

COPY NO. 371

296

OCI NO. 6329

30 June 1954

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST



Item 9

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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SECRET ✓

~~U.S. EYES ONLY~~

*Dist. to Record
Dist. to [unclear] & [unclear] [unclear]
[unclear] [unclear]*

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23.

Comment on the Guatemalan negotiations: / The new Guatemalan military junta headed by Colonel Elfege Monzon has arranged through American ambassador Peurifoy and the Salvadoran government to enter into negotiations with rebel leader Castillo Armas designed to work out terms for a peace settlement.

The negotiations are tentatively scheduled to take place in San Salvador beginning at noon on 30 June. The junta has asked the papal nuncio in Guatemala to act as an impartial witness at the proceedings.

Meanwhile both government and rebel radios in Guatemala have announced a cease-fire.

Castillo Armas has reportedly stipulated that his consent to enter into negotiations does not obligate him to come to any agreement. The two sides are, however, believed predisposed to reach a settlement. There are reports that one and possibly both of Monzon's fellow junta members are favorably inclined toward Castillo Armas.

Monzon himself, though a cabinet minister in the Arbenz regime, has long been considered strongly anti-Communist. A few hours after becoming interior minister in the short-lived junta headed by Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz, Monzon ordered the arrest of all known Communist leaders. Many of these are now reported to have found asylum in the Argentine, Chilean and Mexican embassies in Guatemala City.

SENSITIZED COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE : 12 JULY 1954

BY THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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| 3 | 6 |

ROUTING (12)

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA
CONF :
INFO :

2039Z 12 JUL 54

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO:

CITE: DIR

JULY 12 DREW PEARSON COLUMN STATES THAT CASTILLO ARMAS IS NEPHEW OF
AND WAS SECRETARY TO UBIACO. PLEASE VERIFY.

Y... ..

18 JUL 1954

015

ABSTRACT INDEX
DATE

CONTINUING OFFICERS

RECALCULATING OFFICERS

IT IS FOR YOU TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

NOV 1954

1 JULY 54

1
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TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

TO: [REDACTED]

2319Z 23 JUL 54

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

(CITE: [REDACTED])

TO: DIR

REF [REDACTED]

NO INFO THUS FAR CONFIRMING REF REPORT THAT CASTILLO ARMAS IS NEPHEW TO UBICO. WE HAVE ASCERTAINED HE AT ONE TIME WAS EMPLOYED AS SECRETARY TO UBICO.

END OF MESSAGE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 11-11-2001

016

[REDACTED]

INSTRUMENTAL
DATE

IT IS FORWARDED TO YOU A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

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| ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED | | | CROSS FILED BY |
| FILE NO | SOURCE | DATE OF DOCUMENT | ANALYST |
| | | 19 Aug 54 | |
| SUBJECT | | | DATE |
| Political Activities Guatemala | | | |
| Political Views of Regular Army | | | 24 Aug 54 |

PERTINENT INFORMATION

As for Army allegiance to individual members of the Junta, [] state that the Majority of the Army favors DOMON and is Obeying his orders when carrying out Military Commands from the Junta. that Carlos CASTILLO Armas enjoys no support in regular army Circles, and that Enrique Trinidad OLIVA has been relegated to a Secondary position meriting little consideration by the army.

APPROVED FOR
DATE 18 MAR

0017

CROSS-REFERENCE FORM

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

26 APR 55

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DIRECTOR

18 DVP?

(11 2012)

26 APR 55

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

RE:

SITREP 18-25 APR

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 18 MAY 1979

1. DURING WEEK OF REVIEW INCREASING GOVT ACTIVITIES NOTED DUE TO ALLEGED UNREST WITHIN ARMY RANKS. LEADER OF MOVEMENT REPORTEDLY COL ENRIQUE CLOSE DE LEON MINDEF - GUARDIA DE HONOR ALERTED DURING WEEK.

2. [REDACTED] STATED [22] APR [REDACTED] ADMITTED TRD BUT GOVT NOT CONCERNED. DURING PAST WEEK UNCONFIRMED REPORT STATED [REDACTED] BURNED IN EFFIGY IN GUARDIA DE HONOR. [REDACTED] ENRAGED AND DECIDED REMOVE CLOSE DE LEON FROM DEFENSE MINISTRY AND SEND HIM OUT OF COUNTRY. MENDOZA BROTHERS AND POSSIBLY NEIDERHEITMAN URGED [REDACTED] REFRAIN FROM ACTION IN VIEW OF SUPPORT CLOSE HAS IN ARMY.

3. COL NEIDERHEITMAN REQUESTED UFCO MANAGER [REDACTED] SEND 2 GUAT PILOTS EMPLOYED UFCO TO GUAT CITY. BOTH PILOTS HERE ON STANDBY BASIS FOR DUTY WITH [REDACTED] FORCES IN EVENT OF

25 APR 53

[REDACTED] (14 3012)

PAGE 2

REVOLT. [REDACTED] REASONED THIS ACTION INDICATIVE GOVT CONCERN. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] COMMENT: INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRECLUDES THOROUGH AND FAIR EVALUATION FOREGOING. BELIEVE SITUATION NOT YET CRITICAL ALTHO CONTINUE INTEREST AND UNTOJAN ACTION PART GOVT COULD CREATE INCIDENT. POSSIBILITY ALSO EXISTS THIS MAY BE ATTEMPT REMOVE CLOSE WHO LAST OF NON-LIBERATION OFFICIALS TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE.

END OF MESSAGE

This document contains information which is the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

COUNTRY: Guatemala
SUBJECT: CASTILLO Armas/CORDOVA Cerna Relations

REPORT NO. CS-63206
DATE DISTR. 9 May 1955
NO. OF PAGES 1
REQUIREMENT NO. RD

DATE OF INFO: 18-30 April 1955

PLACE ACQUIRED

DATE ACQUIRED

REFERENCES

(BY CABLE)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

Juan CORDOVA Cerna, head of the Guatemalan National Economic Planning Commission, has vehemently denied reports to the effect that he tried to persuade President Carlos CASTILLO Armas to resign and to leave Guatemala. He attributed the rumor to Carlos LEMUS Gallardo, official of the National Defense Committee Against Communism, and added that Luis CORONADO Lira, head of the Secretariat for Propaganda, Culture, and Travel, is responsible for similar reports concerning demands for resignation being presented to CASTILLO. CORONADO Lira himself denies that he has had any connection with these rumors, but says that LEMUS is incompetent and talks too much.

Comment. There is considerable evidence that mutual suspicions and jealousies are disturbing the stability of the CASTILLO regime. Rumors such as this, which are receiving widespread circulation in Guatemala, are contributing to the formation of such suspicions and to recriminations within the government.

([REDACTED])

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 18 MAY 1978

DISSEMINATED

MAY 1955

0028

STATE

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

X

FBI

AFC

MICROFILMED

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; field distribution by "Z")

File #: 100-100000

6 July 1955

1. On 25 June President CASTILLO Armas was invited to attend a luncheon at Chiquimula to celebrate the first anniversary of the capture of that town by the Liberation Forces. Many government employees and especially members of the Liberation and National Army were invited. Among those invited was Captain Fernando ROMERO who was given the job of assassinating the President.¹ CASTILLO, however, only made a short visit to Chiquimula and did not remain for lunch. ROMERO, therefore, was not able to fulfill his mission.

2. ROMERO then began to drink and soon entered into a heated political discussion with Col. Jorge BARRIOS Solares, the Governor of the Department of Guatemala. ROMERO became so enraged he tried to use the hand grenade which he had in his pocket for use in killing the President. One of Col. BARRIOS' aides, however, saw what ROMERO intended to do and shot him through the head. The grenade went off wounding several people including Col. BARRIOS.²

COMMENTS:

1. It is not clear whether this was an organized attempt on the President's life or whether it was Captain ROMERO's own idea.
2. Newspaper accounts of this event indicate only that ROMERO was killed by a grenade which he had in his hand and fail to indicate why he was handling a grenade at a fiesta. Col. BARRIOS has evidently recovered from his wounds and has returned to duty.

Classification

FORM NO. 81-58
1 FEB 1948

6 July '55

0023

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 18 MAY 1979

COUNTRY Guatemala

REPORT NO.

CS - 70000

SUBJECT Assassination of President CASTILLO
Armas Planned by Captain Fernando
ROMERO

DATE DISTR.

1 August 1955

DATE OF INFO. 25 June 1955

NO. OF PAGES

1

REQUIREMENT NO.

RD

PLACE ACQUIRED

REFERENCES

DATE ACQUIRED

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. Captain Fernando ROMERO, who went to Chiquimula, Guatemala, on 25 June 1955 to attend the celebration of the first anniversary of the capture of the town by liberation forces, planned to assassinate President Carlos CASTILLO Armas while the latter was at a luncheon there.¹ However, CASTILLO made only a short visit to Chiquimula and did not remain for the luncheon as scheduled; ROMERO was therefore unable to carry out his mission.
2. In a heated political discussion with Col. Jorge BARRIOS Solares, Governor of the Department, which took place that evening, ROMERO became so enraged that he attempted to throw the hand grenade which he had planned to use against CASTILLO. When an aide to BARRIOS saw what ROMERO intended to do, he shot him through the head. However, the grenade exploded, and several people were wounded, including Col. BARRIOS.²

Comment.

1. It is not clear whether this was part of an organized attempt on CASTILLO's life or whether ROMERO was acting solely on his own authority.
2. Newspaper accounts of this incident indicated only that ROMERO died in Chiquimula after a grenade exploded in his hand. Col. BARRIOS has returned to duty.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(+1)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 18 MAY 1955

030

November 1956

MICROFILMED

JUN 6 1966

DOC. NO. 100,000,000

5p

Trip to Guatemala and Interview with President Carlos Castillo Armas.

Translation of a Report by Arturo Araya A., 5 November 1956.

I arrived in Guatemala City at 3 P. M. on the 29th of October, registering at the Hotel Palace. At 5 P. M. of the same day I visited (Lic.) Carlos Salazar, to whom I had written about my trip, so that he might help to arrange an interview with President Castillo Armas; and the above-mentioned lawyer, after explaining the reasons that estranged him from the president, told me, with regret, that he was not in a position to help me. The reasons which he gave were that Colonel Castillo Armas has surrounded himself with persons who served the pro-Communist regime of ~~Guatemala~~ ^{Guatemala} and Arbenz, and who, for natural reasons, are irreconcilable enemies of us anti-Communists who are striving for their overthrow; that some of the old comrades in the Movement of Liberation who are still close to the President (like Fario Sandoval, Sub-Secretary of the Presidency; Mario López Villatoro, Sub-Secretary of Divulgación, Cultura, and Turismo; Eduardo Paracena, Sub-Secretary of Salud Pública; José Calderón Salazar, Diputado and Editor of the newspaper NUESTRO DIARIO, and others) have made common cause with the now-dormant group. He concluded by wishing me success in my plan to talk with the president, but warned me that perhaps I might not succeed.

