975, conversation with him.
3 Mr. Schwarz. That is Tab S of the McNamara book.
4 Mr. McNamara. The last paragraph -- if you have copies
5 of that in front of you -- Item E states in 1967, following a
6 conversation with Jack Anderson held at Ted Kennedy's request,
7 he, Mr. McCone, prepared a memo of conversation which referred
8 to some of the events surrounding the August 10, '62, meeting:
9 but that contrary to the impression I had received from
10 Dillon and others the memo did not refer to me. He will
11 send me a copy of the memo next Monday when he returns to his
12 office in Los Angeles.
13 That was his recollection on June 25, 1975 when I called
14 him, at which time he was in Seattle. The memo was, he
15 thought, in his office in Los Angeles.
16 As it turns out, he was in error in one respect be-
17 cause the memo did refer to me, and when he sent it to me I
18 subsequently discovered that.
19 In any case, the origin of the April 14, 1967, McCone
20 memo apparently was a conversation he had with Jack Anderson
21 at the time.
22 Senator Hart of Colorado. Thank you.
23 Senator Morgan. Mr. Chairman.
24 The Chairman. Senator Morgan.
25 Senator Morgan. Mr. McNamara, first let me preface

1 my remark by saying that I personally think who raised the
2 question of assassination is now not immaterial, but I think
3 the fact that it has now been established to my satisfaction
4 that the question was raised, that probably meets the needs of
5 the committee as far as I am concerned and I am not interested
6 really in pointing out or establishing precisely who did or
7 didn't.
8 But there is one point that I would like for you to
9 comment on.
10 Following the minutes of the meeting on August 10, we
11 have a number of memoranda which have already been referred
12 to, and as the Chairman has pointed out, the memorandum of
13 August 13 from Lansdale, which was just three days after the
14 meeting, starts off, as our Chairman so well pointed out,
15 "In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in
16 the 10 August policy meeting".
17 I note, it seems to me, just three days afterward, it
18 would be unlikely that he would write that into a memorandum
19 if he did not feel that that was actually his instructions,
20 and disseminate that memorandum.
21 Then when you go following that memorandum, that is the
22 one you recall that he used the words that were later excised.
23 The very next day we have the Harvey memorandum which
24 takes General Lansdale to task for raising the question of
25 assassination. But then he goes on to say that "I was present

1 or "I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on
2 the point", and so on.
3 He says a question of assassination, particularly of
4 Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the
5 meeting of the Special Group, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
6 And the last sentence of a paragraph is "I took careful
7 notes".
8 Now, add to that the Inspector General's report that
9 was made in 1967, which was seven years ago, which says --
10 does he have a copy of that? It is under Tab C.
11 The Inspector General report starts off saying that
12 Tom Parrott's minutes of the meeting make no mention of the
13 subject of assassination. Both McCone and Harvey recall that
14 McNamara raised the question or raised the subject.
15 Harvey's notes taken at the meeting show that
16 it was also mentioned by Murrow but the nature of the comment
17 was not recorded, Mr. McCone states in the memorandum 14 April
18 '67, that he recalls meetings on 8 or 9 of August in Joint
19 Chief's operation room in Pentagon, and on August 10 in the
20 section, and so forth, at one of these meetings and McCone
21 now recalls it at JCS the suggestion was made that top people
22 in the Cuban regime, including Castro, be liquidated.
23 Now, this memorandum was made, as I say, seven, eight
24 years ago at the time when it seems that Mr. McCone's
25 memory would be probably more keen than it is at the present

time. And would you not agree that those three documents would indicate that perhaps you did raise the question?

Mr. McNamara. Not at all. Not at all and I think --

end nash
cb fols

Senator Morgan. Would you tell me why?

Mr. McNamara. Yes, because if you wish to put heavy weight on what happened eight years ago -- read McCone's memo of April 14, '67 --

Senator Morgan. All right, leave that out.

Mr. McNamara. You can't leave it out. That is part of eight years ago.

Senator Morgan. Let me leave it out for the purpose of my question, if you will, please.

Why would General Lansdale only three days after the meeting in a memorandum prepared for general circulation make such a statement and then the next day Mr. Harvey, the fourth day after, make such a statement and say that he made notes of it.

Mr. McNamara. Well, I am just addressing your question to me, which, if I misstated correct me -- your question is do not those three memoranda support the contention that I raised the question of assassination. I don't think they do.

Senator Morgan. I agree. I will accept your answer on that.

Thinking back and just take the two memoranda made the third and fourth days after the meeting, both of which had general circulation, were not made in secret, were not kept in separate files but generally curculated.

For instance, Lansdale's was circulated to Harvey, to ...

1 State Department, to General Benjamin Harris, Defense. Who
2 was he?
3 Mr. McNamara. He must have been a representative of
4 the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I don't recall him.
5 Senator Morgan. Lon Wilson.
6 It seems to me those two memoranda that quickly after
7 that meeting for general circulation would tend to indicate
8 that certainly in their minds and according to their notes
9 that you did raise the question.
10 Mr. McNamara. Lansdale's memorandum makes no reference
11 to me whatever as having raised the question so --
12 Senator Morgan. But it notes the question was raised.
13 Mr. McNamara. But it doesn't indicate I raised it,
14 and it certainly indicates I support it and not even the
15 Harvey Memo indicates I support it. The Harvey memo simply
16 says I raised the question. I could have raised the question
17 in opposition.
18 I don't mean to be trying to read into these statements
19 words that aren't there, but I must be very careful. I have
20 no recollection of it, my senior associates have no recollec-
21 ion of it, it is totally inconsistent with my moral standards
22 now and then.
23 Senator Morgan. Your moral standards have changed a little
24 now from what they were?
25 Mr. McNamara. Not my moral standards.

Senator Morgan. Your willingness to engage in covert activity?

Mr. McNamara. But not for moral reasons. For perfectly practical political reasons and associated with the view of Domecracy. But I don't mean to be nit-picking with you on this point, but it is a very important point to me, and there is nothing in the Lansdale memorandum that in any way indicates I raised or supported the issue of assassination. And the important point, if I may continue, sir, is that I didn't know of that memo before it was sent out, so McCone says. When he brought it to my attention, I immediately agreed with him there should be no consideration of assassination. It is unlikely I would have said that then if I had been in support of it two days earlier.

Senator Morgan. Mr. McNamara, as I said earlier, I think it is really immaterial and I don't mean to be nit-picking but I am simply not willing to accept your statement in the light of the hard evidence that we have that as a matter of fact you did not raise it.

Mr. McNamara. It may be immaterial to you whether I raised it. It isn't immaterial to me, gentlemen, and I know of no hard evidence you have that I supported assassination of Castro.

Senator Morgan. No question of supporting it, the question of raising the question.

Mr. McNamara. That is why I used the word support, because the only evidence you have is from a Mr. Harvey whom as far as I know, I don't know, who says I raised the question. That is a long way from supporting.

I don't want to jump to the conclusion that I even raised it, but in any event there is no evidence you have that I supported it and it sounds like nit-picking and I don't want to waste your time on it, but it is not nit-picking to me, this is my life and I am not about to --

The Chairman. It doesn't sound like nit-picking to me, Mr. McNamara. It is a terribly important point for you. I think it is an important point from the Bank, the institution you represent, and I regret very much that there has been such an assortment of statement in the press about this matter. We live with that every day but this Committee has been very careful to avoid leaks.

Mr. McNamara. You should be proud of it; you have.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Schwarz. I think it may be helpful in light of the discussion of the meeting to read into the record what the CIA said, not about who raised it but about what happened in connection with it.

Senator Morgan. What are you reading from?

Mr. Schwarz. From Page 118 of the CIA Inspector General Report.

cb 5

1 Senator Morgan. We don't have that.

2 Mr. Schwarz. It's not in there and this is a two

3 column set of rather cryptic conclusions that has on the left-

4 hand column published detailes or unpublished details, and

5 on the right-hand column the facts as we know them.

6 On this subject the following is stated in the left-hand

7 column unpublished details.

8 The Chairman. Does the witness have this before him?

9 Mr. Schwarz. No, he does not because we didn't copy it.

10 Mr. McNamara. I will follow it orally.

11 Mr. Schwarz. The left-hand column unpublished detail

12 there was a meeting at the Department of State in which the

13 assassination of Castro was discussed. Then under the right-

14 hand column under the heading facts as we know them, true,

15 the subject was raised at a meeting at State on 10 August

16 1962 but it related to any actual attempts of assassination.

17 It did result in MONGOOSE action memorandum by Lansdale

18 assigning to CIA action for planning liquidation of leaders.

19 The offending phrase was later exercised from copies

20 forwarded to CIA, State Department and USIA, but the danger

21 may have already been done.

22 Senator Schweiker. Mr. Chairman.

23 You say, Mr. Secretary, there is no evidence that suggests

24 affirmative decision was made, yet the memorandum that we are

25 talking about was written on the assumption, in fact, the group

1 that you were in did make that decision and did proceed
2 about, and the only correction that was made for the record
3 was that it was corrected to the point that they didn't want
4 to talk about it but they were going forward with it.
5 That is exactly what the evidence is that we have, and
6 while you may contradict the evidence, we do have evidence
7 of that.
8 Mr. McNamara. I am contradicting the evidence or I am
9 saying I don't see any evidence that you have that indicates
10 I supported assassination of Castro. That is number one.
11 Number two: McCone's memory apparentyl in '67 and
12 certainly in the memo he wrote in '67 indicates that he strongly
13 opposed assassination at the time, and I strongly opposed
14 planning for assassination at the time.
15 That is in writing before you. I think that is rather
16 clear evidence that the two of us would not have directed
17 or supported or accepted planning of the assassination of
18 Castro. I know of no contrary evidence.
19 Senator Schweiker. The contrary evidence is that they were
20 going ahead and planning on that basis and only should the
21 reference to the planning and operation be deleted, and the
22 fact it was on the assumption that that group did support
23 the assassination.
24 I don't want to nit-pick either but I think we ought to
25 keep the record straight.

Mr. McNamara. I haven't seen the evidence, to use your phrase, they were going ahead and planning on that basis. As a matter of fact, I heard the counsel read a statement from the CIA Inspector General which indicates they were not going ahead and planning on that basis.

Number 2, McCone's objection to the letter was not, or to the Lansdale memo, was not to the written statement that they should plan. His objection was to any planning and my opjection was to any planning and his memo makes that very lcear. I am relying on his memory, not mine, but the memo was written in '67 and is very clear on those points.

Senator Schweiker. Haven't you seen the Harvey memo? Hasn't the staff shown you the Harvey memo?

Mr. McNamara. I have seen the Harvey memo and that gives no indication that the meeting of August 10 approved the planning or the action to assassinate Castro. It says in a very ambiguous way that McNamara raised the question unquote and doesn't indicate whether I raised it to dismiss it, to object to it or to support it.

Senator Schweiker. I would like to reread it.

Upon receipt of attached memorandum I called -- this is Operation MONGOOSE. Operation MONGOOSE as I understand it was being directed by a man under you, General Lansdale.

Mr. McNamara. May I interrupt you. Lansdale was not under me.

Senator Schweiker. Who was he under?

Mr. McNamara. He was under the Committee, he was working for the Interagency Committee. He was not taking instructions from me.

Senator Schweiker. What role did you have in Operation MONGOOSE?

Mr. McNamara. If I may digress just a second, I am not entirely clear on the organizational structure at the time. But as I understand it, there were several committees involved in covert actions. One was the 5412 Group. So far as I know they were not concerned with MONGOOSE. The second was the Special Group. My understanding of the Special Group is that they were a group responsible for considering counter-insurgency actions. I was not a member of either the 5412 group or Special Group.

Senator Schweiker. He was only a Deputy, a member of either group?

Mr. McNamara. Yes, sir.

Senator Schweiker. And in fact did represent you?

Mr. McNamara. Yes, did represent me. And let me digress again to say whatever my Deputy did I assume responsibility for. I had an extremely close relationship with them. I can not believe he did anything of any importance they didn't discuss with me. I am fully prepared to accept full responsibility for whatever my Deputy did in those two. In any

event neither one as far as I know had anything to do with MONGOOSE.

Then there was what I understand to be a Special Group MONGOOSE. And I am told that General Lansdale was acting as program director for that Special Group. He was taking directions from that committee and not from me. But I am sorry, sir, I interrupted you.

Senator Schweiker. That is all right.

I think it is important to set the record streight on that.

Paragraph four of the memo says: "Upon receipt of the attached memorandum I called Lansdale's office and in his absence pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand as far as CIA was concerned we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandun, including those disseminated to State, Defense and USIA. Shortly thereafter Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed he had done so."

Now, the point of this whole thing is that he isn't blowing the whistle and saying we agreed not to assassinate Castro or that was a misconception, he is saying just delete

1 it and delete it in the copy that your office had, but no
2 reference at all about going wrong or not doing it or what
3 all, so the assumption certainly is very clear to the authority
4 of the memo it was to go ahead but not call it that. I don't
5 see how you can say there is no contradictory evidence. You
6 may disagree and say it is wrong, but there certainly is.
7 Mr. McNamara. AGain, I don't want to be nit-picking.
8 We ought to be clear what I am disagreeing with. (a) I am
9 disagreeing with any statement that there is evidence that
10 I proposed or supported or authorized the preparation of
11 plans or any action relating to the assassination of Castro.
12 I know of no such evidence.
13 (b). I agree that this language in paragraph four of
14 Mr. Harvey's memo of 14 August is ambiguous. It would be
15 consistent with the CIA having prior to August 10 been
16 planningassassination, and it would be consistent with them
17 continuing to do so afterward. But I call your attention to
18 the fact it doesn't say that. It states it only reports to,
19 only relates to the discussion of assassination. It doesn't
20 say we are not requesting to discuss it. We are going to
21 go ahead and do it. I think one has to be very, very careful
22 in reading this language.
23 The Chairman. Senator Schweiker, were you finished?
24 Senator Schweiker. Yes.
25 The Chairman. I think that it may be well to point out

the delimma that faces this Committee.

We have received your testimony that you at no time, neither at the August 10 meeting nor any other time, advocated or approved, discussed, or undertook to authorize the assassination of Castro; is that correct?

Mr. McNamara. That is correct.

