

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

COUNTRY Cuba REPORT NO. OO-B 3,187,419  
SUBJECT Isle of Pines Defenses (Tanks, Anti-aircraft guns, + travel restrictions) DATE DISTR. 26 May 1961  
NO. PAGES 1  
REFERENCES  
DATE OF INFO. 9 May 1961 and Earlier  
PLACE & DATE ACQ Isle of Pines; Apr60 - May 61

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

1. Prior to the invasion, there were 25 to 28 fast heavy-duty tanks stationed on the Isle of Pines. I understand these tanks had been brought to the island at night on the ferry. They were stationed on the Southeast side of the island. There were generally about three thousand militia stationed on the island. I believe these tanks and militia were still on the island when I left on the 30th of April.
2. In the town of Nueva Gerona there was an anti-aircraft gun emplacement on the top of the Customs building. It was always manned by three or four militia. There were numerous gun emplacements on the ridge of the mountain alongside the Rio de las Casas.
3. The Cuban gunboat sunk in the approach to Nueva Gerona is not an obstruction in the channel.
4. All roads leading to the Model Prison are blocked off one and two blocks from the prison. No one is allowed to pass these blockades without special permission. There are many machinegun emplacements around the prison.
5. At some road intersections there are roadblocks of logs and boards. When the cars stop the occupants are questioned by militia. When US citizens were stopped the militia did not speak and by signs indicated that the hood should be raised, the trunk opened, etc.
6. In nearly all instances the militia carried new automatic weapons or small machineguns. In the bathroom of the DIER H. headquarters there was a pile of old US Springfield Rifles on the floor.

Approved for Release  
Date 07 APR 1976

-end-

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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<b>COUNTRY</b>	Cuba	<b>REPORT NO.</b>	CS -3/475,618
<b>SUBJECT</b>	Opposition Situation in Cuba as of 18 May 1961.	<b>DATE DISTR.</b>	5 June 1961
		<b>NO. PAGES</b>	1
		<b>REFERENCES</b>	RJ
<b>DATE OF INFO.</b>	April - May 1961		
<b>PLACE &amp; DATE ACQ.</b>	(18 May 1961)	<b>FIELD REPORT NO.</b>	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

**SOURCE:**

1. The underground forces in Cuba have been beaten but not destroyed. In general they have gone underground and are waiting for a favorable time to go into action. There was some terrorist activity in the few days preceding 18 May 1961.
2. Apparently as a result of the events in Cuba since 15 April, public opinion is now possibly sixty per cent in favor of Fidel CASTRO. People have strongly criticized some of the captured invaders for having talked too much. The behavior of some has been bitterly censured.
3. Public opinion is largely unfavorable to the United States, which is considered to have been the cause of the defeat. Many people believe that the position of the United States has been weakened and ridiculed by CASTRO and the Communists. The Revolutionary Council, headed by Dr. Jose MERO Cardona, is regarded as having no fighting spirit and as being a complete failure.

Approved for Release  
Date 07 APR 1976

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[Redacted]

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. OO-A 3,189,482

SUBJECT Harassment of Anti-Castristas

DATE DISTR. 26 June 1961

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES [Redacted]

DATE OF INFO. To May 61  
PLACE & DATE ACQ. Havana To May 61

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

[Redacted]

1. Despite my aversion to Castro and Communism, I remained in Havana until May 1961 hoping that existing conditions were temporary and a return to normality would come about. My hopes rapidly diminished after the first of the year (1961), and were completely extinguished after the failure of the April invasion effort.
2. We "non-believers" (anti-Castro Cubans) were subjected to a stiffening attitude by the Castro forces commencing in January 1961. At that time, for example, Cuban Negro women were assigned to the FUCSA apartment building in which I resided to search the tenants entering or leaving the premises. The purpose of this was to humiliate us. I heard that Castro wanted to take over the building to house delegations from Red China and other Communist countries. Various places I went, I was spotted as an "American" and was treated (or mistreated) as such, especially by members of the Home Guard. I found the Home Guard to be crude and impolite. The militia was trained to be polite (in a semi-sneering way) to us.