I proceeded to the Palacio Nacional, in order to see Sr. López Villatoro, who told me that he had not received my letter in which I informed him of my trip, but offered to take the necessary steps to have me received by Col. C. Castillo Armas. For this purpose, he told me that on the following day, Tuesday 30th, he would notify me of the results, by telephone, at the hotel. He did not keep his promise, as I waited in vain on his call all Tuesday morning. And then no longer depending on López Villatoro, I got in touch with (Licenciado) Antonio Valladares Aguirre, a distinguished individual and personal friend of the President. This lawyer confirmed what Lic. Carlos Salazar had told me the day before, adding that, having returned to Guatemala on the 6th of October after a long absence, he had encountered difficulties in

... to his friend the President, whom he had been able to see only
for a few moments, shaking his head, but not being able to talk with him
at any great length. Nevertheless he took me to see (Lic.) Ricardo Gutiérrez
Lemus, Minister of Foreign Relations, as well as to the Minister of Government,
(Lic.) Eduardo Rodríguez Genís. Of the first one of these, I requested that he
arrange an interview with the President, which he offered to do willingly,
indicating that, on the following day, Wednesday the 31st at 10:30 in the
morning, he would inform me; and, in fact, he kept his promise, telling
me that he had obtained an interview for five o'clock in the afternoon of
the same day. Well ahead of the hour I proceeded to the presidential ante-
room, which was filled with people. The President began receiving them,
and time passed without my turn's coming up. Finally, at eight thirty in
the evening, an aide of the President advised all of us who were waiting
that the President was leaving, and begged all present to return the follow-
ing day at ten o'clock. This worried me, because I thought it might be an
excuse not to receive me, in view of the background information which the
lawyers Salazar and Valladares had given me. But on the following day,
Thursday 1st of November, prior to the appointed hour, I again visited
the Minister of Foreign Relations, informing him of what had occurred Wed-
nesday evening and reiterating my request that the President receive me.
The Minister told me to go to the presidential ante-room and that he
would come for me later on and try to have me received.

This he did and, at 10:15, I was the first person to be received by
the President. I gave him the most cordial greetings from don Jorge Prieto
Laurens and also from Admiral Juan Botta, and then told him that I had re-
ceived a letter from one of his secretaries, in which the latter, at his in-
structions, informed me that for the time being it would be impossible to
have the Third Congreso Contra la Intervención Soviética en América Latina
in Guatemala in accord with the agreement made in Rio; that, availing our-
selves of the kindness of the Government of Peru, it had been agreed to
have the meeting in Lima, at an early date; that, in consequence, our
first step was to inform him - Castillo Armas - so that during the meet-
ing in Lima his government would have a platform from which to announce
to the whole continent the democratic and constructive work that is being
carried out in Guatemala, and that we hoped, that, just as in the 1st

... well as a gesture, for such a... worthy and brilliant... of the... which represented... in the Conference in Mexico, in 1954, and in Rio de Janeiro, in 1955. I told him that, since in Peru a demonstration of authentic democracy had just been carried out, by recognizing the electoral triumph of the opposition candidate in the person of (President) Manuel Prado, it was now necessary to carry there - and in the presence of the delegates of the twenty Latin American countries, representative of all sectors of society - the good tidings of the labor of democracy and recuperation carried out by his (Castillo Armas') government, after the overthrow of the first pro-Soviet regime to be established in our hemisphere.

That, likewise, we considered that having the Third Congress in Peru would assuredly contribute to the strengthening of the democratic movement in that country; in similar fashion we considered it advisable to concentrate the efforts of our continental organization in zones or countries where help against Communist infiltration was most needed.

I added that we thought it best that our continental conferences should take place in different latitudes; that it was that the first one took place in Mexico, a country situated in North America; the second one in Brazil, in the extreme east of the Southern Continent; and the third should therefore take place in Lima, on the western side of South America; and that the fourth could take place in Guatemala, that is in Central America, or in some other country of the Andilles or the Caribbean area.

The President listened to us most attentively and with evident satisfaction, answering that he appreciated very much, in the first place, the greetings from his people and the Admiral, and that he was pleased that I was the bearer of them. That he thought the selection of Peru a good choice and that, of course, he would send a good delegation to the Congress, made up of representatives of all sectors of Guatemalan society; but that he thought it proper, in so far as the work of his government was concerned, for us to handle it, so that his delegation could supplement it later. That he had met Dr. Prado in the former Session of Presidents, although there was no opportunity for a full exchange of impressions and information between them.

(He added) that he thought it an excellent idea to help the men of countries that stood most in need of help against Communist infiltration, as well as that our congresses should take place in different latitudes. And, therefore, hoped that the fourth Congress would take place in Guatemala, because, when that time should come, he would be in a position to offer to the Confederación all the facilities and aid that it might need.

Afterwards, he talked to me most enthusiastically about a book which has just appeared on the contemporary political history of Guatemala, -- a book whose author is (sic) Mario Efraín Méjara Farfán, one of the promoters of the presidential candidacy of Juan José Arévalo and afterwards a prominent collaborator in his regime. Then he gave me a pamphlet illustrating what he is doing for the humblest classes, and proceeded to explain to me that he is concentrating his action in this respect on the following points: to improve living conditions by making the farmer cultivate his land in such a way that it will produce what is necessary for raising the living standard; intensive sanitation effort in order to improve the physical health of the people, by attacking the endemic diseases from which they suffer, and by avoiding the epidemic ones; to develop agriculture and help the farmer to keep animals and domestic fowls; and afterwards, go all out for the alphabetization of the masses, as well as for sports, as a means of replacing the ancestral vices which have characterized the people.

Finally the conversation moved into personal matters, and he recalled how our friendship began via correspondence, at the beginning of 1952, when he was still in exile in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, telling me that our letters always brought him messages of faith and optimism about the triumph of the cause of the Guatemalan people, which was his own cause, against the pro-Communist regime of Jacobo Arben. At this point, one of the secretaries entered the presidential office, carrying three photographs of the President, and the latter then asked me if I had a photograph of him. I answered that we had one in our offices, dedicated to our organization. Then he said: "I am going to dedicate one to you personally," which he did in most cordial terms.

Our interview went on until eleven o'clock, or for three quarters of

December 1967

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE *F* *57*

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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NOV 12 1967

32

ACTION

INFO

FILE

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AD

FILE COPY

BY

061808Z CITE

DIRECTOR

NO

41

[REDACTED]

A REPORT CONFIRMING
 WHAT [REDACTED] PREVIOUSLY SUSPECTED TO WIT THAT THE FOLLOWING
 ARE INVOLVED WITH THE FAR:

[REDACTED]

(B) ALSO SUSPECTED IS FATHER BLASE BONPANE, UNIVERSITY PARISH
 IN GUATEMALA CITY. HE IS A CLOSE FRIEND OF THE MELVILLE BROTHERS.

[REDACTED]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
 DATE 0 OCT 1978

6 Dec 67 #11

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 13

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23 JANUARY 1968

CLASSIFICATION

INDEX DESTROY RETURN TO TRAINING FILE END

NO INDEX PLS IN CO FILE NO.

COPY

(Classification)

(date and time filed)

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(reference number)

-IMMEDIATE

JAN 23 16 20 Z

CITE DIRECTOR

68719

REFS: A. [redacted] (IN 26685)*
B. [redacted] (IN 07282)**

REQUEST ANY ADDITIONAL INFO STATION MAY HAVE ON HAND RE
FATHER BLASE BONPANE, MARYKNOLL PRIEST AND CLOSE FRIEND MELVILLE
BROTHERS. PLS REPLY IMMEDIATE.

END OF MESSAGE

Comment: Refs refer to Father BONPANE who may have been involved with the Guatemala insurgent situation.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date _____

[redacted]

[redacted]

23 Jan 68

ISSUING OFFICE

COORDINATING OFFICER

[redacted]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

[redacted]

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

23 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Headquarters Traces on Father Blase BONPANE,
Maryknoll Priest

(a) Division Traces Negative

(b) [REDACTED] (IN 07282) 6 December 1967:

[REDACTED] Father Blase BONPANE, a University parish priest in Guatemala City, is a close friend of the Melville brothers (Thomas and Arthur) and suspected of being involved with the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR). [REDACTED]

(c) [REDACTED]

(IN 26685) 9 January 1968:
Father BONPANE had left

Guatemala and will not return. [REDACTED]

(d) New York Times dated 22 January 1968: "A third Maryknoll priest, the Rev. Blase BONPANE, 38, was not at the secret meeting (referring to a meeting between Maryknoll priests and members of the FAR) but was ordered home and asked by his superiors not to discuss the incident. He (BONPANE) said, however, that to prevent him from discussing the Guatemala situation at a major conference on Latin America that opens in St. Louis on January 29, the Maryknolls had ordered him to report for a new assignment in Hawaii on

7:00 PM FOR RELEASE
D. 1968

that date. A Maryknoll spokesman said that Father BONPANE would be suspended from his priestly duties---he would be forbidden to say Mass or hear confession---if he attended the St. Louis meeting, which is to be sponsored by the Catholic Inter-American Cooperation Program."

~~(e) Catholic Directory 1967: Lists BONPANE, Blase A., Maryknoll priest as having an address in Huehuetenango, Guatemala.~~

15 March 1968

INFORMAL MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, [redacted]

SUBJECT: Notes Concerning Father Bonpane's Lecture
"Students and the Revolt in Guatemala"

1. On the evening of 12 March 1968, Father Blase Bonpane of the Maryknoll Order spoke to a standing room only audience in the Hall of Nations, Georgetown University. The lecture was sponsored by three student organizations; Latin American Forum, People to People, and the East Campus Christian Forum. The primary theme of Father's talk was about the local Guatemalan student effort to assist the social revolution of their country in an active but non-violent manner. The question and answer period that followed his presentation covered the entire spectrum of problems confronting Latin America.

2. Father's formal presentation began by telling of the disgruntled and frustrated students at the National University of San Carlos who wanted to be active participants in the social revolution of their country without having to make the final decision of joining one of the armed rebel groups in the mountains. There seemed to be no alternatives open to these students. As a last desperate attempt to find a way to channel the energy, talent and dedication of these students into a non-violent organization that could assist the existing revolution Father Bonpane and others began to organize the students into groups to go out into the countryside to carry out a program of civic action. An eight day course was initiated at the university to instruct the students on topics such as The Social Question, Dignity of Man, Common Good, Principles of Organization, and How to Organize/Develop the Legia de Campesinos. This pilot project of the Christian Guerrilla Organization had the nominal blessing of the archbishop. Many of the students with whom Father Bonpane dealt had been to Cuba on various occasions for some type of tour, schooling or training.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 10 OCT 1978

[redacted]

3. The students met with immediate success when sent to live with Indian families. There was an eagerness on the part of the Indians to want to learn to read and write Spanish and a general acceptance of the personal hygiene and public health procedures implemented by the students. There was no violent disagreement among the guerrilla groups as to the actions of the students and they soon became known as the "Guerrillas de Paz." The students did carry on a dialogue with the various guerrillas in their respective areas.

4. Father stated the final dissolution of this non-violent student movement was brought about by the threats of death against certain students and the actual public listings of these individuals with a price on their heads. After some quick consultations it was decided to disband the movement formally and Father with his friends were very occupied in exfiltrating students out of Guatemala. This was still going on up to the time of Father's recall to the United States.

5. The gains the students had made in forming the ~~Legia~~ Legia de Campesinos came to a temporary halt when the newly elected Chief of the Legia de Campesinos in the parish of Father Arthur Melville was brutally murdered.