Senator Baker. Stop a second. Let's try to deal very precisely because I want to listen carefully. Discussed -- you intend discussed to be in there?

Mr. McNamara. I have no recollection of ever discussing it.

Senator Baker. I was relating that back to our disagreement. Surely that is a discussion of it.

Mr. McNamara. Well, I didn't state that I disagreed with it. In discussions.

Senator Baker. I am trying to help, not hurt.

Mr. McNamara. I know you are and --

Senator Baker. Let discuss out and it will make me feel better.

Mr. McNamara. I would be happier to have discuss out because there is evidence from Harvey that I did discuss it and I would be happier to have it out too, sir. But, I have no recollection of it and none of my senior associates have recollection of it.

The Chairman. We also have received evidence from you

1 senior associates that they never participated in the
2 authorization of an assassination attempt against Castro
3 nor ever directed the CIA to undertake such attempts.
4 We have much testimony establishing the chain of command
5 where covert action was concerned, and all of it has been
6 to the effect that the Special Group or the Special Group
7 Augmented had full charge of covert operations, and that in
8 that chain of command any proposal of this character or any
9 other proposal having to do with covert operations being
10 directed against the Castro regime, or against Castro personally,
11 were to be laid before the Special Group Augmented and were not
12 to be undertaken except with the authority of that group and at
13 the direction of that group.
14 Now, at the same time we know from the evidence that
15 the CIA was in fact engaged during the period in a series of
16 attempts to assassinate Castro.
17 Now, you see what we are faced with is this dilemma.
18 Either the CIA was a rogue elephant rampaging out of control,
19 over which no effective direction was being given in this
20 matter of assassination, or there was some secret channel
21 circumventing the whole structure of command by which the CIA
22 and certain officials in the CIA were authorized to proceed
23 with assassination plots and assassination attempts against
24 Castro. Or the third and final point that I can think of
25 is that somehow these officials of the CIA who were so

1 engaged misunderstood or misinterpreted their scope of author-
2 ity.
3 Not it is terribly important, if there is any way
4 that we can find out which of these three points represented
5 what actually happened. That is the nature, that is the
6 quandary.
7 Now, is there anything that you can tell us that would
8 assist us in finding an answer to this central question?
9 Mr. McNamara. I can only tell you what will further
10 your uneasiness. Because I have stated before and I believe
11 today that the CIA was a highly disciplined organization,
12 fully under the control of senior officials of the government,
13 so much so that I feel as a senior official of the government
14 I must assume the responsibility for the actions of the two,
15 putting assassination aside just for the moment. But I know
16 of no major action taken by CIA during the time I was in the
17 government that was not properly authorized by senior officials.
18 And when I say that I want to emphasize also that I believe
19 with hindsight we authorized actions that were contrary to
20 the interest of the Republic but I don't want it on the
21 record that the CIA was uncontrolled, was operating with
22 its own authority and we can be absolved of responsibility
23 for what CIA did, again with exception of assassination, again
24 which I say I never heard of.
25 The second point you say that you have, you know that CIA

1 was engaged in a series of attempts of assassination. I
2 think to use your words. I don't know that. I accept the
3 fact that you do and that you have information I was not
4 aware of. I find that impossible to reconcile. I just can't
5 understand how it could have happened and I don't accept
6 the third point, that they operated on the basis of misunder-
7 standing, because it seems to me the McCone position that he
8 was opposed to it, his clear recollection and his written
9 memo of 1967 that I was strongly opposed to it, his state-
10 ment that Murrow was opposed, all should eliminate any
11 point of misunderstanding. So I frankly can't reconcile.
12 The Chairman. Just to give you some further information.
13 We also have very hard evidence that McCone was not told about
14 the assassination efforts directed against Mr. Castro and
15 that Helms agreed not to --
16 Senator Mondale. Helms and Harvey agreed not to tell
17 him.
18 The Chairman. Helms and Harvey both agreed not to tell
19 McCone.
20 Senator Mondale. The other thing that is interesting
21 in the sequence of some of these events. These attempts
22 at Castro's live occurred before the August 10 meeting,
23 that is many of them did know something was underway long
24 before the August 10th meeting, and the August 10th meeting,
25 if you believe the worst, simply ordered a paper from the

1 CIA on the question of liquidating foreign leaders. It wasn't
2 an order to liquidate any foreign leaders. Nor did Harvey
3 at that meeting advise anybody what he was doing.
4 So we are presented with the possibility that we had some
5 free-wheeling operating on their own. We don't know.
6 Senator Baker. Could I say a word in that respect?
7 The Chairman. Yes. Would you like to comment at this
8 point?
9 Mr. McNamara. No, I will hear the Senator, then try to
10 explain.
11 Senator Baker. To heighten your distress or discomfort
12 a little more, I know in the opening lines of the Inspector
13 General's report dated 25 April '67 are these -- the Committee
14 has heard me read them before. "The reconstruction of the
15 Agency's involvement and plans to assassinate Fidel Castro
16 is at best an imperfect history. Because of the extreme
17 sensitivity of the operations being discussed or attempted
18 as a metter of principle, no official records were kept of
19 planning, of approvals nor of implementation."
20 So, you see, in addition to the almost irreconciable
21 alternatives that we have suggested to you, we have an exti[illegible]
22 of policy by CIA that no document should reflect this, and
23 implying clearly if plans were made that we will defy you to
24 find them.
25 Turn to page 130 of IG report. What do other component[illegible]

1 of government know about this operation, meaning assassinations.

2 Quoting from the IG report. "Former Attorney General

3 Robert Kennedy was fully briefed by Houston and Edwards on

4 7 May '62. Memorandum confirming the oral briefing was forwarded

5 to Kennedy on 14 May '62." The memorandum does not use

6 the word "assassination," but there is little room for

7 misinterpretation of what it meant.

8 Presumably the original of that memo is still in the

9 files of the Justice Department. It should be noted the

10 briefing of Kennedy was restricted to Phase I operation which

11 had ended about a year earlier. Phase II was already under

12 way at the time of the briefing but Kennedy was not told of it.

13 The Chairman. I think that latter part which Senator

14 Baker was fair enough to include, together with some testimony

15 that corroborates the fact, indicates at one point the

16 Attorney General was briefed about Phase I of the operation

17 having to do with an attempt against Castro's life, but was

18 briefed in such a manner that he was lead to believe that that

19 was over, that was over, and was not told at that briefing

20 that this was a Phase II, a new effort then underway to

21 assassinate Castro.

22 Mr. McNamara. Mr. Chairman, May I make one comment with

23 respect to this series of comments?

24 The Chairman. Yes.

25 Mr. McNamara. It relates to what I think Senator

1 Schweiker raised a moment ago. Didn't Lansdale and Harvey
2 receive instructions from the August 10 meeting to develop
3 plans to assassinate Castro? From what I have just heard,
4 and I had no previous knowledge of what I have just heard,
5 it sounds to me that something I still can't conceive of
6 was going on, tha the CIA had been planning assassinations
7 and perhaps attempting assassinations against Castro for some
8 considerable period of time prior to August 10.
9 The Chairman. That is correct.
10 Mr. McNamara. Assuming that for the moment it is not
11 very likely that Harvey and Lansdale were taking their in-
12 structions for planning assassination from the August 10
13 meeting, and I think that interpretation should not be
14 considered --
15 The Chairman. That is correct.
16 Mr. McNamara. -- as a likely one.
17 Senator Schweiker. I didn't read paragraph 3, but this is
18 right to the point of this issue and not indirect.
19 The Chairman. What are you reading from?
20 Senator Schweiker. The same August 14 memo. This is four
21 days after the meeting. It is the best evidence we have of
22 what happened four days after and we have nothing that is
23 more directly relevant in terms of the historical documentation.
24 The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel
25 Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of

the Special Group Augmented in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August, it was the obvious consensus at the meeting in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record which ties into Senator Baker's point. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on the point these notes are four days old and the Special Group Augment is not expecting any written comments or study on this point. We couldn't have more direct evidence unless you had notes.

Mr. McNamara. (a). I have no notes. (b). I think this ambiguous sentence can be read in a variety of ways. It can be read that some of us had begun to hear of assassination attempts and were opposed to it and wanted it clarified or we wanted no more talk of it. There are a whole series of interpretations that can be made. What is apparently completely clear to you and again to upset me is that there is evidence that prior to August 10 there were assassination plans and attempts against Castro.

The Chairman. Oh, yes, going back to the Eisenhower Administration.

Senator Mondale. Had you ever heard about that?

Mr. McNamara. I had never heard about it and I still find it difficult to believe. I accept the statement that you have evidence that is acceptable to you and I share the conclusion you have come to, therefore, but this is totally inconsistent

1 with the whole series of my briefings, one of which is that
2 the CIA was fully under control of the senior officials of
3 the government and that we, therefore, must stand responsible
4 for whatever important actions CIA undertook. I have felt
5 that way, I have said it publicly, I said it as recently as
6 60 days ago, and with the exception of assassination, I
7 still feel that way. I can not reconcile why they would
8 be acting on assassination plans or attempts without proper
9 authorization.

The Chairman. That is the question with which we are faced. There is no doubt but what the CIA in fact did engage in a series of attempts against the life of Castro. We have all of the evidence. The testimony has been confirmed by CIA's own investigation of the affair. The men who participated have so testified. The particulars have been laid before us involving attempts to secure the assistance of men thought to have been long connected with the Mafia. It is all there. It all happened. And though it is gallant to assume a responsibility, you could only have one, the President himself could only have one, if he did not direct the CIA to engage in such activities only in the broadest military sense of a commander who must assume responsibility for the actions of his subordinates even if he does not order, even if he has no knowledge of it.

Senator Schweiker. I think one other thing we should

1 say in fairness to the Secretary is that we mentioned General
2 Lansdale, and it is true his testimony is contradictory, and
3 in fairness to the Secretary we should also point out that
4 in his interview with the Washington Star -- I am trying to
5 get a whold of the one with CBS News --
6 Senator Mondale. Do we have that yet?
7 Senator Schweiker. No; we are trying to get it by tele-
8 phone.
9 Where he tells a completely different story than he
10 told our committee. He does not refer to you. He refers
11 in this interview to Robert Kennedy. So I think when we
12 talk about General Lansdale we should make clear, General
13 Lansdale in this interview does not in any way implicate
14 you.
15 Senator Mondale. Then Lansdale before us said the story
16 was cockeyed, he hadn't said that. So I don't know.
17 Mr. McNamara. On the Lansdale matter, I don't want to
18 speculate on his motives or what he would do or wouldn't do
19 without authority. I would repeat to you only two points.
20 (a). That your staff showed me a memo indicating he had been
21 detached from the assignment to the Pentagon, in sometime,
22 I forget whether it was late '61 or early '62 to work for the
23 account of one of these committees and, therefore, while he
24 might still have carried the title Assistant Secretary of
25 Defense, he was not taking instructions from the Secretary of

1 Defense during the period we are discussing, and secondly,
2 I will report a conversation I had with General Lansdale,
3 simply referring to notes I made at the time.
4 The Chairman. When did this take place?
5 Mr. McNamara. I am just trying to find the exact date.
6 It was in reference to one of these newspaper articles.
7 Give me a moment to find the particular reference.
8 A few weeks ago on the issue of whom he received his
9 instructions from.
10 On the 30th of May, two conversations in the same day.
11 This is because of a most unusual situation but let me refer
12 to that because it relates to this. It also shows my
13 problem.
14 On May 24, the AP and Washington Star reported relating
15 to the August 10 meeting, that I had been there, and that
16 it then says, AP says, while one source who has seen the
17 minutes said the subject was immediately dismissed, i.e.,
18 planning of assassination of Castro, two sources say a memo
19 was written two days later and by assistant to then Secretary
20 of Defense McNamara directing the CIA to develop contingency
21 plans for a possible assassination of the Cuban leader.
22 By the most amazing error, six days later the New York
23 Times in an article on the Mafia and the CIA, buried deep
24 in the article, states, quoting the AP: "The Rockefeller
25 Commission who had obtained minutes of a meeting on August

1 attended by the Secretary of Defense McNamara, Rusk, McCone,
2 Bundy, the meeting," the AP reports said, "included
3 discussion of killing Mr. Castro." One source told the AP
4 the matter was immediately dismissed but the wire service
5 quoted two other sources. This is the important point. The
6 wire service, AP, quoted two other sourced who said a memo
7 was written two days later by McNamara directing the CIA to
8 prepare contingency plans for the elimination of Castro.
9 Needless to say, when I read that I was deeply upset.
10 Let me complete this, if I may, Mr. Schweiker, then come
11 back because this is a complete misstatement of what the
12 AP said.
13 I was concerned enough when I read the AP because the
14 implication was that Lansdale wrote the memorandum under
15 my direction, as Assistant to McNamara he must have been
16 reporting to me, he must have taken instructions from me and,
17 therefore, I was responsible for Lansdale's memo. But I have
18 learned enough about this kind of problem to know that to
19 try to get this point cleared was going to make a two-day
20 story out of a one, so frankly, I didn't recall the AP on this.
21 On the 30th of May we get this kind of story. I was so upset
22 I called Horrick, under whose byline this appeared, and
23 sought to correct it, and he was shocked when I read it to
24 him. He hadn't head the printed version of the story. He
25 said that is not the story I filed. The AP made clear you

1 you didn't write it, Lansdale wrote it. I have to talk to
2 my editors. And he talked to them and called me back and
3 said it is a horrible error and we will correct it, and I
4 don't know whether they have or not, I haven't seen a correction.
5 But assume for a minute they have. I said when you correct
6 it correct the impression Lansdale wrote the memo under my
7 instruction because he was not operating for me at the time.
8 I learned this in the interim. Horrick said no, we can't
9 correct that, we can only correct our misquote of the AP.
10 I said correct that and I will talk to the AP. Before I
11 talk to the AP to be damned sure I was right, because my
12 memory is very bad about this period, I called three people.
13 I called Max Taylor, Roswell Gilpatric and Lansdale to find
14 out who Lansdale worked for and who he was taking instructions
15 from at the time, and it was with respect to that I will now
16 answer your question.
17 My call to Lansdale, I made two calls to Lansdale on May
18 30, and my note says, in answer to my question, Lansdale
19 said he was not working for me at the time of the August 10,
20 '62 meeting, but then I would rather not say what else he
21 said because I think it is wrong, for somebody else, and I
22 probed him on it and he said not exactly something else, and
23 I probed him and got something else later on in the same day
24 I called AP and reported all this to them except I said that
25 I just wanted to make clear Lansdale was not working for me and

1 taking instructions from me. They said they would report
2 that, correct the misstatement, correct the statement. But
3 when they reported that they would have to report their source
4 for the story. And I said I don't give a damn, report your
5 source. By the way, who was it? They said it was Lansdale.
6 I said you had better damned well get on the telephone and
7 talk to Lansdale because I just talked to him and he said I
8 was not instructing him at the time. I said, furthermore,
9 when you call Lansdale and you ask him whether he was
10 taking instructions from me with respect to that memorandum,
11 if he leaves you with any doubt on the matter, you call me
12 back because I want to sit down with the two of you in person
13 that afternoon and get this straightened out. I am quite
14 clear Lansdale was not working for me, wasn't taking instruct-
15 ions from me, I didn't have a damn thing to do with the memo
16 and I don't want any misunderstanding on it. I am not trying
17 to hand it on Lansdale, I want to make this clear, I want
18 to make it perfectly clear he wasn't working for me.
19 That was about three o'clock on Friday afternoon. I
20 heard nothing more of it.
21 I would just as soon have this off the record.
22 The Chairman. Very well.
23 (Discussion off the record.)
24 Senator Schweiker. On the record.
25 Mr. McNamara, who did General Lansdale work for? Can

you clear that up for us?

