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PROBABLE ARGENTINE POLICY TOWARD THE US TO 1952 AND ITS EFFECTS ON US INTERESTS



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SUMMARY

Argentine foreign policy is of particular importance to the US because first, Argentina is a relatively strong, "medium-class" power which ranks as a leader in the inter-American system; and second, Argentina, although a member of the regional system, has considerable capacity for independent action because it is remote from centers of US power, and its economy under normal conditions is oriented toward Europe. In time of peace Argentina is capable, because of its situation and resources, of supporting US policy objectives, opposing them and working to displace US influence in Latin America, or of taking an intermediate position. Argentina's ability to utilize its connections with extra-Hemisphere powers not appreciably more distant than the US has been an important factor in its capacity to oppose the US in the Hemisphere. In the event of war between the US and the USSR, the advantages to the US of Argentine cobelligerency would outweigh the demands made by Argentina and the obligations incurred by the US. Argentina's normally large food surpluses would be available. It could insure domestic and possibly regional security against sabotage of the supply to the US of strategic materials, could stimulate production and further stability in other Latin American states through leadership and example, and could make relatively effective use of US matériel and equipment for maintaining internal order and assisting the US in regional defense. It could also supply certain materials in short supply to its neighbors. On the other hand, Argentina would require the diversion of some US military equipment, and Argentine leaders could be expected to contribute to US difficulties by demanding recognition of an undisputed hegemony over southern South America, possession of the British-owned Falkland Islands, and armed equality with—if not superiority to—Brazil.

Argentine foreign policy up to Perón's accession to power has been conditioned by a desire to maintain ties with European nations, by a strong urge for independence within the Hemisphere particularly in relation to the US, and by an ambition to achieve leadership in the Hemisphere. The Perón regime has added to these historic Argentine objectives the desire to effect a high degree of economic independence, and implementation of policy has been complicated by changes in the world situation and by conflicts among groups influencing foreign policy.

In the absence of a major war, Argentine policy will be influenced by the fact that the need for industrialization equipment, which only the US is presently in a position to supply, requires a high degree of cooperation with the US. Perón originally estimated that satisfaction of his needs from available resources would require little sacri-

Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, and the Air Force have concurred in this report. For a dissent by the Office of Naval Intelligence, see Enclosure A, p. 25.

The information herein is as of 1 January 1949.

face of nationalistic independence, but lavish expenditures for industrial equipment from the US combined with decline in world demand for Argentine products vitiated original estimates, produced a financial crisis in mid-1948, and caused virtual suspension of procurement in the US for Argentine industrial development. This crisis confronts the Perón regime with the difficult choice between some sacrifice of the appearance of economic independence and some slackening of the industrialization program—either step a dangerous one for the regime's stability. At the moment, the Argentine president seems to be temporizing. Any decision reached will be subject to constant review; if and whenever Perón decides the advantages to be gained from concessions to the US outweigh the disadvantages, Argentina will become more cooperative; if he decides that the political cost of abandoning appearance of independence is too high a price to pay for US assistance, he will intensify Argentine resistance to US policy at home and abroad.

In case of a US-USSR war before 1952, it is estimated Argentina will be a cobelligerent on the side of the US. An Argentine alliance with the USSR is extremely unlikely in view of the slight possibility of reciprocal advantage, and various factors indicate Argentina would prefer cobelligerence to neutrality. By remaining neutral Argentina would risk: another increase of Brazilian armed strength relative to that of Argentina such as occurred from Brazilian participation in World War II; forfeit of Argentina's much-vaunted claim to leadership in Latin America; probable sanctions by the US and possibly by other American republics. Defeat of the US would, moreover, expose Argentina to ultimate Communist rule.

There would be strong pressure for a declaration of war from the anti-Communist Argentine military, and the government could expect to strengthen its position with the predominantly Catholic populace through participating in a war against atheistic Communism. The government could also anticipate distinct advantages in controlling a war crisis situation through a declaration of war. There is evidence of Perón's own apprehension of international Communism; his government has reportedly made extensive preparations for an all out attack on Communism and Soviet agents, preparations which include the possibility of breaking relations with the USSR and its satellites. The exact nature, extent, and timing of Argentine cobelligerence will be determined by the attitude of Argentina toward the US at the time and by bargains struck with the US or arranged in an inter-American conference under the Rio treaty.

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PROBABLE ARGENTINE POLICY TOWARD THE US TO 1952 AND ITS EFFECTS
ON US INTERESTS

I. Importance of Argentina to the US.

1. BASES OF ARGENTINE IMPORTANCE.

The foreign policy of Argentina is of particular importance to the US because this relatively strong, "medium-class" power, which is a member of the inter-American system, but remote from centers of US power and influence, has unusual capacity for independent action.

With an economy naturally competitive with rather than complementary to that of the US, Argentina has not been heavily dependent on the US either for markets or imports. The Argentines are a nation of 16 million people occupying an area slightly larger than the US east of the Mississippi and have, of all Latin American countries, the highest standard of living, the highest literacy rate, the largest per capita wealth and the greatest share in world trade, and the largest proportion of European population. Attainment of this position of leadership has to a large extent been possible because of the remarkable productivity of Argentina's main agricultural area—the only extensive plain in the temperate zone of South America. Argentina is more than self-sufficient in foods. During the period 1935-1939, Argentina was the world's largest exporter of beef, corn, oats, cattle, hides, and skins; it was second largest exporter of wheat and wool as well. By exporting very large quantities of agricultural products, Argentina has been able to import sufficient fuels, raw materials, and machinery, to become virtually self-sufficient in a broad range of manufactured consumer goods. In 1943, the net value created by industrial production for the first time exceeded that created by agricultural and pastoral production.

The fact that Buenos Aires is 6,650 miles by water—or twice as far as Europe—from Washington is a most important factor in Argentina's capacity for independent action. Unquestionably, remoteness from the centers of US power has been an important element underlying Argentine foreign policy's pursuit of the most independent course of all the Latin American republics both within the Hemisphere and in extra-Hemisphere relations. The framers of Argentine foreign policy have evidently estimated that the US would not use its power to coerce that country in time of peace no matter what friendly ties they made with potential enemies of the US or to what degree they failed to cooperate in the inter-American system. They have also apparently realized that Argentina lies outside the zone in which the US could be certain of its ability to make its will militarily effective, should the exigencies of a desperate war situation justify considering such action. Argentina therefore enjoys, more than any other Latin American country, with the exception of Chile and—to a smaller extent—Brazil, capacity for independent action deriving from its geographical position. But because of its larger degree of assertiveness and economic self-sufficiency, Argentina actually has much greater independence than Chile or Brazil.

2. ARGENTINE IMPORTANCE TO US IN PEACETIME.

Because of its considerable latitude for independent action, Argentina has the capabilities for acting as a focus and head of anti-US sentiment in the Western Hemisphere, both in inter-American organizations and outside of them. Conversely Argentine pro-US activities are the more influential because they are, in the eyes of the rest of the Hemisphere, generally free from suspicion of US pressure. Prior to World War II, Argentina was able to use ties with its European customers, particularly those with Germany and the UK, to counter US influence. The war has greatly diminished these Argentine capabilities, but a restoration of economic strength in Western Europe—providing Argentina with industrial supplies and equipment now obtainable in quantity only in the US—would make Argentine use of such ties again of interest to the US. Present relations with Spain show Argentina as the stronger partner and do not greatly strengthen Argentina *vis-à-vis* the US.

Argentine tendencies toward expansionism and authoritarian organization of the state are a matter of concern to the US because of the effects of these tendencies on other American states, particularly on those states adjacent to Argentina, and because these tendencies complicate direct US-Argentine relations and activities within the inter-American system. These tendencies combine with Argentina's relatively strong economic and military potentials to produce fear and suspicion of Argentine intentions. The states which consider themselves menaced by Argentine expansionism frequently seek US assurances of support against Argentine encroachments, and there is reason to believe that these fears are sometimes deliberately exaggerated to increase US contributions of economic, military and moral support. Similarly, Brazil relies on its ties with the US in its rivalry with Argentina to such an extent that US-Brazilian relations inevitably reflect Brazil's conceptions of US policy toward Argentina. Argentina's neighbors are strongly jealous of US-Argentine cooperation and tend to construe such cooperation as undue favoritism. Paradoxically, there is also a contrary tendency among the other American republics to come to the defense of their fellow Latins when they conceive that the US is abusing its power advantage against the Argentines. The expansionist and authoritarian tendencies of Argentina are also of direct interest to US long-range policy in view of the possibility that Argentina might succeed in altering the balance of power in South America.

Argentina also has some importance to the US as a market and in providing investment and entrepreneurial opportunities. While the present situation—resulting from impairment of European sources of supply and from increased demand due to Argentina's accelerated program of industrialization—will probably not be permanent, it is unlikely to pass away overnight. Argentina was recently the largest market for US goods in this hemisphere (purchases during the first quarter of 1948 reached an annual rate of \$780 million). In the past, Argentina has offered exceptionally favorable opportunities for secure and profitable investment. Although present conditions are not encouraging for private investment, it is possible that this situation will change so that more than the currently estimated total of \$300 million of US investment funds will be attracted there.

3. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE US OF ARGENTINE COLLABORATION IN THE EVENT OF WAR BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR.

In the event of war between the US and the USSR, there are of course many theoretically possible Argentine positions ranging from hostility to the US through less or more benevolent neutrality to cobelligerence. For reasons detailed in Part IV, it now seems probable Argentina will choose cobelligerence. It is true that while Argentina could be expected to provide some purely military support to a US war effort in the maintenance of local security and aid to US transport and communications in the area, its far more important contributions would be of a non-military nature, and many of these contributions would presumably be forthcoming whether Argentina were a cobelligerent or a neutral. It is estimated, however, that total Argentine contributions as a cobelligerent would outweigh certain difficulties inherent in Argentine participation.

Argentina's large food surpluses would constitute its most valuable contribution to a western war effort. Control of the seas would probably assure the availability of these surpluses to the US and its allies exclusively. Although the Argentines could in any event be expected to get as much as possible for their provisions, it is probable that US procurement of Argentine supplies would be more successful if Argentina were an ally than if it pursued a policy of neutrality, however benevolent. Furthermore, Argentina, as a cobelligerent or as a benevolent neutral, could be expected to make a significant contribution to the relief of US supply and transportation shortages by providing considerable amounts of foods, light manufactured consumer goods, and chemicals to the other American republics, goods which they normally obtain from the US or other sources that would be taxed or unavailable in time of war.

The fact of Argentine cobelligerence could itself be of considerable value to the US in the force of Argentine example and leadership in Latin America. Competition between Latin American states for US favors might well result in increased efforts on the part of the various republics. Such augmented effort on the part of the Latin American states might be expected to compensate the US in some degree for the difficulties occasioned by their conflicting demands for US military and economic support. Argentina itself might be expected to expedite the production and delivery of moderate quantities of beryl and tungsten to aid the US war effort.

Argentina is probably better equipped than any other major Latin American republic to meet the Communist threat within its own boundaries, and could be counted on in its own self-interest for domestic security against Communist sabotage of the flow of essential materials to the US and its allies. It is also possible that in an extreme situation of chaos induced by Communist action, Argentina, if not threatened by invasion, might be in a position to make a significant contribution to regional security by assisting other countries to protect themselves against Communist guerrilla action and sabotage of the supply of critical materials.

Argentina does not now have and will not have in the predictable future the military establishment or the natural and financial resources requisite for the creation of forces adequate to repel an attack from a major power or to make any sizable contribu-

tions to an expeditionary force. In common with all other Latin American republics, Argentina would be militarily expensive to the US in any global war, since US matériel would have to be diverted for adequate modern defense. Furthermore, the contribution that Argentina could make to common military defense of the continent would be greatly restricted by the limited extent of its sea and air power as well as by the inadequate land transportation facilities to the other republics.

In the event of war with the USSR, Argentine leaders will probably demand responsibility for regional defense, despite their country's limited military capacities. This will make it difficult to include Argentina in a general strategic plan. It is anticipated that the Argentine Government will seek to exploit its status as an ally to obtain military equality if not superiority to Brazil, to further its efforts to establish an undisputed hegemony over the southern half of the continent exclusive of Brazil, and to obtain possession of the Falkland Islands. Argentine demands for US acquiescence in such efforts could be expected to generate friction with that government and possibly within the inter-American system and with the UK, which frictions would tend to undermine the unity required in war.

On the other hand, by virtue of its relatively advanced industrial and engineering experience combined with the relatively high quality of its military discipline and training, Argentina could be expected to make more efficient use of equipment obtained from the US than any other Latin American state. And it would of course be far less costly to the US to send equipment than to send both equipment and military personnel and have to maintain troops at such a distance.

The limitations of Argentine sea power are such that the US could at best expect some assistance in the defense of Cape Horn and the Straits of Magellan as an alternative route to the Panama canal, provision of access to naval bases with their denial in Argentina's own self-interest to Soviet submarines, and limited patrol of sea lanes.

II. Argentine Foreign Policy up to the Present.

1. BASES AND HISTORICAL OBJECTIVES OF ARGENTINE FOREIGN POLICY.

In the past Argentine foreign policy has stressed Argentine ties with European nations, Argentine independence of US influence, the extension of Argentine leadership in Latin America, and neutrality in world power conflicts.

Argentina has considered that its national interest lay in keeping the closest possible ties with available and potential customers, in resisting any possible subordination to US economic interests, and in opposing US leadership in inter-American activities. Argentina, prior to World War II, depended on Britain for financial development and markets for its beef, on Germany for military ideas, and on France for intellectual stimulus. The historical precedent of Argentina's former position as the center of the Spanish viceroyalty of La Plata, the possession of great wealth in agricultural resources, and the existence of a proud nationalist spirit have fostered the Argentine belief that their country possesses opportunities and capacities for development greatly beyond those of any other Latin American country. Since they viewed their country's po-

tentialities as comparable to those of the US in the nineteenth century, the Argentines have in the twentieth century conceived of themselves as rivals of the US for leadership in the Hemisphere. Therefore they have both resisted any inference of subordination to the US in the inter-American system and have sought to assert their primacy in a grouping of neighboring states whose endowments the Argentines consider inferior to their own.

2. ARGENTINE FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE PERÓN ADMINISTRATION.

The Perón government has adhered to the main historical objectives of Argentine foreign policy; the postwar period has witnessed important changes, however, both at home and abroad, and these changes have had their effect on traditional attitudes. For example, the division of world power into two camps has been accompanied by a weakening of Argentina's adherence to the concept of neutrality. Although the Perón group on coming to power continued Argentine neutrality and delayed a declaration of war against the Axis until the final stages of the conflict, and Perón himself has subsequently expressed Argentina's traditional neutrality in terms of the "Third Position", he has also acknowledged the intensified world pressures against neutrals in the unprecedented public statement that Argentina will go to war on the side of the US.

Three factors have conspicuously affected the execution of Argentine policy. First, radical changes incident to World War II have strengthened Argentina's international position including its position in South America; second, the government has emphasized a policy of economic independence including an ambitious program of rapid industrialization; third, the Perón revolution in Argentina has both shifted the bases of political power in that country and changed the make-up of governmental machinery. These new factors have guided the pursuit of continuing basic Argentine objectives and therefore have governed Argentine activities in the United Nations and in the inter-American system, in relations with other nations, and in Hispanic and labor propaganda. (See Appendix for detail on execution of Argentine foreign policy.)

Argentina has, largely by default, gained an increasingly important position in international affairs as a result of world economic dislocations and the decline of Western European power, and has vigorously exploited this opportunity. Diminished world food supplies gave Argentina an opportunity to dispose of its normally large surpluses on a sellers market and, at least temporarily, greatly increased its relative economic importance. The Perón government has made every effort to extend Argentina's economic importance to the world political arena and has taken an aggressive part in some world organizations not paralleled since early Argentine enthusiasm for the League of Nations. The destruction of Western European industrial and military capacity, together with Argentine plans for rapid industrialization, however, has placed Argentina in a position of greater dependence on the US for industrial and military equipment. While one underlying basis for bilateral trade with Europe remained as before the war, because of Europe's need for Argentine raw materials, there were fundamental changes in the patterns of Argentina's relations with the world abroad. Because the Europeans were unable temporarily to supply industrial goods in pay-

ment, they were obliged to finance much of their purchasing through liquidation of existing investments and thereby cut important ties which had for many years bound the Argentine economy to Europe.

The Perón government's emphasis on the policy of economic independence is clearly an attempt to gain in the economic field an independence comparable to the independence Argentina has long asserted in the political field. However, in this attempt Argentina is involved in a paradoxical situation since equipment for industrialization essential to economic independence can, temporarily at least, be obtained only from the US and at the discretion of the US. The Perón administration has committed itself to a program of: planned industrialization for greater self-sufficiency; liquidation of foreign holdings in basic industries and a declared policy of excluding new foreign investment in such areas; an increase in Argentine exports of manufactures in addition to maintenance of foreign markets for raw materials; and development of Argentine banking, insurance, and other facilities. In large part through direct government action the administration has been trying—without, at least for the first two years, any appropriate use of priorities—to pay off foreign mortgages on the national property, establish an industry complete with underlying services, satisfy the demands of military prestige, and at the same time extend its economic influence to foreign countries. The Perón administration's policy of all-out industrialization has both accentuated the distortion from the prewar trade pattern with Europe and affected relations with the US; because of economic dislocations in Europe, only the US could provide the quantity and quality of machinery needed for the power, transportation, and other developments projected under the five-year plan, but US markets did not absorb Argentine exports in quantity sufficient to provide the needed dollars which could not be obtained from European customers.

Argentine efforts to overcome its postwar arms inferiority in relation to Brazil have increased its need for US products, and considerable procurement from European countries has not eliminated this need. Argentina hopes also to continue to obtain machinery from the US to expand the local arms industry.

Domestic conditions incident to the revolutionary changes effected by the present administration in the scope of governmental operations and in its personnel have produced confusion and inconsistency in the execution of foreign policy. Under President Perón, groups and institutions most influential in the formation of foreign policy until 1943 have either lost their influence or been forced out of policy-making councils. The old-line, conservative, landholding interests, who opposed industrialization and emphasized trade in agricultural products with Europe and particularly with the UK, have been forced to yield their commanding position. The former staff of the Foreign Office has been cleared out and replaced by labor leaders, poets, doctors, and professors, among whom are many chauvinistic nationalists. The resulting organization, influenced by combinations among the groups and individuals discussed in the following section, has tended to emphasize the aggressive, nationalist, anti-US theme of Peronista policies to the detriment of good relations with the US and other countries.

3. GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS INFLUENTIAL IN THE FORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICY.

Considerable insight into the character of current Argentine policy, particularly with reference to the apparent confusion and inconsistencies mentioned in the previous section, can be obtained from an examination of the powerful groups and individuals who influence its day-to-day development and execution. The conflict between long-term requirements of national policy—such as industrial development and national defense on the one hand and short-run political profit to be gained from chauvinist gestures on the other—is sharply reflected in bitter personal differences at the top level. In the continuing struggle for influence on foreign policy, gains and losses by various elements occur with such frequency that it is impossible to determine for any considerable period whether greatest influence has been exerted by advocates of extreme nationalistic ideas, by representatives of the armed forces, or by individual (either moderate or extreme) civilian leaders, opportunist politicians or particular combinations of any of these. It is possible, however, to indicate the direction in which the various groups seek to guide foreign policy.

a. *Nationalist influence.*

Because Perón has based his strength to a large degree on the support of the largely uninformed populace and because anti-foreign appeals have helped to consolidate his hold on this group, the vacuum in the field of foreign policy created by the elimination of conservative internationalist interests has been filled to a considerable extent by anti-foreign nationalist elements. The extreme nationalists do not exercise predominant influence in the Perón administration, but the state of mind which they represent is very important in the field of foreign policy. The reorganization and expansion of the foreign service brought in many nationalist zealots strongly prejudiced against the US and the loose and spontaneous character of Argentine administrative operations has allowed them to exaggerate nationalist aspects of the administration's foreign policy. Nationalists are to be found in large numbers—chiefly in the Hemisphere—explaining Argentine policy and propagandizing for the Perón administration, and it is clear that their activities are at least tolerated by the administration and that they work to increase the conflicts between moderate and nationalist trends in Argentine foreign policy.

b. *Influence of the Army.*

Despite Perón's strong political support from the working class and notwithstanding the fact that he has in the past publicly announced his intention of "returning the Army to its barracks", there is little doubt that the continuity of his regime is subject to the continued approval of the army. Thus army leaders have at least twice forced Perón to alter his policy and practice. In one instance military spokesmen convinced him of the necessity of restraining Señora Perón from "meddling" in foreign affairs following her return from Europe in 1947. In another case army officers successfully demanded, in an atmosphere suggesting a *coup d'état*, that Perón repudiate a contract for the development of a steel mill which had involved substantial graft by the

President of the National Economic Council. Evidently, therefore, while Perón has held the loyalty of the more influential military elements through their confidence in his ability to keep labor in line, because of the large appropriations and salary increases he has obtained for them, and the important role accorded the army in the industrialization program, the power of the army poses definite limits within which he must operate. Neither the limits prescribed by the military nor its direct influence on foreign policy is clearly evident. However, the record of military support for US-sponsored measures for Hemisphere defense and arms standardization indicates that the predominant influence in the army favors a considerable degree of collaboration with the US. Support of such a policy by Argentine military leaders is understandable in view of their urgent desire to rearm and particularly to redress the imbalance in armed strength effected by US armament of other Latin American republics, especially Brazil, and the denial of arms to Argentina during World War II. The US is a most important potential source of arms and industrial equipment and the Argentine Army needs a fund of US dollars and goodwill to exploit that source.