6. Father tried to sound the alarm that the United States Government is following the wrong line of approach to the problems of Guatemala and to Latin America in general. He claims that the counterinsurgency program is "counterproductive" to the objectives of our government and though the program may be a military success the revolution will continue and Vietnams could spring up all over Latin America. Father asked which is more beneficial to the people of Guatemala, the arrival of four new HUEYs (fully armed helicopters) or four new hospitals which could be built with the money used to purchase the helicopters. Father stated no country in Central America needs a military force, only a national police force and our government should not support the expansion of the military power structure. He pointed to Costa Rica as an example to follow in this case. He claimed that the Americans are going to become hated by the campesinos as more and more American military representatives are connected with a Latin American military effort to wipe out the guerrilla. The initial

difficulty of the upper middle class urban guerrilla to identify with the campesino and vice-versa has been overcome because the campesino now is able to identify with the dead guerrilla for here is someone who died trying to assist and aid the campesino in improving his lot. ~~The identification process has become a binding reality.~~

7. Father made some general observations of the Guatemalan guerrilla. To date Father had never met a loud mouth or arrogant guerrilla. They are willing to listen to what you have to say as long as the rhetoric is not canned. Almost man for man the guerrillas are dedicated men who have lost their initial fear of death and consider themselves the vanguard of an armed social revolution. Many of the guerrillas identify themselves with the "new seed" mentioned in the New Testament which "must fall" in order for the harvest to be reaped. Numerous guerrillas when slain or captured have had a copy of the New Testament in their back pocket. Father claims that the guerrillas are willing to enter into informal discussions with government, church, or military officials at any given time. However, the guerrillas are dedicated to carrying the revolution to its final social conclusion and would not be satisfied with just a "palace revolution because they have seen hundreds and don't think any of them are worth a damn."

8. Father told the audience you must understand the historical nature of the power structure in Guatemala to understand why little or nothing is being done to feed, clothe, and educate the masses. He briefly explained the power pyramid with the Military sitting on top directing and dictating the country, right below the National Police always acting in a most direct and brutal way. Under these you have the governmental structure which is stymied and unable to act on certain matters even when willing because of the power exerted by the Military and the National Police. Father had praise for the court system of Guatemala and said if one could get to court for due process of law the courts were generally fair and gave a good hearing to the guerrillas.

9. When asked about the influence Cuba has on the guerrilla movement in Guatemala, Father stated, "Cuba

has had influence by what it is and the example it portrays by its very existence." Cuba experienced a genuine revolution involving certain social reforms and was able to withstand the pressure of the U.S. showing other countries it was possible to get out from underneath the colonial claws of the American institutions. Cuba provides very little material support to the guerrilla movement in Guatemala and in no way controls the action of the independent guerrilla groups, FAR, 13th of November Movement, and the Christian Guerrilla Organization. However, given the little economic aid provided by Cuba in direct contrast to aid given by the United States the proportion of influence is alarming.

10. At the conclusion of the question/answer period a student asked what the students of Georgetown could do about the Guatemalan situation. Father stated he was going to start a fund and in fact plans to formalize the fund into a legitimate foundation had already begun so that interested students and other interested individuals who wanted could support those in Guatemala who were seeking to alleviate the inhumane social conditions that presently exist. He then stated that it would probably be called the Melville Foundation and once formalized he would get in contact with the student organizations that sponsored his talk. Another question was raised, "does this mean we would be supporting the guerrillas in Guatemala?" to which Father answered negatively stating that the money would go to individuals who would be assisting the local people upgrade their social position via constructive projects of public health, education and orderly organization of the workers. He did not indicate who these individuals were or if they were directly or indirectly connected with the guerrillas.

11. Attached is a copy of the article appearing in the Evening Star, March 13, 1968, commenting on Father's lecture. The content of the article is basically correct, however, the implication via the organization of Father's statements in the article that he was using the occasion to attack the U.S. and its policies in Guatemala in a sensational/emotional manner is incorrect. Rather the mood of presentation throughout was to analyze the problem as Father viewed it and present constructive approaches to the solution even though his suggested approaches were counter to existing U.S. ones.

Administrative routing and classification markings, including checkboxes and stamps.

121540Z APR 68 CITE [REDACTED]

DIRECTOR INFO [REDACTED]

10 APR 68 IN 88353

REF DIRECTOR ES455 [REDACTED]

1. MILGROUP EXECUTIVE OFFICER, LT COL CORMACK, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 9 APRIL WITH FOLLOWING INFORMATION HE RECEIVED

FROM [REDACTED]

A. BISHOP ENRIQUEZ, AUXILIARY TO CARDINAL QUINTERO, INFORMED [REDACTED] THAT MININT CALLED ON CARDINAL QUINTERO 8 APRIL TO ADVISE THAT ONE OF THE MARYKNOLL PRIESTS FROM GUATEMALA WHO HAD GOTTEN INVOLVED IN GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES HAD SHOWN UP IN VENEZUELA ACCOMPANIED BY A MONSIGNOR ILLICH.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 10 OCT 1978

[REDACTED]

B. [REDACTED] BELIEVES MARYKNOLL PRIEST MUST BE REV ELASE BONPANE, SINCE HE UNDERSTANDS OTHER TWO MARYKNOLLERS INVOLVED (THE MELVILLE BROTHERS) HAVE RETURNED TO GUATEMALA

[REDACTED]

Administrative stamps and markings at the bottom right of the page.

[Redacted]

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| 3 | 8 |
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INDEX YES NO

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INFC: _____

FILE _____

PAGE 2 [Redacted]

C. [Redacted] VERY MUCH CONCERNED THAT
 IF STORY TRUE BOWPANE ACTIVITIES VENEZUELA
 COULD CREATE VERY SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR
 MARYKNOLL COMMUNITY.

2. [Redacted]

3. [Redacted]

4. [Redacted]

BT

[Redacted]

23 OCT 1968

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
ATTN: Special Agent in Charge of
Washington Field Office

MICROFILMED
JAN 3 1969
DCC. MICRO. SER.

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: BONPANE, Blase Anthony

1. Reference is made to the request dated 10 September 1968 concerning Subject, born 24 April 1929 in Cleveland, Ohio. The files of this office contain the following information concerning Subject.

2. A summary of information dated from 6 December 1967 to 10 April 1968 indicated that Subject was a close associate of Arthur Thomas MELVILLE.

Subject suspected of being involved with the Revolutionary Guerrilla Front (FAR), the Communist paramilitary group in Guatemala. Subject was the lessee of a building in Guatemala City, which was raided by the Guatemalan Army on 12 January 1968.

Subject reportedly left Guatemala sometime during December 1967-January 1968.

FILE IN 201-240899*

201-840899

3. According to a report dated 1 April 1968 [redacted]

[redacted] Subject lectured a standing room only audience on 12 March 1968 in the Hall of Nations, Georgetown University, Washington D. C. The title of the address was "Students and the Revolt in Guatemala," which according to Source, was delivered with a degree of naivete on the part of Subject and contained several incorrect misleading statements.

4. A report dated 10 April 1968, [redacted]

[redacted] indicated that Subject might be identifiable with an unnamed Maryknoll priest who was travelling in Venezuela in early April 1968 with Monsignor Ivan ILLICH. The unnamed priest was described as one of the group of Maryknoll priests who were suspected of involvement with the guerrilla activities in Guatemala. [The files of this office do not indicate the whereabouts of Subject after his 12 March 1968 address in Washington D. C.] [redacted]

5. [redacted]

[Redacted]

CSCI-316/04083-68

Encl, 1 name check
1 attachment as stated above

RID/CE: [Redacted]

BASED ON: 201-840899

[Redacted]

DIR 68719 (23 January 1968)

(IN 07282)
(IN 35976)
(IN 26685)
(IN 57588)

[Large Redacted Area]

(IN 88953)

FILE IN: 201-840899

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

201-840899

NLIS - 11-20 1

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This report contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

FILE

COUNTRY HAITI

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/538,286

SUBJECT RUMORED PLOT BETWEEN TRUJILLO FAMILY AND HAITIAN OFFICIALS TO ASSASSINATE JUAN BOSCH

DATE DISTR. 23 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 20 FEBRUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 73340

PLACE & DATE ACQ. APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

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1. ON 20 FEBRUARY 1963, LUC DESIR, TOP TONTON MACOUTE LEADER AT THE NATIONAL PALACE, SENT TWO CIVIL MILITIAMEN TO THE BORDER TOWN OF BELLADERE WITH A SEALED LETTER TO BE GIVEN TO THE LOCAL CIVIL MILITIA LEADER. WHEN THE MILITIAMEN ARRIVED AT BELLADERE LATER THE SAME DAY, THEY REPEATED TO THE LOCAL LEADER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WHICH DESIR HAD GIVEN TO THEM, "KEEP READY. THE DAY IS COMING SHORTLY".

2. THE CONTENTS OF THIS LETTER WERE UNKNOWN. HOWEVER, THE TALK AMONG MILITIAMEN ASSIGNED TO THE PALACE WAS THAT THE TRUJILLO FAMILY HAD GIVEN A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY TO HAITIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FOR

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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| STATE/INR | DIA | ARMY/ACSI | NAVY | AIR | JCS | SECDEF | NSA | NIC | AID | USIA | OCI | ONE | OCR | ORR | OBI | OD | EXO |
| STATE/DIB | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I&NS | FBI | | |

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Content UNCLASSIFIED

per 058375

date 9 May 1977

FORM 3-62

1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(15-30)

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(When Filled In)

TDCS-3/538,286

IN 73340

PAGE 2

THE PURPOSE OF CARRYING OUT A PLOT TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT-ELECT
JUAN BOSCH ON OR PRIOR TO THE DATE OF HIS INAUGURATION.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCLANT, CINCARIB

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END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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11

BUNDY SMITH
ALEXANDER
BELK • ROUTINE
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DINGEMAN
JDCS - 3/572,403
JESSUP
DISTR: 23 APRIL 1964
KLEIN
KUEER

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY HAITI

SANITIZED COPY

DATE OF INFO. 21 APRIL 1964

SUBJECT

REPORTS THAT THE NATIONAL PALACE WILL BE THE OBJECT OF AN AERIAL BOMBARDMENT

SMITH, WM. X

PLACE & DATE ACQ. |

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL |

REF IN 67443
FIELD REPORT NO.

1. ON 21 APRIL 1964 COLONEL GRACIA JACQUES, COMMANDER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, SAID THAT PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER IS AFRAID THAT THE PALACE IS GOING TO BE THE OBJECT OF AN AERIAL BOMBARDMENT. DUVALIER'S FEARS WERE CAUSED BY REPORTS RECEIVED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI THAT THE PALACE WOULD BE BOMBED FROM THE AIR.

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCLANT, CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

Content UNCLASSIFIED
per 058375
dcto 19 APR 1978

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Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

COUNTRY HAITI
DATE OF INFO. 7 MAY 1964

Content UNCLASSIFIED
per 050375
date 8 APR 1976
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SUBJECT

JDCS -3/580,943
DISTR 8 MAY 1964

PLAN BY COMMUNISTS FOR ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTION DURING
MAY 1964
REEDY
SAUNDERS
SMITH

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF IN 79153

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO. 1

1. AS OF 7 MAY 1964, MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL LIBERATION PARTY (PPLN), ONE OF HAITI'S TWO COMMUNIST PARTIES, WERE SAYING THAT THE PARTY PLANNED TO DISTRIBUTE ANTI-GOVERNMENT LEAFLETS DURING THE WEEK OF 15-22 MAY. (FIELD COMMENT: ON 22 MAY 1961, FRANCOIS DUVALIER WAS REINAUGURATED PRESIDENT FOR AN ADDITIONAL SIX YEARS. EVERY YEAR SINCE THEN THIS DAY HAS BEEN CELEBRATED AS A GREAT NATIONAL HOLIDAY.) FRITZLER GAILLARD, INFLUENTIAL PPLN MEMBER, STATED THAT THE REASON FOR THE LEAFLET DISTRIBUTION WOULD^{BE}/TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE PUBLIC THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF OPPOSITION TO DUVALIER AND TO MOBILIZE AN ANTI-

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO EXO
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CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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TDCS -3/580,943

IN 79153

PAGE 2

GOVERNMENT CONSCIOUSNESS.