Mr. McNamara. The piece of paper that your staff showed me indicates that sometime, I think it is in the latter part of '61, at White House direction, he was assigned to work for an interagency group that was planning and perhaps authorizing covert action against the Government of Cuba.

Senator Schweiker. Who would he have reported to?

Mr. McNamara. He would have reported to the Chairman of this group and the group itself.

Senator Schweiker. That would have been whom?

Mr. McNamara. Well, you have the evidence much better than I.

The Chairman. We have a record.

Mr. McNamara. I am not trying to evade it, I am confused about the groups and I don't have it clear in my mind how they are organized. I wasn't chairman of the group and he wasn't taking instruction from me and he clearly understands that or recalls it.

The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz.

Senator Baker. Just a minute.

Senator Schweiker. May counsel tell us who was chairman of the group?

Mr. Schwarz. General Maxwell Taylor.

Senator Mondale. Special Group Augmented, and Taylor was the head of it.

Senator Baker. Mr. McNamara, tell us who those people were that told you who Lansdale worked for and who they claimed he worked for.

Mr. McNamara. I talked to Max Taylor or Roswell Gilpatric and to Ed Lansdale himself. The three of them, before I called the AP, and the reason I did, I was going to ask the newspapers to correct my statement, what I thought was a misstatement.

Senator Baker. Who did they say he worked for?

Mr. McNamara. Well, I would rather leave it that they said he didn't work for me.

Senator Baker. No, no.

Mr. McNamara. Max Taylor tole me he worked for him. I don't want to draw Max Taylor into this.

The Chairman. General Taylor told us the same thing.

Mr. McNamara. All right.

Senator Schweiker. He has been here.

The Chairman. He told us that.

Mr. McNamara. I am not trying to broaden the net. I don't want to blacken anybody.

Senator Baker. We don't want to blacken anybody. Who else, if anybody?

Mr. McNamara. Well, all I can tell you, Max Told me that Lansdale worked for him at the time. Ros Gilpatric told me that it was his understanding he worked for Max at the time.

1 In any case, he didn't work for me. That was the thing I
2 wanted in and I wasn't as careful that afternoon to find out
3 who he did work for. To be damn sure he didn't work for me
4 and Lansdale told me he didn't work for me. Well, the Lansdale
5 story I don't want to repeat.
6 Senator Baker. I would like you to repeat it.
7 Mr. McNamara. I would rather not because It was two
8 different stories. It was just a hock of a mess and this
9 is what lead to this damn CIA, I mean CBS report that evening.
10 It just got all screwed up and it is still a mess in the
11 press. I got back to my office last Monday morning and my
12 secretary -- I had been out of town on the weekend -- my
13 secretary put on my desk, I guess it is a Washington Star
14 Report, headline -- you undoubtedly have seen it, but the
15 headline of last Friday, you can see it from where you are.
16 And this indicated July 3, whatever that would have been,
17 the end of last week. "LANSDALE NAMES RFK IN CASTRO PLOT".
18 The Chairman. I know, I am aware of that story, we
19 questioned Lansdale about it.
20 Mr. McNamara. You want me to talk about Lansdale. I
21 don't want to talk about Lansdale. I don't want to repeat
22 a lot of erroneous information.
23 The Chairman. Mr. McNamara, let me just say this.
24 One of the problems we have is to evaluate the testimony of
25 that General Lansdale has given this Committee. The

1 credibility of Lansdale as a witness is one of the issues before
2 us. Now, I think that Senator Baker's question is pertinent
3 because what Lansdale told you bears upon his credibility.
4 He has been before us, we know what he has told us, and we
5 have had various appraisals given this Committee of Lansdale
6 by people who know him very well. He claims he has been
7 misquoted in the press. In unsworn testimony he did not
8 charge Robert Kennedy with having given him instructions as
9 to assassinate Castro.

10 Now, that is the situation. If you could tell us
11 what he told you it would help us in our evaluation of the
12 testimony he has given the Committee.

13 Senator Baker. Thank you very much.

14 Let me simply say for Mr. McNamara, let me make a
15 statement that I think the Committee fully understands but
16 I want him to understand.

17 In the course of my career in the Senate, I have never
18 been involved in a situation of such great sensitivity as
19 this situation. In the course of this inquiry I think one
20 of the most remarkable attributes of this Committee has been
21 its calm in the fact of coordinated circumstance unfolding
22 and unlikely paradox that appear before us. I think that every
23 member of the Committee will agree that no effort has been
24 made so far to sully the reputation of any living or dead
25 and that the temptation to do so for partisan purposes has

been totally and completely and effectually resisted. No one is attempting to do that now. The committee knows it and I want to know it.

Mr. Chairman, I would like the witness to answer the question.

Mr. McNamara. I have tried not to sully anyone's reputation and I haven't commented to the press except my own reputation being sullied, and one of the reasons I haven't is that until the full story gets out, explanations of partial partisan is bound to stimulate other partisan responses and it simply perpetuates this speculation about indivisuals, some of them dead, and others incapable of defending themselves. So I have been very careful what I have said.

Now, I will answer your questions, since you know more than I do already about Lansdale, I think in this situation.

But in answer to my question, to him as to whom he worked for, he said he worked for a committee and the chairman of the committee, but this was only after I asked him about the memo relating to the August 10 discussion that was referred to in the press as stating that Lansdale asked CIA to prepare an assassination plan. I said who gave you the instructions to prepare that memo and his reply to me was the President. And I said now, Ed, don't tell me that. Are you suggesting that you were in the presence of the President and he gave

1 that instruction? I said I don't believe it.

2 Now, this is to disagree a second. That was a telephone

3 call. I know Lansdale well. The last time I saw Lansdale

4 personally, to the best of my knowledge, was in Saigon.

5 Ellsberg was with him, civilian and dressed in combat fatigues

6 with a 45 caliber pistol on his belt and two of them were

7 playing God knows what games.

8 I haven't seen him from then to now. So I tracked him

9 down to raise this question. And he said, in response to

10 who authorized that memo -- he said the President. So I said,

11 Ed, don't kid me now. I can't believe that you were in the

12 presence of the President and he authorized you to send that

13 memo to CIA. He said, no, that wasn't exactly it. I said

14 goddamn, tell me exactly what it was. Don't tell me it was

15 the President. I am not trying to put words in your mouth.

16 I want to know what happened. The first thing I have got

17 to get clear, it wasn't me, and he said that is clear, it

18 wasn't you, and the second thing I have got to get clear,

19 you weren't working for me. He said that is clear, I was

20 working for the committee and the Chairman, and the third

21 thing I want to get, who did authorize you to do it? He

22 said, okay, it wasn't the President. I said who was it.

23 He said -- this is where it got vague -- well it wasn't the

24 President. Finally I dropped it. This is all on the tele-

25 phone. So I dropped it. I got it clear it wasn't me and

1 it wasn't the President. And then I went back to the AP,
2 and it was at that point the AP said well their authority for
3 printing in effect he was my Assistant and I authorized him, I
4 said you had better darn well get him on the telephone,
5 which is what they did, and this is what intervened between
6 three o'clock and the time Ethel called my wife and my wife
7 called me. Three hours fourty-five minutes later AP went
8 back on Lansdale and according to AP Lansdale in a sense
9 gave them the same point, the President authorized it.
10 Said it was ultimately the President. The AP reporter was
11 smart enough to know that is unlikely, not really the
12 President, it was a high intermediary. At this point you
13 get two stories. It may be two different reporters. One of
14 them said was the high intermediary McGeorge Bundy, and Lansdale
15 said no, it wasn't McGeorge Bundy, it was higher than that.
16 And the reporter said well, I guess the only person higher
17 than that could have been Robert Kennedy. Is it a fair
18 assumption it was him? And Lansdale said that is a -- I am
19 not quite certain now the exact words, but something,
20 well that is a conclusion one could draw, or some such thing
21 as that, and it was from that that the CBS got that story
22 that night at 7 o'clock on the Cronkite Show.
23 This is what has been going on, gentlemen, an explanation
24 of my reluctance to speak to you.
25 I don't want to sully Lansdale. I sure as hell don't

1 want to sully Lansdale. I sure as hell don't want dead
2 people --
3 The Chairman. We know what has been going on, Mr.
4 McNamara, and we have heard Mr. Lansdale's testimony under
5 oath that it was not Bobby Kennedy and that he was
6 misconstrued in the press.
7 All right, Mr. Schwarz, would you continue with the
8 questioning.
9 Mr. Schwarz. Would you look at the Exhibit 1, again,
10 which are minutes of the meeting of August 10, and read
11 into the record from the page 2 as far as this is at 38 B
12 in the Lansdale Book -- what is reported on a subject that
13 is not assassination, what is reported that you said on
14 another subject.
15 Mr. McNamara. Yes, paragraph 5 on page 2 of the memo
16 indicates that discussion then turned to the objectives of
17 the MONGOOSE program. McNamara questioned whether we can not
18 separate the building up of agent assets within Cuba from
19 action that would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of the world
20 opinion. This lead to the suggestion by General Taylor we
21 should consider changing the overall objective from one of
22 overthrowing the Castro regime to one of causing its visible
23 failure.
24 Mr. Schwarz. It suggests you were concerned about
25 something, you wanted the U.S. not to do things that would

1 hurt it in the eyes of the world opinion.

2 Do you have any recollection whatsoever what you had in mind?

4 Mr. McNamara. I don't. I believe by August 10, 1962

5 that the Bay of Pigs operation was a total disaster, an error

6 in every sense of the word, and certainly would have

7 opposed any military action of that kind. As a matter of

8 fact, 60 days after that August 10 meeting, during the Cuban

9 missile crisis, I strongly opposed military intervention in

10 Cuba because I thought it would kill several thousand

11 Cubans, kill several thousand Americans, run the risk of

12 Soviet response in some area of the world and danger the

13 U.S. in the eyes of the world opinion. So by this time I

14 had learned the error of my support of the Bay of Pigs of

15 a year and a half earlier and I was quite conscious of the

16 desirability of avoiding actions that would hurt the U.S.,

17 but quite frankly, I have no recollection of what those

18 actions were.

19 Mr.Schwarz. In the MONGOOSE program, it is correct,

20 is it not, that the MONGOOSE program was a program which was

21 fully authorized by the President?

22 Mr. McNamara. I believe so.

23 Let me start out again. You showed me or one of your

24 associates showed me a memo late 1961 establishing an original

25 structure for carrying out what was later called the MONGOOSE

1 program. I don't know whether the memo referred to it as
2 such and I am sure, therefore, that the program in the sense
3 of the original structure and action to consider what could
4 be done to weaken the Cuban regime was authorized by the
5 President. I don't wish to imply that whatever actions we
6 took, and I have lost recollection what they were -- I
7 don't want to imply every one of those individual actions
8 was authorized by the President. I doubt it very much.
9 Mr. Schwarz. Was a program to overthrow the Castro
10 regime authorized?
11 Mr. McNamara. I think one would phrase it somewhat
12 definitely. I think a program to weaken the Castro regime
13 with the hope that it would be overthrown was authorized.
14 I think that was the objective.
15 I tried to recall as best I can what the objective was
16 and I think that is the best expression of it.
17 Mr. Schwarz. There is a memorandum which is dated
18 April 13, '62, it in the Taylor Book generally here or not?
19 Senator Morgan. No.
20 Mr.Schwarz. I can read the whole thing into the recor
21 It is a memorandum from Maxwell D. Taylor for the record
22 April 13, '62. Subject: Operation MONGOOSE, and it refers
23 to you, Mr. Secretary, and I would like to ask you to explain
24 if you can, what you understand the position attributed to
25 to be after it had been read into the record.

"On April 13, General Taylor discussed with higher authority the MONGOOSE meeting of April 11 and 12 reporting the feeling of Secretary Rusk and McNamara that the MONGOOSE program should have no target date. Taylor pointed out the probable personnel problems which would arise if the schedule were completely indefinite.

"Taylor was informed that we would have to live with the consequences of no date, doing the best we can to bolster motivation. Taylor commented that we can probably carry out the first phase as planned with the review of the situation about August 1.

"Higher authority favors a strong effort to recruit Cubans for the U.S. Army. He was told that a new look is being taken and that by lower administration standards we can do better than in the past."

Now, what do you understand the statement attributed to you and Secretary Rusk that the MONGOOSE program should have no target date to mean?

Mr. McNamara. Well may I give a rather long answer to this, Mr. Chairman, to try to explain what I think it meant?

I want to go back to the Bay of Pigs.

The Kennedy Administration some 90 days after I came in office was confronted with a need to decide whether to proceed with or disban the operation that later became known as Bay of Pigs.

I and others recommended to the President we proceed with it. There was no opposition from anyone in a senior position that the President counseled with that I am aware of other than Senator Fulbright, and we were all wrong, it was a clear error. This became apparent to some of us shortly afterwards. It certainly wasn't apparent prior to the time but it became apparent shortly afterward.