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Date 07 APR 1976



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

NLR-76-146

# 1

10 JUN 1964

*J.C. Johnson*

*645*

*file  
HSC?*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Coverage of Castro Activities in the  
United States.

REFERENCE : National Security Action Memorandum  
No. 45, subject as above, dated  
25 April 1961

1. Coverage of Castro activities in the United States is the primary responsibility of the Department of Justice. To supplement this coverage, I have taken implementing action through CIA facilities abroad and in the United States. Our program in the United States has been coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

2. It is not anticipated that CIA implementation will entail recommendations requiring the President's approval.

SIGNED

ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

Declassified by *CS8315*  
date *31 MAR 1976*

NOV 79-176

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL SECURITY

3 Nov 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The Situation and Prospects in Cuba

Summary

1. The Castro regime has sufficient popular support and repressive capabilities to cope with any internal threat likely to develop within the foreseeable future. The regime faces serious, but not insurmountable, economic difficulties. The contrast between its rosy promises and the grim actuality is producing disillusionment and apathy. Some specially motivated elements have recently dared to demonstrate their disapproval. The bulk of the population, however still accepts the Castro regime, or is at least resigned to it, and substantial numbers still support it with enthusiasm. At the same time, the regime's capabilities for repression are increasing more rapidly than are the potentialities for active resistance.

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DocId: 333769  
Date: 23 NOVEMBER 1979

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The Economic Situation and Prospects

2. The Cuban economy is now feeling the impact of three revolutionary changes: (a) the loss of most of its experienced middle and upper level managerial talent; (b) the imposition of elaborate state controls; and (c) a drastic shift in the trading pattern, from primary dependence on the US to primary dependence on the Soviet Bloc. The US embargo has produced some economic difficulties through the denial of spare parts for previously acquired equipment, almost all of which was of US origin. Nevertheless, the production of sugar, the principal export crop, has been increased, and the production of tobacco and tropical fruit, the other leading exports, has been maintained. Although Cuba's free world trade and foreign exchange reserves have declined sharply, the Bloc is taking enough exports and returning enough consumer goods and machinery to keep the economy going.

3. The domestic production of foodstuffs and other consumer goods, and the imports obtained from the Bloc and elsewhere, are together not sufficient to compensate for the loss of former imports from the US. Personal consumption has declined, especially in the cities, and most drastically in the case of the upper and middle classes. In some rural areas, however, especially in

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centers of sugar production, living conditions have been substantially improved, particularly in terms of housing and sanitation. These examples of the tangible benefits received by some keep alive the hopes of many others.

4. In addition to trade, the Bloc has extended to Cuba some \$357 million in credits for industrial development. However, only a few of these development projects are yet underway, nor is much likely to be accomplished for another year or more.

5. In general, the Cuban economy is characterized by major shortages and a high degree of disorganization. This state of affairs will continue for some time to come, and may indeed get somewhat worse. In view of the availability of Bloc assistance, however, we do not believe that the economy will deteriorate so far as to bring about Castro's overthrow, or force him to make basic changes in his policy. On the contrary, the situation will probably begin to improve within a year or so, as the new Communist-type organization takes hold, managerial experience increases, and foreign trade is adjusted to new channels.

Popular Acceptance of the Regime

6. Initially, almost all Cubans hailed the triumph of the Revolution with enthusiasm. Disillusionment, however, came quickly

to the urban middle class, urban organized labor, and the landed gentry. It has since spread to small peasant proprietors and even to humber folk, who are beginning to appear in significant numbers in the flow of refugees from Cuba. Revolution is by now well

7. The severe internal repression which accompanied the defeat of the April invasion stilled, for a time, all manifestations of opposition within the country. By September, however, this effect had worn off sufficiently for Catholic crowds in Havana and other cities to dare to defy the regime's prohibition of certain public religious observances. This was the first occasion on which the regime had been forced to use gunfire to disperse hostile public demonstrations. It was therefore indicative of a significant change in the psychological situation.