2. ON 7 MAY AN UNIDENTIFIED HIGH RANKING CONTACT OF THE PARTY OF POPULAR ACCORD (PEP), HAITI'S OTHER COMMUNIST PARTY, TOLD A PEP MEMBER AT A CLANDESTINE RENDEZVOUS THAT THE PEP PLANNED TO TAKE NO ACTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT DURING MAY. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE PPLN WAS WORKING WITH THE EXILES AND WAS PLANNING TO DISTRIBUTE LEAFLETS AND WOULD POSSIBLY UNDERTAKE SOME OTHER ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTION IN MID-MAY. THE CONTACT STATED THAT THE ACTIONS PLANNED BY THE PPLN WOULD ACCOMPLISH NOTHING AND WOULD RESULT IN MANY UNNECESSARY ARRESTS.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCLANT, CINCSO .

(END OF MESSAGE)

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

FORM 2096
5-63

CONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

156

COUNTRY HAITI

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~~BUNDY SMITH~~

~~ALEXANDER~~

~~BATOR~~

~~BELK~~

~~SUBJECK~~

~~CHASE~~

~~FORRESTAL~~

~~JESSIE~~

~~JOHNSON~~

~~KEENEY~~

~~WEIN~~

~~ROMER~~

~~MOODY~~

~~REEDY~~

~~CAINDERS~~

TDCS D2-315/00587-64

DISTR. 31 AUGUST 1964

DATE OF INFO. 29 AUGUST 1964

INCREASE IN PLOTTING AGAINST THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT BY PERSONS IN THE MILITARY, GOVERNMENT, AND BUSINESS

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL

REF IN 63674

SMITH, WM.

Content UNCLASSIFIED

058375

3 OCT 1977

1. AS OF 29 AUGUST 1964 THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT PLOTTING BY PERSONS IN BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND MILITARY CIRCLES. PLANS TO ATTACK THE PALACE WILL BE TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH THE ARRIVAL OF REBEL FORCES IN PORT-AU-PRINCE. THIS WILL TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS KEY MILITARY LEADERS IN PORT-AU-PRINCE AND PROVINCIAL TOWNS NEAR PORT-AU-PRINCE HAVE BEEN CONTACTED AND HAVE GIVEN THEIR AGREEMENT. SOME COLONELS AND A NUMBER OF JUNIOR OFFICERS ARE INVOLVED IN THE PLOT. COLONEL GRACIA JACQUES, COMMANDER OF THE PALACE GUARD; COLONEL OCTAVE CAYARD, COMMANDER OF THE COAST GUARD; AND LT. COL. LUC PIERRE-LOUIS, COMMANDER OF THE TACTICAL BATTALION OF THE NATIONAL PALACE, HAVE BEEN CONTACTED BY THE CONSPIRATORS.

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GROUP 1

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2. IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE MOVE BY THE MILITARY AND REBELS, LOCAL MERCHANTS HAVE AGREED TO CLOSE THEIR STORES. COMMENT: THESE TACTICS WERE USED WHEN PRESIDENT MAGLOIRE WAS OVERTHROWN.) THE MOVE AGAINST PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER WILL TAKE PLACE ON A WEEKEND, BECAUSE OF TIME NEEDED TO COORDINATE AND MAKE CONTACTS. IT WILL ALSO TAKE PLACE AFTER A PAYDAY FOR LOCAL EMPLOYEES, WHICH MEANS THE SECOND OR FOURTH WEEKEND OF THE MONTH, IN ORDER TO ASSURE SUPPORT OF THE BUSINESS STRIKE BY EMPLOYEES.

3. THE OPPOSITION WILL BE COMPOSED OF FIVE GROUPS. MEMBERS OF ONE GROUP ARE:

A.

B.

C.

D.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

TDCSDE-315/00587-64

IN 63674

PAGE 3

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, GENCLANT, GENCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

FORM IX-1
1-63

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• ROUTINE

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OIA WATCH OFFICE

TDCS DB-315/00620-64

DISTR. 3 SEPTEMBER 1964

COUNTRY HAITI

DATE OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1964
INFO.

SUBJECT

HAITIAN REBEL ACTIVITIES

PLACE &
DATE ACQ

REF

IN 66453

SOURCE
AND
APPRAISAL

Content UNCLASSIFIED

per 058375
date 8 OCT 1977

2. | SAID THAT THE MILITIA IN MIRAGOANE DOES NOT KNOW HOW TO HANDLE ARMS; MANY OF THEM HAVE NEVER HELD OR FIRED A RIFLE. MANY OF THEM ARE DISLOYAL TO DUVALIER

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PAGE

IS PROBABLY BEING SUPPORTED BY WESSIN.)

7. | COMMENT: LIMITATION OF REBEL ACTIVITY TO THE MOUNTAINS COULD PRODUCE DANGEROUS SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES AFTER DUVALIER IS OVERTHROWN. PEASANTS IN THESE AREAS ARE PROVING RESPONSIVE TO REBELS AS THE MOST IMMEDIATE RECOURSE FOR STRIKING BACK AT DUVALIER FOR HIS WELL-KNOWN AND CONTINUING SLAUGHTER AND TERROR TACTICS. THE PEASANTS ARE ALSO BECOMING SOCIALLY AWARE OF POSSIBILITIES FOR IMPROVING THEIR LOT BUT ARE AWAKENING TO THESE POSSIBILITIES THROUGH BROADCASTS FROM RADIO HABANA, WHICH ARE MAINLY ANTI-U.S. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. THESE BROADCASTS, WHICH HAVE BEEN TARGETTED AT HAITI OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS, ARE THE ONLY "OUTSIDE VOICE" BEING RECEIVED BY A LARGE SECTOR OF THE RURAL PEASANT POPULATION. THE BROADCASTS, COMBINED WITH A CONTINUING CLIMATE OF INSURRECTION AND REPRISALS OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, COULD CREATE FERTILE GROUND FOR HAITIAN COMMUNISTS WHO COULD DEVELOP BEYOND THE CONTROL OF THE DEMOCRATIC REBELS IN A POST-DUVALIER REGIME. FOR THIS REASON, THE BEST INTERESTS OF A DEMOCRATIC HAITI WOULD BE SERVED BY A SHORT-TERM FIGHT BEFORE THE PEASANTS ARE OVERLY AROUSED. THE REBELS NOW ENGAGED IN THE FIGHT AGAINST DUVALIER OFFER THE BEST CHANCE THUS FAR FOR A DEMOCRATIC HAITI).

8. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSO CINCLANT.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

(END OF MESSAGE)

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McGeorge Bundy

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MCGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

1965 DEC 6 AM 11 09

6 December 1965

OCI No: 2378/65

Copy No. 101



INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

-HAITI AFTER DUVALIER

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Office of Current Intelligence

Declassified By 028375
date 1 OCT 1977

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OCI No. 2378/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
6 December 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Haiti After Duvalier

1. Haitian society is so primitive, its people are so unsophisticated and so prone to violent settlement of personal scores, and their means of communicating with one another are so elementary that it is difficult to predict with confidence the course political events may take. The analysis which follows is distilled from the best information available and reflects the belief that even in so backward a country as Haiti the downfall of a dictatorial regime will trigger certain consequences.

2. Duvalier's departure may inaugurate a violent and possibly bloody period. The extent of the turmoil probably would depend on the way he goes -- whether by natural causes, coup or assassination -- and the ability of his would-be heirs to consolidate power and forestall a collapse of public order. Whatever the immediate outcome of a power struggle, over the succeeding weeks or even months, the political situation would be extremely confused and likely to deteriorate rapidly. Duvalier has throttled even the most rudimentary forms of political dialogue and there are few people in Haiti qualified to hold power for long.

3. The Haitian Constitution of 1964, which legalized Duvalier's status as President for life, made no provision for a vice president or for naming a successor. Duvalier has said informally that his 15-year-old son is to succeed him, with Mrs. Duvalier acting as "regent" until the boy reaches maturity. Despite previous constitutional provisions for peaceful and orderly change of government, only five of more than 30 of the past Haitian

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chief executives have lived out their terms and left office voluntarily, and three of these served during the US occupation.

4. An assault upon the regime from any quarter or a successful attack on Duvalier, himself, would be likely to unleash a wave of recrimination and vengeance on the part of those components or victims of his regime who hate each other but had hitherto been held at bay by the President. Indeed, it is likely that the death of the dictator would rupture the government and that the semblance of a civil service which exists at present would melt away. Dissolution of the central bureaucracy would leave the regular armed forces, the rabble-like militia and the secret police to contend among themselves.

THE ARMED FORCES

5. The Haitian armed forces, including air and coast guard personnel, number approximately 4,800 officers and men who are used primarily as a constabulary. Roughly half of the armed forces are quartered in Port au Prince, where they presumably would seek access -- now denied them -- to the arms and munitions cached in the National Palace. Poorly equipped and led, the armed forces would have no more than an even chance of besting the secret police and militia.

6. The secret police have no official name or status; Haitians refer to them as the Ton Ton Macoute (TTM), a Creole phrase which means "bogeyman." The TTMs are armed thugs, about 1,500 in number, who carry out special assignments -- i.e., assaults and murder, arson, pillage, extortion and violence of all kinds. From time to time, the TTMs overstep themselves and Duvalier temporarily curbs them. However, they are too useful for him to restrain for too long.

7. The civil militia, dubbed the National Security Volunteers (VSN), was created by Duvalier as a counterforce to the regular armed forces and is favored by the President. Totaling about 10,000

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members, the VSN is made up of weekend soldiers who are administratively separate from the regular military but assigned to assist the army. Only about one-third of the VSN members are armed -- and these with antiquated pistols, revolvers and bolt-action rifles. They are poorly trained and could not cope with a trained and disciplined foe, but are effective against even more poorly armed civilians.

8. Duvalier's sudden death from natural causes would probably occasion the least public disorder, assuming that the news could be withheld long enough to permit one or more of his palace entourage to consolidate control over the regular armed forces, the militia and the secret police. The presence of half of the armed forces in the capital, where almost all of the country's reserves of weapons and ammunition are stored in the National Palace, would probably give the advantage to the military in determining who would be the new president.

9. The situation would be similar if Duvalier were mentally or physically incapacitated for a long time. Assuming his henchmen were so disposed, they could use their positions as palace insiders to supplant him even before his death. The length of time during which Duvalier was unable to function would determine the extent of disorganization within the government itself.

10. Since taking office eight years ago, Duvalier has managed to prevent anyone in his regime from building up a personal following. Nevertheless, several men within the government have figured in reported plots against Duvalier, or are said to be ready to step in should he die. Various alignments do appear from time to time; but no determined opposition has been detected.

11. Plotting within the military has been endemic since Duvalier's accession. However, premature disclosure invariably has led to imprisonment and death or exile for the plotters. Chief of staff of the army General Gerard Constant -- along with Colonel Jacques LaRoche and Lt. Colonel Roget St. Albins -- might set up a junta in the event of Duvalier's disappearance. While St. Albins is said

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to be well liked by his fellow officers -- but is otherwise an unknown quantity -- Constant is impatient and easily influenced. LaRoche, the strongest willed of the three, is said to be unscrupulous and would probably emerge as the dominant figure. None is suspected of Communist affiliations, but LaRoche is reported to be strongly anti-US.