Despite our feeling that it was a serious error, there was also an opposing force influencing us, because during that period from the Bay of Pigs until this date of 13 April 1962, my recollection is there were continued efforts by the Cuban Government to subvert the established government elsewhere in the hemisphere. I think I am right, I may be wrong on the date, but I think I am right there were actually efforts to assassinate Betancourt, the President of Venezuela and at the time, for example, so we were very disturbed about it. The President was very disturbed about it.

But I think what you see reflected in this memo of April 13 is a feeling on Dean Rusk's part and mine that we should have learned something from the Bay of Pigs, we should understand that it wasn't possible to, by military action and probably not by others and certainly not by a fixed date, which is the point of this memo. It was certainly not possible by a fixed date to so weaken the Government of Castro as to insure its overthrow, and it would be dangerous

1 So I think you can read in the memo in our opinion to have
2 a fixed date that is kind of objective, it is that kind of
3 situation that lead to the miserable failure in the Day of
4 Pigs. This is the way I interpreted this and I submit as
5 evidence in support of that the action we took in October of
6 '62 in response to what then was a very serious problem of
7 the actual introduction of missiles and nuclear warheads
8 on the Isle of Cuba. A limitedaction that is to say,
9 a limited response, I should say, to the action.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you put before the witness the document from McNamara Tab N, which is some more record of the NSC standing group meeting No. 2/63, April 23, 1963.

After this I am going to have just one more question, after this memo.

You are cited, Mr. McNamara, as stating after Mr. Bundy presented a memorandum or really before a memorandum was discussed, you are indicated as taking the position that before the group should discuss the substance you should consider whether the present policy would produce a major change, and that Mr. Castro's position over the shortterm would improve if the U.S. took no additional actions.

"He made clear his belief that elimiantion of the Castro regime was a requirement and that if others agreed our present policy would not result in its downfall we should develop a program for approval which would produce changes

1 acceptable to us.

2 "The program should aim at creating such a situation of

3 dissidents within Cuba as to allow U.S. to use force in

4 support of anti-Castro forces without leading to retaliation

5 by the USSR or the west."

6 And I call your attention further to the proposed three

7 studies by the Attorney General on the following page, which

8 include as study (a) a listing of measures which would

9 take following a contingency such as death of Castro or

10 shooring down of the U-2.

11 The committee has had lots of instances of language such

12 as elimination of the Castro regime.

13 Now, (a). did you take the position reflected there?

14 (b), does what you say there, to the best of your

15 recollection, include assassinations as a tactic? If not,

16 why not?

17 Mr. McNamara. This is the first time I can recall seeing

18 this memo in many years, and first let me get clear on the

19 date. I can't believe this date is correct, April 23, '63?

20 Mr. Schwarz. Well it does fit with some other Bundy

21 documents we looked at this morning, so I am sure it is

22 correct.

23 Mr. McNamara. When was the missile crisis?

24 Mr. Schwarz. October, '62.

25 Mr. McNamara. Well, this sounds pre-missile crisis to

1 me. I can't believe it is post-missile crisis. Let me just
2 leave it with you. It doesn't sound right to me and it
3 looks to me to be April 23, '62.
4 I would be almost sure that is the case. In any event,
5 with respect to your question --
6 Mr. Schwarz. I am sorry, incidentially, if we do not
7 show you this document --
8 Mr. McNamara. That is all right. Let me take a second
9 too read it.
10 The reason I mentioned it, you see, Item A is reference
11 to the shooting down of U-2. There had been a U-2 shot down
12 about this period. This is one of the reasons I questioned
13 whether the date is correct.
14 I don't interpret any of these actions, and certainly
15 not the three listed on page 2 under the heading the Attorney
16 General proposed three studies, A, B, C, -- I don't interpret
17 any of those as suggesting or authorizing preparation of
18 plans for the assassination of Castro. I do interpret those
19 three and certainly the further list of seven items on
20 page three as indicating a belief that it was in the interest
21 of the U.S. to weaken the Castro Government and ultimately
22 see its replacement by a non-Castro regime, presumably
23 Democratic non-Communistic regime. I think that was the basic
24 desire of the President at the time and the basic objective
25 of the program.

Mr. Schwarz. One of the studies proposed, as you say, was a list of measures we would take following contingency such as the death of Castro. Assume, if you will, with me, as is the fact demonstrated by the recrod this morning -- that in this period of time there were a number of such studies, culminating, incidentially, in one that said it would not improve the position of the United States. But do you know of any other country where stidies were made of what would happen if a particular leader died?

Mr. McNamara. I am sure - - I am sure there were studies of that kind. There were. At the time the governments of many parts of the world were unstable, there were frequent changes. I remember in connection with the then Congo, for example, there were possibilities of replacement of leaders, and I am sure that studies were made of action we would take if "X" were to be overthrown or died or otherwise be replaced.

It was quite a customary contingency to examine.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you remember specifically examining that contingency with respect to Cuba or any other country?

Mr. McNamara. No; I remember more in relation to the Belgian Congo than I do in Cuba. I have no recollection of studying the contingency in the case of Cuba.

In the case of the Belgian Congo in the 60's, I guess, the first half of the 60's, the situation was so unstable we

1 frequently considered what would happen if "X" was replaced.

2 The Chairman. That completes Mr. Schwarz's questions.

3 Mr. Smothers, do you have any questions?

4 Mr. Smothers. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

5 First, Mr. McNamara, do you recall a General by the

6 name of Mr. Richard Goodwin?

7 Mr. McNamara. Yes, I do.

8 Mr. Smothers. In what capacity did you know him?

9 Mr. McNamara. Well, in the early period of the Kennedy

10 Administration he was assigned to the White House. I was

11 going to say to the Office of the Assistant for National

12 Security Affairs. I am not exactly certain of that. But in

13 any event he was assigned to the White House. Then following

14 that assignment he was assigned to the State Department and

15 in both capacities my associates and I expect I had contact

16 with him.

17 Mr. Smothers. Was your contact with him extensive

18 enough to form an opinion regarding his reputation in the

19 government at that time?

20 Mr. McNamara. Well, I have been lead to respond to

21 one question on reputation, gentlemen, I am not going to

22 respond to any more.

23 Mr. Smothers. We will come back to that, Mr. Secretary.

24 Do you recall a Cuban Task Force Chaired at one time by

25 Paul Nitze?

Mr. McNamara. No sir, I don't. I am not suggesting he didn't chair one but I don't recall it.

Mr. Smothers. Do you recall an investigative effort out of the White House after the Bay of Pigs?

Mr. McNamara. Well, I recall after the Bay of Pigs because with hindsight so many of us in senior positions recognized it as a serious error, that President Kennedy asked General Taylor, who was retired out of the military service at the time, to come out of retirement and join with the then Attorney General and perhaps others -- I am not clear as to whether there were others or not -- to consider what mistakes had been made and how we could prevent making similar mistakes in the future.

That group carried out the study after which my recollection is that a special group to consider counter-insurgency was set up, and that was directed by General Taylor, I believe, and carried on out of the White House.

Mr. Smothers. May we go, please, to Tab P of the McNamara Book, and this would be Exhibit --

Mr. Di Genova. Seven.

Mr. Smothers. Let's enter it as Exhibit 7.

(Document referred to is marked McNamara Exhibit No. 7 for identification.)

Mr. Smothers. Appearing at Tab P is an interview with Mr. Richard Goodwin, concluded by members of this staff on May 27, 1975, and I ask, please, to go to paragraph number 1 headed Assassination.

Reading from number paragraph one, McNamara Exhibit 7, we find these words: "In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of assassination although it would not have surprised him if it had gone on. He mentioned one specific instance in which he heard talk of assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs and the Task Force was established, first chaired by Paul Nitze, then by Goodwin in his capacity as White House Staff Officer. At the meeting of that Taks Force." Is this document before the witness?

Mr. McNamara. Yes, it is.

Mr. Smothers. --"held at the State Department, McNamara suggested, 'getting rid of Castro'. Someone from CIA perhaps Bissill, then asked if McNamara meant, 'Executive Action'".

"McNamara responded that he did and stressed his interest in the idea.

"However, Goodwin did not bring up the topic. Later in the meeting after McNamara left the idea was not reasonable even apart from all objection, the Bay of Pigs showed political as politically different, because he would either be replaced by Raol or Che Gueverra," both words then "Castro".

Does this relating of conversations with Mr. Goodwin

1 bring to your mind any new recollections of any discussions
2 of assassination regarding Castro?
3 Mr. McNamara. No, it does not. I didn't see this
4 document until perhaps two or three hours ago when your
5 Counsel showed it to me.
6 I don't quite understand, since I met twice with the
7 committee staff, it wasn't shown to me until today. I have
8 no recollection of it, it is 14 years ago, and it sounds
9 extremely unlikely to me. I know one thing. I didn't normally
10 attend that group. I am not saying I didn't attend, if
11 Goodwin said I did that day, I don't know what day he is
12 talking about. He doesn't show any date.
13 Mr. Smothers. We don't either at this point.
14 Mr. McNamara. It just sounds so loose. I am not
15 prepared to accept it as a reliable representation of what
16 went on at the time.

and cb.

Mr. Smothers. Well, we know that Mr. Goodwin was not a member of Special Group Augmented. We further know he was not at the August 10th meeting. I am sorry. We further know that his recollection as the question was raised did not come from the August 10th meeting.

Without regard to how clear that memory is, this appears to be another incident of at least the memory of a discussion about getting rid of Castro, and in this instance appears to be attributed to you.

Mr. McNamara. Well --

Mr. Smothers. I am just talking here now about a meeting which he chaired and which you apparently came in and left. I am asking merely is there any present recollection in your mind of such a session?

Mr. McNamara. I have no recollection and I am not even clear what year you think the meeting was held.

Mr. Smothers. Might we leave that?

Mr. McNamara. May I ask a few questions? This memo on was not brought to my attention before I came here today and I hadn't thought about it.

First, when do you think the meeting occurred?

Mr. Smothers. Mr. Goodwin will be back before this committee, Mr. Secretary, and perhaps we will have a clearer picture at that time.

Mr. McNamara. Secondly, as to getting rid of Castro, I

1 think there is no question but if that is what you are asking
2 me about -- let me make a statement if I may, sir.
3 As to getting rid of Castro, if I am asked about that,
4 it is clear enough that we were anxious to get rid of the
5 Castro government. No question in my mind about that.
6 Now, as to executive action. Mr. Belin of the
7 Rockefeller Commission asked me sometime this spring whether I
8 was familiar with the term Executive Action. To the best of
9 my recollection I am not familiar with the term. I didn't know
10 then and I don't know now what it meant, although I am told --
11 I guess I was told by Belin and perhaps also by members of
12 your staff that Executive Action had something to do with
13 assassination capabilities that were begun or established in
14 the 1950's and carried over into the 1960's. I know no more
15 about it than what I have been told by either Belin or members
16 of your staff and I have absolutely no recollection of this
17 meeting.
18 Mr. Smothers. Mr. Secretary, your answer satisfies me
19 at this point and I would like to move on to another matter.
20 Mr. Schwarz. Could I state for the record why we didn't
21 show you that until today?
22 Mr. McNamara. Surely.
23 Mr. Schwarz. I told you when we did first meet that in
24 addition to the Harvey matter there was another person who
25 we thought would say you had raised the subject. I also

1 told you I didn't want to tell you about that until we had
2 an opportunity to put the person under oath.
3 Mr. McNamara. Surely.
4 Mr. Schwarz. As we then had to put Mr. Harvey under
5 oath. WE had thought we would have an opportunity to put Mr.
6 Goodwin under oath on this matter but he is coming back on Cuba
7 and, therefore, I decided to show it to you even though we
8 hadn't reached that point.
9 Mr. McNamara. I am grateful to you for showing me it
10 now. I wish I had been able to think about it earlier.
11 Mr. Smothers. Can I take you back to the period when
12 Mr. Roswell Gilpatric served as your deputy in the Depart-
13 ment of Defense?
14 Mr. McNamara. Sure.
15 Mr. Smothers. Could you give the committee some infor-
16 mation or some feeling for the relationship between you and
17 Mr. Gilpatric?
18 Mr. McNamara. Yes, yes.
19 Mr. Smothers. Was it a close working relationship?
20 Mr. McNamara. It was very close indeed. We acted
21 more as partners than as Secretary and Deputy. That is why I
22 said earlier that although Mr. Gilpatric was a member of the
23 54/12 organization and Special Group and presumably of the MON
24 GOOSE committee, whatever it was called, I don't believe
25 that anything important was authorized or approved or

1 supported by Mr. Gilpatric that he didn't discuss with me, and
2 I am fully prepared to take the responsibility for anything he
3 did in this capacity.

4 Mr. Smothers. Did he report to you regularly on the
5 MONGOOSE sessions -- did he keep you up to date?

6 Mr. McNamara. I don't want to speak specifically about
7 MONGOOSE because I don't recall MONGOOSE, but he reported to
8 me regularly about everything he was doing.

9 Mr. Smothers. Was he fairly meticulous about the dis-
10 charge of the responsibility?

11 Mr. McNamara. If he were active in MONGOOSE I have no
12 reason to believe he didn't report to me.

13 Mr. Smothers. And, of course, he was particularly
14 meticulous in fulfilling his function and keeping you up to
15 date?

16 Mr. McNamara. Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Smothers. How many years have you known Mr. Gilpatric?

18 Mr. McNamara. 15, 14.

19 Mr. Smothers. To the best of your knowledge, what kind
20 of memory did Mr. Gilpatric have?

21 Mr. McNamara. Again you will have to determine that for
22 him.

23 Mr. Smothers. You talked to him about things that have
24 appeared or happened sometime ago, including the Lansdale
25 situation you have related to us. Is his memory good, fair,

very poor?

Mr. McNamara. I don't want to characterize his memory.

Mr. Smothers. Mr. Secretary, is it you have no impression of it?

Mr. McNamara. I don't wish to give a personal opinion of other people's capacity. Mr. Gilpatric I know from the record has testified before you. You are qualified to appraise his memory.

Mr. Smothers. Without being disrespectful, I think this is a perfectly legitimate question and I do desire a response to it.