8. There have also been some increase in small-scale guerrilla and sabotage activity and a considerable increase in such passive forms of resistance as absenteeism. However, most disaffected Cubans now think primarily in terms of escape. In mid-September, some 15,000 had completed legal arrangements to leave the country which were then cancelled by the government, and some 500 were in asylum in the several Latin American embassies in Havana. Illegal departures occur almost daily.

9. Despite these manifestations of disaffection, the great bulk of the population still accepts the regime and substantial numbers still support it with enthusiasm. The sprawling revolutionary bureaucracy now embodies a new class with a very definite personal stake in the regime.

Castroist Political Organization

10. The regime is now in the process of a complete reorganization of the form of government in Cuba, and of the organization of a new totalitarian political party to operate and control it. The Communist model is apparent in both instances.

11. The traditional provincial and municipal governments are being replaced by juntas (soviets) for "coordination, execution, and inspection" (JUCEI). Already established in each province of Cuba, the JUCEI's consists of a "provincial congress," representative of all major economic entities in the territory, which meets occasionally; a "plenum" of the congress, which meets every few months; and several smaller bodies which meet frequently and actually direct the provincial administration. The primary function of all JUCEI is the local implementation of plans received from higher authority.

12. The new totalitarian political machine is to be the United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution, a merger of the amorphous 26 of July Movement (or what is left of it) with the well organized Communist Party. Although Castro is of course to be the supreme head of this party, the man who is pushing the project is Blas Roca, the Communist Secretary General. Party membership is to be limited to the elite of the revolutionary struggle and prerequisite to appointment to any important political or economic position.

13. A significant arm of the Castroist political organization is the paramilitary Association of Rebel Youth (AJR), derived from the previous Communist youth organization. These teenagers, of the type that would be found in juvenile gangs, are a terror to their parents, their schoolmates, and the general public. They have charge of indoctrination in the schools and have been active in the formation of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (see paragraph <sup>22</sup>~~23~~). Active participation in the AJR is to be prerequisite to educational and eventually political advancement.

#### The Castroist Security Apparatus

14. The forces now available to the regime to suppress insurrection or repel invasion are:

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- a. The Rebel Army (32,000)
- b. The Rural Police (9,600)
- c. The Rebel Air Force (2,000)
- d. The Navy (2,000)
- e. The Militia (250,000, including 83,000 women)
- f. The Rebel Youth (150,000, including 10,000 girls)
- g. The National Police (9,000)
- h. The Maritime Police

15. The administrative and command structure of these forces is extremely loose; the improvisation of ad hoc commands including disparate elements is the common practice. Confusion and lack of coordination are therefore likely in any emergency situation.

16. The army has been strengthened by the receipt of Bloc arms and is being instructed in their use by Bloc personnel. However, it has had little or no combined arms or field training. It displayed great tactical ineptitude at the time of the April landing.

17. About a fifth of the army are veterans of Castro's guerrilla struggle against Batista. The remainder are early adherents. In time, however, Castro came to doubt, with reason, their loyalty to the course the Revolution had taken on achieving

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power. The militia were therefore established as an alternative armed support for the regime. The original units were composed of Castro's most ardent followers. In time, however, the militia was so greatly expanded by recruitment under pressure that its revolutionary zeal was considerably diluted. Castro has therefore transferred his favor and reliance to the newly organized Rebel Youth, who are now his most fanatical followers.

18. In general, the militia and the Rebel Youth, both part-time forces, have only light arms which are issued to them only on occasion. They are not capable of sustained combat, but are effective for controlling and coercing the general public. In addition, some selected units of the militia and the Rebel Youth are specially armed and trained and are, in effect, army units specially dedicated to Fidel Castro.

19. The capabilities of the air force have been greatly enhanced by the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of personnel from training in the Bloc. There are now about 35 MIG-15's and MIG-19's operational in Cuba.

20. The navy is unreliable and distrusted; most of its personnel were taken into custody at the time of the April

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landing. Mutinies, defections, and purges have left it few professionally trained and technically qualified men.