12. A sudden coup by a person or group closely identified with Duvalier would minimize the dismay among Duvalier's supporters and serve to limit the degree of bloodshed. In this situation, those who have been most closely identified with the excesses and brutality of Duvalier's rule -- notably the TTMs -- would have less fear of reprisals by a successor government because they might themselves be involved in its formation and would have little choice but to support it. If, however, a coup brought to power a person or group not in sympathy with Duvalier's internal policies, the situation would be radically different. The militia and Ton Ton Macoutes probably would react by striking out at the white and mulatto population of Port au Prince out of fear that these groups would seek revenge for their mistreatment under Duvalier.

13. Any assassination of Duvalier which caught his entourage off guard would be likely to signal a reign of terror, probably limited to the capital but possibly extending to the rural areas as well. Members of Duvalier's entourage and the military would have less of an advantage in such a situation, although they still would have the easiest access to the arms and munitions in the capital. Public disorder would be a major problem. The suddenness of the assassination and the resulting public uncertainty probably would prompt the militia and the Ton Ton Macoutes to go on a rampage in Port au Prince -- both to gain what they could out of the breakdown of law and order and to try to overcome the likely reaction of the man-in-the-street to news of Duvalier's death. In addition, the deliberate racist policies of Duvalier -- setting up the majority blacks against the minority whites and mulattos -- would ensure that any conflict would have racial overtones.

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THE COMMUNISTS

14. The uncertainty and turmoil following Duvalier's departure would almost certainly be capitalized on by either or both of Haiti's Communist parties. With a maximum of 500 members and up to 2,000 fellow travelers, the Communists constitute the only internal opposition with any degree of training and organization -- however primitive. Concentrated in Port au Prince, the Communists would be in a position to enter the contest from the start. Their fortunes would be improved under any circumstance in which a successor to Duvalier were not immediately named. They probably would find it to their advantage to prolong any indecision over a new government, possibly making a stab at seizing power themselves. However, this would require effective support among the military, the TTMs and the militia. We do not know whether they would be able to garner such support, but we doubt that they would become the controlling factor even though they might become an important force.

15. Three men in Duvalier's cabinet or close to him -- Herve Boyer, Paul Blanchet and Jules Blanchet -- are known to have had Communist ties in France. None of them is known to have such connections at the present time with either of Haiti's two Communist parties, but all three are anti-US and one or all may be "sleepers."

THE EXILES

16. The exile population, both Communist and non-Communist, would also attempt to take advantage of Duvalier's passing. The exiles could be counted upon to try to return to Haiti immediately -- from the United States, Mexico, possibly the Dominican Republic and from France. In any attempt to establish one of their own number in power in Haiti, the emigrés would be handicapped by the divisiveness, discord and absence of recognized leadership

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
that have impeded their activities in exile. Individual emigrés enjoy almost no following in Haiti, with the possible exception of former President Paul Magloire. It seems unlikely that any emigré or group of emigrés would be able to seize power without substantial foreign support.

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10 December 1965

SC No. 00700 65A

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SPECIAL REPORT

HAITI'S DISMAL OUTLOOK—WITH OR WITHOUT DUVALIER

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

Declassified by 058375
date 3 OCT 1977

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HAITI'S DISMAL OUTLOOK--WITH OR WITHOUT DUVALIER.

Since coming to power eight years ago, Francois Duvalier has throttled even the most rudimentary forms of political dialogue in Haiti and few persons there are qualified to replace him. His eventual disappearance from the scene may inaugurate a period of violence and bloodshed. The extent of the turmoil probably will depend on whether he is removed by natural causes, coup, or assassination--and on the ability of his would-be heirs to consolidate power and forestall a collapse of public order. Contending for power will be the bureaucracy, the internal security forces, Communists, and non-Communist exiles. Whatever the immediate outcome, the political situation will be extremely confused over the succeeding weeks and even months.

The Political Scene

Duvalier was elected President for a six-year term in 1957. Four years later, in 1961, he had himself "re-elected" for an additional six years. He then proclaimed himself "President for Life" in 1964--an action sanctioned by a controlled plebiscite. The next step, according to recurring rumors, will be to proclaim himself emperor.

Only five of Haiti's more than 30 chiefs of state have lived out their terms and left office voluntarily; three of these served during the US occupation from 1915 to 1934. The Haitian Constitution of 1964 made no provision for a vice president or for choosing a successor to the president. Duvalier has said that his 15-year-old son will succeed him, with Mrs. Duvalier serving as "regent" until the boy reaches maturity.

Duvalier has erected a facade of legality around his regime, but he has remained in power by destroying or neutralizing all sources of opposition. The only legal political grouping is his own National Unity Party. Government and military leaders have been rotated often to keep them from developing personal followings or becoming potential rivals. As a counterforce to the regular military, Duvalier has set up his own civil militia and secret police. As a result, there is probably no person or group within the government able to mount a coup.

Even so, opposition to the Duvalier regime is believed to be widespread among the relatively few politically minded Haitians, notably the business community. This opposition is unorganized, nonvocal, and ineffective against the internal security forces, especially the secret police. Two small Communist parties, which

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operate more or less overtly, comprise the only organized internal opposition. The politically apathetic majority--probably 90 percent of the population--is illiterate, physically and culturally isolated, and exists on the fringe of starvation. Many accept Duvalier's grandiose claims to supernatural powers and authority and believe him the reincarnation of a voodoo deity.

Military and Security Forces

Duvalier depends for survival on the armed forces (FAdH), the civil militia, and the secret police.

The FAdH numbers around 4,800 officers and men, including ground, air, and coast guard personnel. It is primarily a national constabulary, with responsibilities for internal security, local police functions, and fire fighting. Half of its total strength is in Port-au-Prince, the capital; the remainder is in



Slums in Port-au-Prince

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small, police-type units throughout the country.

Duvalier has replaced most of the FAdH's professional officers with less capable men who are unquestionably loyal to him. The FAdH is poorly equipped with obsolescent hardware. Except for two unarmed T-28 aircraft, a twin-engine Cessna 310, and one C-47 transport--all illegally acquired in 1964--no new equipment has been purchased since about 1962. There are serious shortages of weapons, ammunition, vehicles, ships, aircraft, and logistical support of all kinds.

The FAdH has almost no capability for standard military operations in the countryside. In mid-1964 two groups of rebels--25 to 30 in one group and 13 in another--eluded capture for over two months before being overpowered by sheer numbers. The military forces might, however, be more effective within Port-au-Prince, where they would have access to munitions stored in the National Palace.

The 10,000-man civil militia, the National Security Volunteers (VSN), was created by Duvalier and is personally loyal to him. About one-third of its members are armed, but with a motley collection of pistols, revolvers, and bolt-action rifles. The group is poorly trained and could not cope with a well-armed and -trained enemy. However, their uniforms and their public training sessions add to Duvalier's appearance of strength and help to cow the populace.

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The secret police apparently have no official name or status; Haitians privately refer to them as Ton Ton Macoute (TTM), a Creole phrase meaning "bogeyman." The TTMs are armed thugs, about 1,500 in number, who specialize in beatings, murder, arson, pillage, extortion, and other violence. Occasionally, the TTMs overstep their rather broad authority and Duvalier is forced to curb them. However, he seems to find them too useful to limit their power for long.

The Economy

Haiti's GNP currently is estimated at \$300 million--equivalent to about \$60 per capita, the lowest level in Latin America. There is little prospect that the downward trend of recent years will be reversed.

When fiscal year 1965 ended on 30 September, foreign exchange reserves were very tight, and the internal budgetary situation placed additional pressure on the government. Revenues were lower than anticipated, at least partly because of theft by customs and tax officials. The \$28.2-million budget approved for FY 1966 is about \$400,000 lower than last year's and contains no provision for any direct government investment.

Production of export crops--coffee, sugar, and cocoa--increased this year, but their value did not rise because world prices declined. Projected increases in the output of coffee and sugar in 1966 are unlikely to benefit Haiti because of the likelihood that

world prices will continue low and that sugar production will far exceed the quota set by the US--the principal market for Haitian sugar.

Life for the peasants, who comprise over 80 percent of Haiti's population, has been even more difficult in the past year because of a prolonged drought. Although the peasants customarily exist at a subsistence level, 1965 saw actual cases of starvation. The small middle class--especially the merchants--also feels the effects of the decline in the economy, in addition to exorbitant taxes, harassing regulations, and arbitrary "voluntary" collections.

Possible Opposition Within the Government

Several men within the government have figured in past plots against Duvalier, or are described as ready to take over when he dies. Various alignments appear within the palace entourage from time to time, but no determined opposition has been detected.

Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs Clovis Desinor appears to be trying to disassociate himself from the most odious features of the regime in order to be available for some role in the post-Duvalier period. Desinor probably could count on some support from Port-au-Prince businessmen. Colonel Gracia Jacques and other illiterate Duvalier favorites probably are not intelligent enough to make more than a stab at gaining power.

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Three others--Minister for Coordination and Information Paul Blanchet, and Duvalier intimates Jules Blanchet and Herve Boyer-- have been mentioned as possible contenders for the presidential chair. All are anti-US and have had past Communist connections in France, but none is known to have connections with either of Haiti's Communist parties.

Plotting within the military is endemic. However, premature leaks invariably have led to imprisonment or exile for the conspirators. The chief of staff of the army, General Gerard Constant, is said to be prepared-- along with Colonel Jacques La Roche and Lt. Col. Roger St. Albins--to set up a junta in the event of Duvalier's disappearance. Of the three, La Roche is the strongest willed and presumably would be the dominant figure. He is reportedly unscrupulous and strongly anti-US. Constant is impatient and easily influenced. The only information available on St. Albins is that he is well liked by other officers. None of them is suspected of having Communist connections.

The Communists

Haiti's two Communist parties--the Party of Popular Accord (PEP) and the Popular Party of National Liberation (PPLN)-- are small, lacking in discipline, and poorly indoctrinated. Their split stems from personal rivalry among the leaders, rather than any real ideological differences.

There is no precise information on the number of PEP members

and sympathizers; estimates place the membership at around 200 and the number of fellow travelers between 300 and 1,000. The PEP is seeking adherents mainly in labor ranks, and formerly supported the Inter-syndical Union of Haiti (UIH). The UIH was disbanded by the regime in December 1963 because of its antigovernment propaganda, and now is thought to be operating clandestinely as the Haitian Syndical Front (FSH). The PEP presently has no newspaper; however, between 1962 and 1964 it published the clandestine monthly Voix du Peuple.

The PEP is recognized by the international Communist movement as the Haitian Communist party. It is Moscow oriented; the amount of financial assistance it receives from Moscow, if any, is unknown, but it is believed to be receiving Soviet guidance via Mexico through a Haitian Communist exile, Gerard Pierre-Charles.

A recent estimate places the number of PPLN members at around 300, with perhaps 500 to 1,000 sympathizers. The leadership currently publishes no newspaper, but during 1962 and 1963 it sought to win readers for a monthly called Haiti-Demain among the urban workers, peasants, and the very small middle class.

The PPLN has concentrated on a succession of short-lived youth fronts. One of the most recent, taking its name from a type of peasant attire, was called the Caracoa Bleu. Organized around the end of 1962, it reportedly had about 400 members and an

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additional 500 or so sympathizers who attended lectures, concerts, and art exhibits which were used as vehicles for Communist propaganda. Caracoa Bleu became inactive toward the end of 1964 and is thought to have been reorganized early in 1965 under the name Popular Youth League (LJP), which continues to sponsor much the same type of activities.