There are, of course, anti-US nationalist elements within the Argentine Army, and the General Staff reportedly harbors an international policy section which elaborates Argentine grand strategy on the basis of a plan to gain control of Latin America when the US shall be heavily committed and possibly weakened in a war with the USSR. However, the army's practical interest in equipment of troops and a measure of military industrialization, together with the position of the US as a logical supplier appears to be a more important factor in military views on foreign policy than the theoretical projections of the General Staff unit. In the present national crisis the military group headed by Minister of War Sosa Molina appears to hold the balance of power and will probably exert an influence favorable to US-Argentine cooperation in important foreign policy decisions now pending.

c. *Civilian Leaders.*

Perón's most important civilian aides in the field of foreign policy are Foreign Minister Juan A. Bramuglia, Ambassador (and Senator) Diego Luis Molinari, and Miguel Miranda, President of the National Economic Council. Bramuglia, formerly a Socialist lawyer active in trade-union affairs, is regarded as the most reasonable and respectable and least nationalist civilian member of the cabinet. He has shown considerable sympathy for the complaints of foreign interest with regard to the nationalist policies of the administration and may be said to represent the tendency to recognize and deal realistically with Argentina's inevitable interdependence with the rest of the world. Senator Molinari, roving ambassador for the Perón administration, who formerly exerted only nominal influence on foreign policy, was recently reported to be one of the influential individuals in the administration's foreign policy. He represents in his own person the unpredictable character of Argentine policy. Often identified with the extreme nationalist point of view, he has frequently worked against moderate policies sponsored by Bramuglia. As leader of the Argentine delegation to the ITO conference at Havana in 1948 he deplored US predominance in the world, attempted to defeat the ITO Charter and in general took a hostile line toward the US. As Argen-

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tina's dollar crisis has deepened, however, he has reportedly aligned himself with pro-US and moderate elements in the cabinet including his enemy Bramuglia. Miguel Miranda, as President of the National Economic Council, has controlled Argentina's foreign economic policy which is extraordinarily important in the total foreign policy developed by the Perón administration. The attitudes of Miranda, a self-made industrialist who entered the government in 1946, illustrate some of the contradictions and problems of working out a program of economic cooperation with Argentina. He is fully conscious that industrialization and the long-range program for economic independence can best be realized with foreign private investment. However, many of his actions and the trading ventures of IAPA (Argentine Trade Promotion Institute) under his direction have apparently done as much to alienate US business as the nationalists' war on foreign investors. During the past two years Miranda has gambled on his ability to finance much of Argentine capital development through shrewd trading with the outside world which has needed Argentine agricultural products.

III. Probable Argentine Policy toward the US in the Absence of a US-USSR War.

Since the long-range, permanent objectives of Argentine foreign policy indicate a counter-US—if not actually anti-US—position in Western Hemisphere and in world affairs, any exceptional degree of Argentine cooperation in US objectives in the period short of war will be due either to casual coincidence of the objectives of the two countries or to some special situation pushing the Argentines toward a larger degree of cooperation than would normally be the case. The present impairment of European sources of supply of heavy machinery and equipment and the importance attached by the Perón administration to their five-year plan of industrialization constitute such a special situation; it is therefore these admittedly temporary factors that are likely to be most influential in guiding—within the boundaries set by long-range policies—the execution of Argentine policy during the next few years.

The urgency—from the Argentine point of view—of the present situation, and its opportunity—from the US point of view—are both due to a fundamental miscalculation on the part of the Argentine Government. It seems clear that President Perón originally estimated that Argentine resources were such that he could carry out his ambitious five-year plan and at the same time avoid any such compromise of Argentina's long-term policy of complete independence, as would be involved in making important concessions to the US and to US capital in particular. Argentina may derive certain long-run advantages, both political and economic from development leading to a great measure of independence of US and European sources of supply, and the local political advantage deriving from the sponsorship of such a program, can hardly be questioned. But the attempt to realize all the elements of the program simultaneously, and without incurring unpopular obligations to foreign countries, assumed a highly favorable economic situation.

To a certain extent Argentina did possess these advantages. When Perón assumed control late in 1945 there was on hand a wartime accumulation of \$1.5 billion in gold and foreign exchange. Argentina subsequently gained an equal amount of hard-

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currency exchange from heavy postwar exports. With these dollar funds and with its supplies of foodstuffs Argentina was in a strong position during the first two years of the Perón administration. It was not only independent of US aid; the Argentine market was the largest market for US exports in the Hemisphere. Argentina did extend large credits to European nations, but because of the urgency of European food requirements and the impaired European capacity to supply desired industrial equipment in return, the Perón government was in a strong bargaining position that enabled it to sell at high prices, demand manufactured goods, fuel or other scarce commodities at favorable prices or to demand payment in hard currency which could be—and was—used to buy industrial equipment from the US.

Argentina seems also to have acted on the assumption that more dollars would become available when its wartime accumulation was spent—that US loans and grants to Europe would guarantee a fresh supply of dollars as the original fund became exhausted. Hence the Perón administration's plans for future heavy expenditure of dollars, the use of dollars for purchase of US properties, and relative indifference to the possibility of insuring supplies of dollars by measures designed to encourage US private investment. It is true that extreme nationalist political influence, rather than indifference to the possibilities of securing dollars, probably explains the administration's reluctance to grant long-term concessions to foreign oil companies and thereby obtain financing for the vital development of its own additional crude production and refinery capacity. But the administration needlessly alienated corporations maintaining branch factories and agencies in Argentina, as the government trade-promotion institute interfered with their operations and as the import business became more and more a government monopoly subjecting US companies to an uncertain future. In general, the growing area of government intervention, which extended to insurance, transport services, and importation, and the obvious intention of the administration to extend its control of business both directly and indirectly, also acted as a deterrent to new investment.

Argentina therefore spent as if the country could draw on an inexhaustible balance. Very large imports from the US during the 1946-48 period reached an annual rate of \$780 million in the first quarter of 1948, when Argentine sales to the US were at an annual rate of only \$330 million. These heavy outlays, which exhausted Argentina's expendable supply of dollars, were continued despite the renewed inconvertibility of sterling in August 1947 in expectation of large dollar purchases by ECA. Fear of a third world war and the anticipation that ECA priorities would give European countries a preferred place in the US market may explain the speed and extravagance with which purchases were made.

The situation became critical in June of 1948. The backlog of expendable dollar exchange had been exhausted; payments due for goods on order or already delivered amounted to over \$400 million; blocked remittances of dollar profits of US firms had reached a total of \$35 million. In effect Argentina was in a state of default to US business despite the administration's insistence that it would honor all obligations contracted. The action taken to give foreign capital a liberalized base on which to cal-

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trying to strengthen his political position through demagogic appeals to anti-US sentiment and intensifying his efforts to obtain urgently needed dollars from the US. On the one hand he has attempted to implicate a US citizen and "international capitalist intrigue" in an alleged attempt on his life. On the other hand he has sent the president of the Argentine central bank to the US to develop a plan for obtaining dollars, has given renewed assurances of willingness to comply with US requirements for participation in European dollar trade, and has taken preliminary steps toward reorganizing Argentine economic policy in a direction more consistent with US views of internationally cooperative trade policy.

It seems probable that some short-term decision will have to be made in the near future, but it seems equally probable that any such decision will always be subject to revision in the light of Argentine necessities as they seem to the Perón administration to become less urgent or to press for solution. If President Perón decides that the advantages to be gained by making the concessions required for US aid outweigh the disadvantages, the US should be able to exact as a consideration both some abatement of anti-US activities and propaganda and also increased cooperation in international agencies and projects. If, on the other hand, meeting US terms seems to involve a backward step in nationalistic policy that the president dare not risk, he will covertly allow the tempo of his industrialization program to slacken and continue to try to build up Argentina as the leader of a Hemisphere bloc that would oppose US plans in the Hemisphere, and would stress independent action in world affairs. The coming decision, and any later decisions made in view of changed circumstances will of course be influenced by the severity or moderation of US terms as well as by Argentine need, and also by the manner of the presentation of US terms in relation to President Perón's domestic commitments to a nationalist-influenced foreign policy of complete Argentine independence. The Argentine feeling of rivalry with the US is not likely to disappear; but the degree of its manifestation during the next few years—or longer, possibly depending on US action—may be lessened by the favorable bargaining position temporarily given the US by recent Argentine overestimation of their own strength and present need for US cooperation.

IV. Probable Argentine Policy in the Event of a US-USSR War Before 1952

While the degree of Argentine opposition to or cooperation with the US during the period in which there is no US-USSR war will vary according to the government's changing views of Argentine needs, it is estimated, weighing all considerations as they exist at the present time, that Argentina will, in the event of war between the US and the USSR prior to 1952, join in the war on the side of the US.

Argentine alliance with the USSR in such a war must be considered extremely unlikely. It is true that the Perón administration, in implementing its present rather ambiguous foreign policy under the guise of the so-called "Third Position" (opposed equally to capitalist and Communist imperialism), has at the propaganda level attacked the US much more vigorously than it has attacked the USSR. It is also true that the Argentine Government has engaged in tentative efforts to play Soviet states off against

the US. But there is no visible basis for Argentine advantage—except possibly the highly tenuous basis of likeness of interest in such control of US power and influence as to permit Soviet expansion in the world and Argentine expansion in the Hemisphere—in an Argentine-USSR alignment. In fact, Soviet efforts during the past two years to reach a basis of collaboration with Argentina against the US have been frustrated by this lack of community of interest. One possible bond by which the Soviets may have hoped to attract Argentina—furnishing of heavy equipment essential to Argentina's most cherished goal of economic independence—has proved valueless because of the Soviet's inability to furnish such equipment. In view of the present deficit position of Soviet heavy industry, such inability may be expected to last at least over the next few years, and to preclude any Argentine alignment with the USSR which would make impossible obtaining from the US, the best potential source, the equipment so urgently required. In case of war between the US and USSR, these considerations would apply with even greater force, in view of the fact that the US, by control of the seas, will presumably be able to interdict any significant shipments that the Soviets might undertake to Argentina.

There are also impressive reasons for expecting that Argentina would not only refrain from making common cause with the Soviets but would also reject neutrality in favor of cobelligerence on the side of the US.

Argentine power policy on the continent of South America has as a primary objective maximum Argentine capabilities *vis-à-vis* Brazil. As a result of US arming of Brazil during World War II, that country gained a large power advantage over Argentina. The Perón administration, with strong army support, has demonstrated its determination to redress this balance and has made diligent efforts to obtain weapons and military equipment from all promising sources. Although Argentina's postwar arms procurement program has attained a considerable measure of success, particularly in aircraft categories, it has not supplied Argentina with matériel adequate for a balanced military establishment equivalent to Brazilian armed strength, and it is doubtful that this parity can be achieved before 1952. It is highly doubtful that Argentina would risk the aggravation of Brazil's power advantage which could be expected to result from Argentine neutrality in a third world war. Rivalry with Brazil is a fundamental assumption of Argentine foreign policy, and there is every reason to believe that the Perón government views prominence in military capabilities, and loyalty of the army through satisfaction of ambitions for rearmament as important for the attainment of its priority purpose of increased influence and prestige in Latin America.

It is estimated also that Argentina's general position in the Hemisphere would suffer from a policy of neutrality in a US-Soviet war. Consolidation of international sentiment against neutrals on the outbreak of hostilities would probably convince the Argentines that cobelligerence would offer better prospects for acquiring the Falkland Islands and hegemony over southern South America. It is also probable that the demand for sanctions against any Hemisphere government which remained aloof from such a war would be much stronger than in past wars, because the US public would be much more conscious of the high stakes involved.

By remaining neutral, Argentina would also forfeit whatever claim it may have to Latin American leadership. In case of a war between the US and the USSR, the governments of the other American republics can be expected to align themselves with the US more readily than in World War II, because of fear of the consequences of a Communist victory and because the pro-Soviet segments of their populations are less influential than were pro-Axis elements in the last war.

Argentina also appears to have larger reasons for supporting the US even if a future war with the Soviets did not extend to the Hemisphere security zone, and if the US had less than an even chance to win. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the death or political eclipse of Perón would result in a different course of action, since the army would probably take over and could be expected to be influenced both by its desire for US arms and equipment and its aversion to Communism. The occupation of Western Europe by the USSR would change present relations between Argentina and the USSR to a marked degree. Currently the Soviet government finds Argentine nationalist policies useful in maximizing friction in the Western Hemisphere. However, if Soviet influence extended to the Atlantic and could be brought to bear on Argentina, possibly facilitated through Communist control of Spain with which Argentina has close ties, Soviet policies could be expected to change in accordance with the new opportunities. Argentine policy-makers must realize that at that time an independent and nationalist Argentina would have less value to the USSR, and that the USSR could be expected to work to install a Communist administration in Argentina.

Finally, a number of basic domestic factors will tend strongly to assure Argentine cobelligence on the side of the US in case of war with the USSR. Military elements would exert pressure for participation and the government could expect to strengthen its position by rallying the predominantly Catholic populace in support of a war which would probably be effectively propagandized by the West as a crusade against atheistic Slav Communism. Furthermore, President Perón himself is reliably reported to be apprehensive of the threat of Communism to his government and to Argentina. These reports are substantiated by his administration's development and current execution of an ambitious secret master plan which contemplates the possible necessity of a break in relations with the Slav states in accomplishing the purpose of eliminating the Communist potential from Argentina by 1952. Any final doubt that might exist in Argentine government circles on the advisability of a declaration of war against the Soviets would in all probability be resolved by the pressing need for wartime controls and US supplies and equipment to deal with large-scale public disturbances and acute world shortages that would inevitably accompany a global conflict between the US and the USSR.

It is not possible to predict the exact nature, extent or timing of Argentine cobelligency. A reasonable minimum estimate would be a *pro forma* declaration of war, strict domestic control of hostile and subversive elements, and making supplies available on terms profitable to Argentina. It is also considered highly probable that Argentina would wish to be assigned certain specific responsibilities in coordinating and executing coastal and sea-lane defense in its area, and would desire to furnish expeditionary

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forces of the approximate size agreed on for Brazil. Both the timing of the Argentine declaration of cobelligerency and the extent of its cooperation will probably be affected by the way in which the war begins and thus by the obligations that devolve upon Argentina under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. It is believed that Argentina will ratify the Rio treaty and formally fulfill its obligations under that instrument. If, however, a war begins outside the Hemisphere zone described by the treaty, Argentina may take advantage of its limited obligation to consult and thereby delay any positively helpful action lest it appear overly ready (from the traditional Argentine point of view) to come to the assistance of the US. It must be expected that the Argentines will in any event endeavor to drive a shrewd bargain for their participation, either in direct discussion with US authorities if an attack occurs against the US in the Western Hemisphere defense zone, or in inter-American deliberations according to the machinery provided by the Rio treaty in case the war begins outside that zone.

It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that, if war between the US and the USSR occurs before 1952, Argentina will be a cobelligerent with the US, and that the promptness, extent and effectiveness of Argentine cooperation will depend on the future course of US-Argentine relations and on bargains struck at the time.

APPENDIX

RECENT IMPLEMENTATION OF ARGENTINE FOREIGN POLICY

Analysis of the recent implementation of Argentine foreign policy clearly demonstrates that the Perón administration has adhered to traditional Argentine objectives. It has, however, adapted its program to the changes in its international position brought about by World War II, and has guided its relations with the US with reference to the requirements of its accelerated industrialization program.

a. *United Nations.*

In central UN bodies the objectives of Argentine foreign policy have generally coincided with those of the US on vital issues. The Argentine delegates have voted with the US with noteworthy consistency when the US-USSR division has been clear and unmistakable, except as on such issues as freedom of information. But also consistent with Argentina's foreign policy objectives has been the effort to capitalize Argentine leadership in seeking compromise solutions, to use the UN as a sounding board to propagandize a greater Argentina under Perón leadership, to oppose the unequal position of the great powers in the UN organization, and to oppose the censure of Spain in accordance with Argentina's long opposition to intervention in domestic affairs and its special friendship for Spain.

In the special UN organizations, the pursuit of Argentine special interests has made its delegates far less cooperative than in the central UN organizations. In some they have not even participated—e.g., the International Emergency Food Committee, the World Bank, and the Monetary Fund—because such participation was considered inimical to national interests or did not suit the government line of economic independence. In those organizations, in which Argentine delegates have participated—e.g., the ITO Conference in Habana—they have on the whole vigorously opposed the US program, emphasizing what they considered national interest in spheres such as bilateral as opposed to multilateral trade. The divisions between the US and Argentina in these gatherings have been underlined by Argentine efforts to capitalize on them for propaganda purposes and by the obvious notice taken of these differences by other delegations participating.

Argentina's record at the ITO Conference is fairly typical of its activities at special conferences directly involving national interests. The bitter attack of Senator Molinari, chief of the delegation, on the ITO Charter and on US economic policies was an expression of the powerful nationalist influence in the Perón government that resists any immediate limitations on Argentina's economic sovereignty in return for what that group considers the unlikely advantages of international cooperation. This group felt that Argentina had much to lose from multilateral economic agreements and that it could strike more favorable bargains on a bilateral basis using its decisive weapon of control of food supplies. The attack on US economic policy was calculated to under-

mine support for the US by appealing to Latin American delegations and to those of other undeveloped areas that view protective quotas, exchange controls, state trading, and bilateral and preferential agreements as natural devices to protect their infant industries and to find markets for their raw materials.

b. *Inter-American System.*

Historically the significance of Argentina to the attainment of US policy objectives has been most clearly revealed in Argentine obstruction to inter-American cooperation. Motivated by the desire for independence and leadership in Latin America and conditioned by strong ties with Europe, Argentina has been the least cooperative of republics in the inter-American system. Inevitably this position in relation to inter-American cooperation has involved very frequent obstruction to US inter-American policy by Argentine representatives. The attitudes of the Perón administration in the inter-American system appear to have been no less cooperative than those of previous administrations and on certain issues they have been more cooperative.

At the August 1947 Inter-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro representatives of the Perón government supported the US-sponsored Inter-American Defense Plan which was the main item on the agenda. With the backing of most of the Army and the Peronista Party, Perón offered this unprecedented degree of Argentine cooperation in inter-American affairs despite considerable domestic opposition from Nationalists, Radicals, Communists, and some members of the armed forces. In doing so, he was apparently motivated by a hope of obtaining US technical and material aid for Argentina's industrial and armament expansion program as well as by a desire to perfect arrangements for defense of the Hemisphere in case of a third world war.

In insisting at the Bogotá Conference in 1948 that political and military powers should be withheld from, and that no broad economic powers should be granted to, the central organization of the inter-American system, the Argentine representatives gave renewed evidence that Perón's foreign policy embraces the traditional Argentine aversion to cooperation in the inter-American system at the cost of what it considers a possible sacrifice of Argentine sovereignty. The traditional Argentine fear of a "super state" was employed early in the conference as the basis for ostensible opposition to collective action against Communism. Actually, this obstruction seems to have been merely part of a maneuver designed to gain a bargaining position on the Falkland Islands question. Eventual Argentine adherence to the resolution for the defense of democracy against international Communism was consistent with President Perón's efforts to initiate action of this nature at the Rio Conference.

The Argentine offer at Bogotá to contribute generously to the capitalization of an Inter-American Bank for economic development and to provide an important part of the machinery and raw materials needed by the other Latin American republics was clearly a pretentious gesture designed to extend Argentine influence in the Hemisphere at the expense of that of the US. The offer was timed to take advantage of the bitter disappointment of the other American republics with Secretary Marshall's statement that European reconstruction was first in importance and that Latin American countries should rely principally on private capital for economic development.

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This was obviously a hollow offer since Argentina itself is in need of machinery and its ability at the time to make foreign loans was essentially limited to the sale of food surpluses on credit.

c. *Relations with European Countries.*

The political relations of the Perón administration with Europe have been marked in general by attempts to turn Argentine economic advantage to political use in gaining power and prestige at home and abroad, and by tentative moves to engage in the game of playing off European countries against the US. Only relations with the UK and with Spain merit particular note.

Tension between Argentina and the UK over their conflicting territorial claims, which gained world attention following the dispatch of British, Argentine, and Chilean naval units to Antarctica in February 1948, is a phase of a century-old dispute over the Falkland Islands and of recent changes in world power relationships. The Perón government has revived the dispute at this time both for current domestic political advantage, and because it sees an opportunity in the weakening of British power to recover the islands by direct pressure or with the support of the US and the inter-American system. President Perón did not hesitate before the Bogotá Conference to play off US concern with the USSR in an attempt to gain US support for Argentine claims to the Falklands against those of the UK. Failing in this, he collaborated with other governments in obtaining sufficient support at the conference for the passage of a resolution, from which the US abstained, that condemned the occupation of American territories by extra-continental powers. The dispute in Antarctica, which also reflects the growing ambitions of the Argentine Government, differs from the Falklands question in that the rights of the claimants are less well-defined and because other governments are involved as actual or potential claimants. Recent Argentine disapproval of the terms of a US proposal to settle conflicting Antarctic claims through joint control by an eight-power condominium and indications that Argentina will increase the intensity of its efforts against the UK over the Falklands emphasize the significance of the prestige-conscious and expansionist Perón foreign policy in relation to US responsibilities.