Mr. McNamara. I can tell you that he is in a position where his performance depends on his memory and his performance is highly regarded by his peers.

Mr. Smothers. Well, again you have been in a position to assess his powers or recollection, and this is a question of some importance to this committee and if you can make that assessment I would like to have it.

Mr. McNamara. Well, you are pressing me to do things I am not qualified for and I don't wish to pretend to this committee I am in a position to appraise Ros Gilpatric's memory. I can tell you I am in a position to appraise his integrity. It is of the highest. I haven't worked with him closely for seven years. I can't report on his physical condition or mental condition or memory, and I am -- no, may I finish

1 my sentence, please.

2 I am not trying to evade a question, but I don't think

3 that I should mislead this committee as to what I know and

4 what I don't know.

5 Mr. Smothers. I think your statement that you are not

6 qualified to answer is fine.

7 You mentioned earlier that you had upon learning of

8 some of General Lansdale's comments spoken with Mr. Gilpatric,

9 amongst others --

10 Mr. McNamara. Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Smothers.--regarding the job that General Lansdale

12 performed while at the Pentagon at the time that he was re-

13 ported to have been working for you?

14 Mr. McNamara. No, sir, I didn't report that. I stated

15 I asked Mr. Gilpatric whom General Lansdale was working for

16 at that time.

17 Mr. Smothers. When did this conversation occur, approxi-

18 mately?

19 Mr. McNamara. Let me refer to my notes a second and I

20 can give you the exact date. I believe it was May 30.

21 Yes, May 30.

22 Mr. Smothers. If you could, Mr. Secretary, this is

23 again an important detail for us -- could you recant that con-

24 versation? Do you recall what the nature of the conversation

25 between you and Mr. Gilpatric was?

1 Mr. McNamara. I will relate what I related earlier.
2 That on May 30 in connection with my inquiries to determine
3 exactly who General Lansdale was working for at the time of
4 August 1962, I called Maxwell Taylor, Ros Gilpatric and
5 General Lansdale himself, and during my conversation with Mr.
6 Gilpatric I asked him specifically whom Lansdale was working
7 for in August '62 and Mr. Gilpatric stated that he was not
8 working for either himself, that is Gilpatric, or me in
9 August '62, but rather for the committee that was dealing with
10 the MONGOOSE operation.
11 Mr. Smothers. Did he elaborate further on General Lans-
12 dale's duties? Did you touch on that at all?
13 Mr.McNamara. My notes don't indicate so and I don't re-
14 call that he did.
15 Mr. Smothers. Did you have any further discussions
16 of Lansdale, per se? In this conversation?
17 Mr. McNamara. Let me say I don't want to evade your
18 question. I am not sure this came up with Gilpatric.
19 I don't think at the time. If what you are driving at am I
20 aware there is a note some place in the record that indicates
21 Gilpatric and I didn't think much of Lansdale? I am aware of
22 that but I don't think Gilpatric told me that.
23 Mr. Smothers. That is not my purpose, Mr. Secretary.
24 I am sorry at this moment I can't share that purpose with
25 you.

1 Mr. McNamara. I can't refresh my memory any more than
2 I have as to what Gilpatric said.
3 Mr. Smothers. Let's not make it a tradeoff. My
4 concern is that, going back to that 30 May conversation, you
5 recall you said this guy Lansdale, who did he work for.
6 Mr. McNamara. That is right.
7 Mr. Smothers. And again Mr. Gilpatric said to you what,
8 as best you can recall?
9 Mr. McNamara. I will refer to my notes again. I
10 would like to be precise on this. Gilpatric said that in
11 August of '62 Lansdale was not working for either Gilpatric
12 or McNamara, he was working for a committee that had something
13 to do with MONGOOSE, or what I know called MONGOOSE. He
14 said I think Cuba covert action.
15 Mr. Smothers. Cuba covert action?
16 Mr. McNamara. Covert operation, something like that.
17 Mr. Smothers. You had also testified earlier that you
18 had had a conversation with several other persons in an
19 effort to put together the circumstances surrounding this
20 August affair?
21 Mr. McNamara. That is correct.
22 Mr. Smothers. And you mentioned General Taylor, Mr.
23 Bundy, and Mr. Rusk. Again recognizing the purpose is not to
24 have you testify or reveal any confidence, I wonder if you
25 could recant briefly for the committee the substance of those

1 discussions?

2 Mr. McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I don't wish to involve

3 others. I don't wish to be unresponsive to your committee. I

4 will be happy to report what my notes indicate. I don't wish

5 to indicate they are complete.

6 The Chairman. That is fine.

7 Mr. McNamara. Max Taylor said, one, after receiving his

8 Bay of Pigs report the President established a special group

9 with Max as chairman to oversee the government's counter-

10 insurgency programs. The special group set up special group

11 MONGOOSE to oversee the Cuban counterinsurgency activities,

12 infiltration of intelligence groups and low level sabotage.

13 Three, Lansdale was not an assistant to McNamara but was

14 Program Manager of the Special Group-MONGOOSE.

15 Four, Max served as Chairman of the Special Group;

16 Special Group MONGOOSE; and what he and I would call the

17 303 Committee, which was a later name for what was then

18 properly called 54/12.

19 Five, Max has no recollection of ever hearing the word

20 assassination mentioned in connection with any of these ac-

21 tivities.

22 Mr. Smothers. Do you have the date of this conversation?

23 Mr. McNamara. May 30.

24 I have given you previously the essence of my conversa-

25 tion with Lansdale also on May 30, and my conversation with

1 Gilpatric on May 30, and I spoke to Dean Rusk on June 9, who
2 stated that (a) at no time did anyone recommend assassination
3 to him; (b), at no time did his representatives on the 303
4 committee -- and I think he would have included his represen-
5 tatives on Special Group as well -- mention to him that the
6 committee had considered assassination.
7 (c), he has no recollection of assassinations being
8 discussed at August 10 '62 meeting and he believes he would
9 have recall it if there had been a serious discussion of it.
10 Mr. Smothers. And the date of your conversation with
11 Mr. Bundy?
12 Mr. McNamara. I am sorry, I don't know that I have
13 notes of that. Let me check.
14 I have talked to him several times. He is president
15 of the Ford Foundation. I am a trustee of it and wehave had
16 frequent conversations primarily about Ford Foundation busi-
17 ness, but I think interjected in that have been discussions
18 of this and I frankly don't have notes I can give you.
19 Mr. Smothers. Mr. McNamara, in your conversation, your
20 most recent conversation with Mr. Gilpatric was when?
21 Mr. McNamara. I think I talked to him after he had
22 testified before this committee, whenever that was.
23 Mr. Smothers. You also talked to him just before his
24 testimony, didn't you?
25 Mr. McNamara. Yes, he had dinner with me and my wife

the night before he testified.

Mr. Smothers. Didyou spend much time talking about the subject of this investigation?

Mr. McNamara. Well, I am sure we talked about it. I don't know how much time. I got home about 7:30 at night and he was with us for dinner, my wife and I and him, and I took him back to his hotel around ten. My wife was with us much of the time and I am sure we didn't talk about it while she was there, because I haven't wanted her to dwell on this subject. And after that I am sure we did talk about it.

Mr. Smothers. Did you show him the 1967 McCone memorandum?

Mr. McNamara. I doubt it. I don't want to say I didn't but, wait a minute -- I was going to say I don't think I had papers with me that night.Let me think.

Let me refresh my memory now of dates.

I didn't receive the '67 McCone memorandum until -- it was mailed on June 25. When did Mr. Gilpatric testify? What was the date?

Mr. Smothers. July 8. So you would have been with him on the evening of July 7?

Mr. McNamara. All right, I probably did show it to him because the memo was in my possession at the time and I think I took this folder home with me that night and I probably did show it to him.

Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss the tenor of that memorandum?

Mr. McNamara. If I showed it to him I must have.

Mr. Smothers. Do you have any present recollection of that discussion?

Mr. McNamara. I am not completely clear. I think I must have said to him that I was deeply disturbed about the problem of my own position with the press because I have been following these press clippings rather closely, ad I indicated to you earlier, and there has been a series of misstatements about my activities, including such a one as an indication that I wrote the memor to the CIA when the memo which you have is written by Lansdale, and McCone remembered me raising the question of elimination of Castro when McCone said he didn't, and the memo indicates the memo of my conversation, which I probably also showed Mr. Gilpatric indicates he did not remember me raising the issue.

So, I probably showed both the memo of my conversation with McCone and McCone's memo of April '67 to Mr. Gilpatric.

Mr. Smothers. To the best of your recollection did that memo in your discussions refresh Mr. Gilpatric's recollection regarding the events of August 10th?

Mr. McNamara. Frankly I don't want to comment, wish to comment whether it did or didn't. I don't remember whether it did.

1 Mr. Smothers. To be sure I understand your answer,
2 are you saying you do not remember or do you not wish to
3 comment?
4 Mr. McNamara. The stenographer can read what I said.
5 I think I said I don't remember. In any case, that is what
6 I wish to say, I don't remember.
7 Mr. Smothers. You do not remember Mr. Gilpatric's
8 response or recollection?
9 Mr. McNamara. No. Your question was did my showing him
10 these papers refresh his memory, and frankly I don't know
11 whether it refreshed his memory or not.
12 Mr. Smother. What, if anything, did he say after you
13 had shown him these papers?
14 Mr. McNamara. Well, you are asking me details that
15 I just can't remember. I am not trying to hold anything back.
16 I imagine he said he had not been involved in this problem up
17 to this minute. I am the one who has been in the press for
18 two months. Ros was very close to me, I am very close to
19 him, and to be honestly frank with you in a hell of a
20 mess.
21 Mr. Smothers. This was four days ago?
22 Mr. McNamara. May I finish my answer, sir.
23 I am in a hell of a mess so my purpose in showing this
24 to Ros was to get his advice on what to do, not to refresh his
25 memory. He is not in a problem, I am in a problem. As a

1 friend I think I showed these to him to ask him what he thought
2 I should do as far as the press is concerned. This is my
3 concern.

4 I have told you that press all over the world has me
5 responsible for consideration if not authorizing assassination
6 of Castro and this is a completely untenable position for me,
7 I cannot continue effectively in my present position as long
8 as this impression lasts.

9 So, I have been talking to Ros and to others about what
10 to do. This is not the responsibility of the committee, you
11 didn't cause it, but it is a serious problem for me and I am
12 concerned about it.

13 The Chairman. We understand.

14 Mr. McNamara. It is that which I was talking to Ros
15 about. In the course of it I showed him the McCone papers, I
16 guess to indicate to him that contrary to what Time Magazine
17 said, McCone said something quite different, and I don't
18 remember the conversation in detail but I am sure that was the
19 purpose of it and import of it.

20 Mr. Smothers. Mr. Secretary, I realize this is a ter-
21 rible decision that has been created for you and I trust
22 that you understand the purpose of this inquire is not merely
23 to recant everything you may have discussed with a friend.
24 This is a terribly important matter or certainly it will become
25 before this committee and I am asking if you recall any data.

1 of his response to your discussion of the August 10 situa-
2 tion. Did he incate to you, oh, yes, I was at the meeting,
3 I don't remember hearing you say that?
4 Did you discuss it at all?
5 Mr. McNamara. Well, we must have but frankly I don't
6 recall any such details.
7 Mr. Smothers. One final area of inquiry.
8 The memorandum from General Lansdale is directed to
9 General Benjamin J. Harris. Do you know him?
10 Mr. McNamara. I have no recollection of having met him.
11 I undoubtly have but I don't have any recollection of it.
12 Mr. Smothers. I have no further questions.
13 Senator Schweiker. I had asked earlier, I should say
14 I asked, Mr. Secretary, and several Senators had asked your
15 understanding about if assassination were feasible, if the
16 President did or didn't know about it. I got one impression
17 from your answer. I have here your interview, I guess, of
18 two days ago, July 9, by Mr. Joseph E. diGenova of the committee
19 staff, and I would like to read just a paragraph from this
20 memorandum with a direct quote from you and see if I mis-
21 understood or whether this is a change in your position.
22 "As far as the Presidential approval for assassination
23 attempts, which we indicated to him had in fact", we meaning
24 the investigator -- "to him had in fact been made against
25 Castro" -- you said "it makes me uneasy to say it. If all

1 these things were going on, assassination, I can't believe
2 the top officials didn't know about it. It is unlikely that
3 it was done without our knowledge. I don't believe that these
4 things could have been going on without those at the top
5 knowing it. I might not have known about it but not others
6 at the top."
7 Is that an accurate quote for what you told the
8 committee staff a couple days ago?
9 Mr. McNamara. I don't think the last sentence carries
10 the connotation I would have wished to imply. I think what
11 I said, I will repeat now, because it does make me uneasy, it
12 is going to make you uneasy.
13 Senator Schweiker. Uneasy can quite reconcile with
14 what you told us about half an hour ago.
15 Mr. McNamara. What I have said here and what I said
16 a half hour ago is completely consistent.
17 Senator Schweiker. I think you said a little while ago --
18 we can check the record to see -- you couldn't conceive something
19 like this could go on in terms of the CIA, in terms of the Pre-
20 sident being in any way involved, and that only covert actions.
21 as I recall, you said something to the effect that you under-
22 stood the covert action probably did go all the way to the top.
23 you are sure if assassinations occurred they did not go
24 all the way to the top. I am fairly certain, you can check
25 the record, you said that.

1 This is, as I see it, quite a little different approach.

2 Mr. McNamara. Let me both refer to what I said half

3 an hour ago and if you don't think I am referring to it

4 correctly check the record, then also let me refer to this.

5 A half hour ago I don't believe we were talking about the

6 President. What I was discussing was the control by senior of-

7 ficials of the Administration of the CIA and I stated that

8 I believed that there were no major actions undertaken by

9 CIA that were not properly authorized by senior officials.

10 Now, I did not mean to imply by that every major

11 action taken by CIA was authorized by the President. I think

12 I very carefully used the term senior officials, and I meant

13 particularly the members of the 54/12 committee, and through

14 them I meant myself and Secretary Rusk.

15 I did not mean to imply the President himself parti-

16 cipated in a review of or authorization of major actions

17 of CIA.