The PPLN suffered a setback in July 1965, when the accidental shooting of a member during an arms training class enabled the police to discover its meeting place and arrest several members --including some who possessed extensive knowledge of party organization and activities. There were follow-up arrests and several party leaders hurriedly left the country.

No direct contact between Moscow and the PPLN has been detected. It is Castro-oriented and receives ideological guidance from Radio Havana, which beams one program in French and another in Creole.

Over the past few years, there have been unsuccessful attempts to unite the PEP and PPLN in something to be called the United Democratic Front (FDU). Radio Havana treats the FDU as if it were an organized party and has called on all "patriotic Haitians" to join it to overthrow Duvalier.

Most of the exiled Haitian Communists are in Europe, or Mexico. The largest group is in France, where there is an organization of approximately 150. About

40 are in Mexico, where they reportedly publish a bulletin called Ralliement which is also circulated in Europe. In addition, there are probably 40 to 50 Communist exiles studying in bloc countries and in Cuba.

The Non-Communist Opposition

Most of the non-Communist Haitian exile opposition is located in New York and Miami, with smaller groups scattered around the Caribbean in Venezuela, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and perhaps in the Bahamas. Other large groups of uneducated Haitian workers in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the Bahamas are not active politically.

Of those with political pretensions, about ten leaders in New York have grouped their individual followings into the International Haitian Union. It is presently active and sponsors a half-hour daily short-wave broadcast to Haiti in Creole over New York station WRUL. The program consists of music, news, and poetry, and carefully avoids any direct reference to Duvalier or his regime. Nevertheless, Duvalier has complained to the US Government that these broadcasts are inciting the Haitian population to revolt.

There are about 30 relatively well-trained Haitians in the Dominican Republic, under the command of Fred Baptiste, who led them in incursions across the border in 1963 and 1964. They operated an arms repair center for the rebel Caamano government during the Dominican

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rebellion. Baptiste and several other Haitians reportedly have left for France, apparently because they are pessimistic about being able to launch anything against Duvalier under the Dominican provisional government. They may plan to join other exiles in the Western Hemisphere.

Haiti After Duvalier

There is almost certain to be a complete breakdown of the government and extensive disorder when Duvalier leaves the scene. For eight years "Papa Doc" has silenced all political dialogue; executed or exiled all potential opposition; played on racial antipathies; allowed the economy to stagnate; permitted quasi-military terrorist organizations to exercise almost unbridled authority over the populace; and made no provision for a legal, orderly transfer of power. The way in which Duvalier goes--as well as the ability of his would-be successors to consolidate their control--will determine the extent of the turmoil.

Duvalier's sudden death from natural causes probably would occasion the least public disorder, assuming that news of his demise could be withheld long enough to permit one or more of his entourage to consolidate control over the militia, military, and internal security forces before they fell upon one another.

If Duvalier were mentally or physically incapacitated over a long period of time, his henchmen might be able to capitalize

on their positions within the palace to supplant the ailing dictator. The length of time during which Duvalier was unable to function or the choice of a successor remained unclear would determine the extent of dislocation within the administrative bureaucracy.

A coup could also limit the amount of attendant bloodshed. The assumption of power by a person or group closely identified with Duvalier would cause less dismay to his rank-and-file supporters. Those most closely associated with the excesses and brutality of the Duvalier regime--for example, the militia and the Ton Ton Macoutes--would probably go along with it on the assumption that there would be no wholesale reprisals against them. If however, the coup should bring to power someone not in sympathy with Duvalier, the situation would probably be radically different. The militia and Ton Ton Macoutes probably would react by striking out at the



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long-suffering white and mulatto population of Port-au-Prince out of fear that these groups would seek to exact revenge for their mistreatment under Duvalier.

A public assassination of Duvalier would be likely to occasion a reign of terror, probably limited to the capital but possibly extending to the rural areas. Members of Duvalier's entourage and the Haitian military would enjoy less of an advantage in such a situation, although they would still have access to arms and munitions stored in the capital. Public disorder would be a major problem. The militia and Ton Ton Macoutes probably would go on a rampage in Port-au-Prince, both to seize what they could in the way of booty and to attempt to get the jump on what would likely be a vendetta against them. Moreover, the deliberate racist policies of Duvalier--setting up the majority blacks against the minority elite of whites and mulattoes--would probably result in bloody racial turmoil, with the blacks seeking vengeance and the whites and mulattoes fighting for their lives.

Either or both of Haiti's Communist parties will try to capitalize on the uncertainty and turmoil. Concentrated in Port-au-Prince, where the expected power struggle and public disorder would be centered, the Communists could only hope to improve their fortunes during any vacuum in national leadership and would probably seek to prolong the choice of a successor to Duvalier, possibly to make a stab at seizing the top office themselves. To

seize a pre-eminent position, however, the Communists would require the effective support of the military, and probably the Ton Ton Macoutes and the militia. There is no indication that they could garner such support.

Any attempt by the various exiles to establish one of their number in power would be handicapped by the same divisiveness and lack of effective leadership that has hindered emigré activities in exile. With the possible exception of former president Paul Magloire, the exiles have almost no following within Haiti. It seems unlikely that any exile or group of exiles would be able to seize power without substantial foreign support.

Prospects

Barring a totally unforeseen development, there is no indication that Duvalier will voluntarily leave the scene in the immediate future. He is a diabetic and suffered a serious heart attack in 1959, but a US doctor who talked with him within the last six months found him in excellent health for his age and medical history.

The possibility of assassination, however, cannot be overlooked, even though there have been no known threats in recent years. Duvalier ventures out of the heavily fortified palace only rarely and then under extremely heavy guard. (~~SECRET~~
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Situation and Prospects in Haiti

Submitted by

[Signature]

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated overleaf

27 OCTOBER 1966

Authenticated:

[Signature]
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

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SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN HAITI

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the situation and outlook in Haiti over the next year or so, and to consider what might happen in the event of President Duvalier's death or overthrow.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Duvalier's position still seems fairly strong, despite the sporadic plotting and political tension normal in Haitian affairs. We think the chances are better than even that he will remain in power during the period of this estimate. If he does, there will be continuing political repression and economic stagnation or decline.

B. Duvalier's overthrow would probably have to be largely an inside job, with some key members of the security forces—and especially the Presidential Guard—participating. We doubt that any now in a position to organize such a coup has the will or the courage to attempt it. None of the many small groupings among the divided, bickering Haitian exiles could succeed in overthrowing Duvalier without decisive help from the US or some other foreign government. The Haitian dictator might, of course, die suddenly of natural causes, though he is only 59 and in reasonably good health; assassination is also a possibility, though he takes unusual precautions.

C. Duvalier's departure would probably be attended by some acts of violence in Port-au-Prince and other towns. Whether this violence was limited and sporadic or became widespread and intensive would depend in large part on the manner of his going. The danger of widespread hostilities would probably be greatest in the event Duvalier were assassinated in public. A coup attempt that failed at the last minute could produce equally nasty results.

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D. The most likely successor to Duvalier would be a military junta which might or might not choose to exercise power behind a civilian front. Initially at least, such a government would probably not be stable, and there would likely be maneuvering for power among its members.

E. The two Communist parties are too small and weak to be able to contend for power even in a disorderly situation following Duvalier's departure. We doubt that outside Communist support—from Castro, the Soviets, or Haitian Communist exiles—would be forthcoming on a significant scale. We believe that the Haitian Communists themselves would see their best chance of gaining influence as coming through offers of their administrative assistance to new government leadership rather than through any attempt to seize power on their own, and we think they would act accordingly.

F. In a situation where order had completely broken down, the Organization of American States (OAS) would almost certainly acquiesce in action by the US to evacuate foreign nationals. Any proposal for US or OAS intervention to restore order and establish an effective government, however, would encounter strong opposition within the OAS. Any contention that such intervention was necessary in order to forestall a Communist takeover would be disbelieved by many OAS members unless the supporting evidence was incontrovertible. Whatever the purpose for intervening, the US would face considerable criticism internationally.

G. The initial Haitian reaction to the landing of a US force would probably be favorable, but if a military occupation were at all prolonged, opposition would develop. Nevertheless, the problems in Haiti are such that it might prove more difficult to get a force out than to put it in, as was the case in 1915.

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DISCUSSION

I. BACKGROUND

1. Haiti is the most backward country in the Western Hemisphere and one of the most backward in the world.¹ Its resources are poor in quality and underutilized; population pressure is heavy.² Perhaps 10 percent of the people are literate in French; the rest are illiterate and speak Creole, a local dialect. Most Haitians are superstitious as well as uneducated; voodoo beliefs are more influential than the country's nominal Catholicism. Standards of health and sanitation, though somewhat improved with foreign aid, are still abysmally low. Malnutrition is the rule, not the exception; malaria, tuberculosis, typhoid, parasitic infestation, tetanus, and syphilis are widespread. The bulk of the population, which subsists by farming small plots of depleted land in the countryside, is politically apathetic.

2. Ever since Haiti became independent (1804), antagonism between mulattoes and blacks has been the most sensitive factor in Haitian politics. The mulatto elite were very few in number; but, because of their virtual monopoly of education, their services were indispensable in the administration of the government and, as a class, they were able to exercise effective control through behind the scenes manipulations, even after it became normal for the President to be black.

3. Haiti has never developed an effective electoral process. Political power has always been acquired and held by military force, overt or latent. Since Haitian Presidents have seldom, if ever, retired voluntarily, a de facto system developed whereby a military junta would depose each President at the end of his constitutional term. His successor would then be selected in back room consultations and this selection would be formalized by duly constitutional processes. In 1957, however, this system broke down because each of the several black leaders who thought himself in line for the Presidency refused to be passed over. After a period of turmoil and instability, the army conducted an election which brought Dr. Francois Duvalier to the Presidency for a six-year term.

4. There is little doubt that the election was rigged, but Duvalier probably did have at least the passive acceptance of the majority of the peasantry. Moreover he had the enthusiastic support of most of the black elite, who saw his election as a revolution against mulatto domination. This meant, however, that

¹ Statistics concerning Haiti should consequently be treated with reserve; those used in this paper, though the best available, are approximations.

² The population in 1963 was about 4.6 million—or some 430 per square mile. Except for Trinidad and Tobago, this is the highest population density in the Hemisphere. Moreover, only about 10 percent of the Haitians live in the towns, and the density of rural population is higher than 1,000 per square mile of cultivated land or pasture.

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some among the mulattoes immediately began to conspire with the disappointed black leaders to unseat him. His position was precarious for a time, and it was partly in reaction to this threat that he took the first steps to transform his regime into a terroristic personal dictatorship. In the course of time he has eliminated or forced into exile every actual or suspected opponent, mulatto or black. Extolling *négritude* and representing himself as the protector of the black masses against mulatto domination and exploitation, he has deliberately intensified racism in Haiti.

II. THE PRESENT SITUATION

A. Methods of Rule

5. Duvalier, realizing from the outset that the military establishment was the key to power, proceeded to bring it under control by purging many of its most capable officers and by building up two counter forces—a civil militia and a special sort of secret police. The latter, called the *Ton Ton Macoutes* (Creole for "bogeymen"), serve as Duvalier's enforcers and informers. To ensure that the military behave, Duvalier severely restricts their supplies of ammunition and their access to heavy arms, keeping the bulk of these in the cellar of the National Palace.