Present Argentine relations with Spain are in a sense complementary to the change in its relations with Britain. The Perón administration has cut important ties that bound Argentina to Britain for a century and has declared its independence of British guidance. At the same time it has also undertaken what might be termed an Argentine adoption of Spain. The Perón government has extended credits to Franco, shipped urgently needed foodstuffs, assumed the role of his strongest defender in the UN and projected the extensive use of Spain as Argentina's entrepôt for the sales of goods to Europe. In return for benefits received, Franco Spain has pursued a consistently friendly policy toward Perón and has lent itself to his use of propaganda emphasizing kinship with the mother country, which has been an important vehicle in his drive for Latin American union under Argentine leadership.

d. Relations with the Soviet Bloc.

The Perón administration, although stressing its anti-Communist character in national politics, has drawn a distinction between its attitude toward the local Communist Party and that toward the Soviets and has continued to carry on a sporadic affair with the USSR. Because the Communist Party has not been a threat to the Argentine Government and because Argentine propaganda is geared to a neutral position as between capitalism and Communism, President Perón has felt himself under no strong compulsion to break relations and to make hostile gestures toward the Soviet as part of an anti-Communist campaign. On the contrary, Argentine economic negotiations with the Soviets—initiated soon after President Perón came to power, suspended for over a year, and renewed with the gathering financial crisis and receding prospects of ECA dollars—suggested a tentative effort to use the USSR as a counterpoise to US influence. Although it is extremely unlikely that Argentina will find any firm basis of collaboration with the Soviets because of the strongly anti-Communist character of Argentina and because the basis for substantial trade intercourse does not exist, Perón's relative tolerance for the Soviets in the context of balance as against the US contains potentially serious dangers to the Hemisphere and US security interests. The quasi-Marxian content of the "Third Line" propaganda offensive in Latin America directed against the US has impaired the Argentine potential for leadership in any Hemisphere effort against Communism. Furthermore Soviet and satellite diplomatic representatives in Argentina have effectively used their diplomatic status for proselytizing and organizing Slav groups who constitute the chosen instrument of planned sabotage for the Soviets.

e. Relations with Latin American Countries.

The activities of the Perón government most conspicuously directed against US interests have been undertaken in connection with Argentine efforts to extend its influence among Latin American states. Labor propaganda has been an outstanding weapon used by the administration in its attempts to displace US influence. Peronista labor leaders, who have been conspicuous in Argentina's postwar foreign propaganda offensive, are thoroughly indoctrinated with anti-US propaganda and have made it their business to tear down the US while building up Argentina. Argentine foreign policy in the Latin American countries leans heavily on the identity of race, language, and culture, and, as in the case of its labor policy, it has taken on an anti-US coloration. President Perón himself appealed in his 23 May 1948 broadcast message to the Mexican people on the anniversary of Argentine independence, for the indestructible unity of the two nations "prompted by the voice of blood, religion, and language" coupling this with an attack on "imperialist capital and international trusts."

Reactions of the other Latin American governments to attempts to extend Argentine influence through labor, nationalist, military, and general propaganda channels vary considerably. The governments of nearby countries—including all potential members of a southern bloc—have expressed to US officials serious misgivings regarding the purpose of Argentine activities. They have repeatedly complained that the

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Perón administration is trying to infiltrate labor, nationalist, and military circles and thereby to gain a commanding position in local politics. The Brazilian Government has also voiced its suspicion that Argentina is actively working to gain control of southern South America. Governments of countries farther north are naturally less concerned with the problem of Argentine political or economic domination. They appear in some cases to have welcomed tokens of Argentine interest as providing a bargaining weapon in their dealings with the US. This is especially true in Central America and the Caribbean, to which areas the combined operations of labor, nationalist, and anti-US propaganda have been carried with particular emphasis by Argentine missions.

To date the political operations of the Argentine Government have not attained any large measure of success in Latin America. They have been hampered by lack of plan, inferior personnel, the tendency of other Latin American countries to look to the US for leadership on matters of importance, by a distrust of Argentina which in some cases outweighs a distrust of the US, and by Argentina's own need to maintain friendly relations with the US.

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DISSENT OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

1. The Office of Naval Intelligence dissents from those portions (Section IV and part of Summary) of ORE 50-48 which estimate the probable Argentine policy in the event of a US-USSR war before 1952, for the following reasons:

a. ONI believes that, in the event of a US-USSR war, Argentina would probably follow a course of Neutrality rather than cobelligerency on the side of the US, because:

(1) Her foreign policy will be opportunistic and maintenance of a neutral position would be to her advantage.

(2) Neutrality would not necessarily mean the loss of Argentine leadership in South America. Basically she is far superior to other Latin nations and this enormous advantage is not lost by non-participation in a war on the other side of the world.

(3) The Communist threat to Argentina is too remote to be used as "pressure for a declaration of war".


b. ONI does not believe that the advantages to the US of Argentine cobelligerency would necessarily outweigh the disadvantages. "Benevolent" neutrality might furnish the US with required Argentine support but with fewer US obligations.

NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
SURVEY

ARGENTINA

SECTION 56
PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY

JANUARY 1964



WARNING

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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*This Section was prepared for the NIS by the
Central Intelligence Agency.*

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54. Public Order and Safety

A. General

Public order and safety in Argentina have traditionally been influenced by the nation's high standard of living, high rate of literacy, the traditionally honest court system, and a high degree of interest in criminology. In recent decades many institutions concerned with public order and safety have been adversely affected by protracted political and military unrest and the distortion of justice during the Perón era.

Argentina shares with Uruguay Latin America's highest standard of living. Generally poverty has not constituted a stimulus to crime although during the past year economic hardship has prompted some increase. Argentina's police and penal institutions are better equipped and financed than those of most other Latin American nations, although below the standard of the United States. The Argentine legal profession has manifested interest in criminology and penology dating back to the 19th century and authorities have kept well abreast of new ideas in these sciences although these ideas have not always found their way into law.

Political and military unrest, becoming marked during World War II, and characterizing most of the ensuing regimes—of Perón (1946-55), of the provisional military government (1955-58), of ousted President Arturo Frondizi (1958-62), and of succeeding President José María Guido (1962-63)—has greatly increased the problem of maintaining public order and safety. Since the successful overthrow of Perón the prime cause of disorder has been the attempts of extremist groups—Peronists, Communists, or extreme nationalists—to gain power by subversive means, and the occasional extralegal efforts of opponents to block these groups. Unrest has manifested itself in the overthrow of established governments three times since 1943, in numerous cabinet changes and major shifts of policy, and in open battles between factions of armed forces, the most recent in September 1962 and April 1963.

Political instability has led to economic stagnation with little growth since World War II and has inhibited investment of the size needed to overcome the economic deterioration of the Perón era. The recession during 1962-63 was aggravated by the ouster of Frondizi in March 1962 and has been characterized by widespread unemployment,

default on payment of salaries, inflation, and scarcity.

Economic difficulties have resulted in reductions of operating funds of law-enforcement agencies and penal institutions. Low salaries and lack of modern equipment have decreased the efficiency of police forces, while penal institutions are crowded and lack facilities for rehabilitation. A gradual upturn in the economy evidenced in mid-1963 may tend to change these situations for the better.

Subversive movements have caused the armed forces, who regard themselves as the foremost defenders of constitutionalism, to maintain tight control over the nation's security units. Excepting a few provincial forces, the military exercises direct or indirect control over the police, largely by placing its active or retired officers in command positions. Although this practice has aroused public criticism and resentment among subordinates on the various police units, armed forces leaders are reluctant to withdraw their control of national security organizations barring the removal of subversive threats from Peronism and Communism. Unrest has also caused the suspension of many constitutional rights over long periods through the imposition of a state of siege and the "CONINTES" plan, which places the police under the military in an emergency.

In accord with the federal organization of the nation, Argentine police functions are divided on a national and a provincial basis. Each of Argentina's 22 provinces has its own police forces. The Federal Police (*Policía Federal*) have nationwide jurisdiction in certain types of crimes as well as exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal District (*Distrito Federal*) of Buenos Aires and in Tierra del Fuego, the only remaining administrative unit governed as a national territory. Federal Police authority in the provinces is exercised by small regional offices located in the provincial capitals and major interior cities. Other countrywide police functions are exercised by the National Gendarmerie (*Gendarmería Nacional*), a militarized police force under army control. Although it normally serves as a land frontier guard, the Gendarmerie performs internal police functions in case of emergency and is the first element called upon to reinforce regular police units. The National Maritime Prefecture (*Prefectura Nacional Marítima*), which is under navy

control, is charged with policing the nation's water boundaries and ports and performs security functions in designated waterfront areas.

Argentina's police elements, backed by armed forces, are considered capable of containing any security threat short of a nationwide uprising. Despite a need for improved communications and transportation equipment and despite morale problems brought about by low pay and inadequate public support, the National Gendarmerie and National Maritime Prefecture are well disciplined and efficient. However, except for the police of the Province of Buenos Aires—an organization as large and capable as the Federal Police—provincial police forces are less reliable than national forces. Pay is low and equipment is poor. In the event the provincial police are incapable of maintaining order, Gendarmerie or armed forces units can be speedily substituted.

The Argentine penal system, like all others in Latin America, is governed by codified laws on the concept of Roman law. Trial by judge rather than jury is the rule and the aim of the system is the rehabilitation rather than the punishment of the prisoner. Penal practices, however, do not always meet requirements of the law, due to lack of funds and insufficient facilities. Nevertheless, Argentina's penal system remains among the best in Latin America.

Argentina's federal organization of government is reflected in a dual system of courts, with both provincial and national or federal courts of first instance and of appeal, as well as supreme courts. Supreme authority is held by the national or federal supreme court. National courts have sole jurisdiction in the federal capital and Territory of Tierra del Fuego, while jurisdiction in the provinces is divided between national and provincial courts. The national government and provinces have their own prisons.

The Argentine Criminal Code (*Código Penal*), dating from 1922, is classical in philosophy but with influence from the positivist school of penology. Its penalties are average by Latin American standards but lenient in comparison with many U.S. criminal codes. The death penalty has been abolished and life imprisonment is rare. The penalty of disqualification (*inhabilitación*), which bars the recipient from official employment or civic privileges, is frequently given for crimes involving malfeasance in office, while fines are commonly prescribed for less serious crimes. The usefulness of fines as a penalty has been reduced in recent years, however, by inflation which makes prescribed fines inconsequential. The chief weaknesses of the Argentine penal code are the failure 1) to comprehend types of crimes which have become common since the code was promulgated and 2) to take cognizance of the most modern theories of penology. The national Code of Procedure

(*Código de Procedimientos*), dating from 1883, calls for trial by judge and written forms of court process. It has been frequently criticized as placing too much reliance upon the ability and impartiality of the judge and for causing long trial delays. The detention of persons for long periods while awaiting trial is a cause of concern among Argentine penologists. Procedural codes wholly or partially utilizing oral process are in force in seven of Argentina's 22 provinces.

Argentina's federal prison system has some 15 institutions, located in the city of Buenos Aires and elsewhere. Slightly less than half of Argentina's total prison population is confined in federal prisons with the balance in provincial institutions. Although legal codes call for separation of prisoners according to character and offense, various categories of prisoners, including those arrested for political reasons, may be housed in one institution. Most of the 235 political prisoners still held in mid-1963 were released after the elections in July of that year.

New prison construction has been minimal since World War II and institutions are crowded. The Detention Institute (*Instituto de Detención*) in Buenos Aires, where a riot of discontented prisoners in December 1962 cost 25 lives, is illustrative of the poor conditions in many prisons. This institution was not only overcrowded but lacking in workshops and recreation and sanitary facilities. Provincial prisons, with the exception of those in the Province of Santa Fe, are even more poorly equipped and maintained. The caliber of administrative personnel and guards in federal prisons is generally above the Latin American average. Treatment of prisoners follows legally prescribed norms.

Many prisoners, especially those awaiting trial, pass their days in idleness. Postprison rehabilitation is also deficient since national and provincial parole boards receive little supervision, are not effectively controlled, and only partly meet their responsibilities. Excepting the Province of Santa Fe, the caliber of personnel and the effectiveness of rehabilitation are lower in provincial prisons, as opposed to federal prisons. Plans have been formulated by the national government for construction which will end overcrowding and provide facilities necessary for rehabilitation, but their fulfillment will depend in large measure on the reestablishment of tranquillity and on economic recovery.

There is at present no active civil defense organization in Argentina. Civil defense plans come under the jurisdiction of the armed forces and consist of brief outlines dating from the era of World War II for passive air raid defense (*defensa antiaérea pasiva*). Systems for blackout and early warning are planned. These envision coordinated efforts of armed forces, police, and firemen.

B. Police system

Primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in Argentina is divided between the national government's Federal Police (*Policia Federal*) and the various provincial police forces, roughly in the same manner that police authority in the United States is divided between state and federal governments. However, the Federal Police also assume exclusive police functions in the Federal Capital of Buenos Aires. Other police functions in designated areas are carried out by the National Gendarmerie (*Gendarmeria Nacional*) and the National Maritime Prefecture (*Prefectura Nacional Maritima*). All Argentine police forces are modeled on European systems, principally French.

1. Federal Police

a. ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP — The Argentine Federal Police were established with the federalization of the city of Buenos Aires on 9 December 1880. They were an outgrowth of the police of the city of Buenos Aires, created by law on 24 December 1821, 11 years after Argentina declared its independence from Spain. By Decree 17,550 of 1943 the authority of the Federal Police was extended to the provinces, giving this force jurisdiction (*fuero federal*) over all crimes of a national nature, such as political offenses or simple crimes involving national authorities. Under the Perón regime (1946-55) the Federal Police were granted the privilege, similar to that of the armed forces under the Code of Military Justice, of trial by police courts under a special police penal code, but by a decision of the National Supreme Court (*Corte Suprema de Justicia*) in May 1956 Federal Police were again subject to civil penal codes.

The Federal Police are subordinate to the President of the Republic through the Minister of the Interior. The influence of the armed forces has traditionally been strong, even though the Federal Police do not fall under organizational control of the military as do Argentina's other national law-enforcement agencies, the Gendarmerie and the Maritime Prefecture. Organic regulations approved in November 1962 provide that any qualified person may occupy the posts of Chief of Federal Police and head of the Directorate of Federal Coordination (*Coordinación Federal*), the counter-subversive arm of the force, thereby reversing a decree of January 1958, which required that these positions be filled from the armed forces. Under present conditions of relative instability, chiefs of the armed forces, however, feel that only through preserving their influence in Argentina's national law-enforcement agencies can they insure strong and concerted action against subversive elements. Other posts which are usually filled by presidential appointment rather than from the ranks of professional police officers are the Deputy Chief (*Subjefe*) of Federal Police, the head of the Directorate of Federal Coordination, and the head of the force's legal arm, the Legal Counsel (*Asesoría Letrada*), who must be a lawyer. This practice has resulted in friction, since regular Federal Police officers resent the appointment of outsiders to high posts and because armed services appointees often have no particular qualifications for these assignments. Admiral Recaredo E. Vázquez, who served as chief of Federal Police from September 1960 to March 1962, had never performed police duties during his career and had never lived in the Federal Capital.

The organization of the Federal Police is shown in FIGURE 1. In addition to his duties as head of




FIGURE 1. ORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL POLICE

the force, the Chief of Federal Police acts as a judge of violations (*contravenciones*) pertaining to police ordinances in the city of Buenos Aires and controls the granting of identity documents. Directly subordinate to the Office of the Chief (*Jefatura*) are the Legal Counsel and the Directorates of Instruction (*Instrucción*) and Federal Coordination. The Directorate of Instruction controls the training of all policemen, and operates three schools. The Legal Counsel serves as a technical-judicial agency which examines the acts of the Federal Police and advises on their legality or jurisdiction. The Directorate of Federal Coordination operates against subversion by domestic extremist groups or by foreign powers and controls the Regional Police Offices (*Delegaciones Exteriores*) which exercise the authority of the Federal Police in Argentina's 22 provinces. (See SECTION 56, Intelligence and Security, for a more complete discussion of the Directorate of Federal Coordination.)

In addition to assuming the functions of the Chief in his absence, the Deputy Chief serves as Inspector General and Comptroller of all operations of the force. Nine directorates are dependent upon the deputy's office (*Subjefatura*). The Administrative Directorate controls repair facilities for equipment and vehicles, provides veterinary service, and performs ordinary administrative tasks such as the payment of salaries and collection of fines. The Directorate of Social Work and Health (*Dirección Obra Social y Sanidad Policial*) promotes the well-being of federal policemen and their families and provides medical assistance to jailed persons. It operates the Bartolomé Churruca Police Hospital and other institutions devoted to police social benefits. The Personnel Directorate controls recruiting, retirement, and pensions, and is responsible for the administration of all active duty personnel.

A variety of operations are charged to the General Secretariat (*Secretaría General*), including police bands, library, and museum. It also issues duty rosters, regulations, and bulletins and controls the General Archives. The Judicial Directorate compiles criminal statistics and has charge of relations with the nation's judicial hierarchy and prison system and is responsible for the security of prisoners and the protection of women and minors in Federal Police custody. It controls the Women Police (*Policia Femenina*), a unit primarily devoted to police work among women and minors, and has charge of the Police Warehouse (*Depósito Policial*). The San Miguel Asylum (*asilo*) for police orphans is administered by this directorate. The Communications Directorate (*Dirección Comunicaciones*) operates telegraph, telephone, and radio networks and installation and repair shops for these facilities, and also handles communications for the nation's federal

law courts. It does not control Radio Communications Command (*Comando Radioeléctrico*), which is a part of the Security Directorate (*Dirección Seguridad*).

All uniformed Federal Police with the exception of the Women Police and the Fire Department serve under the Security Directorate, the organization of which is shown in FIGURE 2. This directorate is the major operational division under the Deputy Chief of Police. Personnel engaged in ordinary patrol work serve in the Public Order (*Orden Público*) Division of this directorate while the four specialized uniformed units are in the Corps (*Cuerpos*) Division. The territorial jurisdiction of the Public Order Division, entirely within the city of Buenos Aires, is divided into six subdivisions (*circunscripciones*) and 50 precincts (*comisarias*), with the latter forming the basic control unit. The office of Passive Air Raid Defense (*Defensa Antiaérea Pasiva*), shown as dependent to the Subdirectorato, exists only on paper.

The Investigations Directorate (*Dirección Investigaciones*), the organization of which is shown in FIGURE 3, conducts specialized crime investigation and maintains extensive criminal identification files. Its jurisdiction, however, is confined to the Federal Capital. Federal investigative functions in the provinces are carried out by the Regional Police Offices under the authority of the Federal Coordination Directorate. These regional offices were formerly under a Directorate of the Interior (now defunct) and their assignment to the Federal Coordination Directorate appears to reflect an increasing preoccupa-




FIGURE 2. ORGANIZATION OF THE SECURITY DIRECTORATE




FIGURE 3. ORGANIZATION OF THE INVESTIGATIONS DIRECTORATE

tion with suppression of subversion as opposed to ordinary crime and an effort of armed forces leaders to win firmer control over such activity. Five regional offices are located in populous Buenos Aires Province, two each in the provinces of Santa Fe, Córdoba, Corrientes, Entre Ríos, and Chubut, and one in the capital of each remaining province. The staffing of each office varies between 2 and 12 men, depending on local requirements.

The Buenos Aires Fire Department* (*Dirección Bomberos*) was established in 1870 and later placed under the authority of the Federal Police. In addition to firefighting duties, the department initially had some paramilitary functions, joining regular Federal Police forces in combating revolutionary outbreaks and civil disturbances. In 1930, however, the carrying of sidearms by firemen was abolished and technical proficiency improved, although firemen continue to support police units in riot control. A rapid increase in the incidence of arson in 1955 brought about the creation of the Investigative Section (*Sección Pericias*), within the Fire Department to assist the judicial authorities in apprehending and convicting arsonists while an increase in terrorism caused the creation of the Explosives Brigade (*Brigada de Explosivos*), demolition experts, in 1957. In the same year, a Technical Inspection Section (*Sección Inspecciones Técnicas*) for fire safety in commerce and industry was founded.

* The usual designation in other countries is *Dirección de Bomberos*; Argentina often omits the article.