21. Recently, the professional security agencies of the government -- Army G-2 (the Secret police), the National Police, and the Maritime Police -- were transferred from the Ministry of the Armed Forces to a newly created Ministry of the Interior. This change is likely to enhance their effectiveness. It does not indicate a reduction of Raul Castro's power, since Ramiro Valdes, the new Minister of the Interior, is one of his close associates. Valdes is a Communist, formerly head of Army G-2.

22. A network of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution is being established to provide an additional agency for political surveillance and control. What these committees lack in professional competence, they make up for in pervasiveness and zeal. The Rebel Youth have been particularly active in promoting their formation. The announced goal is 100,000 committees with over a million members covering every community in Cuba.

If Castro Were to Die

23. Fidel Castro's personal prestige and popularity were indispensable to the regime in the earlier stages of its development.

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None of his lieutenants could have inherited the personal authority which he then exercised. His loss now, by assassination or by natural causes, would certainly have an unsettling effect, but would probably not prove fatal. The Revolution is by now well institutionalized; the regime has firm control of the country; its principal surviving leaders would probably rally together in the face of a common danger. Indeed, a dead Castro, incapable of impulsive personal interventions in the orderly administration of affairs, might be more valuable to them as a martyr than he is now.

24. The fact remains that Castro has had to control tensions, jealousies, and conflicts of interest and purpose among his principal lieutenants: Raul Castro, the head of the armed forces; "Che" Guevara, the director of industrial development; Munez Jimenez, the director of agrarian reform. There could be a falling out among them at Castro's funeral. There would almost certainly be a struggle for power among them afterward, which might break into the open.

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
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25. A coordinated estimate of the Cuban situation and prospects, NIE 85-62, "The Situation in Cuba," is scheduled for USIB consideration in January.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

  
SHERMAN KENT  
Chairman

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# Memorandum

18

TO : File

DATE: 24 April 1962

FROM : Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

SUBJECT: Rolando MASFERRER Rojas  
DPOB: 12 January 1918 - Holguin, Oriente, Cuba  
#36859(C)

1. On 24 April 1962, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] They have a report that subject characterized as "a leading Cuban gangster" is holding fund raising meetings in New York City with his slogan being, "A rifle for every Cuban." [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] was requested to check for any data this Agency might have.

3. [REDACTED] advised that all recent data in his files has come from the Bureau. Subject heads an organization known as "One Rifle" with headquarters in New Jersey. [REDACTED] so advised.

*HJM*

OS/AAS/HJM:es 24 Apr 62

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Dep. Dir. Sec.
Executive
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*Handwritten signature and date: 4.25.62*



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NLK-77-990

#1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
22 August 1962

OCI No. 3047/62

Copy No. 10

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Recent Soviet Military Aid to Cuba

1. Intelligence on recent Soviet military assistance to Cuba indicates that an unusually large number of Soviet ships have delivered military cargoes to Cuba since late July and that some form of military construction is underway at several locations in Cuba by Soviet bloc personnel who arrived on some of these ships and are utilizing material delivered by the vessels. During the period at least 1,500 passengers have debarked from four ships under security conditions suggesting that their mission is related to the construction and military activity; another 1,500 arrived during the period and were greeted with considerable publicity as economic specialists and students. Some still unconfirmed reports suggest that recently arrived Soviet bloc personnel number as many as 5,000. The speed and magnitude of this influx of bloc personnel and equipment into a non-bloc country is unprecedented in Soviet military aid activities; clearly something new and different is taking place. As yet limited evidence suggests that present activities may include the augmentation of Cuba's air defense system, possibly including the establishment of surface-to-air missile sites or the setting up of facilities for electronic and communications intelligence.

2. As many as 20 Soviet vessels may have already arrived in Cuba since late July with military cargoes. Five more Soviet vessels have left Black Sea ports under conditions suggesting that they are en route to Cuba with additional military equipment. Most reports on these shipments have referred to large quantities of transportation, electronic, and construction equipment, such as communications and radar vans, trucks of many

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date 26 OCT 1977

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varieties, mobile generator units, tracked and wheeled prime movers, cranes, trailers, and fuel tanks. Eyewitnesses who saw the material being transported from the port areas report that much of the transportation was done at night and even that town street lights were turned off as the convoys passed through.

