

104TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 1033

To impose comprehensive economic sanctions against Iran.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 23, 1995

Mr. KING (for himself, Mr. ENGEL, and Mr. NEY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, to the Committees on Banking and Financial Services and International Relations, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To impose comprehensive economic sanctions against Iran.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Comprehensive Iran
5 Sanctions Act of 1995”.

6 **SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS.**

7 (a) IRAN’S VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.—The
8 Congress makes the following findings with respect to
9 Iran’s violations of human rights:

1 (1) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Spe-
2 cial Representative on Human Rights, Amnesty
3 International, and the United States Department of
4 State, the Government of Iran has conducted assas-
5 sinations outside of Iran, such as that of former
6 Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar for which the
7 Government of France issued arrest warrants for
8 several Iranian governmental officials.

9 (2) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Spe-
10 cial Representative on Human Rights and by Am-
11 nesty International, the Government of Iran has
12 conducted revolutionary trials which do not meet
13 internationally recognized standards of fairness or
14 justice. These trials have included such violations as
15 a lack of procedural safeguards, trial times of 5 min-
16 utes or less, limited access to defense counsel, forced
17 confessions, and summary executions.

18 (3) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Spe-
19 cial Representative on Human Rights, the Govern-
20 ment of Iran systematically represses its Baha'i
21 population. Persecutions of this small religious com-
22 munity include assassinations, arbitrary arrests,
23 electoral prohibitions, and denial of applications for
24 documents such as passports.

1 (4) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Spe-
2 cial Representative on Human Rights, the Govern-
3 ment of Iran suppresses opposition to its govern-
4 ment. Political organizations such as the Freedom
5 Movement are banned from parliamentary elections,
6 have their telephones tapped and their mail opened,
7 and are systematically harassed and intimidated.

8 (5) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Spe-
9 cial Representative on Human Rights and Amnesty
10 International, the Government of Iran has failed to
11 recognize the importance of international human
12 rights. This includes suppression of Iranian human
13 rights movements such as the Freedom Movement,
14 lack of cooperation with international human rights
15 organizations such as the International Red Cross,
16 and an overall apathy toward human rights in gen-
17 eral. This lack of concern prompted the Special Rep-
18 resentative to state in his report that Iran had made
19 “no appreciable progress towards improved compli-
20 ance with human rights in accordance with the cur-
21 rent international instruments”.

22 (6) As cited by Amnesty International, the Gov-
23 ernment of Iran continues to torture its political
24 prisoners. Torture methods include burns, arbitrary
25 blows, severe beatings, and positions inducing pain.

1 (b) IRAN'S ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.—
2 The Congress makes the following findings, based on the
3 records of the Department of State, with respect to Iran's
4 acts of international terrorism:

5 (1) As cited by the Department of State, the
6 Government of Iran was the greatest supporter of
7 state terrorism in 1992, supporting over 20 terrorist
8 acts, including the bombing of the Israeli Embassy
9 in Buenos Aires that killed 29 people.

10 (2) As cited by the Department of State, the
11 Government of Iran is a sponsor of radical religious
12 groups that have used terrorism as a tool. These in-
13 clude such groups as Hezbollah, HAMAS, the Turk-
14 ish Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for
15 the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
16 (PFLP-GC).

17 (3) As cited by the Department of State, the
18 Government of Iran has resorted to international
19 terrorism as a means of obtaining political gain.
20 These actions have included not only the assassina-
21 tion of former Prime Minister Bakhitiar, but the
22 death sentence imposed on Salman Rushdie, and the
23 assassination of the leader of the Kurdish Demo-
24 cratic Party of Iran.

1 (4) As cited by the Department of State and
2 the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Ter-
3 rorism, the Government of Iran has long been a pro-
4 ponent of terrorist actions against the United
5 States, beginning with the takeover of the United
6 States Embassy in Tehran in 1979. Iranian support
7 of extremist groups have led to the following attacks
8 upon the United States as well:

9 (A) The car bomb attack on the United
10 States Embassy in Beirut killing 49 in 1983 by
11 the Hezbollah.

12 (B) The car bomb attack on the United
13 States Marine Barracks in Beirut killing 241 in
14 1983 by the Hezbollah.

15 (C) The assassination of American Univer-
16 sity President in 1984 by the Hezbollah.

17 (D) The kidnapping of all American hos-
18 tages in Lebanon from 1984–86 by the
19 Hezbollah.

20 **SEC. 3. TRADE EMBARGO.**

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection
22 (c), effective on the date of enactment of this Act, a total
23 trade embargo shall be in force between the United States
24 and Iran.

1 (b) COVERED TRANSACTIONS.—As part of such em-
2 bargo the following transactions are prohibited:

3 (1) Any transaction in the currency exchange of
4 Iran.