The Fire Department consists of a directorate and subdirectorato, with the Investigative Section and Administrative Office dependent on the former, and Administrative Services, Technical Services, and the two territorial subdivisions into which the city is divided dependent on the latter. Each subdivision has three zones (*zonas*), the basic control unit. A harbor firefighting unit, the river detachment (*destacamento fluvial*), and various other detachments are administered separately. The Technical Inspection Section is a dependency of Technical Services.

b. BUDGET AND SALARIES — Total salaries (base pay plus allowances) for the different ranks of Federal Police officers (excluding enlisted men and noncommissioned officers) range from a low of 12,000 pesos (US\$89 as of mid-1963) to 50,000 pesos (US\$370) per month. Basic salary is about 50% of the amount, the balance being composed of allowances such as time in grade (10% of basic salary), family, and professional risk. Latest pay scales for enlisted personnel are not available, but in the past, base pay for the highest enlisted rating, Principal Noncommissioned Officer (*Suboficial Principal*), has been only slightly less than that of the middle grade Inspector Officer (*Inspector Oficial*), while only the two lowest enlisted ratings, Agent (*Agente*) and Corporal (*Cabo*), were paid at a lower basic rate than the Subadjutant Officer (*Subayudante Oficial*) the lowest grade of commissioned status.

In addition, cash awards are given for acts of valor, unusual devotion to duty, arrests performed while off duty, and injuries sustained. Expenses to cover traveling, moving, and other official activities are also provided.

Although Federal Police are better paid than other nonmilitary security forces except the Buenos Aires Provincial Police, their combined salaries and fringe benefits are considered inadequate. In 1961 the salaries of lower ranking police enlisted personnel were found to be comparable with, and in some cases less than, those of chauffeurs and truck drivers working for government agencies.

Retirement benefits are computed on base pay plus certain allowances and length of service. Officers receive 100% benefits after 30 years' service and enlisted men after 25 years. The former become eligible for voluntary retirement, with 60% benefits, after 20 years' service, while the latter are eligible after 17 years. The scale is exactly the same as that of the Argentine armed forces and although generous by U.S. standards, it is not above average for civil employees in Argentina, whose retirement benefits after long service customarily approach their regular sala-

c. **STRENGTH** — Present strength of the Federal Police is approximately 16,000 men, including the 100 officers and 1,200 enlisted men of the Fire Department. The size of the force is considered inadequate for preserving public order and safety in an urban area with a population of approximately 4,000,000 and represents an absolute decline of about 25% from a strength of 20,000 in 1957, and a much sharper drop in relation to population growth since that year. The ratio of police to population is even more disproportionate when the great numbers of persons who commute daily to the Federal District from outlying suburbs are considered. Among other factors reducing the capabilities of the Federal Police is the division of each 24-hour period into four shifts instead of three. This practice is followed in order to give policemen the opportunity to supplement their incomes with part-time jobs.

Inadequate strength is probably most acute among uniformed policemen engaged in routine patrolling in Buenos Aires, where it is estimated that the number of men available for such duty is little more than in 1922, when the population of the Federal Capital was only 1.8 million. In 1961 a total of 6,547 enlisted men were assigned to the 50 precincts of the capital. Each patrolman on duty was estimated to be responsible for the safety of 7,036 persons, and to have charge of an average of 18 densely populated square blocks. A former chief of Federal Police stated that an additional 9,000 men would be required to patrol Buenos Aires' streets adequately. Similarly, the strength of the Investigations Directorate of the Federal Police declined from 1,504 in 1945 to 1,111 in 1961, while crimes against property rose from approximately 7,500 in 1940 to 16,400 in 1961. The Mounted Police and Infantry Guard, principal riot-control forces, declined from 3,049 men in 1945 to 2,000 in 1961. The present trend indicates that personnel shortages are likely to become more serious; in 1961 it was estimated that only one person entered the ranks of the Federal Police for every four who left.

d. **OPERATIONS** — The mission of the Federal Police is to perform security and judicial functions in the provinces and the Federal Capital within the limitations provided by the Constitution and the laws of the nation. Within Buenos Aires the territorial jurisdiction of the Federal Police is limited only by that of the National Maritime Prefecture in the port area.

Ordinary patrolling is still carried out principally by unmounted police who report via a special police telephone network. When funds are available authorities hope to replace most foot patrolmen with car and motorcycle patrols and to equip individuals with portable radio transmitter-receivers. The Regional Police Offices in the provinces are generally inadequately

staffed to meet their responsibilities. Their effectiveness is also often reduced by limited cooperation offered by provincial police forces which dislike interference by outsiders.

Federal Police are responsible for issuing and maintaining records of identity cards (*cédulas de identidad*), including the necessary file of biographic information required to obtain such official documentation. Possession of the card is not required by law, but is necessary for many purposes of identification, such as registration at hotels, and it is carried by most Argentines. It may be issued to resident aliens and minors below the age of 18 as well as to adult citizens. Identity cards are of wallet size and carry the right thumbprint and a passport-type picture of the bearer.

Control of widespread automobile theft has been a major problem since World War II and much of the task has fallen on the Federal Police. Incidence of automotive theft has risen rapidly in recent years as high duties and other restrictions on imports have forced the price of new and used vehicles to several times that of comparable models in the United States and Europe. Responsibility for combating auto thefts falls on the Automotive Brigade (*Brigada de Automotores*), and upon the recently established National Automotive Registry (*Registro Nacional de Automotor*), which aims at the registration and indexing of all cars and trucks in Argentina. Through intensified investigative work and a campaign of public education Federal Police succeeded in lessening the number of thefts from their 1961 highs, and increasing the recovery rate from 19% in June 1960 to 46% in February 1962. Proposals have been made to curb automotive theft further by giving the Federal Police nationwide jurisdiction over such cases.

Although administrative corruption has become so widespread in recent years as to cause extensive popular mistrust and to be a factor in military unrest, the Federal Police are not authorized to investigate or control corruption in government. Federal Coordination officials, however, may intervene in cases of official irregularities involving national security. A National Investigating Committee, created by executive order, operated from April to October 1962 and uncovered irregularities by the President of the National Bank (*Banco de la Nación*) and lesser officials and some experts have proposed the creation of a Federal Police division modeled on the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Traffic control in the city of Buenos Aires is the responsibility of the Traffic Police Corps, familiarly known as the "grey foxes" (*zorros grises*), because of their distinctive uniforms. Traffic problems in the Federal Capital are complicated by widespread disregard of traffic regula-

tions among motorists and pedestrians. Traffic lights, which were not in use until after World War II, have been gradually increased, despite the complaints of motorists. As of May 1963, Buenos Aires had only 100 intersections controlled by lights, as compared to 9,000 in New York City. Traffic Police still lack an adequate number of squad cars and motorcycles for their duties. Traffic at most heavily used intersections is controlled by patrolmen through manually operated lights or hand signals given from enclosed traffic tubs (*castilletes*), while observance of automatic traffic lights is often enforced by stationing policemen nearby. In early 1963 a corps of women Traffic Police (*Policia Femenina de Tránsito*) was organized to reinforce traffic control efforts in the Federal Capital.

A large proportion of the Federal Police effort is directed against manifestations of subversive activity, although direct responsibility for investigating and controlling subversion rests with the Federal Coordination staff and armed forces intelligence units under the direction and coordination of the Secretariat of State Intelligence (*Secretaria de Informaciones del Estado*). Major objectives of terrorists, rioters, and saboteurs have been attempts to intimidate legal opposition groups and to weaken the stability of the government through bombings, some of them of considerable daring.

Pressure by armed forces leaders who felt that the police were not taking sufficiently vigorous action against suspected terrorists and who were alarmed by attempts against military personnel and installations, caused the imposition of the CONINTES (a contraction of the term *convulsión interna del estado*—internal commotion in the state) plan in March 1960. The plan calls for suspension of certain constitutional guarantees and combining police and armed forces elements into a unified antiterrorist command under army direction. The plan authorizes trial by military tribunals. When put into effect it was apparently successful in greatly diminishing the incidence of terrorism. It was suspended in August 1961, due to increasing allegations of arbitrary implementation as well as to a decline of terrorist activity. It has since been reimposed for brief periods of time, but in order to curb general political and military unrest, rather than to combat terrorist activity.

Control of politically inspired riots and strikes and other civil disorders forms an important part of Federal Police operations, since mob violence in Argentina and elsewhere in Latin America is a potential threat to the stability of the government. Not only Peronists, Communists, and rightwing, antisemitic organizations, but also elements within the more moderate national political parties have attempted to use civil disorders to their ad-

vantage. The Mounted Police and the Infantry Guard, together numbering about 2,000 men, are the prime riot-control elements. In emergency, reinforcements may be drawn from other police units, from the National Gendarmerie, and from units of the armed forces.

Many measures are used to prevent or control disturbances. Known Communist, Peronist, or other agitators may be arrested in anticipation of disorders. The efficacy of this measure was demonstrated on May Day of 1962 and during the Cuban crisis of October 1962. These dates passed with a minimum of disturbance. Police try to control potentially explosive situations by dispersing assemblies of small groups or by a show of force in which open-sided police vans, loaded with about 35 men armed and ready for action, are parked in strategic locations. Mounted Police try to control crowds by maneuvering their horses. The Infantry Guard Corps is equipped with sidearms, nightsticks, steel helmets, and tear-gas guns.

Riot control activities are supported by the Fire Department which operates high-pressure fire hoses and armored cars which squirt streams of brightly colored dye on demonstrators. This last device enables police to identify and arrest mob participants after they have left the scene of the disturbance. Although efficient, Federal Police are restrained in dealing with disorders, and serious casualties among demonstrators are rare.

Ordinary Fire Department operations are handled from six engine houses (*cuarteles*) in Buenos Aires, which contain most of the department's motorized equipment and 300 of its 1,300 men. The balance of the department's personnel are assigned to detachments in the various police precincts. Rule-of-thumb is that one truck is sent in case of fire in a private house, two if in a factory or commercial establishment, and three if in a large building or at a public event. The Technical Inspection Service of the Fire Department reportedly inspects safety installations in an average of 20 buildings of various types a day. The approval of the Plans and Assessments Section (*Sección Proyectos y Asesoramientos*) is required before any building may be occupied in Buenos Aires. Since most buildings are constructed with non-flammable materials, fires are not a serious problem in the Federal District. In 1962 they numbered 1,813, an increase from the 1,694 registered in 1958, but less than the 1,838 of 1961.

c. WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT — The materiel of the Federal Police, with the exception of motorized equipment for patrolling, is considered generally adequate. Patrolmen are armed with nightsticks and pistols, usually .38 calibre or 9mm, and submachine guns are available for issue. As of 1961 only 50 patrol cars were regularly available.

a serious deficiency considering the size of Buenos Aires. The telecommunications system of the Federal Police, although good by Latin American standards, does not compare favorably to those of police forces in the United States. Telephone communications for individual patrolmen are not good, particularly on rainy days when dampness affects the lines. Radio, the means of communication with patrol cars and with the Regional Police Offices, is considered adequate.

Federal Police laboratory and record keeping facilities are considered satisfactory although below the standards of U.S. police forces, principally because of a lack of funds to purchase the latest equipment and to send technicians to study abroad. As elsewhere in Argentina, the Federal Police use the Vucetich fingerprinting system, invented by an Argentine in 1891. Similar to the Henry system, it has been adopted by police forces in many nations. The fingerprint files of the Federal Police are extensive but no nationwide registry of fingerprints has been set up. The biographic and criminal records and card index files are administered by hand. Professional and technical publications of the Federal Police, except for a technical periodical of the Fire Department, have been discontinued since 1955.

Motorized equipment of the Fire Department consists of 36 fire trucks, two portable power plants, a portable repair shop, three ladder trucks, two special trucks for chemical fires. The department also has a fireboat in Buenos Aires harbor.

Federal Police wear blue uniforms of wool or cotton except the Traffic Police who wear grey. The quality and style of uniforms compare favorably with those of the armed forces. Firemen usually wear a fatigue uniform on duty while mounted police are outfitted in riding pants and boots.

F. PERSONNEL, RECRUITMENT, AND TRAINING —

All persons employed by the Federal Police serve in the broad categories of officer (*personal superior*) or enlisted man (*personal subalterno*). Advancement to the rank of Inspector General, highest officer rank, is theoretically possible in all branches of the force, except the administration, band, or Women Police. Qualified physicians or lawyers serving the Federal Police hold officer grades. Enlisted men are ranked in descending order as follows: Principal Noncommissioned Officer (*Suboficial Principal*), Adjutant Noncommissioned Officer (*Suboficial Ayudante*), Clerk Noncommissioned Officer (*Suboficial Escribiente*), First Sergeant (*Sargento Primero*), Sergeant (*Sargento*), First Corporal (*Cabo Primero*), Corporal (*Cabo*), and Policeman (*Agente*), or Fireman (*Bombero*). The small Women's Police unit has no enlisted rank higher than that of First Sergeant.

In order to be promoted both officers and enlisted men must be approved by a qualification board (*junta calificadora*). The board for officers is composed of the heads of the various directorates, presided over by the Assistant Chief of Police, and meets annually in October to determine those eligible. The enlisted men's board is composed of lower rank representatives from the various directorates. Conditions for promotion are professional and physical aptitude, completion of the requisite time in grade, and passing special courses required at each grade level. Extraordinary promotions may be made for distinguished acts.

Officer personnel may resign from the service at any time, and enlisted men may leave after their initial 3-year enlistment period. Personnel who resign are not barred from applying for reassignment to the force. While on active duty personnel may be placed on temporary inactive status (*disponibilidad*) at their own request or that of their superior officer in order to attend to personal affairs or in the event of long sickness. Men with no specific post may be placed on *disponibilidad* until one is available. Personnel who have been arrested are also placed on inactive duty status. Retired personnel are subject to recall to active duty in the event of an emergency. Upon retirement they are permitted to live in any part of the Argentine Republic but must report change of domicile within 3 days and cannot reside abroad without special authorization.

Training of Federal Police personnel is good by Latin American standards and Argentine authorities have such confidence in their methods that the establishment of an international police academy to train representatives from all parts of Latin America is contemplated. However, recruitment of both officers and enlisted personnel remains a problem, as reflected by persistent personnel shortages. The present lack of popularity of Federal Police service as a career stems not only from low pay but from a decline in the social and professional prestige of the police among the general public. Low prestige is in part a residue of the Perón era when the Federal Police acquired a reputation for brutality, and in part a result of occasional disorders and scandals within the force.

Enlisted men must be Argentine nationals, under 26 years of age, over 5 feet 5 inches tall, and have prior service in the armed forces unless fulfilling compulsory military obligations with the police. The applicant must also be in good health and without any criminal record. Minimum educational requirements are 4 years of primary schooling or qualifying by examination in lieu thereof. Aspirants for special appointment, such as communications technicians or musicians, must in addition demonstrate their skills in competitive tests. After signing the 3-year enlistment con-

ment, recruits either receive a basic training course of 1 month or are placed directly in units for on-the-job training. Salary, equipment, and uniforms are provided from date of acceptance, as are medical, social, and other benefits.

Continuous manpower shortages, dating from the Perón era, have made necessary the use of military service conscripts. Conscripts are inducted in March, June, September, and December of each year, and totaled 2,992 as of mid-1963. Volunteers for service with the Federal Police receive the benefits of higher pay than armed forces inductees and the assurance of spending their conscription term in Buenos Aires. Except for conscripts, who represent a cross-section of Argentine society, most enlisted personnel of the Federal Police are from the lower and lower middle classes.

With the exception of technical and professional personnel all Federal Police commissioned officers are graduates of the 2-year school, "Coronel Ramón L. Falcón." There is no provision for advancement to officer grade from enlisted ranks. Prospective cadets must be Argentine citizens, between 17 and 23 years of age, and have completed the third year of secondary schooling. They must also pass a medical examination and be between 5 feet 5 inches (1.65 meters) and 6 feet 5 inches (1.95 meters) tall. Federal Police officers differ little in background from officers of the Argentine armed forces, many choosing a police career after failing to gain admission to armed forces academies through physical defect or lack of family influence. Most are of middle class origin and have completed secondary education.

Cadets may be trained as either regular or administrative officers. Courses for regular police officers include penal law, police administration, police practices and techniques, Argentine history, gymnastics, and use of firearms. Courses for administrative officers also include accounting and mathematics. The academy is operated under strict military discipline.

Upon completion of the 2-year course cadets receive the rank of Subadjutant Officer (*Subayudante Oficial*), the lowest officer rank, and are assigned to police divisions. At specific periods during an officer's career he is required to enroll for further courses at the Superior Police School (*Escuela Superior de Policía*).

Established in 1906 in the Caballito district of Buenos Aires, the Coronel Ramón L. Falcón Academy is dilapidated and crowded. A new building is in preparation in the Villa Lugano district of the city, but no information is available as to when it will be completed. Police authorities have proposed expanding training at the academy to 4 years after the new building is occupied.

Foreign training for police continues to be limited by lack of funds, but is increasing. A pro-

gram to provide U.S. training for 15 participants over a 5-year period beginning in 1963 was preceded by the attendance of 3 officers at the Inter-American Police Academy in the Canal Zone. Two high-ranking officers attended special riot control courses in the United States in 1963, and four officers were sent to the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany for training in 1962. U.S. advice on specific police problems has occasionally been requested and films of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are used in some training courses.

g. MORALE AND PUBLIC RELATIONS — Poor morale is regarded as one of the chief problems of the Federal Police, although it has not reached such a magnitude as to limit effectiveness. A well-developed system of fringe benefits has not served to counteract the adverse effect of low pay scales or the low prestige of Federal Police among the general public. Other factors adverse to morale include the numerous deaths and injuries suffered by police in line of duty and the opinions held by the rank and file that the government is indifferent to the well-being of members of the force and that the legal system favors the criminal.

Fringe benefits are provided by the government and private societies. A limited number of low-cost housing units have been provided through government housing programs. Free hospitalization is provided at the Bartolomé Churrucá Police Hospital in Buenos Aires.

The principal private agencies aiding police are the Police Family Benefit Associations (*Asociaciones Pro Hogares Policiales*), about 50 of which operate on a neighborhood basis in Buenos Aires. Financial and social assistance which these voluntary societies provide include low-interest loans, donations for family emergencies, scholarships for children, courses for self-improvement, sports and social meetings, and free entertainments, such as barbecues (*asados*). However, the basic objective of such societies, which is to provide low-cost housing for enlisted personnel, has been negated in recent years by lack of bank credits. Another private agency benefiting Federal Police is the Vacation Camp Assistance Commission (*Comisión de Ayuda a Colonia de Vacaciones*) which operates a summer camp for police children at Capita del Monte, in the Province of Córdoba. There is a social-athletic club for enlisted personnel, but as yet no officers' club, a pronounced detriment to morale of police commissioned officers since nearly every branch of government in Buenos Aires has its own club.

Other than appeals on their behalf by high police officials and interested citizens, the Federal Police have little means of publicizing their needs or exerting pressure on the government for increased budget support. In the past they have

not resorted to strikes or demonstrations to achieve their demands. The only professional organization in the Federal Police is the Federal Police Enlisted Personnel Club (*Circulo de Personal Subalterno de la Policia Federal*), whose leaders have thus far resisted strong pressures among the rank and file to engage in union-type activities. Police took concerted action, however, in demanding the ouster of unpopular Federal Police Chief Enrique Green in August 1962. Incensed by Green's passive attitude following the killing of a fireman on duty by Marine sentries during an armed forces uprising, 200 officers, supported by enlisted personnel, met and named a five-man committee to ask for his resignation.

The principal manifestation of police discontent in recent years occurred in July 1961 during a funeral procession for two members of the force who had been killed on duty. As the procession passed the Congress Building members of the group fired a number of shots against the building. Investigation revealed that, in addition to dissatisfaction with equipment and legislation considered inadequate to control crime, those responsible were embittered by activities of a congressional committee investigating police brutality and other malpractices and were angered by failure to lower the Congressional flag to half-mast as the procession passed. Congressional indignation was calmed by a public apology from the Chief of Federal Police, but the event was regarded as evidence of poor discipline within the force.

The Federal Police have not succeeded in recovering the good reputation which they enjoyed before [the Perón regime]. Since 1955 cases of brutality and torture by police personnel have been infrequent, but such cases have been called to public notice often enough [to keep Federal Police prestige below its pre-Perón level]. Occasional strained relations with the press have also served to damage the public image of the force. Newsmen declared a 24-hour protest strike in July 1961 following the rough handling of reporters at the Congress Building shooting incident, and the bruising of a newsman covering an airplane crash at a Buenos Aires airport.

Corruption is not believed to be widespread within the Federal Police but low salaries and the large financial rewards to be gained by abetting smuggling and other activities constitute a formidable temptation. An investigation in September 1960 uncovered complicity by high officials in such activities as dope and white slave traffic and automobile thefts. The Chief of Federal Police, Admiral Ezequiel Vega, and five other naval officers on duty with the force were arrested for involvement in corrupt practices or failure to prevent them, while five regular police officers were suspended. Further investigation revealed irregulari-

ties of such extent that a full-scale reorganization of the Federal Police was ordered by the new chief. Although sufficient evidence for criminal prosecution of offenders was felt to be lacking, a total of 217 officers, suspected of malpractices or judged by their peers to be incompetent, were forced from the service.