18 Now, I state then that, having said that, I was faced

19 with a dilemma of the kind you are when you tell me that

20 assassination attempts have been carried out by CIA, and I

21 said I have no knowledge of it because I believed that I

22 would have had knowledge of that kind of event carried out by

23 CIA, and I believe I would not have only had knowledge, I

24 believe it would not have been carried out without my autho-

25 ization or the authorization of senior officials reporting t

1 me, my deputy, and therefore I am at a loss to explain this
2 and I can't explain it by the third alternative mentioned of
3 a[illegible] on the part of CIA officials.
4 [illegible], I think what I said half an hour ago is completely
5 consistent with this except possibly for the last sentence of
6 that paragraph, and this I don't think carried the connotation
7 I meant to give, if I used that language. I might not have
8 known about it but not others at the top. I am not quite sure
9 what this implies but I don't wish to say today that I might
10 not have known of assassination attempts but others at the
11 top of the government would have. I don't believe that. I
12 don't believe it for several reasons.
13 In the first place, I believe that if that had
14 been carried on in CI and if anybody in the government had
15 known about it at the top, my deputy would have, because he was
16 closely associated with control of the CIA.
17 Secondly, I don't believe the President or Attorney
18 General, and I would include Dean Rusk and McGeorge Bundy, would
19 have had knowledge of assassination attempts if they didn't
20 impart to me, and I think if they say they had such knowledge
21 then I think I must assume I did. I have no recollection
22 of it but I assume I did if they say they did. And the reason
23 I say that, the relationships among the top members of the
24 Kennedy Administration on matters of this kind were so close
25 I cannot separate myself from them and if they said I am pre-

1 to --

2 The Chairman. They have not said that.

3 Mr. McNamara. That is the first point. That is the point

4 I wanted to make. And it is contrary to what is implied by

5 this last sentence and I fear I may not have made my

6 meaning clear to members of your staff in relation to that

7 last sentence and I want to make absolutely certain

8 that this committee understands that I am not trying to

9 separate myself from other senior members of the Kennedy Ad-

10 ministration, number one.

11 Number two, I find it almost inconceivable that the

12 assassination attempts were carried on during the Kennedy

13 Administration days without the senior members knowing it, and

14 I understand the contradiction that this carries with respect

15 to the facts.

16 Senator Schweiker. Just one more point, Mr. Chairman.

17 I am groping for understanding what you did mean

18 because this is just a fragment of what was said, apparently,

19 at the same interview, where you said reference to General

20 Lansdale and I quote: Bobby and JFK must have asked me if

21 Lansdale should be appointed.

22 Mr. McNamara. Yes.

23 Senator Schweiker. And I must have said yes.

24 What was this in reference to?

25 Mr. McNamara. Let me just find it here.

1 was a piece of paper in a file that indicated that Gilpatric
2 and I had a low opinion of Lansdale, or at
3 some point developed a low opinion of Lansdale. I think it
4 is in connection with that I was asked if it is likely that
5 you recommended Lansdale. And in late '61, and I can only
6 say that the probability is the President would not have appointed
7 Lansdale to the job without asking me would I recommend him
8 and I probably did recommend him.
9 Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10 That is all.
11 The Chairman. I think since this question has arisen
12 we should put the full three paragraphs in the record.
13 Senator Schweiker. Which three?
14 The Chairman. Which read as follows. These are from
15 the notes of the interview, the earlier interview with Mr.
16 McNamara which took place on July 10, 1975.
17 It is a memorandum to Fritz Schwartz and Curtis Smothers
18 on the subject of Presidential approval. The notes read:
19 "As far as Presidential approval for assassination attem
20 which we indicated to him had in fact been made against Cast
21 he said: 'It makes me uneasy to say it. If all these things
22 were going on, assassination, I can't believe that the top
23 officials didn't know about it. It is unlikely that it was
24 without our knowledge. I don't believe that these things cou
25 have been going on without those at the top knowing it.' I

not have known about it, but not others at the top.'

"He does not remember any requests for arms from insurgents. Such a request, however, would have gone through the 5412 Committee. 'We were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter.' And there was pressure from JFK and RFK to do something about Castro. 'But I don't believe we contemplated assassination. We did, however, contemplate overthrow.'

"Neither Bissell nor Helms, he said, would have circumvented McCone and gone to RFK or JFK to get approval for plots. 'That's the least like of all explanations if plots actually occurred.' Moreover, he cannot believe that 'Dick Helms would have kept McCone in the dark about any such plots. No matter what you think, Dick Helms is an honorable guy.'"

Well, I think that ought to go in the record.

The fact is, Mr. McNamara, that Dick Helms testified before this committee he did keep McCone in the dark and we know that the CI was heavily engaged in assassination attempts. Whether or not it was so authorized is another question.

The final irony of all we know is that one such assassination weapon was passed for the purpose of assassinating Castro on the very day, indeed, the very hour President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas.

If there are no further questions.

end nash

Senator Baker. One brief question that I think will produce only a brief answer.

Mr. McNamara, are you acquainted with the Drew Pearson column of 3 March 1967, alleging assassination plots against Castro?

Mr. McNamara. No, Senator Baker, this is something that I don't recall. It quite clearly was the article that led Mr. McCone to subsequently dictate that memo of whatever it was, April of '67, but I have not been a reader of Mr. Pearson's or Mr. Anderson's column for some years.

Senator Baker. You had no conversation with the President, with Robert Kennedy, or with Mr. Helms about that column?

Mr. McNamara. None that I know of.

Senator Baker. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I want to thank you very much for your testimony.

Mr. McNamara. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. May I suggest to you that it would be helpful to the Committee if you would not discuss your testimony with anyone. I know that you have an intention to make some statement to the Press of a general character and we have no objection to your doing that.

Mr. McNamara. I would like to make just a one line or two line statement to the Press. I know they are out there. I think you can understand that will all of this relating to

me on the record in the Press I can't go out and say no comment.

Senator Schweiker. We certainly think you're entitled to that, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Schweiker. I certainly concur with the witness.

Mr. McNamara. I just don't want to appear and say "No comment" and thereby endorse the --

The Chairman. You can't say no comment. It only leads to very unfortunate conclusions and inferences.

Mr. McNamara. Yes, that is a problem.

Senator Schweiker. In fact, I really think, Mr. Chairman, I think I can assure the Secretary that he can say what he wants to say, because there have been so many stories, and this is his opportunity to perfect it.

The Chairman. Yes.

We discussed this before the meeting, and it is understood that he should and intends to say what he feels is necessary to the Press. I had reference to the details of your testimony.

Mr. McNamara. Frankly, I tell you, I just jotted this down before the hearing, and I'll tell you what I'm going to say.

I want to say that the hearing was held in Executive Session, that under such circumstances it is inappropriate for the witness to comment to the Press; only the Chairman should do so, and that I have one statement to make. I cannot believe

3

that President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy or any senior member of President Kennedy's Administration approved of an assassination attempt or the planning of an attempt on any political leader, period. That is all I want to say.

The Chairman. That's fine.

Thank you again, Mr. McNamara.

(Whereupon, at 4:35 o'clock p.m., the Committee proceeded to other business.)

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MCN Ex. #1

MONGOOSE

10 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August 1962

PRESENT: State: Mr. Rusk, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin, Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Hurwitch

White House: General Taylor, Mr. Bundy

Defense/JCS: Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer, General Lansdale

CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. Harvey

USIA: Mr. Murrow, Mr. Wilson

1. Mr. McCone said that the conclusion of the Board of National Estimates was that the Soviets will not let the Castro regime fail because of its own inherent weaknesses. This thought had not been contained as such in the NIE. Later in the meeting, Mr. McCone said that he believes we must face the fact that Cuba will be stronger in a year or two than it is now; he added his personal opinion that the Soviets might consider establishing an MRBM base in Cuba. He noted that these two points are not necessarily concurred in by the Board of National Estimates or by the USIB.

2. At Secretary Rusk's request, General Lansdale gave a brief explanation of the four possible courses of action outlined in recent papers. He then summarized progress to date by saying that during Phase I, now completed, an intensive intelligence look has been taken at Cuba, that we have learned a great deal, but that we do not yet have a true assessment of resistance potential.

3. Mr. Rusk suggested the possibility that in the event of a blockade of Berlin, the U.S. might wish to change its posture toward Cuba, perhaps engaging in direct retaliation against Soviet shipping, etc. He suggested that the Berlin and Cuba contingency plans should be closely meshed. Mr. McNamara was uncertain on this point, saying that he did not believe limited retaliation of this kind would constitute an adequate response to a Berlin blockade, whereas world-wide harrassment of Soviet facilities would be a different matter.

4. Mr. Rusk emphasized the desirability of attempting to create a split between Castro and old-line Communists. He pointed out that such a split would be bound to be beneficial to U.S. interests no matter which way the balance of power swung. In this general connection, it was hard for him to visualize a valid pretext for U.S. military intervention in Cuba under any circumstances currently foreseen. However, should reasonably viable resistance develop to the extent for example that some provinces might oppose the Havana Government, then the U.S. might desire to give support to such provincial officials.

In response to the above, Mr. McCone pointed out that at the moment the previously-cited frictions between Castro and the old-line Communists have been resolved in Castro's favor, and no issue currently exists. There has additionally been at least a temporary rapprochement between Fidel and Moscow. He indicated that this of course may be temporary. He said that there has been some success in recruiting Cuban officials abroad to work for the U.S., and that there have been some defections.

5. The discussion then turned to the objectives of the MONGOOSE program. Mr. McNamara questioned whether we cannot separate the building up of agent assets within Cuba from actions that would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion. This led to the suggestion by General Taylor that we should consider changing the over-all objective from one of overthrowing the Castro regime to one of causing its visible failure.

In this context Mr. McCone then presented an alternate plan (called hereafter the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B described by General Lansdale, which he said had been prepared as a result of the conclusion that stepped-up B would not in fact result in the overthrow of Castro. He emphasized that the stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless the U.S. is prepared to accept attributability for the necessary actions, including the eventual use of U.S. military force. Mr. McCone said that a stepped-up B will risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a Hungary-type blood bath if unsupported. Not only would the U.S. be blamed, but there would also be a high noise level in the press and eventually a situation would be created which would require intervention.

On the other hand, the CIA variant now proposed would, in Mr. McCone's view, avoid all of these dangers because it would not invite an uprising. Again he repeated his view that the U.S. might, however, face a stronger Cuba in the future.

6. The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group. Mr. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split. It was emphasized that any actions under this plan must be so designed as to avoid major attribution to the U.S.

7. General Lemnitzer told the Group that the Navy does not wish Guantanamo used as a base for operational activities, as suggested by CIA. He said that the other Chiefs have not yet given an opinion on this but he thought that they would agree with the Navy, as he himself does. The view is that this base is too important to the U.S. and too vulnerable to Cuban pressure to take the chance of provoking Cuban reaction. The State representatives agreed with this view.

8. Mr. Bundy suggested that a hard look be taken at the possibility of support to selected Cuban exiles on a strictly "disengaged" basis; in other words, should they be given covert financial and material support, with the idea of seeing what they could generate on their own.

9. Mr. Rusk suggested that continued pressure should be placed on Castro by keeping interest in the prisoner issue alive.

10. <u>Action to be taken</u>:

CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan, in accordance with the above-summarized discussion. This should be ready by Wesnesday, August 15th.

Thomas A. Parrott

cc: General Lansdale

Attachment - Agenda for Meeting

McN Ex. #1

MONGOOSE

10 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August 1962

PRESENT: State: Mr. Rusk, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin, Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Hurwitch

White House: General Taylor, Mr. Bundy

Defense/JCS: Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer, General Lansdale

CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. Harvey

USIA: Mr. Murrow, Mr. Wilson

1. Mr. McCone said that the conclusion of the Board of National Estimates was that the Soviets will not let the Castro regime fail because of its own inherent weaknesses. This thought had not been contained as such in the NIE. Later in the meeting, Mr. McCone said that he believes we must face the fact that Cuba will be stronger in a year or two than it is now; he added his personal opinion that the Soviets might consider establishing an MRBM base in Cuba. He noted that these two points are not necessarily concurred in by the Board of National Estimates or by the USIB.

2. At Secretary Rusk's request, General Lansdale gave a brief explanation of the four possible courses of action outlined in recent papers. He then summarized progress to date by saying that during Phase I, now completed, an intensive intelligence look has been taken at Cuba, that we have learned a great deal, but that we do not yet have a true assessment of resistance potential.

3. Mr. Rusk suggested the possibility that in the event of a blockade of Berlin, the U.S. might wish to change its posture toward Cuba, perhaps engaging in direct retaliation against Soviet shipping, etc. He suggested that the Berlin and Cuba contingency plans should be closely meshed. Mr. McNamara was uncertain on this point, saying that he did not believe limited retaliation of this kind would constitute an adequate response to a Berlin blockade, whereas world-wide harrassment of Soviet facilities would be a different matter.

4. Mr. Rusk emphasized the desirability of attempting to create a split between Castro and old-line Communists. He pointed out that such a split would be bound to be beneficial to U.S. interests no matter which way the balance of power swung. In this general connection, it was hard for him to visualize a valid pretext for U.S. military intervention in Cuba under any circumstances currently foreseen. However, should reasonably viable resistance develop to the extent for example that some provinces might oppose the Havana Government, then the U.S. might desire to give support to such provincial officials.

In response to the above, Mr. McCone pointed out that at the moment the previously-cited frictions between Castro and the old-line Communists have been resolved in Castro's favor, and no issue currently exists. There has additionally been at least a temporary rapprochement between Fidel and Moscow. He indicated that this of course may be temporary. He said that there has been some success in recruiting Cuban officials abroad to work for the U.S., and that there have been some defections.

5. The discussion then turned to the objectives of the MONGOOSE program. Mr. McNamara questioned whether we cannot separate the building up of agent assets within Cuba from actions that would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion. This led to the suggestion by General Taylor that we should consider changing the over-all objective from one of overthrowing the Castro regime to one of causing its visible failure.

In this context Mr. McCone then presented an alternate plan (called hereafter the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B described by General Lansdale, which he said had been prepared as a result of the conclusion that stepped-up B would not in fact result in the overthrow of Castro. He emphasized that the stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless the U.S. is prepared to accept attributability for the necessary actions, including the eventual use of U.S. military force. Mr. McCone said that a stepped-up B will risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a Hungary-type blood bath if unsupported. Not only would the U.S. be blamed, but there would also be a high noise level in the press and eventually a situation would be created which would require intervention.