3. Personnel who arrived on the four Soviet passenger vessels--each of which has a normal passenger capacity of 340, though one of them declared 365 passenger when leaving the Black Sea--have been described variously by Cubans who have seen them. Most agree that they were obviously non-Cuban in appearance and were dressed in civilian clothing. A number of independent sources report that the foreign personnel were dressed in dirty, dusty, slept-in, red-checkered shirts and faded blue trousers. The foreign personnel unloaded the vessels themselves; usually Cuban militiamen have been charged with this work even when it was a military cargo. There is no hard evidence that any of these people are in combat, military units. There is strong evidence that their mission is related to unidentified military construction.

4. At least a dozen refugees from the area of Matanzas have reported independently on military construction at two sites near that north coast city. Two and possibly more ships arrived in the port of Matanzas and unloaded cargoes under tight security precautions. Cargoes were taken to at least two general areas where construction is underway. Initial construction, according to one of the eyewitnesses, involved the grading and leveling of a naturally level portion of the western slope of a hill by Soviet personnel using heavy equipment. This was taking place at a site just east of Matanzas at a place called El Bongo. Other sources confirmed that material was leaving the docks in the direction of El Bongo. Another source, who left Cuba more recently, reported that by 4 August foreign personnel were assembling what appeared to be a prefabricated curved-roofed structure at El Bongo. The other site of construction activity near Matanzas is apparently just across the provincial border in Havana province at Santa Cruz del Norte, near the former Hershey sugar mill. In this place, too, construction activity initially involved the leveling of a portion of a hill near the coast. Cuban residents had been cleared from the area.

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5. There are as yet no confirmed report of construction activity underway in other parts of Cuba. However, there is considerable reason to presume that such activity is underway or is to be initiated shortly in a number of other locations in Cuba, ranging from Oriente province in the east to Pinar del Rio in the west. A refugee from the port of Antilla in Oriente province reported that a Soviet ship unloaded in late July at nearby Nicaro. The material unloaded, including electronic vans, tracked prime movers, and trailers, was moved through Antilla toward the Peninsula de Ramon, an area where he reported construction work had been underway for some time. Another ship is reported to have discharged a similar cargo as well as foreign personnel in the port of Casilda, in southern Las Villas province. In northern Las Villas, Cayo Esquivel, an island off the coast, has reportedly been evacuated. In the area just south of Havana city, we have numerous independent reports that a number of farms have been evacuated and that the boys' reformatory at nearby Torrens has been converted for living quarters for numbers of foreign personnel. Information from individuals who live near the reformatory indicate that the numerous Soviet personnel who moved in early this month wore "casual, dirty, civilian clothes." Other reports indicate that quantities of equipment such as has been reported elsewhere have been seen on the confiscated farms near the reformatory. Other reports from other parts of the island indicate that Cuban families have been evacuated from an island near Mariel, the port in Pinar del Rio province where much of the equipment was unloaded, and from a farming area near Guatana, Pinar del Rio province.

6. What the construction activity involves is not yet known. The activity in the Matanzas area could be the initial phases of construction of a SAM-equipped air defense system, erection of electronic and communications intelligence facilities aimed at Canaveral and other US installations, or an ECM system aimed at US space, missile, and/or other operational electronic systems. The kinds of equipment described could fit with any of these objectives; the evidence thus far, as well as Soviet practice in other countries receiving bloc military assistance, would suggest, at least tentatively, construction of an air defense system based on the GUIDELINE missile. Information to confirm or refute this should become available within a week.

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7. The step-up in military shipments and the construction activity once again provide strong evidence of the magnitude of the USSR's support for the Castro regime. Together with the extraordinary Soviet bloc economic commitments made to Cuba in recent months, these developments amount to the most extensive campaign to bolster a non-bloc country ever undertaken by the USSR.

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