Awareness of unsatisfactory public relations has caused the Federal Police to make efforts to bolster their prestige, especially among the poorer classes, upon whom fears of police brutality fall most heavily. The success enjoyed by the police athletic league of many large cities in the United States prompted the creation of a similar organization in Buenos Aires; athletic contests, usually soccer, are organized for youth under the supervision of police volunteers.

h. EFFECTIVENESS — The Argentine Federal Police are universally regarded as one of Latin America's best police forces, many observers placing them second only to the *Carabineros* of Chile in effectiveness. The Federal Police are well led and experience no serious deficiencies in training and materiel, although their effectiveness could be improved with additional telecommunications and automotive equipment. Careful consideration of the caliber of the Federal Police (and other Argentine police forces) prompted the U.S. Ambassador to advise that there is no need for a U.S. AID police assistance program in Argentina.

The effectiveness of the Federal Police in handling civil disorder has been repeatedly demonstrated. They have usually managed to contain riots with a minimum of property damage and bloodshed. Little information is available on the capability of the Federal Police to combat ordinary crime, but the incidence of crime, particularly crimes of violence, in Buenos Aires appears lower than in many cities of similar size elsewhere.

The principal threats to the effectiveness of the Federal Police lie in the areas of morale and public relations. Public authorities have cited the necessity of paying police at a rate compatible with the responsibility of their job and of improving facilities and equipment. These actions would have the additional benefits of attracting recruits to restore the Federal Police to adequate strength and of decreasing susceptibility to bribery.

2. National Gendarmerie

a. ORGANIZATION — The National Gendarmerie (*Gendarmeria Nacional*) was created in July 1938 and numbers approximately 11,000 men. It is organized on a military basis and responds to Argentine Army regulations.

Like other national police agencies, the Gendarmerie is under firm armed forces control. The director must hold a rank not lower than brigadier general in the armed forces and his two chief as-


assistants are also army officers on active duty; the organization is under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of War (*Secretaría de Ejército*) rather than the Ministry of Interior. In September 1951, under the Perón regime, the National Gendarmerie was placed under the control of the Ministry of Interior, becoming a police force in fact as well as in function; it was returned to military control in October 1955, following the overthrow of Perón.

The General Security Command, the Quartermaster General, and the Directorate General of Institutes, which controls training, are subordinate to the General Directorate (*Dirección General*) of the National Gendarmerie which has its headquarters in the city of Buenos Aires. Headquarters controls matters pertaining to registration, identification, communications, investigations, supply, and motor repairs, as well as administration. The National Gendarmerie has a small intelligence unit, which is subordinate to the Secretary of War, but not to the Army Intelligence Service (*Servicio de Informaciones del Ejército—SIE*). This unit reports on non-Communist subversive activities directed against the Argentine government from border countries,

Communist activities in border areas, and smuggling activities.

Territorial organization of the National Gendarmerie is shown in FIGURE 4. There are three regional commands comprising a total of 10 groups (*agrupaciones*) in the field forces of the Gendarmerie. Each group is commanded by a lieutenant colonel or major and is of regimental size. Each group covers the frontier security zone in one or two provinces. Within the groups are from two to five squadrons (with the exception of the Buenos Aires group), equivalent to battalions and under the command of a captain. Each squadron is composed of from two to four sections, equivalent to companies and commanded by a lieutenant. Basic command unit is the post, approximately four of which constitute a section. Each post has from 2 to 10 men under the command of a non-commissioned officer.

In addition to their tactical commands, Gendarmerie personnel are assigned to one of two functional groups or corps; the command corps (security, investigations, communications, mechanized) or the professional corps (legal, sanitary, administrative, veterinary, construction, clerical, and including tailors, carpenters, shoemakers, saddlers, orderlies, and cooks). Civilian



NOTE: Location of units is given in parentheses.

FIGURE 4. ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GENDARMERIE AND GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF UNITS.

not are governed by the regulations for armed forces civilian employees.

b. ORIGIN — The National Gendarmerie has a dual function as a security force and a military force, with normal security jurisdiction in the frontier zone and extraordinary jurisdiction throughout the country. As a military force the Gendarmerie participates in army mobilization plans.

Outside the frontier security zone the Gendarmerie functions principally as a riot control force. Members are thoroughly trained in control tactics and are the first to be called upon when efforts of the local police prove inadequate. They also take the place of local police forces in emergencies such as during the strike of provincial police in Córdoba Province in mid-1961. Although no regular Gendarmerie units are normally stationed in Córdoba, 800 men were rapidly brought in to relieve the army units which had initially replaced the police.

The Gendarmerie may supplement regular military forces in border areas in the event of war and provide military intelligence. The force is normally charged with border traffic control, prevention of smuggling and illegal border crossing, guarding against or ferreting out arms caches, and preventing unauthorized assemblages of persons. It may also serve as auxiliary customs police and regulate navigation in the large Patagonian lakes under Gendarmerie jurisdiction. Most of the casualties sustained by the force are in the area of the Paraguayan frontier and result from clashes with armed bands crossing from that country. Gendarmerie officers have complained that they are hampered by insufficient personnel in carrying out their mission of preventing illegal border crossings. For instance, the Salta group consisting of only 700 men in mid-1963 guarded 1,400 kilometers of rugged boundary separating Argentina from three other nations.

The National Gendarmerie also performs duties not ordinarily associated with police work, especially in areas which are particularly isolated or where colonization is being attempted. It is charged with such civic functions as aiding in the creation and development of population centers and with increasing standards of living and educational levels in the zones under its jurisdiction. The force conducts primary education where other facilities are lacking and often provides sanitary instruction, vaccination, and medical surveys. It builds and repairs roads in isolated areas and keeps them open in inclement weather. In emergencies such as floods, earthquakes, or fires, it aids in evacuating persons and repair of damages. The Gendarmerie communications network supplements the federally controlled telephone and telegraph system in frontier areas. Communica-

tion services include the operation of approximately 215 radio posts, and pickup and delivery of mail in isolated places.

c. EQUIPMENT — The Gendarmerie is not known to have any serious materiel deficiencies but, like other Argentine police forces, performance could be improved by additional and more modern transportation and telecommunications equipment. Men are armed with 7.65 Mauser rifles, .45 caliber pistols, and an unknown number of machine guns. Motorized transportation consists of small British Army-type trucks, and U.S. type station wagons, jeeps, and motorcycles. Horses, skis, and snowshoes are also used under appropriate conditions. Aircraft equipment consists of one helicopter and three Piper Cubs; 6 four-place helicopters and 16 light liaison planes have been ordered from the United States. Communications equipment is predominantly of U.S. manufacture (ECA) or Argentine copies thereof.

d. TRAINING AND PERSONNEL — With the exception of the director, his two chief assistants, and a number of retired Army officers who staff administrative and supply positions, all non-technical positions in the National Gendarmerie are filled from the ranks of graduates of the National Gendarmerie School (*Escuela de Gendarmeria Nacional*), where both officers and enlisted men receive training. Candidates for positions as officer cadets in the school must be Argentine citizens, single or widower without children, between 17 and 25 years of age, and have completed the third year of secondary school. Physical and admission examinations must ordinarily be passed, but the latter is waived for secondary school graduates and those with equivalent academic credentials.

Enlisted recruits must be between 19 and 27 years of age. Unlike armed forces personnel, all Gendarmerie enlisted men are volunteers, but service in the force satisfies legal compulsory military training requirements. After the initial enlistment period both enlisted and officer personnel are periodically offered subsequent 3-year reenlistment contracts. Promotions to a higher enlisted rank are usually given after a minimum time in grade of 3 years.

Cadets in the officer candidate curriculum graduate as sublieutenants (*sub-alférez*) after a 3-year course. Instruction includes routine academic subjects, military drill, use of weapons and equipment, physical training, and maneuvers. After graduation officers may return periodically for further courses at the Superior Gendarmerie School (*Escuela de Gendarmeria Superior*). Gendarmerie officers sometimes receive additional training at Army institutes, such as the Superior Technical School (*Escuela Superior Técnica*) and the Superior Intelligence School (*Escuela Super-*

All Gendarmerie noncommissioned officers are graduates of the 3-year course at the noncommissioned officers school, located at Jesús María, Province of Córdoba. Civilian volunteers who have completed their 1-year compulsory military service or men selected from the ranks of the Gendarmerie are eligible. In addition to all types of police work, instruction includes academic work at the secondary school level.

By a 1956 decree salaries and benefits of the Gendarmerie were placed on a level with those of the army. Allowances for longevity, purchase of equipment and uniforms, and instability of residence, are given in addition to base salary. Members may voluntarily retire upon completion of 17 and 20 years of service for enlisted and officer personnel, respectively or may be forced into retirement on account of age or if disqualified for promotion.

Retirement pay is in proportion to the service credited to an individual, provided a minimum of 10 years has been served, and is awarded on a scale equivalent to that of the Federal Police and the armed forces. Maximum benefits (100%) are extended to officers with 30 years of service and to enlisted personnel with 25 years of service. Disability benefits are extended to personnel disabled during service, and pensions to the survivors of those who die on active duty.

e. EFFECTIVENESS — The National Gendarmerie is considered one of Argentina's most effective police forces. Cooperation between Gendarmerie, army, and police is considered good. The Gendarmerie has demonstrated its ability to assume ordinary police functions with speed and effectiveness and the force is considered more willing than are ordinary police units to employ harsh measures, such as firing into a crowd. Gendarmerie effectiveness in border patrol is handicapped by insufficient forces, but it is anticipated its effectiveness will improve with greater use of light aircraft and helicopters in remote areas.

3. National Maritime Prefecture

a. ORGANIZATION — The Argentine National Maritime Prefecture (*Prefectura Nacional Marítima*) polices all seas, rivers, canals, and ports subject to national jurisdiction. Its duties are somewhat analogous in function to those of the U.S. Coast Guard.

From its foundation in 1896 the Prefecture has been a dependency of the Ministry of the Navy (*Ministerio de la Marina*), except during the latter part of the Perón regime, when it was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. Strong armed forces control is manifest by the provision

The Commandant must be a regular member of the force. Organization of the Prefecture is shown in Figure 5. Within each geographical prefecture are units of varying size known as subprefectures, agencies, and detachments. Within the organization as a whole are 38 subprefectures, 49 agencies, and 193 detachments. Present strength of the Maritime Prefecture is 8,000 enlisted men and 800 officers, representing a slight increase in strength over 1955 when it numbered 5,500 enlisted men and 500 officers. Pay and retirement scales are equivalent to those of the Gendarmerie. Recent budget appropriations for the Maritime Prefecture are not available but appropriations for retirement, pensions, and indemnities in fiscal year 1963 amounted to 75 million pesos or US\$535,715.

b. OPERATIONS — The jurisdiction of the Maritime Prefecture extends from the Pilcomayo and Iguazú rivers on the Paraguayan and Brazilian borders, respectively, down the entire length of the Atlantic seaboard to the Antarctic. The only substantial water boundaries not policed by the Maritime Prefecture are the lakes on the southern Argentine border with Chile, which are under the jurisdiction of the National Gendarmerie. Maritime Prefecture duties include repression of smuggling and illegal entry of persons and maintenance of public order in port areas under its jurisdiction. Its functions include the supervision of all shipping, including regulations of arrival, departure, and anchorage; registration of embarking personnel and of members of merchant marine and maritime unions; and the investigation of marine accidents and collisions. Marine rescue and firefighting are also important duties. The Maritime Prefecture approves or authorizes the construction and conversion of ships and stipulates the safety and lifesaving equipment carried on board. Judicial functions include the judgment of violations (*contravenciones*) carried out in its jurisdiction and the resolving of maritime disputes.

c. EQUIPMENT — The Maritime Prefecture utilizes the following vessels: one frigate; one minesweeper (used for training); four patrol torpedo (PT) boats; 107 general service launches; 54 patrol launches; 48 speed boats; 300 miscellaneous small craft; four transports; and one rescue launch. The force has approximately 350 vehicles, including jeeps, trucks, motor sidecars, ambulances, buses and sedans. Scuba and deep-sea diving equipment are used for salvage and rescue operations; and the force has limited firefighting equipment. The Maritime Prefecture has an adequate supply of weapons, including automatic cannons, heavy and light machine guns, automatic rifles, carbines, and pistols.




FIGURE 5. ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL MARITIME PREFECTURE, 1959

d. TRAINING — All Maritime Prefecture personnel are volunteers. Officers are graduates of the General Martin de Irigoyen Cadet School (*Escuela de Cadetes*) located at Tigre, a northwest suburb of the city of Buenos Aires. Although smaller and less impressive than Argentina's regular naval academy, it is reported to be an excellent school with a notable *esprit de corps* among staff and students. Enlisted personnel are trained at the "Coronel Martín Jacobo Thompson" Petty Officers and Seamen School (*Escuela de Suboficiales y Marineros*). Officers are required to return periodically during their careers for further courses at the Chiefs and Officers School (*Escuela de Jefes y Oficiales*).

4. Provincial police forces

Primary responsibility for public order and safety in each of Argentina's 22 provinces rests with the provincial police forces which exercise functions similar to those of U.S. state police forces. The authority of provincial police forces in criminal matters ordinarily is subordinate to that of the Federal Regional Police Offices (see above) in the case of crimes under federal jurisdiction, such as those involving the national authorities or political offenses. Provincial police

authority may also at times be limited by application of the CONINTES plan for the suppression of terrorism. Armed forces units have also on occasion used CONINTES plan authority to usurp ordinary police functions such as investigation and arrest. Provincial police jurisdiction is limited in many areas by the border-patrolling activities of the Gendarmerie.

a. BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE

(1) *Organization and strength* — The Buenos Aires Provincial Police control public order and safety in Argentina's most populous, highly industrialized, and agriculturally productive province. They work in close cooperation with Federal Police in the suppression of crime and control of civil disturbances, particularly in the industrial suburbs surrounding Buenos Aires.

With headquarters in the provincial capital of La Plata, Buenos Aires Provincial Police are responsible to the governor of the province through the provincial minister of the interior. A 1962 decree requires that the chief of the force be an air force officer. Organization of the force is shown in Figure 6. There are eight directorates and six administrative offices. The Deputy Chief serves as inspector general. The uniformed personnel




FIGURE 6. ORGANIZATION OF BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE

are administered in two different directorates: patrolmen serve in the Security Directorate, other uniformed units, including traffic police, Fire Department, and security guards, in the Institutes Directorate. Within the nine territorial districts into which the province is divided the basic organizational unit is the commissary, whose jurisdiction is further divided into subcommissaries and detachments in thinly populated parts of the province.

Present strength of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police is believed to be somewhat in excess of 18,000, about the same as that reported in 1957 and a slight increase over the 1955 strength of 16,122. Roughly 40% are estimated to be administrative and technical personnel. Strength has not kept pace with population growth, the present number of uniformed personnel being no greater than that of 1945. The volume of operations and degree of effectiveness may be gauged by FIGURE 7. Although percentage of arrests is good in the case of crimes against persons, which are mainly crimes of violence, it is considerably lower in the case of crimes against property, believed in part due to the lack of sufficient personnel to investigate all petty thefts.

(2) *Operations* -- Police operations range from riot control to rural patrol activities, often conducted on horseback, in the sparsely populated countryside. The organization maintains both infantry and cavalry security guards (*guardia de seguridad*), a canine section, and a small Woman's Brigade (*Brigada Femenina*), created in 1947.

Traffic control, a task made difficult by the extensive system of highways leading into the Federal District, is entrusted to the Highway Police

Corps (*Cuerpo de Camineros*), with headquarters in the Buenos Aires suburb of Florencio Varela, and subcommands in the suburbs of San Martin and Lanus, and in the provincial capital of La Plata. The industrial suburban area surrounding the city of Buenos Aires, extending from the suburb of Tigre to the city of La Plata, is patrolled by some 100 detachments, each consisting of one automobile and two motorcycles.

Policing the swampy Paraná delta, which contains the summer homes of many wealthy Buenos Aires citizens as well as isolated rural dwellings, is entrusted to the Security Guard of the Islands (*Guardia de Seguridad de las Islas*). This unit is equipped with motor patrol boats and relies on an extensive radio communications network.

(3) *Training, facilities, and effectiveness* -- The training of Buenos Aires Provincial Police of officer rank is similar to that of Federal Police officers. Cadets take 2 years of training under military discipline at the Juan Vucetich Police Academy at La Plata. Courses include history, geography, and psychology; law-enforcement studies; and military training which stresses the "art of leadership." Cadets participate in military exercises with regular army units. Physical training includes gymnastics, boxing, and judo. Second year cadets engage in law enforcement work in the cities of La Plata and Mar del Plata during the summer months.

Buenos Aires Provincial Police officers receive further training during specified periods of their careers in order to be eligible for advancement. Such courses, lasting up to 1 year, are given at the Superior Police School (*Escuela Superior de*

FIGURE 7. NATURE OF CRIME AND RATE OF APPREHENSION, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, 1957

CRIMES AGAINST	NUMBER			
	Crimes	Probable offenders	Arrested	Remaining at large
Persons (Las Personas) (Violent crimes).....	13,299	17,112	14,165	2,947
Chastity (La Honestidad).....	932	1,119	810	309
Property (La Propiedad) (Theft and swindle).....	25,859	33,774	7,544	26,230
Liberty (La Libertad) (Illegal servitude and entry).....	783	1,017	762	255
Public administration (Administración Pública) (Misappropriation of funds, abuse of authority, resistance against authority)....	845	1,155	302	853
Public Security, (La Seguridad Pública) (Arson and sabotage).....	9	11	5	6
Marriage (El Estado Civil) (Bigamy).....	1	1	1	0
Character (El Honor) (Libel).....	84	92	51	41
Public Trust (La Fe Pública) (Counterfeiting and bad-check passing).....	86	138	31	107
Public Order (El Orden Público) (Intimidation).....	0	0	0	0
Public Authority (Los Poderes Públicos) (Rebellion).....	499	822	338	484
Total	42,397	55,241	24,009	31,232

NOTE: The most common offenses in each category are given in parentheses.

Policía) in La Plata. Courses deal with advanced legal and criminological subjects, but also include military tactics, small arms firing, fencing, and riding. Enlisted personnel are trained at the Noncommissioned Officer and Troop School (*Escuela para Suboficiales y Tropa*).

The Buenos Aires Provincial Police are not known to have any serious deficiencies in equipment or facilities, although authorities have cited a need for more vehicles and communication equipment. Criminological facilities are reported to be inferior to those of Federal Police although better than those of other provinces. The Technical Secretariat makes an effort to keep informed of the latest scientific advances in criminology and police communications.

Pay scales for Buenos Aires Provincial Police are comparable to those of Federal Police and higher than those of other provincial security forces. Certain fringe benefits are provided. A department of social assistance within the Social Secretariat is devoted to aiding policemen and their families. A police cooperative store offers low prices and credit on foodstuffs for both active and retired personnel, and a summer vacation colony is operated at the resort of Miramar for police and their families. The San Jose Asylum is maintained for orphans of policemen.

Buenos Aires Provincial Police are considered by most observers the equal or near-equal of the Federal Police in riot control and the suppression of ordinary crime. They are well organized and disciplined.

b. OTHER PROVINCIAL POLICE FORCES — Little information is available on the police forces of provinces other than Buenos Aires; however, none is believed to equal the Buenos Aires Provincial Police in size or efficiency. A 1963 aid report described their organization, training, and equipment as "fair to poor." All provincial police forces are under the control of the governor of the province through the provincial minister of the interior and their organization is generally similar to that of the Federal Police and the Buenos Aires Provincial Police, but usually less elaborate. Most are divided into separate sections which perform the functions of administration, investigation, and law enforcement, with the last separated into ordinary patrol and traffic control units. Riot control duties are frequently performed by mounted police.

Because motorized equipment is in short supply, much patrolling in rural areas is still done on horseback. Traffic control is made difficult by a shortage of patrol cars and motorcycles. Communications and laboratory equipment are likewise inferior. Most provincial police carry pistols or carbines, while mounted units may utilize sabers for riot control.

Pay scales for provincial policemen are generally inadequate, resulting in low capability and efficiency of personnel, and giving rise to morale problems. In July 1961 Córdoba Provincial Police struck, demanding increased wages, and police in the Province of Mendoza reportedly threatened similar action. Because of low pay, provincial

police are reportedly often susceptible to bribery.

Training facilities and programs are considered inferior to those of the Federal and Buenos Aires Provincial Police although the more populous provinces have special police academies. Leadership is generally poor. An investigation of Córdoba Provincial Police in early 1960 revealed that among chiefs of police districts were men who had been previously passed over for promotion, others who had no previous police experience, and some who had criminal records. One chief was reportedly almost illiterate. A system of examinations for competence was subsequently introduced to correct the situation.

C. Penal system

1. Civil

a. **LEGAL BASIS** — Argentina's legal system, like that of other Latin American nations, follows the concept of the Roman Justinian Code with emphasis on the administration of justice through the application of formal and highly detailed legal codes. In contrast, the United States and most of the English-speaking world emphasize common law, which places heavy reliance upon prior court decisions to provide legal precedents.

Argentina and Mexico are the only Latin American nations to retain the dual system of courts and administration of justice characteristic of federal republics such as the United States. Argentina has both federal and provincial court systems, but strong unitary influence is shown by the fact that criminal, civil, commercial, and mining codes are national in scope. Procedural codes, however, are left to the provinces.