On the other hand, the CIA variant now proposed would, in Mr. McCone's view, avoid all of these dangers because it would not invite an uprising. Again he repeated his view that the U.S. might, however, face a stronger Cuba in the future.

6. The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group. Mr. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split. It was emphasized that any actions under this plan must be so designed as to avoid major attribution to the U.S.

7. General Lemnitzer told the Group that the Navy does not wish Guantanamo used as a base for operational activities, as suggested by CIA. He said that the other Chiefs have not yet given an opinion on this but he thought that they would agree with the Navy, as he himself does. The view is that this base is too important to the U.S. and too vulnerable to Cuban pressure to take the chance of provoking Cuban reaction. The State representatives agreed with this view.

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10. <u>Action to be taken</u>:

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Thomas A. Parrott

cc: General Lansdale

Attachment - Agenda for Meeting

TOP SECRET-HUFORN
SPECIAL HANDLING

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA
ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE
GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE
LON WILSON, USIA

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Alternate Course B

In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)" will be used as the starting basis.

Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.

We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the outline paper for submission. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of drafts.

Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime,), Economic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
9/9/98 data-but note State concerns (blue tabs)

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

TOP SECRET-NOFORN
SPECIAL HANDLING

Gen. Harris: Economic (limited deception), Paramilitary (limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Wilson: Psychological (including covert). Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING

POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO PROVOKE,

HARASS OR DISRUPT CUBA

Section I - Economic

Section II - Military

Section III - Psychological

Section IV - Other

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING;
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

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THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SECTION I - ECONOMIC

1. Operation Mobilize

a. Objective: Seek to maintain maximum mobilization of Cuban Armed Forces (FAR).

b. Possible Courses of Action

(1) Mislead Cuban authorities into believing preparations are being made for an invasion in the Cienfuegos-Trinidad area, by:

(a) Interrogating Cuban refugees on the following items in the Cienfuegos-Trinidad area:

1. Beaches.
2. Roads and trails.
3. Port facilities.
4. Military strengths.
5. Known friendly people.
6. Prominent personages.

(b) Conducting survey to locate and recruit for future use, persons:

1. As interpreters.
2. Familiar with boat channels, etc., to act as pilots.
3. Capable of operating commercial radio stations.
4. Capable of operating public utilities.

(c) Conducting amphibious exercises in Southeast US-Caribbean-Latin American areas and giving wide public dissemination to the exercises.

(d) Circulate rumors in Cuba of impending invasion.

2. Operation Disrupt

a. Objective: Disruption of Cuban economy.

b. Possible Courses of Action

(1) Reduce sugar production in Cuba.

(a) Destroy crops by fire or use of chemicals. CIA

(b) Inhibit crop growth by sowing maribu seeds. CIA

(c) Sabotage sugar mill machinery. CIA

(d) Destroy supplies of cartons, bags and other containers for distributing sugar.

(e) Sabotage vehicles, roads, railroads, ships, etc., used for hauling sugar.

(f) Cause spoilage of export sugar enroute for delivery to purchaser.

(g) At cane cutting time plant rumor of high intensity nuclear fallout from Soviet nuclear shots washed down on Cuba during the rainy season. Has tendency to adhere to cane and especially dangerous to workers both in the fields and in the mills. Even sugar will be contaminated. US discovers fallout in Key West and southern Florida, but is of low order and not dangerous because was the edge of the pattern. As a result of the above, US survey is conducted and it is determined that Cuba is in the center of the pattern and speculates that intensity is such that exposure for two or three days particularly in cane, to which it adheres readily, could lead to serious effects. Publish area of dangerous fallout as determined by this survey. Stop Pan Am flights to Cuba due to danger from exposure to fallout. Conduct survey of Guantanamo. Determine by rigged instruments that some facilities are "hot" and have been washed down. News articles theorize that fish shipment to Cuba may be contaminated. Call attention to Japanese fishing boats caught in fallout and that these contaminated fish reached the Japanese markets.

Commander Guantanamo prohibit fishing and the consumption of fish caught locally. Warn the native employees of the dangers. Recall that in early US tests, islands in pacific thought to be out of danger were contaminated, that natives had to be evacuated and could not return for __ years.

(2) Dump "soft" Cuban currency at discount prices.

(3) Pressure IBB, IMF and GATT to restrict Cuban credits (?), loans, etc. Insist that US Allies demand cash payment for goods - no barter.

(4) Introduce counter-revol. ration cards - gasoline, food, clothing.

(5) Conduct selected sabotage of other major Cuban industries and public utilities with priority attention being given to transportation, communications, power plants and utilities. No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba, as such.

(6) [redacted] petroleum shipments to Cuba. 6(1)(c) 24

(7) Encourage friendly nations to stop chartering ships to Bloc countries for trade with Cuba.

(8) Exert influence on friendly countries to stop all trade with Cuba.

(9) Pay Cuban employees at Guantanamo Naval Base in pesos.

3. Take all steps possible to assist other Latin American countries in economic progress, to increase contrast with Cuba.

SECTION II - MILITARY

1. DOD continue to develop and refine contingency plans in order to take advantage of any unforeseen breaks.

2. DOD continue to support CIA and other agencies to the full extent of DOD capabilities as required.

3. Make sabotage materials available to resistance elements in Cuba.

4. Create climate of continued alarm - particularly at night; create false scents by simulation of team landings; make dummy air drops.

5. Operation SMASHER

a. Objective: The objective is to disrupt/disable military and commercial communications facilities in Cuba.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the clandestine introduction of a "special" vacuum tube into selected communications equipment. The tube, which is available, is virtually undetectable inasmuch as its effectiveness is due to the insertion of a chemical compound in the base of the tube. The chemical, when heated becomes a conductor, when cool a non-conductor.

6. Operation "[illegible]"

a. Objective: To crash or force down Cuban MIG aircraft with an all weather intercept capability by communications intrusion.

b. Concept:

(1) Closely monitor MIG air/ground communications for the purpose of determining frequency and terminology usage for practice or real GCI operations.

(2) By use of overriding transmitters and either a decoy aircraft or solid weather conditions, override Cuban controller and have Cuban refugee pilot issue instructions which run MIG out of fuel or towards Florida, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, a carrier, etc.

SECTION III - PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. Operation Discredit Castro

a. Objective: To discredit the Castro/Communist regime.

b. Possible Courses of Action

(1) Publicize the failure of the Castro/Communist regime to care for the health of the Cubans by:

(a) Planting rumor of high incidence of malaria due to the failure of the government to carry out adequate mosquito control.

(b) Newspapers in US pick up rumor, review history of yellow fever in Cuba and US part in stamping it out. Call attention to other areas in Caribbean where yellow fever occurs. Discuss possibility of travellers from those countries to Cuba bringing yellow fever to Cuba. Perhaps Bloc personnel brought it to Cuba.

(c) US publicly, for humanitarian reasons, offers drugs and spray chemicals.

(d)

(2) Increase program of information to Latin American countries on the evils of Castro's communist regime and threat to themselves.

Has been done

(3) Encourage Dominican Republic to table its complaint on Cuban instigated subversion in OAS NOW - to the UN later.

(4) Exploit Dominican Republic charges of Cuban intervention.

(5) Make available to the International Narcotics Commission limited documented evidence of Cuban exportation [illegible] of narcotics.

(6) Increase publicity of hardships being endured by Cuban people - hunger, shortage of consumer goods, [illegible] and equipment.

(7) Increase publicity on lack of freedom of speech to criticize Castro dictatorship and communism - lack of due process of law - failure of Castro regime to hold free elections and to restore Constitution of 1940.

(8) Emphasize that the land has not really been redistributed to peasants under the Agrarian Reform Law but that the persants are more tenants of the state.

2. Operation Discredit Sino-Soviet Bloc

a. Objective: To discredit Sino-Soviet Bloc assistance provided to Castro/Communist regime.

b. Possible Courses of Action

(1) Sow distrust among Cuban population of Sino-Soviet Bloc assistance provided Cuby by:

(a) Planting rumors that canned meats being supplied to Cuba from Bloc countries is horse meat.

(b)

[illegible] Leaflets

a. [illegible] The objective is to create unrest and disorganization amongst the Cuban people.

b. [illegible] This is to be accomplished by airdropping valid Pan American or KLM one-way airline tickets good for flights to Mexico City, Caracas, etc. (none to the US). Tickets could be intermixed with other leaflets planned to be dropped. The number of tickets dropped could be increased. The validity of the tickets would have to be restricted to a time period.

1. Operation Two Swan

a. Objective: The objective is to create indications to Fidel Castro that his value to the revolutionary cause has diminished to the point where plans are being made for his "removal."

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of intelligence means the crescendo increasing until it culminates in Castro's discovery of the mechanism or hardware.

5. Operation Cutout

a. Objective: To indicate to the Cuban Government the ease with which their international communications channels can be cut, and demonstrate their reliance on US communications support.

b. Concept of Operations

(1) Most international communications channels from Cuba are routed through New Orleans, Key West, or Miami.

(2) With the cooperation of US commercial firms arrange for all Cuban circuits to be disrupted simultaneously. Various logical reasons can be given, such as maintenance, emergency, break in cables, atmospheric conditions, or even "unknown, but we are checking."

c. Theory:

(1) Such action could cause much consternation in that it would probably result in requests for increased "Bloc aid" to provide appropriate facilities and capabilities. This, at best, would be a 3 to 4 year priority project.

(2) The action would emphasize the seriousness with which the US views Cuba's current affiliations and the determination to combat communist infiltration into the hemisphere.

6. Operation Bounty

a. Objective: To provide inducements to Cuban citizens to overthrow the Cuban Communist Regime; to put pressure on Cuban Communists by creating distrust and disunity.

b. Concept of Operations

(1) Operation BOUNTY establishes a system of financial rewards, commensurate with position and stature, for killing or delivering alive known Communists.

(2) Rewards range from two cents to $1 million and are determined by the position the individual concerned holds in the Communist hierarchy of Cuba.

(3) A reward will be paid to an individual upon presentation of a leaflet, together with conclusive proof of death and the party/revolutionary membership card of the deceased or delivery to designated locations of known party/revolutionary members.

(4) Leaflets will be designed to indicate phases. For example: The first leaflets will contain only names of Communist leaders; the next leaflets will revise the names into chronological listings; the next leaflets will further revise the names by job, i.e., cell leader, informer, party members, etc.; any of the above or subsequent leaflets will announce the amount of the reward, how and where it may be collected. One final leaflet may be deemed advisable and that one announcing a .02¢ reward for the delivery of Castro.

(6) A proposed price list is as follows:

a. Informer	$ 20,000 -	$ 5,000
b. Cell Leader	40,000 -	10,00
c. Block Leader	45,000 -	30,000
d. [illegible]	[illegible] -	[illegible]
e. Foreign Communist	92,000 -	42,000
f. Government Official	100,000 -	55,000
g. Castro	.02¢	

(7) A national organization will be established to assume responsibility for design and delivery of leaflets and payment of rewards. The location of the organization should be in or around Miami, Florida, and it should establish branches under suitable cover on selected nearby islands in the Caribbean.

(8) Once this operation is implemented, covert actions by US agents could be initiated to kidnap known party members thereby instilling confidence in the operation among the Cuban populace and apprehension among the Cuban hierarchy.

7. Operation Defector

a. Objective: To induce elements or individuals of the Cuban military to defect with equipment.

b. Comment: This activity when properly planned and implemented has the effect of decreasing military capability. In a totalitarian system the immediate reaction is increased security accompanied by decreased activity. It also creates havoc in security and intelligence agencies. Could be accomplished by intelligence means and promise of rewards.

8. Operation Bullseye

a. Objective: The objective is to destroy confidence in fuel supplied by the Soviet Bloc by indicating it is contaminated.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by [redacted] b(1)(c) 24

9. Operation Talk Back

a. Objective: To convince the Castro regime that resistance is reorganizing within Cuba; or to create the impression at an appropriate time that a revolutionary but legally constituted government has been established in Cuba and is requesting assistance.

b. Concept:

(1) Using several automatic transmitters which can be electronically keyed, make transmissions on appropriate HF frequencies indicating contact with outside forces as well as with groups inside Cuba.

(2) The broadcasts could be in clear text or in code or a combination. These could be designed to indicate establishment of a provisional "Free Government" and mounting support to forces opposing Castro without a man ever going ashore in Cuba.

(3) To avoid accurate DF of transmissions they should be limited to 30 seconds in duration.

(4) Transmissions would be pre-taped. Contents would be designed to enable selectivity.

(5) The transmitter with antenna and internal power source, must be fabricated to employ appropriate camouflage and must be capable of a minimum of 10 transmissions. Designs for such equipment are available and the described capability is within the current state of the art. Equipment would have to be especially fabricated, all parts however are "shelf" items. Lead time is considered to be 60 to 90 days. Cost per unit is estimated to be approximately $2,000 to $2,500 each.

(6) A naval radio transmitting device is also available which [illegible] the capability to automatically [illegible] on command, surfaces and transmits [illegible]

resubmerges. This device, called the "porpoise," could be used in conjunction with the equipment described above to further enhance the objective. This would allow positioning of transmitters around the entire island, if desired, or in lakes, water reservoirs, rivers, etc.; where discovery would be almost impossible.

(7) Devices could be airdropped or physically placed. The fabricated unit would be more effective and of simpler construction if it were designed to be placed clandestinely, for automatic erection of the antenna after airdrop although not impossible, is difficult considering the desired size of the unit.

(8) With respect to size and design of the fabricated unit, it should be as small as practicable and can be designed into a container resembling local "Flora."

(9) If approved, it is recommended that knowledge of this operation be restricted to an absolute minimum number of people.

10. Increase program of information to Latin American countries on the evils of Castro's Communist regime and threat to themselves.

SECTION IV - ACTION

1. Operation Sympathize

a. Objective: To secure sympathy of people in Western Hemisphere for hardships being endorsed by the Cuban populace.

b. Concept: To publicize plight of Cuban populace.

c. Possible Courses of Action

(1) Publicize shortage of food and consumer goods in Cuba.

(2) Publicize shortage of doctors and scarcity of medical treatment.

(3) Publicize lack of freedom of speech in Cuba.