6. President Duvalier has not hesitated to solidify his control by taking advantage of popular superstitions. He has won the support of leading voodoo priests, and has encouraged the belief—held by many in Haiti—that he himself has supernatural powers.

7. The President has made himself both the source of power and the chief administrator of the regime. He delegates responsibility only for minor decisions, but makes it worthwhile for a favored group of government officials and businessmen to cooperate in carrying out his dictates. These "insiders" are not a savory lot in any case; a few of them have connections with the Communists. Even for a country which has seldom known honesty in government, Duvalier has set new records of venality and corruption.

8. In 1961 Duvalier staged elections for a new national legislature, providing his "National Unity Party" a near monopoly of seats. Subsequently he announced that since every ballot had carried the caption, "Francois Duvalier, President of the Republic," he had been unanimously elected to a second six-year term. In April 1963, near the end of his constitutional term, he easily broke up the customary military plot to oust him. Also in 1963 he managed to overcome several minor invasion attempts by Haitian exiles. In 1964, at the age of 57, he proclaimed himself President for life.³

9. In recent months Duvalier, apparently hoping to encourage a renewal of sizable US economic aid, has made a few gestures to give his regime a better

³Life tenure was customary during the first 65 years of Haitian independence, but fell into disuse when the last previous President for life faced a firing squad in 1869.

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image. He has ordered *Ton Ton Macoute* leaders to be less arbitrary and more circumspect, and, according to several sources, he has hinted that he might be willing to give up his life tenure and to hold elections. It is highly unlikely, however, that he would make any change that would impair his control of the government.

B. The Opposition

10. Among the few people in Haiti who are politically minded, there is still latent opposition to Duvalier and his methods of rule. But such opponents are cowed, nonvocal, and almost entirely unorganized. There are no longer any significant opposition parties; there is however, an underground social Christian movement called the *Personalistes*, and there are two weak Communist parties.

11. The *Personalistes* seem to have no strong organization as yet, but may have 100 or 200 adherents, most of them in Port-au-Prince. The two Communist parties—the Party of Popular Accord (PEP) and the Popular Party of National Liberation (PPLN)—constitute the only internal political opposition with any appreciable degree of training and organization, but lack discipline, are poorly indoctrinated, and are inclined to compete rather than cooperate with each other. The two parties may have as many as 500 members, all told, in Haiti and in exile, and perhaps 2,000 sympathizers, many of them abroad. The PEP is Moscow-oriented and is the generally recognized Haitian Communist Party. The PPLN has ties with Cuba, where some of its former leaders are in exile. Radio Havana, which broadcasts in Creole or French to Haiti two hours daily, has been unsuccessfully exhorting the two parties to unite and build strength for an "insurrection." Most exiled Haitian Communists are in Europe or Mexico, the largest organization (about 150) being in France. There are, however, probably 70 or 80 exiled Haitian Communists studying in Cuba, the Soviet Union, or other Communist countries.

12. Most non-Communists forced into exile are now living in New York or Miami, with smaller groups in Canada, Venezuela, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic. There are also considerable numbers of Haitian workers living in such countries as the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the Bahamas, but these people are not politically active. The exiles' activities have been constantly hampered by divisiveness, discord, and inability to agree on a common leadership.

13. In the New York exile community 8 or 10 of the leaders have grouped their small individual followings into an organization called the Haiti Coalition. It sponsors a half-hour daily shortwave broadcast to Haiti in French and Creole, which sometimes attacks the excesses of the Duvalier regime, but generally refrains from inflammatory content. This program has apparently attracted a sizable audience in Haiti and has caused Duvalier to make repeated protests to the US. His panicky reaction to two small exile incursions in 1964, which occupied the security forces for several weeks, also suggests that he regards the exiles with apprehension. Rumors of exile plans for a new "invasion" in April 1966 produced a characteristic overreaction by Duvalier in the form of

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an order to execute summarily all Haitians caught returning to their country from the Bahamas.

C. Security Forces

14. The regular Haitian Armed Forces (FAd'H) number about 5,000 men. All officers in key positions were handpicked by Duvalier. Originally a constabulary organized by the US Marines, the FAd'H performs coast guard, border patrol, immigration, civil aviation, fire and police, and general rural administrative services, in addition to its military duties. (There is no civil police force.) Ill equipped, poorly trained, and incompetently led, the FAd'H has still had reasonable success in keeping order, perhaps because it has not had to face up to any major challenge. On more than one occasion the FAd'H Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Gérard Constant, has secretly professed willingness to participate in a coup movement, but he seems a weak, plodding figure without the guts for risky action.

15. The largest organization among Haitian security forces is the National Security Volunteers (VSN), a civil militia of about 7,000 created by Duvalier as a counterforce to the FAd'H. These are essentially weekend soldiers, administratively separate from the regular military, but called upon to assist in keeping order and in mobilizing popular support for Duvalier. Duvalier handpicked many of them; their loyalty is directly to him and not necessarily to higher ranking militia officers. The VSN is badly trained and only about a third of its members have firearms, but even those armed only with machetes make a strong impression on the populace.

16. Units of both the FAd'H and the VSN are stationed at the palace under Duvalier's direct control. The FAd'H unit is the Presidential Guard consisting of some 400 men selected specifically for their loyalty. Their commander—at present Colonel Gracia Jacques, a tough, uneducated former mess sergeant—has primary responsibility for Duvalier's safety and is thus in a highly strategic position. The VSN unit at the palace numbers 200-300 men—also carefully chosen.

17. Most feared of all are the *Ton Ton Macoutes*. With no official title or legal status, they function as "secret police" and may number as many as 1,500. Save for strong control at the top, theirs is not a cohesive organization. It is inexpensive for Duvalier to maintain, however, since its members obtain much of their compensation from shakedowns and extortion. Essentially the *Ton Tons* are thugs; some are members, as well, of the Armed Forces or the militia; a few are also voodoo priests. The *Ton Ton Macoutes* concentrate on acquiring information on any internal opposition and on "special assignments"—e.g., murder, assault, and intimidation. Occasionally Duvalier has found it necessary to curb them temporarily; such restraint has never lasted long. The chief of the *Ton Ton Macoutes*, one Luc Desir, handles political interrogation, confinement, and torture at the National Palace, and is noted for utter brutality and ruthlessness.

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D. The Economy

18. The level of living in Haiti, long the lowest in the Western Hemisphere, has become still worse under the Duvalier regime. Per capita gross national product (GNP) declined from about \$90 in 1955 to about \$70 in 1965. (The average for Latin America as a whole in 1965 was more than \$300.)

19. The waste of human and material resources in Haiti stems from a long history of mismanagement and neglect.⁴ The economic problems are too basic and severe for any quick solution. Yet Duvalier, far from taking any constructive measures to ameliorate them, has usually pursued policies with the opposite effect. Investment has been very low, averaging five percent or less of GNP annually—a rate probably inadequate to maintain the country's existing stock of capital. Duvalier's behavior in relations with the US—and in particular, his blatant diversion of economic aid funds to his own use—caused the termination of most US aid in 1962-1963.⁵ And the climate of insecurity and violence in Haiti has contributed to a sharp drop in tourism, once an important source of foreign exchange.

20. Haiti's export earnings, which generate 10 to 12 percent of GNP, have gradually declined since 1962. Coffee produces about 50 percent of these earnings; sugar and sisal, copper and bauxite, the bulk of the remainder. The decrease in export earnings, along with the curtailment of US aid and of income from tourism, have caused a worsening of Haiti's foreign exchange position and have forced a reduction of imports. This has had some immediate impact internally since Haiti has to import all its capital equipment, all its petroleum products, and much of its industrial raw materials and consumer goods—including some basic foodstuffs. On 30 June 1966, the country's short-term foreign indebtedness exceeded its foreign exchange reserves by some \$6 million.

III. THE OUTLOOK

A. With Duvalier Continuing in Power

21. Now 59 years old, Duvalier is in reasonably good health. He appears in public places only infrequently and then under heavy guard. The cowed state of most internal opposition, continuing use of informants and enforcers, and the counterbalancing of security forces all serve to bolster his hold on power. Assassination is an ever-present possibility; he is certainly more hated than many

⁴Weather too has typically been a difficult and complicating factor. The heavy rains in the wet season tend to leach and erode the soil, and the Haitians know and do little in the way of conservation. Occasionally—as in 1965—there are droughts which seriously reduce agricultural output. Moreover Haiti is in the hurricane belt and was badly hit in 1963 and again in 1968.

⁵US aid at present is limited to a malaria eradication program (US \$2.2 million will be made available for this program in 1966) and a PL-480 Title III food-for-work program, involving US \$1 million in commodities, administered by three American voluntary agencies. Some supplies for disaster relief have also been furnished.

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leaders of government, though harder to get at. The kind of attempt most likely to succeed in killing or deposing him would be one involving insiders—associates of Duvalier whom he continued to trust; further would probably need the participation or connivance of some figures in the security forces, particularly in the Presidential Guard. We doubt that this sort of plot or conspiracy is now in process of development.

22. This is not to say that we anticipate a period of tranquillity. As in the past few years, there will probably be plots and rumors of plots—some internal to Haiti, some involving exile groups. Duvalier will probably respond to certain of these with sharp repressive measures. Thus, while we look for more of the turmoil and tension which are normal in Haiti, we think these factors are not likely to cause Duvalier's downfall for some time to come.

23. As long as Duvalier does remain in power, Haiti's political, social, and economic patterns will probably be much like those of the recent past. Duvalier may, from time to time, make new attempts to clothe his government in more civilized garb, particularly when an economic pinch makes foreign aid look especially desirable. But the underlying nature of his repressive, one-man dictatorship will almost certainly stay the same. He will continue to provide order and control to the Haitians—but not much else.

24. Economically, 1967 will be another year of stagnation or decline. Even before the damage wrought by Hurricane Inez, it appeared that the coffee crop now being harvested would be below that of 1965-1966 and world market prices for coffee, as well as for sugar and sisal, are not promising. These factors may be offset somewhat by a current tendency toward an increase in tourism. To the extent that they are not, imports will have to be reduced, since Haiti's foreign exchange and credit position will not permit a trade deficit of any significant size. A lower level of trade in turn would reduce government revenues—customs duties being the source of approximately one-third of such revenues—and probably force some cut in government expenditures.

25. All this is likely to necessitate some further belt-tightening in Haiti and to prevent any improvement from present levels of unemployment and underemployment. Those living in Port-au-Prince and the other towns will probably be affected more than the great majority of Haitians in the countryside. Duvalier may find it more difficult than usual to pay government employees on time, but we believe that in one way or another he will find funds for the security forces. In sum, we believe that these economic conditions will produce further grumbling and disaffection, but that they are not likely in themselves to provide the impetus for a coup.

B. In the Event of Duvalier's Departure^o

26. Duvalier's death, incapacitation, or overthrow probably would be attended by some acts of violence in Port-au-Prince and in the other sizable towns.

^oThis section of the Estimate is in response to specific questions posed to us in connection with contingency planning.

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Whether the violence were limited and sporadic or became widespread and intensive would depend in large part on the manner of his going.⁷

27. The assassination of Duvalier in public would carry the greatest immediate danger of provoking a generally violent reaction. Even this probably would not lead to serious strife in the countryside, but it might cause fighting and bloodshed in the capital and other towns. Such violence might originate with people who have suffered at the hands of the VSN and the *Ton Ton Macoutes*, and seek vengeance; or it might occur between elements of the FAd'H, VSN, and *Ton Ton Macoutes*. It could conceivably lead to fighting between blacks and mulattoes, an unequal contest in which the mulattoes might be virtually wiped out. It could also endanger the 3,500 white foreigners, including some 1,380 Americans, who reside in Haiti.