5 (2) The transfer of credit or payments between,
6 by, through, or to any banking institution, to the ex-
7 tent that such transfers or payments involve any in-
8 terest of Iran or a national thereof.

9 (3) The importing from, or exporting to, Iran
10 of currency or securities.

11 (4) Any acquisition, holding, withholding, use,
12 transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or
13 exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right,
14 power, or privilege with respect to, or any trans-
15 action involving, any property in which Iran or any
16 national thereof has any interest; by any person, or
17 with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdic-
18 tion of the United States.

19 (5) The licensing for export to Iran, or for ex-
20 port to any other country for reexport to Iran, by
21 any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
22 States of any item or technology controlled under
23 the Export Administration Act of 1979, the Arms
24 Export Control Act, or the Atomic Energy Act of
25 1954.

1 (6) The importation into the United States of
2 any good or service which is, in whole or in part,
3 grown, produced, manufactured, extracted, or proc-
4 essed in Iran.

5 (c) EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION.—In addition
6 to the transactions described in subsection (b), the trade
7 embargo imposed by this Act prohibits any transaction de-
8 scribed in paragraphs (1) through (4) of that subsection
9 when engaged in by a United States national abroad.

10 (d) EXCEPTIONS.—This section shall not apply to
11 any transaction involving the furnishing, for humanitarian
12 purposes, of food, clothing, medicine, or medical supplies,
13 instruments, or equipment to Iran or to any national
14 thereof.

15 (e) PENALTIES.—Any person who violates this sec-
16 tion or any license, order, or regulation issued under this
17 section shall be subject to the same penalties as are appli-
18 cable under section 206 of the International Emergency
19 Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to violations of
20 licenses, orders, or regulations under that Act.

21 (f) APPLICATION TO EXISTING LAW.—This section
22 shall apply notwithstanding any other provision of law or
23 international agreement.

1 **SEC. 4. OPPOSITION TO MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE.**

2 (a) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—(1)

3 The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United
4 States executive director of each international financial in-
5 stitution described in paragraph (2) to oppose and vote
6 against any extension of credit or other financial assist-
7 ance by that institution to Iran.

8 (2) The international financial institutions referred
9 to in paragraph (1) are the International Bank for Recon-
10 struction and Development, the International Develop-
11 ment Association, the Asian Development Bank, and the
12 International Monetary Fund.

13 (b) UNITED NATIONS.—It is the sense of the Con-
14 gress that the United States Permanent Representative to
15 the United Nations should oppose and vote against the
16 provision of any assistance by the United Nations or any
17 of its specialized agencies to Iran.

18 **SEC. 5. WAIVER AUTHORITY.**

19 The provisions of sections 3 and 4 shall not apply
20 if the President determines and certifies to the appro-
21 priate congressional committees that Iran—

22 (1) has substantially improved its adherence to
23 internationally recognized standards of human
24 rights;

25 (2) has ceased its efforts to acquire a nuclear
26 explosive device; and

1 (3) has ceased support for acts of international
2 terrorism.

3 **SEC. 6. REPORT REQUIRED.**

4 Beginning 60 days after the date of enactment of this
5 Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall sub-
6 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
7 describing—

8 (1) the nuclear and other military capabilities
9 of Iran; and

10 (2) the support, if any, provided by Iran for
11 acts of international terrorism.

12 **SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.**

13 For purposes of this Act—

14 (1) the term “act of international terrorism”
15 means an act—

16 (A) which is violent or dangerous to
17 human life and that is a violation of the crimi-
18 nal laws of the United States or of any State
19 or that would be a criminal violation if commit-
20 ted within the jurisdiction of the United States
21 or any State; and

22 (B) which appears to be intended—

23 (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
24 population;

1 (ii) to influence the policy of a govern-
2 ment by intimidation or coercion; or

3 (iii) to affect the conduct of a govern-
4 ment by assassination or kidnapping.

5 (2) the term “appropriate congressional com-
6 mittees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations
7 of the Senate and the Committee on International
8 Relations of the House of Representatives;

9 (3) the term “Iran” includes any agency or in-
10 strumentality of Iran;

11 (4) the term “United States” means the several
12 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
13 of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern
14 Mariana Islands, American Samoa, Guam, the Vir-
15 gin Islands, and any other territory or possession of
16 the United States; and

17 (5) the term “United States national” means—

18 (A) a natural person who is a citizen of the
19 United States or who owes permanent alle-
20 giance to the United States;

21 (B) a corporation or other legal entity
22 which is organized under the laws of the United
23 States, any State or territory thereof, or the
24 District of Columbia, if natural persons who are
25 nationals of the United States own, directly or

1 indirectly, more than 50 percent of the out-
2 standing capital stock or other beneficial inter-
3 est in such legal entity; and

4 (C) any foreign subsidiary of a corporation
5 or other legal entity described in subparagraph
6 (B).

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