(1) **Constitutional provisions** — The Argentine Constitution of 1853, which has been in force since that date with the exception of 1949-1955 when it was replaced by a Peronist-inspired charter, contains guarantees of civil rights, definitions of certain crimes, and broad outlines of judicial procedure. Specifically guaranteed are freedom of employment, petition, teaching, learning, association, and publication of ideas. Prohibited are confiscation of property, punishment without previous trial, self-incrimination, violation of domicile, and penalties for treason which go beyond the person of the offender. The Constitution also specifically forbids the punishments of flogging and torture, and the imposition of the death penalty for political offenses. Several articles which provide for the establishment of trial by jury have never been implemented and trial by judge continues to be the practice. The Constitution makes no mention of writ of *habeas corpus* but in practice it is recognized by the courts on the basis of other laws.

Constitutional guarantees may be temporarily suspended by the declaration of a state of siege by the president; however, the president may not convict individuals or apply punishment on his own authority, his power being limited to arrest and transfer of persons from one part of the country to another. The imposition of a state of siege has been frequently used to circumvent the civil rights provisions of the Constitution in order to combat subversive groups. In practice, Argentina was almost continuously under state of siege from 1941 until September 1963.

(2) **Criminal code** — The first national criminal code was promulgated in 1887. It was subsequently replaced by the Criminal Code of 1922 which still remains in effect. This code, while retaining much of the 1887 code, was strongly influenced by the Italian Criminal Code of 1890 and other European codes. It shows the restrained influence of the Italian positivist school of criminology which is evident in the system of individualization and gradation of punishment. However, the code of 1922 is thought of as principally classical in outlook and secondarily positivist.

Numerous attempts have been made to modify or replace the code in the light of newer ideas in criminology, but none has been successful. Changes and additions to criminal law have been made piecemeal through subsequent legislation. Typical are laws of 1946 and 1947 against speculation, usury, and exorbitant prices, and three laws of 1958 against other shady financial and business dealings. A wave of automobile thefts prompted a special decree-law in 1958, while revulsion against arbitrary arrest and abuse of political prisoners by the Perón regime led to a 1958 law prohibiting such practices. The increasing use of sabotage and terrorism as a weapon of subversion led to the creation of two 1960 laws which not only defined such crimes and their penalties, but ruled that such cases would be judged in federal courts and prescribed a more rapid trial procedure.

The Argentine code is divided into two parts, general and special. The general part covers application of criminal law, penalties, criminal liability, concurrence of felonies, habitual crime, and similar legal considerations, while the much longer special part deals with specific crimes, classifying them according to 12 different categories. Although the code is applied throughout Argentina by both federal and provincial courts, federal criminal law is not exclusive. Provinces may enact additional criminal laws or regulations in accordance with their local police power, although they may not deal with subjects reserved for the national congress. Likewise, misdemeanors (*faltas*) or violations (*contravenciones*)

are not referred to in the code but are left to national, provincial, or municipal legislation.

Extradition provisions of the code are based entirely upon treaty. Treaties have been signed with the following nations: Spain, Italy, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Chile, the United States, Switzerland, and Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay. Where no treaty exists extradition from Argentina is a difficult and time-consuming procedure, with the legal formalities frequently giving criminals ample time to evade arrest.

b. CRIMINAL ACTS — Criminal acts in Argentina are divided into two categories: felonies (*delitos*) or crimes of a serious nature or having serious consequences, and misdemeanors (*faltas*) or violations (*contravenciones*), acts of a less serious nature. The code fails to define these grades of criminality, just as it fails to give a definition of what is considered to be a criminal offense but it does state that no violation may have a penalty of more than 30 days arrest or 10,000 pesos fine. Enumeration of violations not covered in either national, provincial, or municipal codes is left to the police.

The Argentine code considers a crime as a conscious and voluntary act. Exemption from punishment may be awarded to those who at the moment of committing a crime do not comprehend the criminal nature of the act or who cannot control their actions, a definition which includes the insane and minors under 14, although they may be subject to security measures. Also exempt are those who are impelled by irresistible physical force or threats, those who cause damage trying to avoid greater damage, and those impelled by fulfillment of duty, authority, or legitimate obedience. The code makes no specific reference to drunkenness as an exempting or mitigating circumstance and negligence may also be punished by a criminal sentence.

Among factors which mitigate the severity of a sentence is inability to complete the crime, which reduces the sentence by one-half to one-third. Similarly, if rebellion or sedition brings about only "momentary disturbance of order," the punishment is cut in half and if the plot is discovered beforehand the guilty receive only one-fourth the normal sentence.

Those that cooperate in any way with the execution of a criminal deed, even beforehand, are considered criminal participants, and receive an established proportion of the sentence. If the accomplice cooperated in a crime believing that the act to be accomplished would be a less serious crime, however, he receives only the penalty for the less serious crime.

c. PENALTIES — The principle guiding Argentine criminal law is the rehabilitation of the criminal. The code attempts to individualize punishments, by a system of maximum and minimum penalties and by giving considerable discretion to judges in meting out punishment. Prior to sentencing the judge must try to evaluate the convict's personality and must commit his observations and his disposition to writing. He must obtain medical information on the defendant's mental condition and disposition for crime when the sentence imposed is more than 10 years.

The state is entitled to combat crime through security measures as well as penalties. Examples of such measures are commitment to juvenile institutions of minors whose home environment is considered detrimental and confinement of criminally insane to an asylum. The criminally insane can be freed only by a judicial resolution, which may be issued if experts agree that the subject is no longer dangerous.

Four types of penalties are provided in the code: reclusion (*reclusión*), prison, disqualification (*incapacidad*), and fine. Violations are punished by incarceration, disqualification, fine, and warning. Punishment by confiscation of property was specifically abolished by the 1853 Constitution and the death penalty was not included in the 1922 code. The Code of Military Justice provides for death by firing squad in the case of treason during wartime, but this sentence has never been carried out. Unsuccessful attempts have been made in recent years to revive the death penalty as a deterrent to terrorism.

Little practical difference exists at present between the sentences of reclusion and prison. The former was to be the more severe punishment and separate penal establishments were to be provided for those receiving it. The duplication of facilities did not prove feasible, however, and sentences of reclusion and prison are usually served in the same institution. Theoretically, convicts sentenced to reclusion may be used in any type of public work while those serving prison sentences may work only where they are lodged, but almost all convict labor now takes place within the prison. As may be seen in the following tabulation covering 1,153 federal court sentences, the penalty of reclusion is most commonly given in cases of life imprisonment.

	RECLUSION	PRISON
To 1 year	0	266
1 to 3 years	2	398
4 to 5 years	4	209
6 to 10 years	2	161
11 to 15 years	2	50
16 to 25 years	0	23
Life imprisonment (<i>perpetua</i>)	16	21
Total	26	1,157

Selected crimes and penalties are shown in FIGURE 8. Unless otherwise noted, only the penalty for the basic crime is given and penalties may be substantially raised or reduced by circumstances such as death or injury to the victim or lack of malice on the part of the offender. Although sentences may seem lenient by U.S. standards, they are average for Latin America. Imposition of life imprisonment is rare. Those sentenced to life imprisonment may be paroled after 20 years' confinement if they are first offenders. Life sentences being served by habitual criminals may be commuted only by judicial action upon good behavior of the convict or by a governmental pardon.

Fines are widely used as penalties for nonviolent crimes. Guilty persons may also be required to pay damages and court costs to victims of a crime. For the poor the effect of the fine may be mitigated by payment in installments, but jail is customarily imposed for nonpayment of fines. Part of the wages received for prison labor is customarily set aside for payment of fines or damages. In Argentina as in many Latin American nations, however, large-scale inflation has done much to nullify the punitive effect of fines. The only financial penalties which continue to have their intended effect are those few which are based on a percentage of the money involved in an illegal transaction, for example false witness ob-

tained by bribery, in which both briber and bribed are fined double the amount of the bribe.

The penalty of disqualification has two forms, absolute and special. The former disqualifies the guilty person from his present job or profession, from obtaining public employment, from voting, and from receiving a pension, while special disqualification deprives the guilty person only of a specific job, profession, or right. Absolute disqualification may extend over a set period or be perpetual. Disqualification is ordinarily not called for unless the crime in question treats of titles, offices, or authorization. Judges and public officials are subject to disqualification for crime or negligence, and public officials guilty of torturing prisoners receive absolute perpetual disqualification.

The criminal code provides for the suspended sentence. This may be awarded to first offenders with a sentence of less than 2 years, if justified by the character of the guilty person and the nature of the crime. No restrictions are placed upon the recipient and the conviction is considered voided if no new crime is committed during the period of the original sentence.

Precautionary imprisonment (*prisión preventiva*) is not mentioned in the criminal code but is justified in the national Code of Procedure (*Có. de Procedimientos*) in order to hold suspects during indictment proceedings. Release on bail (*libertad bajo fianza*) may be awarded if the person is considered unlikely to elude justice.

Changes of administration have occasionally effected a decree of amnesty for political crimes or for civil and military crimes committed in a political context. Such a decree was issued in September 1955, after the overthrow of the Perón regime; again in May 1958, after the ascension to the presidency of Arturo Frondizi; and most recently (September 1963) by the government of José M. Guido in anticipation of the inauguration of Arturo Illia as constitutional president. The 1958 decree freed 8,000 persons and lifted sentences of disqualification on 41,291.

Official and private criminological agencies play an important part in determining penal policy. The most important of these is the Institute of Criminological Investigation and Teaching (*Instituto de Investigaciones y Docencia Criminológicas*) of the Province of Buenos Aires. The Institute studies the delinquent and his crime as a social phenomenon, functions as a criminological teaching facility, compiles official criminal statistics, and is charged with the formation of a scientific base for provincial criminal policy and with the study of penal science. In 1957 it was given authority over the provincial Protectorate of Former Convicts and Released Prisoners (*Patronato de Liberados y Excarcelados*), an organization equivalent to a parole board in the United States.

FIGURE 8. SELECTED CRIMES AND PENALTIES

CRIME	PENALTY (IMPRISONMENT)
Homicide:	
Against members of immediate family; involving treachery, cruelty, personal gain, severe damage to victim, brutal perversity, poison, fire, flood, derailment or explosion; to facilitate another criminal act.	Life.
Other.....	8 to 25 years.
Treason.....	10 to 25 years, plus absolute disqualification for life.
Insurrection.....	1 to 5 years
Assault:	
Causing temporary injury.....	1 month to 1 year.
Causing permanent injury.....	1 to 6 years.
Theft.....	1 month to 1 year.
Robbery (appropriation of goods by force).	1 month to 6 years.
Forcible rape.....	6 to 17 years.
Bigamy.....	1 to 4 years.
Adultery.....	1 month to 1 year.
Fraud.....	1 month to 6 years.
Counterfeiting.....	3 to 15 years.
Acceptance of bribes by public officials.	6 months to 2 years, plus absolute disqualification for 3 to 10 years.

NOTE Unless otherwise specified, penalties are for criminal acts without exacerbating or extenuating circumstances.

The organization of this Institute is shown in Figure 9. It receives its own budget directly from the province rather than through the provincial Directorate of Prisons (*Dirección de Penales*). The Institute trains criminological assistants, specialists in scientific criminological investigations, and criminological social assistants who carry on social work among criminals and their families. The 2-year courses are open to those with secondary school diplomas while the library of the Institute is open to anyone whose activities are connected with criminology. The Argentine Institute of Criminology (*Instituto Argentino de Criminología*), a private organization, is engaged in the same field but has no direct influence on penal policy.

d. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(1) *Organization of the courts* — Argentina's dual system of federal and provincial courts was originally modeled after that of the United States and still contains many similar features. The supreme judicial body of the nation is the five-man Supreme Court of Justice (*Corte Suprema de Justicia*). Each province likewise has its supreme court subordinate to the national body. The federal government and the provinces each have a parallel system of courts of appeal and courts of first instance. Federal courts have sole jurisdiction in the Federal Capital and the Terri-

tory of Tierra del Fuego; elsewhere authority is divided between provincial and federal courts.

Argentina's judicial system has suffered from interference of the executive branch, although such interference has been legal in form. Perón removed judges unsympathetic to him, while his appointees were removed after his ouster in 1955. An executive decree of April 1962, issued by President José M. Guido, authorized federal intervenors in the provinces to place the local judiciary in "a state of suspense," thereby abrogating their lifetime tenure and resulting in the removal of several. Appointment to federal judiciary posts is now made following examination of candidates by an examining board. The best qualified candidates are chosen to fill vacancies, but persons of bad moral character or anti-democratic ideology (Communist or Peronist) are disqualified. All Federal Supreme Court justices and all federal magistracies are appointed by the president with the consent of the Argentine Senate. Provincial Supreme Court justices and magistracies are generally appointed by the respective governors with the consent of the provincial legislatures.

The Argentine Supreme Court consists of a chief justice and six associate justices, appointed for life and during good behavior. The Supreme Court interprets national legislation, serves as highest court of appeal in both national and pro-




FIGURE 9. INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION AND TEACHING, PROVINCE OF BUENOS AIRES

vincial cases, resolves questions of jurisdiction between federal and provincial courts, and has original jurisdiction in cases concerning foreign diplomats and their servants and in cases involving international law. Its rulings are binding upon all other courts and judges.

Federal appellate courts (*cortes de apelación*) correspond to the federal circuit courts of appeal in the United States and are composed of three or more members. The court of the Federal Capital is at present composed of 12 members, divided into four chambers, one of which concerns itself with criminal matters. Appellate courts, both federal and provincial, supervise their respective courts of first instance in addition to hearing appeals from them.

There are 37 Federal Courts of First Instance (*Juzgados Federales de Primera Instancia*) outside the Federal District. Corresponding roughly to federal district courts in the United States, they are located in all provincial capitals, in major cities, and in the Territory of Tierra del Fuego. Such courts have original jurisdiction in crimes committed on the high seas, in Argentine waters or ports, and in places where the federal government has absolute and exclusive jurisdiction. They also try cases involving national sovereignty and security, that concern national income, affect the mails, concern national elections, or involve falsification of currency or national documents.

Federal criminal courts have sole jurisdiction in the Federal Capital or District. They are of two types: criminal and correctional. Neither the national code of procedure which states the functions of the various courts, nor the decree of February 1944, which established the Municipal Tribunal of Misdemeanors (*Tribunal de Faltas Municipales*) precisely defines the jurisdictions of these courts, but violations, tried by correctional courts, are understood to include all criminal acts not constituting felonies as enumerated in the criminal code.

Violations in the Federal Capital are tried by the Municipal Tribunal of Misdemeanors and by the Chief of Federal Police; they may fall under national or municipal law or under police regulations. National violations are few and include such practices as illegal gambling and maltreatment of animals. Both courts have their jurisdiction limited to cases involving penalties of less than 30 days' confinement, while the Municipal Tribunal cannot assess fines of more than 10,000 pesos and the police court, fines of more than 1,200 pesos.

The Municipal Tribunal is composed of 10 judges who are distributed in 5 courts with 2 judges to each. Procedure before both the Tribunal and the Chief of Police is oral and summary. Appeals from convictions in these correctional courts are taken before Correctional Tribunals

(*Jueces Correccionales*), which serve as courts of second and final instance. Appeal must be made within 24 hours of the finding of the court and must involve penalties of more than 5 days' confinement or 200 pesos fine.

Argentine federal and provincial law has special provisions for the trial of minors. In the capital one or more judges may be added to the criminal courts of original jurisdiction and a special trial process is used. In most of the provinces independent courts for minors have been created. Parents at fault may be included within the jurisdiction of these courts and may be jailed or fined for neglect and other offenses.

(2) *Trial procedure* — Each province as well as the nation has its own code of trial procedure. The national code, in force in all federal courts, is dated October 1888 and modeled after the Spanish law of 1855. Despite much agitation for a change to the more rapid and less cumbersome oral trial, Argentina is one of the few countries maintaining the use of written forms of court procedure. The oral system has been adopted in the Provinces of Córdoba, Santiago del Estero, Jujuy, La Rioja, and Mendoza, and is partially in force in the Provinces of Buenos Aires and San Luis. A new procedural code calling for oral trial has been drawn up under the direction of legal expert Dr. Alfredo Vélez Mariconde, but has not been enacted.

Criminal procedure is modeled on French forms and involves three stages: the pretrial investigation, the indictment (*sumario*), and the trial (*plenario*). Arrests can be only by written order of a judge, unless the accused is apprehended in the act of committing the crime (*infraganti*). (Citizens' arrests in such cases are authorized.) Persons arrested are brought before an instruction judge (*juez de instrucción*) who combines the functions of committing magistrate and grand jury. Witnesses are heard and the accused is questioned to determine if he is guilty and, if so, whether he should be released on his own recognizance, freed on bail, or placed in preventative arrest until the trial begins. In federal trials the judge is not permitted to release an accused if the maximum penalty for the alleged crime exceeds 6 years.

The indictment proceedings are secret as is the investigation which is directed by the instruction judge with the aid of police. Theoretically the judge is impartial and acts only in the interest of the state. The accused is held incommunicado without benefit of counsel, on the theory that his actions or those of his friends might influence the investigation. He may be confronted with witnesses the judge chooses to summon. Witnesses whose testimony conflicts may also be confronted with each other. The judge is specifically forbidden to try to obtain a confession.

If there is sufficient reason to believe the accused guilty, the instruction judge declares the indictment proceedings closed and passes the case together with the evidence to a trial judge (*juex de sentencia*). A stay of proceedings (*sobreseimiento*) may be decreed by the judge at any time during the investigation. It may be permanent if the innocence of the accused is evident, or provisional, in which event the case is held open pending new evidence.

This phase of the Argentine procedural system has been criticized as overdependent on the discretion of the instruction judge. His impartiality may be impaired by dislike of the accused or a tendency to identify himself with the prosecution.

The case for the prosecution in the trial is led either by the public prosecutor (*ministerio fiscal*) or by an attorney for the injured party, if the latter chooses to hire counsel rather than rely solely on the public prosecutor to protect his interests. The accused is legally permitted to defend himself personally, but will be assigned a lawyer if the judge deems it advisable. Burden of proof rests on the accuser who has a period of 30 days in which to produce it.

Because of the use of written proceedings during the trial it often is only necessary to review the files of the pretrial investigation and indictment. The clerk reads the witnesses' statements and reports of findings by the police and others and sometimes procedure is so routine that the judge absents himself and permits the clerk of tribunal to preside. During the reading of the files deponents are available for further questioning and new witnesses may be called. At the conclusion of the trial the respective parties, including third parties seeking damages, sum up the case after which the judge takes it under advisement. In theory sentence must be pronounced within 20 days but the judge sometimes considers the case for longer periods. The judge's findings not only resolve the question of guilt or innocence of the defendant but, in event of innocence, may declare the accusation to be slanderous.

Proponents of oral procedure as opposed to written procedure maintain that the latter tends to present the accused to the judge as a name rather than a person and permits only limited evaluation of the accused's character. They also contend that falsehoods and abuses of justice are facilitated under the present system.

Appeal of a sentence must be made within 5 days under ordinary circumstances. Not only the accused but the prosecution may appeal a judicial decision and attorneys for both may appear in person before the judges of the appellate court.

Procedure in the courts of appeal, in contrast to courts of first instance, is oral.

Because the pretrial investigation of a serious crime may extend over a year or more, Argentine trial processes have been criticized as being slow, resulting in a backlog of cases and persons awaiting trial. Figures on the total number of persons held pending trial in Argentina are not available, but some idea of trial delays may be gained by the fact that of 1,598 persons so held in Villa Devoto Prison in December 1962, 110 had been held since 1960, 73 since 1959, 51 since 1958, 12 since 1957, and one person each since 1956 and 1954.

c. INCIDENCE OF CRIME — Crime rates in Argentina are generally lower than those of other nations of comparable size and socioeconomic development. Incidence of juvenile delinquency and of crime by women is low, although the latter has shown a steady rise in recent years. Crimes involving bloodshed are less frequent in Argentina than in most other Latin American nations; the Argentine criminal has been characterized as one who is interested in enriching himself.

Crimes committed under the influence of alcohol, although not of serious proportions, are more common in rural areas and especially in certain of the provinces of the north, often taking the form of murder or assault. In the northern province of Tucumán crimes against property are rare but the number of homicides and aggravated assaults (*lesiones dolosas*) in certain years has approximated that of the city of Buenos Aires, which has five times the population.

Statistics on Argentine criminality do not reveal any characteristics that differ widely from those of other nations. The ratio between criminals of urban and rural origins closely approximates urban-rural ratios in the population as a whole. However, as shown in the following tabulation, of 1,153 persons sentenced to federal penal institutions in 1955, the latest year for which such statistics are available, 63% of the rural criminals sentenced were first offenders, as against 44% of those of urban origin, an indication that the recidivist is more often found in an urban environment:

	URBAN	RURAL
First offenders	343	230
One previous conviction	180	73
Two convictions	109	28
Three convictions	65	17
Four or more convictions	88	15
Total	785	368

The group included 150 illiterates, 932 persons who had never gone beyond primary school (424 graduates), 67 who had attained some secondary school education (35 graduates), and 4 who had

received university training (1 graduate). The ages of those sentenced were as follows:

YEARS	
18-21	127
22-25	233
26-30	292
31-39	238
40-49	177
50-59	73
60 and over	23

An occupational breakdown of the group revealed urban day laborers (*jornaleros*) to be most numerous, followed by white-collar workers (*empleados*) and rural laborers (*peones rurales*). A large percentage of the prison population are foreign born as might be expected in a nation which has received extensive currents of immigration. In 1955 the federal prison population totalled 2,760; of these 530 were foreigners. Highest crime rates among foreign nationals are held jointly by Chileans and Paraguayans, who form a numerous laboring class element in the southern and northern parts of the nation, respectively. Crime rates among European foreign born, principally Italian and Spanish, are a small fraction of those of Chileans and Paraguayans.