(4)

BLANK

SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

McN. Exh. #3

14 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Operation MONGOOSE

1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information.

2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, received from which have four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were "including liquidation of leaders."

3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious concern at that meeting, in response to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which lends itself to be made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.

4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadvisability and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he delete the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those disseminated to State, Defense, and CIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so.

SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

SECRET EYES ONLY

5. For your information also, in your absence and since the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

Attachment
Memo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62

SECRET/SENSITIVE

14 April 1967

McN. Exh. #4

B-12

TO: The Director

FROM: John A. McCone

1. No memorandum can be located covering the August 10, 1962 meeting; however, it is highly probable that one exists.

2. Meetings of August 8 or 9, 1962, in the JCS Operations Room (Pentagon) and August 10, 1962, in Secretary Rusk's Conference Room were for the purpose of considering staff proposals for Phase II of operation MONGOOSE. This operation was under the direction of General Lansdale, with Wm. Harvey handling CIA participation (under FitzGerald). At one of these meetings -- probably the meeting in the JCS Room -- I recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion, stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USG and CIA were concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should it appear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on moral or ethical grounds.

3. Immediately after the meeting, I called on Secretary McNamara personally and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily agreed. I did this because operation MONGOOSE -- an inter-departmental affair -- was under the operational control of DOD through the JCS.

4. At no time did the suggestion receive serious consideration by the Special Group (augmented) nor by any individual responsible for policy.

5. Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms such as "dispose of Castro," "remove Castro," "knock off Castro," etc., and this meant the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba and the replacing of it with a democratic regime. Terms such as the above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as stated, all refer to a change in the Cuban Government.

John A. McCone

John A. McCone

01835

SECRET/SENSITIVE

(1) 10 AUGUST 1962 + STATE

RUSK - CHAIR
MURROW
TAYLOR
McCONE
A. JOHNSON
LANSDALE
HARVEY
DON NILSON
GILPATRIC
BUNDY (RFK PROXY)
HURWITCH
LEMNITZER
McNAMARA
ED MARTIN
PARROTT
GOODWIN

01836

TOP
SECRET
SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

MONGOOSE DOCUMENTS

00837

SECRET
SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

14 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Operation MONGOOSE

1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information.

2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were "including liquidation of leaders."

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SECRET
SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

SECRET EYES ONLY

SENSITIVE

5. For your information also, in your absence and since the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

Attachment
Memo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62

00839

EYES ONLY

SECRET

TOP SECRET-NOFORN
SPECIAL HANDLING

MONGOOSE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA
ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE
GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE
DON WILSON, USIA

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Alternate Course B

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Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, [illegible]), Economic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT 4/5/88

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET-NOFORN
SPECIAL HANDLING

This document contains [illegible] pages.

Gen. Harris: Economic (limited deception), Paramilitary (limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Wilson: Psychological (including covert). Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

00811

McNamara Ex 5

13 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Operation Mongoose

On April 13, General Taylor discussed with higher authority the Mongoose meetings of April 11 and 12, reporting the feeling of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara that the Mongoose program should have no target date. Taylor pointed out the probable personnel problems which would arise if the schedule were completely indefinite.

Taylor was informed that we would have to live with the consequences of no date, doing the best we can to bolster motivation. Taylor commented that we can probably carry out the first phase as planned, with a review of the situation about August 1.

Higher authority favors a strong effort to recruit Cubans for the U. S. Army. He was told that a new look is being taken and that by lowering admission standards, we can do better than in the past.

Maxwell D. Taylor

No distribution

McNamara Exc

TOP SECRET

Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting No. 2/63, April 23, 1963, 5:00 PM -- Cuba

The basis of the discussion was a memorandum prepared by Mr. Bundy entitled "A Sketch of the Cuba Alternatives."

Secretary McNamara stated that before the group discussed substance, it should consider whether the present policy we are following would produce a major change in Cuba. He expressed his firm view that Castro's position over the short term would improve if we took no actions other than those now under way or projected. He made clear his belief that the elimination of the Castro regime was a requirement and that, if others agreed our present policy would not result in its downfall, we should develop a program for approval which would produce changes acceptable to us. The program should aim at creating such a situation of dissidence within Cuba as to allow the U.S. to use force in support of anti-Castro forces without leading to retaliation by the USSR on the West.

Mr. McCone summarized information leading him to believe that Castro's position in Cuba would be stronger a year or two years from now than it is at present. He expressed his belief that present policy would not cause a major change in Cuba and that the Russians could provide sufficient aid and technical assistance to permit the Cuban economy to remain about where it is now or slightly improve.

Assistant Secretary Martin did not fully agree with the views of the Secretary of Defense or Mr. McCone with respect to the effect of existing policy on the Castro regime. He cited evidence to indicate that present measures are crippling the Cuban economy, leading to shortages, lack of spare parts, and even sufficient food to permit full rations for Cuban militia. Mr. Martin saw no possibility of getting Castro to defect from the USSR. He said there was no way to finance Cuba during the transition period until Castro, by his deeds, had proved that he had broken his ties with the USSR. He said, for example, Congress would never approve the sugar quota for Cuba early enough to avoid a collapse of the Cuban economy cut loose from the USSR and not yet aided by the U.S. Furthermore, he said Castro was the kind of a man who might make promises and not keep them, i.e. he did not

stay bought. The possibility of persuading Castro to leave Cuba was not feasible because Castro was a true revolutionary who could not be induced to give up his revolution.

The Attorney General proposed three studies:

a. A list of measures we would take following contingencies such as the death of Castro or the shooting down of a U-2.

b. A program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in eighteen months.

c. A program to cause as much trouble as we can for Communist Cuba during the next eighteen months.

Under Secretary Ball stated the view that we should not look at Cuba from the point of view of Cuba alone. He said the Cuban problem was a part of our relations with the USSR and with our global battle against Communist aggression. He urged that our policy toward Cuba always be kept in this perspective. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Cuba and the disappearance of the Soviet presence in Cuba was of major importance to us.

USIA Director Murrow stated his view that we need promptly a statement of what we would think was an acceptable post-Castro Cuba.

Secretary Dillon raised certain questions as to what kind of a Cuba we could live with if it were no longer run by Castro or tied to Moscow. He said that American companies had written off their expropriated sugar properties in Cuba but the question remained as to who would own these properties in the event Castro and Communism disappeared in Cuba.

There was a discussion on what we would do for a non-Communist Cuba and what we could do to get Castro to defect from the USSR. There appeared to be some differing views as to whether economic measures we can take would wreck the Cuban economy or whether the only result would be to raise the cost to the USSR of maintaining Cuba.

Mr. Sorensen listed the seven objectives raised at the meeting as follows:

a. Improve our present course of action by doing some things that we are not now doing.

b. Agree on military responses which we should make to contingencies, such as the shooting down of a U-2 plane.

c. Develop a program to get rid of Castro.

d. Measures to disrupt the economy of Cuba.

e. A program to induce Soviet withdrawal.

f. The detachment of Cuba from Moscow.

g. A program of support for dissident elements in Cuba.

Overriding all these points would be a statement of our views as to the kind of a regime we would want to see in Cuba post-Castro.

Bromley Smith

SENSITIVE

INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GOODWIN

FILE:

Date: May 27, 1975 Time: 10:00 a.m.

Place: Goodwin's residence, 1536 32nd St. NW

Participants: Sel. Com. - David Aaron, Rick Inderfurth, Greg Treverton

Subject: Intelligence Activities in Latin America

Submitted by: Gregory F. Treverton

During the 1960 Presidential campaign, Goodwin did foreign policy work for John Kennedy, specializing in Latin America. After the election he moved into the White House to handle Latin America. During that period he spoke with the President about a Latin American matter on the average once a day. Goodwin left the White House in the fall of 1962, becoming Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs under, first, Robert Woodward and then Edwin Martin. After working for the Peace Corps, Goodwin was brought back to the White House by President Johnson, in the spring of 1964, after the Panama Crisis. At that time, however, he did not specialize on Latin America, instead writing speeches for Johnson. He left the Administration late in 1965.

1. Assassinations:

In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of assassination, although it would not have surprised him if it had gone on. He mentioned one specific instance in which he had heard talk of assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was established, first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his capacity as White House Staff Officer. At a meeting of the Task Force, held at the State Department, McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro, someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant

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"Executive Action." McNamara responded that he did and stressed his interest in the idea. However, Goodwin did not bring the topic up later in the meeting after McNamara left. To Goodwin, the idea was not reasonable even apart from moral objections, for the Bay of Pigs had shown that Cuba was politically stable; Castro would merely have been replaced with Raul or with Che Guevara, both worse than Castro. Somewhat later, Goodwin sat in on an interview Ted Szulc had with Kennedy in which the President pledged not to kill Castro. Szulc reported that pledge in an article in Esquire. When he finished his period as Chairman of the Cuba Task Force, Goodwin wrote a memo recommending that the United States let Castro alone; anything the United States did to him could only buttress his position in Latin America.

During his time at the State Department, Goodwin met every week or so with E. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA, and King never mentioned a plan to assassinate Castro. Nor did Robert Kennedy ever mention such a plan to Goodwin when Goodwin worked for Kennedy, in 1966 and 1967.

Goodwin did believe, however, that the United States was involved, at least indirectly, in the successful plot on Trujillo's life. During the Eisenhower Administration, the United States had severed diplomatic relations with Trujillo and attempted to isolate the Dominican Republic. There were frequent reports that Trujillo was about to be assassinated, but the assassination never came off. In fact, the government was surprised when it occurred. Henry Dearborn, the American Consul in Santo Domingo, had been charged with staying in contact with anti-Trujillo forces. Prior to the assassination, he had transferred some weapons, presumably handguns, to those forces. Goodwin suspected that

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the President probably did not know of the gun transfer, but he said that the assassination and the U.S. role with respect to it would have come as no surprise to the President. He doubted that the CIA even would have had to clear the transfer, although a general policy of that sort might have been passed by the Special Group.

Goodwin reported no other mention of assassinations. In fact, he said he once heard a CIA man say that assassination was a bad idea because once started, it never ended. However, an agent in the field might regard killings of one sort or another as within his mission in supporting one political faction over another. And of course someone might have gotten carried away. It was clear from the Bay of Pigs that the CIA sometimes acted without, or even against, instructions (e.g. by bringing Batista followers into the Bay of Pigs invasion team). In general, Latin American work seemed to attract the worst personnel in all Washington agencies including the CIA.

CIA Activities in Brazil:

Goodwin knew little of CIA activities in Brazil. The United States had strongly backed Quadros and never liked Goulart. In the period before 1964, the U.S. gave political support to anti-Goulart factions: followers of Kubitschek and even to the Furtado in the Brazilian northeast. The U.S. had been involved [redacted] for many years and presumably spent a good deal [redacted] on the military side, Walters was brought from Rome to keep a contact with the Brazilian military. How much further Walters' activities might have extended Goodwin did not know.

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3. CIA Activities in Chile:

The Kennedy Administration decided that left wing democratic forces in Latin America were the only means of combatting communist influence and promoting development in the region. That decision was applied to Chile, and the U.S. switched its support from the conservative Alessandri. Goodwin sat in on meetings of the Special Group only rarely, only if Latin America were the subject of the meeting. As he remembered it, the proposals that came to the Special Group were general statements, policy papers, not descriptions of recipients of support or conduits. In line with the policy, support was given to left democratic political elements. The U.S. certainly provided assistance to the Christian Democrats in the 1964 elections, but Goodwin did not know how much. The figure of $20 million, mentioned by Stern, did not seem inconceivable to Goodwin. He contested, however, the assertion that the Chilean election was the most intensely watched election in Washington since the 1948 Italian campaign. From his vantage point in the White House it did not seem so.

4. Changes during the Johnson Administration:

Johnson cared less about Latin America than had Kennedy--Johnson was interested only in Mexico--and so knew less about covert actions in the region. Thomas Mann was left to run Latin American policy, although the President did become active in the two crises--Panama and then the Dominican Republic. Goodwin saw a sharp change in United States' policy under Mann. Mann supported the military and conservative elements in Latin American societies, and American support

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for left democratic reform ended. Goodwin professed himself puzzled by Johnson's assertion that he had discovered a "murder incorporated" in the Caribbean. The only specific instance Johnson ever cited was Trujillo, yet Johnson had known about the Trujillo assassination from the very beginning and so could hardly have "discovered" it after he became President.

5. Covert Operations and Counterinsurgency:

When asked about the ethos surrounding covert actions during the Kennedy Administration, Goodwin responded that the major emphasis was counterinsurgency, not covert action. There was certainly no reluctance to use covert action, but no one believed that American objectives could be secured through it. Counterinsurgency was something different. A good deal of money was spent training police through AID, much more was spent through the Pentagon equipping Latin American militaries, and there was as well some CIA activity. At that point, the U.S. really believed that the communists could not get elected to power and that the threat was subversion. Paramilitary operations were considered by the Special Group (counterinsurgency). Latin American matters were considered there, and in some ways Latin America was considered a kind of training ground for Southeast Asia. Goodwin believed that in sum U.S. counterinsurgency efforts made little difference to the course of events in Latin America. Cuba could not in any case provide support to guerilla movements in South America without substantial support from the Soviet Union, and the guerilla movements that began had little indigenous support.

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In response to a question about NSAM's, Goodwin noted that these came out of the bundy shop [illegible] for [illegible], [illegible] and often wrote these documents. They were both general and, on occasion, specific [illegible] to be supported and [illegible] Kennedy wanted to know the details of American activities in Latin America.

6. Goodwin Suggestions:

Goodwin believed it impossible to control the activities of intelligence organizations without becoming involved in their day-to-day operations. What is required is an active Congressional committee, on the model of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, with an active staff, and the President is permitted both to decide what is a major operation, and thus needs to be communicated to Congress, and who to tell. If the game is over, confidence in men will not do; institutional checks are required.

With respect to people to be interviewed, Goodwin mentioned that the Station Chief in Mexico functioned as a kind of regional supervisor. He also thought we might talk with the FBI person in Puerto Rico, with Arthur Schlesinger, and with Ed Szulc. In [illegible] to a suggestion, Goodwin indicated that Dixon had been interested in the Bay of Pigs [illegible]. He thought that Douglas Dillon [illegible] knew.

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