28. The likelihood of violence would be least if Duvalier died of natural causes in private, so that the key figures moving to take control might have time to decide on a provisional leadership before they announced the dictator's death.

29. The makeup of a successor government would also depend to some degree on the manner of Duvalier's going, but it would depend still more on the relative strengths of the contenders for power. Here individuals would be important as well as groups, and there is no way of knowing ahead of time how some of those in strategic positions might act when the showdown came. There are, however, certain observations which can be made with reasonable confidence about the possibilities for a successor government.

30. Because all political individuals and groups have been so thoroughly repressed, or (if friendly) so sharply circumscribed by Duvalier, we think that an individual or combination from the security services is most likely to take the leading role in a successor regime. Duvalier's system of countervailing forces in these services is keyed to his own command and probably could not long survive him. If the Chief of Staff of the FAd'H were a stronger figure, the regular military would almost certainly take charge once again. They will probably be the strongest contender anyway. There are in the FAd'H some relatively shrewd and courageous figures who might come quickly to the top: e.g., Col. Daniel Beauvoir of the Army General Staff; Major Jose Borges, one of the army's few competent troop commanders, and perhaps Col. Jacques Laroche, the FAd'H Deputy Chief of Staff. Initially, however, a junta of several FAd'H officers would be more likely. The members of such a junta might find it necessary to take in some leaders of the VSN, and even of the *Ton Ton Macoutes*, although that would be distasteful to them.

31. A security forces' junta of this kind might include, as well, a few political figures who have attained a measure of prominence under the Duvalier adminis-

⁷A particularly nasty situation might be created if a coup effort failed at the last moment and Duvalier carried out his frequent threat that he would respond by ordering those loyal to him to cut down any and all suspected opponents.

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tration. Alternatively, a cabinet member or other administration official might be used as front man for what would actually be a military government.

32. None of these possible junta governments would be stable from the outset. A struggle for power within the junta would almost certainly ensue. This could lead to open violence between the contending factions or to the emergence of a single dictator.

33. The existing political parties of opposition—*Personalistes* on the one hand, Communists on the other—are simply too small and weak to compete for power even in a disorderly situation following Duvalier's departure. The Communists' best chance of gaining influence within a post-Duvalier regime would be in offering administrative assistance to whatever power group emerged on top. Such assistance would be in short supply and urgently needed; offers of help would be likely to be accepted without too particular a security investigation. Thus the few capable Haitian Communists would have a chance to penetrate the Haitian bureaucracy and, from that point of vantage, to exercise influence and to build up their party organizations. We believe that the Haitian Communists themselves would estimate their chances in this way and we pursue this course, rather than attempt to take over the government.

34. We doubt that either of the Haitian Communist parties would receive much outside support for an attempt to seize power. The Soviets would probably counsel PEP leaders to move cautiously and aim for a gradual accretion of political assets. Fidel Castro, whose connections are with the PPLN, would probably use Radio Havana broadcasts to exacerbate any political crisis, at the time of Duvalier's removal or subsequently. He could put a small invasion force into Haiti,⁸ but we think it unlikely that he would take this risk any more than he dared take a similar risk during the crisis in the Dominican Republic. He might assist the small number of Haitian political exiles now in Cuba and the Dominican Republic to return in hopes that they could instill new spirit among the Haitian Communists so that they might play a more decisive role at some future time.

35. The exile groups generally are not likely to count for much in the immediate situation after Duvalier. We estimate that none now has the capability—without foreign help—either to overthrow him or to land a large enough force quickly after his downfall to determine the nature of the new government and the course of future events. What the exile groups can do, if there is no

⁸ Cuban air and naval forces have a theoretical capability to put more than 1,000 men into Haiti by sea, air, or airdrop in a few hours' time. This assumes no constraint by need for secrecy or by recognition that US counteraction would probably, at the least, prevent resupply or support of their force. Several thousand people of Haitian extraction live in Cuba, but we have no evidence that the Castro regime has tried to create any military or paramilitary unit from among them.

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restraint on their activities, is to complicate in many ways the already difficult task facing a new government.⁹

36. Because there is such an acute lack of administrative and technical talent among Haitians, in Haiti or in exile, there is scant likelihood that the government which succeeds Duvalier will be much better than the present one. Liberal parliamentary institutions have never been able to survive in Haiti; Duvalier's successors are not likely to have either the will or the ability to establish such a regime in that country. They will do well to establish an orderly and effective administration by the authoritarian methods that are customary there. It is conceivable, however, that a more respectable regime than Duvalier's could be set up.

37. Given Haiti's limited ability to absorb capital and foreign technology, economic and social development would probably remain minimal. Any new regime would probably continue to view Haiti's needs for foreign assistance primarily in terms of financial support for the administration and would resist reforms that would undermine its political control. Nonetheless, the US might gain some leverage over the situation simply by being able to deal with a new group which would be seeking US financial aid and political backing.

38. If the situation following Duvalier's departure became so disorderly as to require military action to protect and evacuate foreign nationals, the Organization of American States (OAS) would almost certainly acquiesce in such action by the US. Even those OAS members generally opposed to intervention are likely to go along, recognizing that Haiti is a special case. It would be remembered, however, that the US military intervention in Haiti in 1915, for the stated purpose of protecting lives and property, turned into an 18-year military occupation. Any proposal for US or OAS intervention to restore order and establish an effective government would encounter strong opposition within the OAS. Any contention that such intervention was necessary in order to forestall a Communist takeover would be disbelieved by many OAS members unless the supporting evidence was incontrovertible.¹⁰

39. In the circumstances postulated, the Haitian townspeople generally would probably welcome a US military intervention with intense relief, as was the case in 1915, expecting it to reestablish order and security for themselves. If

⁹ Although the administrative services of returning exiles would be useful to a successor regime, they would be likely to cause trouble, as a group, by their pretensions to political or military leadership and their demands for the restoration of expropriated or abandoned property. Some could cause international complications. One group led by Cuban exile Masferrer wants to use Haiti as a base for operations against Cuba. Another group seeking association with Dominican "constitutionalists" in Paris might be disposed to assist them in operations from Haiti against the Dominican Republic.

¹⁰ The Government of the Dominican Republic would be extremely concerned about any protracted period of disorder and confusion in Haiti. Elements among the military and on the political right, if not President Balaguer himself, would be inclined to see the Communist threat as imminent. Thus the Dominican Government would be likely to press privately for the landing of a US force in Haiti, and to seek US assurances, as well as more military aid.

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a military occupation were at all prolonged, however, opposition to it would develop. Whatever Haitians came to power in such circumstances would be bitterly denounced by all the disappointed aspirants for office. A continuing US military presence might be required to sustain the new regime. As in 1915, it would be easier to get into Haiti than to get out.

40. These reactions would be generally limited to the towns and their immediate environs. The remoter peasants would almost certainly remain inert unless and until something happened to affect them directly and adversely.

41. Much of the international reaction to a landing of US forces in Haiti—whatever the reason given—would probably be adverse, particularly that of countries with neutralist or leftist governments. Even a brief US intervention to evacuate foreign nationals might face criticism on two counts. First it would be called a new "imperialist" move, a violation of the Charter of the OAS, and an unjustified interference in the affairs of a small nation. And second, if the force departed quickly when the foreigners were out and the Haitians then went back to chopping at each other, the US would be criticized for saving the whites and not caring what happened to the Negroes.

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CITE TDCS -314/14439-66

DIST 11 NOVEMBER 1966

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COUNTRY HAITI

DOI 10 NOVEMBER 1966

SUBJECT SITUATION IN CAPE HAITIEN

(Handwritten initials)

ACQ

SOURCE

1. THE SITUATION IN CAPE HAITIEN IS TENSE. THE MILITIA HAS BEEN CONFINED TO THE CITY BECAUSE IT IS UNDR SUSPICION. THE AUTHORITIES IN CAPE HAITIEN SUSPECT EVERYONE OF REBEL ACTIVITY.

2. COMMENT: THIS MAY INDICATE THAT THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES ARE MORE NERVOUS THAN USUAL DUE TO THE RECENT CIRCULATION OF RUMORS. THE TENSION IS PROBABLY ONLY A FURTHER INDICATION OF UNREST AND OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ALERTNESS TO POSSIBLE TROUBLE.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCLANT, CINCSO.

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London Foreign Affairs Library

14 June 1968

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SUBJECT: MASFERRER (ROJAS), Rolando Arcadio aka
MASFERRER, Roland Rohas

A covert national agency name check was conducted on Subject in January 1950 but his services have never been utilized by the Agency. Subject, born about 1916 in Havana, Cuba, is a former Cuban Senator and Cuban Communist Party member from 1933 until 1945 when he was expelled from the Cuban CP. He is an enemy of CASTRO and was described as a former "goon squad commander for BATISTA's private army". He has been a political refugee since January 1959. His files contain numerous FBI reports regarding his activities as head of an anti-CASTRO organization known as Milicias Anticomunistas Obreras y Compesinas (MFOC) and his attempt to invade Cuba in 1960. This matter was investigated by the FBI.

Latest information in his file is dated February 1967 and concerns consideration by the Internal Security Division, Department of Justice, to prosecute Subject and certain of his followers as co-conspirators. He and 75 of his followers had been arrested at Cocoa Plum Beach near Marathon, Florida while preparing to leave for an invasion of Haiti. Outcome of the case is not reflected in his file.

Subject had asserted that his plotting had been approved by the U. S. Government. On some occasions Subject claimed approval by CIA and at other times intimated approval came from the FBI. Unfavorable publicity and compromise of Agency and sources and personnel were matters being considered if the criminal charges against Subject were pressed in court and the Agency was forced to document its denial of involvement.

24

10 February 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

Subsequent to the date of reference (1) memo, Rolando MASFERRER and his followers were arrested near Marathon, Florida while preparing to leave for an invasion of Haiti. MASFERRER had asserted on numerous occasions that his plotting had been approved by the U. S. Government.

SRS/OS

Atts. Refs.

2/13/69
SRS
OS

8 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

FROM :

SUBJECT :

b. Rolando Masferrer Rojas--Covert. (36 859) and overt (352 772) security files were located regarding Rolando Arcadio Masferrer (Rojas), aka: Roland Rojas Masferrer, a Cuban citizen born 12 January 1918 in Holguin, Cuba. Although limited national agency checks were conducted on Subject in January 1950, there is no indication that Masferrer was ever utilized by the Agency. He is a former Cuban senator and Cuban Communist Party member (expelled in 1945), a former commander for Batista's private army, and firmly anti-Castro. The two files contain numerous FBI reports regarding his activities in connection with an attempt to invade Cuba in 1960 and a subsequent effort to invade Haiti in 1967. Masferrer and 75 of his followers were arrested in January 1967 in Marathon, Florida, while preparing for the invasion of Haiti.

Masferrer claimed that his Haiti invasion plot was approved by the U. S. Government (varying between the CIA and the FBI as the approving agency). While the CIA approval claim was untrue, Agency concern, at the time, centered around the possibility of unfavorable publicity and the compromise of sources and methods if the Agency was forced to disprove Masferrer's charges in court. A handwritten note in Masferrer's file revealed that he died in 1975 when his car was blown apart by a bomb in Florida. No further details regarding his death were contained in his subject files. Since Masferrer has never been affiliated with the Agency, despite his claims, it is believed that Dade County officials should be referred to the FBI for information regarding Masferrer.