Crimes against property and against persons form the overwhelming proportion of criminal acts. Among women, the most common crime is simple theft; of the 385 persons held on federal indictments on this charge in 1955, at least 125 were women.

Organized crime appears to be more prevalent in Argentina than in most other Latin American nations; however, it falls short of the level reached in the United States. Spurred by inflated prices for new and used automobiles, car theft has reached unusual heights in recent years and has evidenced considerable organization and proficiency. In 1961 an estimated 4,320 of Argentina's 1,200,000 vehicles were stolen, 2,800 of them in Buenos Aires and its suburbs. Highly organized gangs divided functions into stealing vehicles, altering their appearance, and transporting them to other parts of the country for resale. Cases of ties with important or minor government officials were revealed: in one case cars were altered in appearance within the Santiago del Estero provincial jail with the complicity of the director, and in another officials within the municipal government of Buenos Aires were issuing ownership documents to gangs. Intensified investigative work has increased recoveries and somewhat reduced thefts from the record high reached in 1961, but automobile theft continues to be a major problem while import restrictions insure exaggerated values for automobiles.

Import restrictions applied to luxury goods have given rise to smuggling. In 1958 the volume of smuggling was estimated at US\$300 million

annually. There is evidence that smuggling is frequently expedited by bribery of customs officials. Unlike auto theft, however, there is no evidence of criminal organizations being involved in smuggling except in drug traffic. This latter is most prevalent across the Bolivian frontier and is carried on principally by Bolivian farm workers who cross into Argentina to assist in harvesting sugar cane and other crops.

In addition to Bolivian cocaine, drug traffic includes opium from the Orient and marijuana from Central America. Most of the users are found in urban areas, particularly among the criminal element. Laws against drug peddlers are lenient by U.S. standards, while users are not commonly prosecuted. Corrupt ties with government administration were evidenced by accusations in 1961 that the Secretary General of Salta Province and the son of the governor were accomplices in the traffic.

White slave traffic, notorious in Buenos Aires previous to World War II, is alleged to continue on a reduced scale. However, those most often enticed or coerced into prostitution now are girls arriving in Buenos Aires from rural districts to seek employment, rather than Europeans. Argentina has ratified U.N. covenants prohibiting legal prostitution, but individual prostitutes who operate clandestinely are not commonly prosecuted.

Administrative corruption and theft has occasionally been widespread at all levels of government. Irregularities range from acceptance of bribes to embezzlement, in one case involving sums exceeding 96 million dollars, which is the charge against José Mazar Barnett, who served as president of the National Bank (*Banco de la Nación*). As stated above, there is no police bureau to deal directly with corruption in government and disclosures of corruption must often await changes in administration, since governments in power are reluctant to reveal criminal acts by subordinates.

f. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY — Juvenile delinquency is not a problem of serious proportions. The Argentine family is more cohesive than that of many other societies and, since large-scale employment of women is not yet the rule, most children receive close parental supervision. In addition, Argentina does not experience the widespread poverty common in many other Latin American nations. An unusual feature of the Argentine juvenile delinquency problem is the political motivation which leads youths from upper and upper middle class families to participate in violence inspired by ultranationalist, anti-Semitic subversive groups.

Argentine legislation gave attention to the problem of juvenile delinquency in October 1919

when the protectorate of minors (*patronato de menores*) law was passed putting those under 18 years of age who are accused of a crime or are in conditions of "material or moral abandonment" at the disposition of the courts. By legal definition abandonment includes frequenting sites of immorality, gambling, or selling objects on the street; but this is loosely enforced. The minor may be put under the guardianship of a "decent" (*honesta*) relative or other person, or confined in a suitable institution until age 21. Parents or guardians guilty of grave negligence may be fined or jailed for short periods. Officials are required to present a report on the background of minors and their families when preparing indictments against juveniles. Since action is designed to be more corrective than punitive, preventive arrest is applied only when absolutely necessary. Close observation of the juvenile is maintained after trial through reports to the judge by the institution where the subject is lodged or, if set at liberty, by inspectors or police officials.

The legal functioning of the protectorate of minors is controlled by the National Council for Protection of Minors (*Consejo Nacional de Protección de Menores*), which is a dependency of the Ministry of Education and Justice (*Ministerio de Educación y Justicia*). In addition to overseeing the protectorate, the Council is charged with supervising private establishments for minors.

The protectorate of minors functioned effectively until 1943 when military and political crises began to interrupt its development. It has in recent years regained some of its former importance but still operates at a reduced level, with many of the provisions of law only partially enforced and others remaining unenforced. A complete reorganization is now contemplated.

Argentina has over 100 establishments, public and private, devoted to minors. The most famous juvenile institution is the "Ricardo Gutiérrez" Colony Home (*Colonia Hogar*), founded in 1924, which has served as a model for subsequent homes. It has roughly 500 boys, aged 8 to 17, who receive training in a variety of trades. Facilities are considered excellent and inmates are housed in small cottages, each under the direction of a married couple. New inmates are given medical and psychological tests, and records are kept of their progress. Other national institutions, located, like the Ricardo Gutiérrez home, near Buenos Aires, are the Carlos Pellegrini home, which teaches industrial, commercial, and agricultural trades, the Almaguete Artisan School (*Escuela de Artesanos Almaguete*), which operates on a system of minimum security, and the Mariano Ortiz Basualdo School Home (*Escuela Hogar*), which specializes in agricultural education. Three homes for girls administered by the Trinitarian order of nuns are the Santa Rosa Shelter

(*Amparo*) in the Federal Capital, and the Cayetano Zebecchi Institute and María Mazzarello Agricultural School in Buenos Aires province.

Most juvenile homes, public and private, do not equal the standards of the Ricardo Gutiérrez Colony Home; those operated by provincial governments are most likely to be deficient because of the lack of financial support. A weakness in treatment of juvenile offenders is the frequent confinement of those awaiting trial in the same jails with adults. In addition, there does not appear to be any nationwide agency to help readjust those discharged from juvenile institutions.

2. Military

Military law is governed by the Code of Military Justice (*Código de Justicia Militar*), which is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the organization and competence of military courts; the second, with procedure in military trials; and the third, with punishments. The jurisdiction of military courts in Argentina is wide: it may be applied not only to regular military personnel and conscripts but also to retired military personnel in certain instances. However, military personnel are tried in a civil court under the civil code for crimes defined by that code unless the crime has a specific military context.

Not only military personnel but civilian employees of the armed forces are subject to trial under military law for crimes enumerated in the Code of Military Justice and for crimes in the civilian criminal code when committed in places subject to military authority. The jurisdiction of the military is greatly widened by the invocation of the CONINTES (a contraction of *comoción interna del estado*) plan to combat terrorism. Among other measures, the CONINTES plan calls for the trial by court martial of civilians accused of terrorism or sabotage. It was invoked from March 1960 to August 1961 and for subsequent shorter periods.

The military court system is headed by the Superior Military Court (*Tribunal Superior de Honor*) consisting of six general officers and three legal experts chosen from Argentina's three military services. Ordinary military courts, composed of seven members, are divided into those for officers and those for enlisted men; the former are composed of higher ranking officers than the latter.

Civilians accused of military crimes are tried by a court for enlisted men, unless the alleged crime was committed in conjunction with officers, but no civilians participate in the functions of military courts; both prosecution and defense are conducted by regular military officers. Accused are tried before military tribunals chosen from their respective services, unless defendants from differ-

ent branches of the armed forces are being tried simultaneously, in which case a mixed tribunal is formed. The resolutions of military courts must be approved by the secretaries of the respective services, except when sentence involves the loss of right to wear uniform or use of military title, in which case the president of the nation must approve.

3. Prison system

a. ORGANIZATION — Argentina has long demonstrated a high level of interest in penology and in the rehabilitation of prisoners and has been among the first nations of the world to adopt advanced principles of prisoner treatment. However, actual practices often do not measure up to standards set forth in penal laws and regulations because of a chronic lack of funds and political and military disturbances. Argentine provinces have their own penal systems, as do the individual states in the United States but, excepting the systems of the Provinces of Santa Fe and Buenos Aires, these are usually less effective than those of the federal government.

Prison expenditures of the federal government in 1961 amounted to 600 million pesos (approximately US\$7,228,900 at the then-current rate of 83 pesos=US\$1). Support of each prisoner in the same year cost 381 pesos daily (US\$4.60), of which 140 pesos (US\$1.67) was spent for food.

All federal prisons in Argentina are administered by the General Directorate of Penal Institutions (*Dirección General de Institutos Penales*), a dependency of the Ministry of Justice. The Directorate consists of a director general and a four-man advisory council, composed of a professor of penal law of the University of Buenos Aires,

the director of the Protectorate of Freed Convicts (*Patronato de Liberados*), the director of Psychiatric Services (*Anexo Psiquiátrico*), and the chief of the National Registry of Recidivism and Criminal and Prison Statistics (*Registro Nacional de Reincidencia y Estadística Criminal y Carcelaria*). This agency records vital data on every person receiving a condemnatory sentence from an Argentine court. The prison system of Buenos Aires Province is regulated by a provincial Law of 1950. The province's prisons and jails are under the direction of a Directorate General of Penal Establishments (*Dirección General de Establecimientos Penales*), created in 1937, and similar establishments exist in other provinces.

b. PENAL AND CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS — At the beginning of 1962 the total Argentine prison population was about 10,000 persons, 500 of whom were women. Roughly 4,900 prisoners were housed in 15 federal institutions, listed in FIGURE 10, and the rest in provincial establishments. Most recent figures (1955) showing population of provincial penal establishments are contained in FIGURE 11. The penal code provides for lodging provincial convicts in national prisons if the sentence is more than 5 years or if provincial facilities are lacking, and federal prisoners may also be lodged in provincial prisons.

Provincial prisons in 1956 numbered 55, distributed among 14 provinces as follows: 8 in Buenos Aires; 6 in Córdoba; 5 in Santa Fe; 4 in San Luis; 3 each in Tucumán and San Juan; 2 each in Santiago del Estero, Salta, Corrientes, Mendoza, Jujuy, and Catamarca, a single institution in La Rioja, and 13 in Entre Ríos. Largest of the provincial prisons is the Olmos Prison in Buenos Aires

FIGURE 10. ARGENTINE FEDERAL PENAL INSTITUTIONS, 1962

NAME OF INSTITUTION	LOCATION	NUMBER OF INMATES	REMARKS
Instituto de Detención (Villa Devoto).	Buenos Aires.....	2,048	Capacity of 800.
Cárcel de Procesados.....do.....	746	Capacity of 600.
Asilo de Corrección de Mujeres.....do.....	111	Capacity of 95; woman's prison.
La Colonia Santa Rosa.....	Prov. of La Pampa.....	84	Prison farm.
Anexo Santa Rosa.....do.....	103	Included three women among inmates.
Penal de Rawson.....	Prov. of Chubut.....	224	
Cárcel de Esquel.....do.....	85	
Cárcel de Resistencia.....	Prov. of Chaco.....	327	
Cárcel de Roque Saenz Peña.....do.....	114	
Cárcel de Posadas.....	Prov. of Misiones.....	203	
Cárcel de Neuquén.....	Prov. of Neuquén.....	189	
Cárcel de Formosa.....	Prov. of Formosa.....	388	
Cárcel de Viedma.....	Prov. of Río Negro.....	62	
Cárcel Penal de General Roca.....do.....	103	Prison farm.
Cárcel de Río Gallegos.....	Prov. of Santa Cruz.....	106	
Total number of inmates.....		4,898	

PROVINCE	HELD UNDER FEDERAL LAW					HELD UNDER PROVINCIAL LAW					TOTAL
	Sentenced		Indicted		Other prisoners*	Sentenced		Indicted		Other prisoners*	
	Men	Women	Men	Women		Men	Women	Men	Women		
Buenos Aires.....	1	0	26	0	0	1,302	62	1,264	51	27	2,733
Santa Fe.....	7	0	1	0	0	483	18	436	21	28	994
Córdoba.....	3	0	16	0	0	13	15	271	18	8	341
Santiago del Estero.....	0	0	3	0	0	146	7	95	6	0	257
Tucumán.....	1	0	6	0	1	244	0	490	0	1	743
Salta.....	2	0	15	0	0	31	0	223	0	0	271
Corrientes.....	3	0	1	0	0	127	1	23	7	8	179
Entre Ríos.....	1	0	15	0	0	199	5	319	13	13	565
Mendoza.....	0	0	8	0	0	242	6	251	12	1	520
San Juan.....	0	0	2	0	0	69	1	138	4	0	211
San Luis.....	1	0	3	0	0	53	3	33	3	108	204
Misiones.....	0	0	2	12	77	76	0	57	52	57	333
La Rioja.....	2	0	2	0	0	7	0	11	0	0	22
Catamarca.....	0	0	0	0	0	25	5	28	21	0	79
Total.....	21	0	100	12	78	3,017	123	3,639	205	251	7,446

* Most probably held for investigation, or at disposition of executive power under state-of-siege provisions.

Province, which houses about 1,000 inmates, while most of Entre Ríos' 13 prisons house less than 100 each. Locations of federal and provincial penal institutions are shown in Figure 12.

No recent nationwide statistics are available, but in the federal district's three prisons as of January 1963, 2,254 of the 2,905 inmates had not been brought to trial. In addition to sentenced and indicted persons, prisons commonly contain small numbers of persons convicted of violations and persons held at the disposition of the executive power under state-of-siege provisions.

Penal law calls for different types of penal institutions for various categories of criminals, including penal colonies or farms, industrial jails, semi-open institutions, adult women's jails, and a special institution for habitual criminals and incorrigibles. Shortages of funds have prevented the implementation of this law. Argentina's federal prison system was described in 1946 as the best in South America but, although still good by Latin American standards, it has since deteriorated. New construction has been minimal, resulting in overcrowding and inability to apply provisions for prisoner rehabilitation.

A principal fault of Argentina's prison system is the lack of separate institutions for those awaiting trial. Consequently hardened criminals are thrown together with first offenders. Facilities for women are inadequate; in certain cases women convicts as well as women awaiting trial have been housed in men's institutions.

Penal farms have been established in the Santa Rosa Colony (*Colonia Santa Rosa*) and the General Roca Penal Jail (*Cárcel Penal de General Roca*). Prisoners in these institutions grow their own food and send the surplus to other prisons; an attempt is made to send convicts with a rural

background to these locations. Other prisons, of the so-called industrial type, contain enterprises such as carpentry, shoemaking, and mechanical and tailor shops. Products are sold on the outside. Industrial shop facilities are insufficient and many inmates, particularly those awaiting trial, spend their time in idleness. The principal national institution for women is the Women's Correctional Asylum (*Asilo de Corrección de Mujeres*) in Buenos Aires. Managed by nuns of the Order of the Good Shepherd, it provides training in sewing and bookbinding, and emphasizes a program of religious services and guidance.

Provincial prisons are of diverse types. Most fall below the standards of federal institutions. Many are overcrowded, dirty, poorly constructed, and lacking in facilities for rehabilitation. A notable exception is the Coronda Model Jail (*Cárcel Modelo de Coronda*) of Santa Fe Province, with a capacity for 800 prisoners. It houses a variety of well-equipped shops and cells contain toilets and furniture. Other jails considered above average are the Olmos Jail of Buenos Aires Province and the Model Jail (*Cárcel Modelo*) of Salta Province.

The Argentine armed forces penal institute, located in Magdalena, Province of Buenos Aires, houses not only officer and enlisted prisoners from the military services, but also any civilians who may be convicted under the CONINTES plan. Clean, well-lighted, and comfortable, and with only about half of its 400-man capacity in use, the Magdalena Penal Institute appears to be one of Argentina's best prisons. Prisoners are housed in individual cells; they manufacture wooden toys, brooms, tiles, and other articles which are sold commercially. Between 1953 and 1962 the number of civilian prisoners varied between 30 and 90. Officers of high rank usually



FIGURE 12. LOCATION OF ARGENTINE FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL PENAL INSTITUTIONS

Special detention quarters are available in the *Estado la Plata* estuaries, but under house arrest.

Prisoners confined for political offenses or under the CONINTE's plan were released by amnesty decrees prior to the resumption of constitutional government in October 1963. Prior to the July 1963 elections there were 235 such prisoners held in 19 national and provincial prisons, jails, and lockups. The largest number, 74, were held in the Rio Bamba Prison of Córdoba Province.

Plans are under way to conform Argentina's prison system to the principles set forth in law. Construction of a new penitentiary was begun in Caseros, a suburb of Buenos Aires, in 1962. Scheduled for completion in 1964, it will house 2,000 convicts in individual cells in a 20-story building and will have a special section for psychiatric observation of prisoners. Plans also call for construction of a prison with a capacity for 1,000 convicts in the area of Ezeiza, near Buenos Aires. It will have maximum, medium, and minimum levels of security, and will be divided into closed, semi-open, and open sections. A new prison farm is also planned on the "open door" principle, which does away with any obstacles to escape and relies on the acceptance of discipline and responsibility by the prisoner. It will have a slaughterhouse and dairy, as well as farming facilities.

C. TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION OF PRISONERS — Much interest has been shown in Argentina in the problem of rehabilitation of prisoners, and detailed provisions governing rehabilitation and treatment of prisoners are established by law. A decree of December 1947 abolished the use of fetters while transporting prisoners and the wearing of the wide-striped prison uniform. Although Argentina has one of Latin America's best records in prisoner rehabilitation, actual practices still fall short of legal provisions; for instance, the only institution now considered to be effectively segregating different categories of prisoners is the Model Jail of Coronda, Province of Santa Fe.

The caliber of administrative personnel and guards in federal prisons is considered to be generally satisfactory, and is much above the general Latin American standard. Regulations for the treatment of prisoners are generally adhered to and there has been little evidence of prison brutality since the Perón era. The federal prison system has attempted to instill a sense of professionalism among its personnel, who are divided into nine officer and eight enlisted grades. Salaries are comparable to those of the Federal Police and training is given all new personnel at the Penal School (*Escuela Penitenciaria*) located in Buenos Aires. That discipline may not be satisfactory,

was shown by the conduct of guards during the December 1962 mutiny at the national Detention Institution (*Instituto de Detención*). Guards seeking revenge for the murder of 9 of their number killed 16 prisoners in their cells.

The quality and capability of administrative personnel and guards in provincial prisons, with the exception of those of Santa Fe, are generally much lower than those of federal prisons. In the Provinces of Jujuy and Catamarca successful jail breaks were carried out with the complicity of prison personnel. Accusations brought against prison authorities of Córdoba Province of giving favorable treatment to arrested Peronist terrorists caused the temporary occupation of that province's prisons by military forces in April 1960.

Argentine penal philosophy considers work as a means of rehabilitation rather than as a punishment or an economic device. Although work facilities are considerably better in Argentina than in most other Latin American nations, many prisoners spend their time in idleness. As of January 1963 an estimated 30% of the men awaiting trial in Villa Devoto Prison, who constituted 1,598 of the 2,048 inmates, were without work. Furthermore, overcrowding has prevented the isolation of prisoners at night; at the time of the prison mutiny at this prison in December 1962, some 2,000 inmates were lodged in spaces containing 800 beds. Discontent was also fostered by association of hardened criminals with novices and by bad sanitary conditions resulting from insufficient bathing facilities.

Prisoners receive a small salary for work performed. In federal institutions the pay is most commonly divided at the rate of 15% for indemnification of victims (if any), 25% for food costs, 40% for jailing costs, and 20% for a savings fund to be given to the prisoner upon release. If no indemnification or food costs are required the percentages vary, but 40% of the prisoner's salary always goes for jailing costs. The doctrine of compensation for work accidents in prison has been legally enacted and established at a rate of 20% of what an ordinary worker receives unless the prisoner is responsible through negligence, disobedience, or deliberate provocation. Work-accident incapacity is determined by prison doctors and neither the prisoner nor his family can challenge their findings.

The basic law of 1933 specifies five steps in prisoner rehabilitation: 1) observation; 2) internment, consisting of work inside the prison; 3) orientation, consisting of work outside the prison; 4) a trial or test period, served at farms or work camps permitting semi-freedom; and 5) reintegration, consisting of release or freedom on parole. Steps three and four are inapplicable because little work is now done outside the prisons and there

institutions operating on a...
A system of moderate discipline, which gives privileges and extra freedom to cooperative prisoners, is used in many federal prisons. Inmates are graded on conduct every 3 months according to seven categories. A breakdown of 1,807 graded during the third quarter of 1955 indicates that most prisoners are considered well behaved. The conduct of only 32 was adjudged bad (*mala*) and 25 very bad (*pésima*); 51 were average (*regular*), 282, good (*buena*), and 405 very good (*muy buena*); the largest number, 991 were declared exemplary (*ejemplar*), the next-to-highest grade, and 21 received the top grade of optimum (*óptima*).

d. PAROLE SYSTEM — The Argentine parole system is better developed than that of most other Latin American nations. The four conditions that must be met to be granted parole are: 1) fixed residence; 2) observance of rules of inspection, especially abstinence from alcohol; 3) adoption of a means of livelihood in the absence of private means; and 4) submission to the authority of a parole board indicated by the proper authorities. The conditions are to be observed until the end of a temporary sentence or until 5 years after the day parole begins in the case of a life sentence. Parole is revoked if the parolee commits a new crime or violates the condition of residence.

Prisoners with sentences of over 3 years may apply for parole after serving two-thirds of the term, while those with less than 3 years may apply after 1 year if sentenced to reclusion, or 8 months if sentenced to prison. Habitual criminals, however, must serve either 10 or 5 years of their sentence, depending on its severity and on previous convictions. Parole is generally granted by the director of the penal institution in which the prisoner is lodged, with the advice of a branch of the General Directorate of Penal Institutions. In the case of recidivists parole is awarded by the sentencing court, with the advice of the authorities of the prison. It has been estimated that 80% of those serving less than 10 years do not serve the full sentence; however, the percentage drops considerably in the cases of two-time offenders and those serving more than 10 years.

Functions equivalent to a parole board are assumed by a local Protectorate of Freed Convicts (*Patronato de Liberados*), composed of private citizens who meet and discuss the cases of released convicts under their jurisdiction. Parolees are required to report to and be questioned by

boards or their representatives at periodic intervals. These agencies date back to the 19th century in Argentina. A small government subsidy is paid to individual protectorates but little control is exercised. These protectorates operate at an inadequate level, with most parolees receiving little or no supervision. Except for the protectorates, no agency aids parolees in acquiring jobs.

A parole organization in Buenos Aires Province, known as the Protectorate of Parolees and Former Convicts (*Patronato de Liberados y Excarcelados*), functions under the supervision of the Institute of Criminological Investigations and Teaching. The Protectorate operates a home for ex-convicts recently freed and attempts to obtain work for them. It tries to secure a family base for the prisoner by urging him to legalize any common-law marriage and legitimize his offspring. Funds accumulated by the former convict from prison work are managed by the Protectorate. The Buenos Aires Province parole system appears to operate somewhat more effectively than does the national system. Other provincial parole systems, however, are commonly weaker than the national system.

4. Appraisal of penal system

Argentina's penal practices are not up to the level of the provisions of the law. In the field of legislation a need exists for a modern code of oral trial procedure to replace the antiquated written procedure. This substitution would provide more equitable and speedy trials and tend to reduce the number of persons jailed while awaiting trial, thereby easing prison overcrowding. While the criminal code has many omissions and is not abreast of the latest theories of criminology, its replacement is not considered urgent by Argentine legal experts.

A prison construction program is needed to eliminate overcrowding and provide work facilities for prisoners. Recommended by Argentine penologists are "open door" institutions to inspire self-discipline in prisoners, and special jails or rehabilitation institutes for homosexuals, alcoholics, vagabonds, and beggars. Care and guidance need to be given the families of inmates, who are at present thrown on their own resources. Argentina's parole system needs to be overhauled and supplemented by the creation of some agency to assist released prisoners in finding jobs.

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D. Comments on principal sources

1. Evaluation

Although data available for the preparation of this Section are reasonably accurate, they are not current and in many cases are inadequate. Recent statistical information is lacking because of slowness of the Argentine Government in processing statistical information. With some exceptions, regular reporting on public order and safety in Argentina by U.S. officials has been scanty since about 1948. There is no AID police mission in Argentina.

Source 2 gives excellent recent information on the organization and regulations of the Argentine Federal Police, while Source 10, written by a chief of the force, gives a good exposition of Federal Police problems and deficiencies. Recent information on Federal Police operations against ordinary crime and their effectiveness is lacking, however. Most data on the Buenos Aires Provincial Police are contained in that agency's publications; because these have not been issued recently, accurate current information is lacking. On other provincial police forces recent data are almost totally lacking. Accurate and comprehensive though not detailed information on the National Gendarmerie and National Maritime Prefecture was obtained from U.S. Government reports and articles appearing in Argentine periodicals. Similar sources were also helpful with regard to Argentine provincial police forces.

Information for portions of the Subsection dealing with criminal law is contained in Sources 4 and 6, while the historical background of Argentine criminal codes is in Source 5. However, no source provides reliable current information on actual practices and the applicability of Argentine

codes. Also, little information is available on Argentine procedural codes except the codes themselves. Source 8 provides an excellent evaluation of the Argentine procedural system but supplies little information about the mechanics of its operation. General observations on incidence of crime are found in Source 1 while the latest available statistical data are taken from Source 3. Information on current conditions and practices in Argentine prisons is deficient as are data on prisoner rehabilitation. Research on this Section was substantially completed by September 1965.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

COUNTRY ARGENTINA

DATE OF INFO. 28 APRIL, 4 MAY 1964

TDCS 5/30,535

DISTR 5 MAY 1964

SUBJECT

PRESSURE ON THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR OF ARGENTINA BY COMMUNIST LABOR GROUP TO CARRY OUT "ATTACK PLAN" SAUNDERS SMITH, W. Y.

REF

IN 76508

FIELD REPORT NO.

1. ON 28 APRIL 1964 AT A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR (CGT) OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE 62 ORGANIZATIONS (PERONIST LABOR BLOC WITHIN THE CGT), RICARDO VINCELLI, LEADER OF THE MOVEMENT FOR TRADE UNION UNITY AND CO-ORDINATION (MUCS - COMMUNIST-DOMINATED LABOR GROUP WITHIN THE CGT), SAID THAT IT WAS THEN KNOWN THAT PRESIDENT ILLIA WOULD NOT MENTION IN HIS SPEECH TO CONGRESS ON 1 MAY ANYTHING CONCRETE TO RELIEVE THE SERIOUS SITUATION OF THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE. ON THE CONTRARY, ILLIA WAS EXPECTED TO INCREASE THE REPRESSION OF COMMUNISTS AND PERONISTS. VINCELLI THEREFORE RECOMMENDED TO THOSE PRESENT AT

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DD/1 AD/CI 2

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THE MEETING, WHICH WAS HELD IN THE OFFICES OF THE MUCS AT HEADQUARTERS OF THE CGT, THAT IMMEDIATE STEPS BE TAKEN TO CARRY OUT THE SECOND STEP OF THE ATTACK PLAN (PLAN DE LUCHA) OF THE CGT.

2. EXAMPLES OF THE TYPE OF PROPAGANDA PREPARED BY THE MUCS AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ARGENTINA (PCA) ITSELF FOR IMMEDIATE DISTRIBUTION WERE SHOWN AT THE MEETING. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE PROPAGANDA WAS OVER A MONTH OLD, IT WAS OF A NATURE CALCULATED TO CREATE A CLIMATE FAVORABLE TO VIOLENCE. VINCELLI PROPOSED AN EARLY MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CGT TO PREPARE CHARGES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY CARRYING OUT THE PROGRAM FOR OCCUPYING FACTORIES. (FIELD COMMENT: ON 5 MAY THE BUENOS AIRES PRESS REPORTED THAT THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CGT WOULD MEET THAT DAY TO CONSIDER WAYS OF APPLYING THE ATTACK PLAN UNTIL 18 MAY, WHEN IN ACCORD WITH AN EARLIER RESOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, PARTIAL OCCUPATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT.)

3. DURING THE WEEK OF 4 TO 9 MAY THE PCA AND THE PARTIDO OBRERO TROTSKISTA PLAN TO LAUNCH A JOINT CAMPAIGN AGAINST "LABOR PENETRATION BY YANKEE IMPERIALISTS" IN ARGENTINA. THE FOCAL POINT OF THIS CAMPAIGN IS THE CURRENT VISIT BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AFL-CIO AND THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT. ILLIA IS TO BE CRITICIZED FOR HAVING PERMITTED THE MINISTER OF

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

TDCS -3/580,535

IN 7650
PAGE 3

LABOR TO MAKE DEALS WITH THE "REPRESENTATIVES OF IMPERIALISM" ON MATTERS WHICH SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THE ARGENTINE LABOR MOVEMENT ITSELF.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCLANT, CINCSO.

(END OF MESSAGE)

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

FORM 2096

MPG. 8-63

(15-38-64)

CONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY

COUNTRY ARGENTINA

TDCS-3/584,310

DATE OF INFO. 17 JUNE 1964

DISTR. 18 JUNE 1964

SUBJECT

POSSIBLE CRISIS IN ARGENTINA AS RESULT OF EXPECTED IMPLEMENTATION OF 24-HOUR WORK STOPPAGES BY THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR

REF

IN 0695

ALEX
HATCH
BEAK
BUTT
CHASE
FORRE
JESSU
JOHN
KEEN
KELLY
KOPPE
MOORE
REED
SAVIN
SMITH

1. IN THE COURSE OF A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ARTURO ILLIA ON 14 JUNE 1964, GENERAL IGNACIO AVALOS, SECRETARY OF WAR, TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT THE MILITARY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PLAN DE LUCHA OF THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR (CGT) IS A SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENT DIRECTED BY PERONIST LABOR LEADERS AND SUPPORTED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ARGENTINA WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF BRINGING ABOUT THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT. AVALOS IMPRESSED UPON THE PRESIDENT THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION CONFRONTING THE GOVERNMENT AND URGED THE PRESIDENT TO TAKE STERN MEASURES IN THE EVENT THE CGT IMPLEMENTS THE FINAL

PHASE OF THE PLAN DE LUCHA WITH 24-HOUR WORK STOPPAGES.

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO EXO
DD/1 AD/CI 2

COPY

AVALOS TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT THE MILITARY WOULD SUPPORT A FIRM STAND BY THE GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE CGT.

2. (SOURCE COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE CGT ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO INITIATE 24-HOUR WORK STOPPAGES SIMULTANEOUSLY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, IT HAS ANNOUNCED A PLAN TO EFFECT THESE WORK STOPPAGES BY PROVINCE OR ZONE. THERE IS NO FIRM INFORMATION AVAILABLE CONCERNING IN WHICH PROVINCE OR ZONE OF THE COUNTRY THE WORK STOPPAGES WILL START. IT IS BELIEVED LIKELY THAT THEY WILL BE INITIATED IN A PROVINCE IN THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY RATHER THAN IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL OF THE PROVINCE OF BUENOS AIRES. IT IS CONSIDERED POSSIBLE THAT THE INITIAL WORK STOPPAGES WILL START ON 18 JUNE.)

3. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE THE DECISION THAT WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORK STOPPAGES, THE POLICE WILL TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO EVICT THE WORKERS FROM THE FACTORIES WITHOUT WAITING FOR ANY JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO ACT. IN THE EVENT THE POLICE MEET RESISTANCE IN THEIR EVICTION ACTION AND ARE UNABLE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION, THE PRESIDENT WILL ORDER THE NATIONAL GENDARMERIE TO ASSIST THE POLICE. THE ARMED FORCES WILL BE ORDERED TO PARTICIPATE ONLY IF A MAJOR DISTURBANCES RESULTS WHICH CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY THE COMBINED ACTION OF THE POLICE AND THE GENDARMERIE.

4. CONCURRENT WITH THE EVICTION ACTION BY THE POLICE, THE GOVERNMENT WILL ORDER THE ARREST AND INCARCERATION OF THE SIGNIFICANT CGT LEADERS. THE GOVERNMENT REALIZES THAT THIS ACTION MIGHT RESULT IN A CALL BY THE CGT FOR A NATION-WIDE STRIKE, WHICH, IF EFFECTIVE, WOULD CREATE A CRITICAL SITUATION. (SOURCE COMMENT: IF CONFRONTED WITH SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, IT IS HIGHLY LIKELY THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL DECLARE A STATE OF SIEGE OR REINSTITUTE THE CONINTES*PLAN.)

5. SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS CONSIDERED POSSIBLE THERE MAY BE A LAST MINUTE MEETING BY THE PRESIDENT WITH CGT LEADERS. BUT THERE IS LITTLE HOPE THAT SUCH A MEETING WILL RESULT IN CANCELLATION BY THE CGT OF ITS PLAN TO IMPLEMENT 24-HOUR WORK STOPPAGES.

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCSO.

7. *HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: WORD BEING SERVED FOR CONFIRMATION. RESULTS WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF THEY MATERIALLY AFFECT THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

FORM 2096

MFG. 6-62

(15-30)


CONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

COPY

✓ 11 September 1954

SC No. 00636/64B
Copy No. 2

15



SPECIAL REPORT

ARGENTINE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

Declassified by 050375
date 29 NOV 1975

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

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11 September 1964

ARGENTINA POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The unrest now besetting the 11-month-old Illia government will intensify with the provocative Peronist campaign to bring back ex-dictator Juan Peron. This campaign seems aimed more at promoting revolution than peaceful Peronist political goals. The hard-line Peronists, who are in the minority, appear fearful that in the March congressional elections soft-line Peronists will succumb to the coalition bids of other parties. Both the Peronists and the other parties are critically fragmented. Organized labor remains the Peronists' strongest political weapon. They are using it to press their campaign and to fan widespread discontent over economic conditions. The armed forces and the majority of Argentines are adamantly opposed to Peron's return.

Ostensibly, the Peronist political offensive is aimed at demanding participation in the March elections and legality for a Peron-directed movement, apart from the various neo-Peronist parties which are already recognized. Leaders of most parties consider these elections, for half the national Chamber of Deputies, unusually important as a possible indication of new and stronger political alignments. At present, political fragmentation is one of Argentina's key problems.

Since Peron was overthrown in September 1955, the regulations governing elections have, in general, permitted the participation of neo-Peronist parties which are independently directed but barred those which profess to be directed by Peron. There have been variations periodically in these regulations, particularly in the provinces, where each provincial electoral board decides independently which parties to recognize within its electoral district. For example, in several past provincial elections the Communist Party as well as the Peron-directed Justicialist Party ran candidates, despite the federal ban on these parties.

This month the National Congress, which already includes a neo-Peronist minority, is to debate a new statute on political parties which will affect the Peronists' electoral role. Illia's People's Radical Civic Union party (UCRP) feels committed by its campaign platform to lift "all political proscriptions." To most people, this means legality for the Peronist and Communist parties. Technically, it could also mean legality for various extremist groups now outlawed, such as the extreme nationalist, anti-Semitic Tacuara organization. Hard-line Peronists are stressing that it also must mean freedom for Peron to return to Argentina.

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Peron

Peron, now 68 and living in luxury in Madrid, has just sent new tape recordings to Argentina reassuring his supporters that he will return before the end of 1964 despite all obstacles. Such statements by him and his supporters, who often travel to Madrid, have been more frequent since the beginning of the year. Last week the Peronists announced plans for a national committee to formalize preparations for Peron's return.

The chief obstacles to Peron's return include a morals charge based on his having kept a teen-age mistress, a treason charge, and the opposition of the armed forces. One of Peron's lawyers citing the statute of limitations, has asked the court to dismiss the morals charge. Government spokesmen have turned aside queries regarding the treason charge with the reply that Peron will be subject to the same laws as any other citizen if he returns to Argentina.

Despite their conviction that Peron would not have the nerve to return, non-Peronists are uneasy over the government's vagueness in the face of the intensifying Peronist campaign. This vagueness apparently stems from a wish to avoid a direct confrontation with the Peronists which might increase sympathy for Peron.

Military leaders have turned aside queries on the

treason charge with the comment that they did not want to concern themselves with political matters. Through confidential official channels, however, military leaders have expressed concern over the government's failure to make a clear statement. According to a usually reliable source, the commander of the largest army installation in the Buenos Aires area commented to the defense minister in late August that "If the day should come when I have to arrest Peron because he has disembarked here, I would first arrest Illia and his government." He added his belief that the aim of the Peronists' campaign was to throw the country into disorder.

The Peronists are well aware of such feeling among civilians as well as military officials and know that highlighting Peron's return prejudices their chances for a legal party. Such emphasis, therefore, casts strong suspicion on their motives.

The extent of the apprehension regarding current Peronist tactics and the depth of feeling against Peron can be



Peron at home in Madrid

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appreciated only against the background of the Peron era, which began nearly two decades ago. In seeking a monolithic state, the Peron regime gagged the press and political opposition; jailed, exiled, or financially ruined persistent opponents; and purged professors from Argentina's once excellent school system. His extensive controls discriminated against agricultural production, the backbone of the economy, and nearly drove the country to bankruptcy. He purged the military, dominated the Congress, and took over and expanded organized labor. A Peronist Party card was required for a government job or a pension. He used the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) in the roles of co-government and chief organ for political action similar to those it is trying to promote today.

His policies also prejudiced economic development not only by wasting Argentine resources but also by discouraging foreign capital and techniques and by failing to train the new technicians needed to develop a modern society. Consequently, many young professionals left the country and are still leaving. The lag in development was important in undermining his regime as well as in creating problems for those who succeeded him.

Political Fragmentation

The decline in Peron's popularity was evident more than a year before the 1955 revolu-



PERON: "I'd rather fight in Madrid."
- El Mercurio, 22 August 1964

tion. Economic difficulties were causing the workers to complain and prompting Peron to make overtures to business and to the US--incidentally authorizing pro-US propaganda in Argentina for the first time in a generation. His burning of the churches, however, so damaged his image that his fight with the church was chosen as the vehicle for the multiparty revolution. Subsequent election results confirm a decline in his personal influence and a disorganization among his followers which could not be attributed merely to official restrictions on Peronist activity.

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Were it not for the fragmentation of the non-Peronist parties and their lack of enlightened leadership, their persistent fear of a Peronist polling power varying from 15 to no more than 30 percent of the electorate would be inexplicable. They have been unable to maintain party unity, much less attract large segments of the former Peronist vote. For example, more than 60 political parties participated in each of the national elections in 1962 and 1963. The plurality of Illia's UCRP in the July 1963 elections was only roughly one quarter of the total vote, while his nearest competitors approximated 15 and 13 percent.

The composition of the National Congress exemplifies this fragmentation: there are 23 parties represented in the 192-man Chamber of Deputies and 12 in the 46-member Senate. The neo-Peronists are also split into different parties and have two blocs in the Chamber of Deputies. Ex-President Frondizi now has a separate Intransigent Radical Movement (MIR), splitting the large congressional bloc of his former Intransigent Radical Civic Union (UCRI). He lost control of the UCRI last July, after he had backed Peron's call for a blank vote, and is now seeking support among the neo-Peronists and reportedly other more conservative parties.

This underlines the fact that Argentine political stability will require the consolidation of democratic forces as well as the peaceful reintegration of pro-Peronist elements into the body politic.

The UCRP, The Government Party

When the majority of political parties--including some neo-Peronists--cast their electoral votes for Illia in the summer of 1963, they thought that they were entering on a period in which a national consensus might be developed in certain areas of government policy. Illia was inaugurated in October with an exceptional measure of good will, but much of this has now been replaced by criticism of the government's economic policies. Business circles are alarmed over such measures as the minimum wage bill, the limited exchange controls, and price controls over various items of primary necessity, such as beef and other foodstuffs. The government remains under pressure from labor because of the continued rise in living costs despite these measures. The exceptional wheat harvest has provided some improvement in the economy. Unemployment persists, however, and price controls have prompted black markets, making food more expensive and scarce than the official records indicate.

Illia's nonparty supporters in the electoral college expected him to appoint qualified men from other parties to responsible positions, as he indicated that he would. Instead, the UCRP has acted like a majority party and maintained a tight grip on decision-making and all cabinet positions. The UCRP's main concessions to nonparty elements have been ambassadorial appointments

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and consultation in the Chamber of Deputies, where it lacks even the slim majority it has in the Senate.

The UCRP, which did not expect to win the July election, lacked a well-developed program and experienced, competent talent. Illia, a country doctor, attracted votes on the basis of his reputation for honesty and concern for the little man. UCRP leaders had been in the opposition since its parent party, the Radical Civic Union (UCR) was ousted from power in 1930. UCRP leaders walked out of the UCR to form their own party in 1957, because of their strong dislike for Arturo Frondizi, who had just won control of the UCR.

The UCRP, like other parties, suffers from factionalism. It includes elements ranging from left of center to the moderate right. Dr. Ricardo Balbin, UCRP president, who heads an important faction within the UCRP, advocates more nationalistic, outmoded views on economic policy than those held by Illia. Many government decisions appear to be reached through debate among the factions, and this tends to hinder flexibility in executive decisions.

The UCRP is well-intentioned and seeks to promote economic development, but its lack of experience has slowed its attack on the enormous economic problems it inherited and has compounded some of them. As an example of these problems, the budget deficit for the fis-

cal year ending 31 October may reach \$900 million compared to a deficit of \$590 million last year. The gross national product dropped about five percent in 1963, following a decline of four percent in 1962. The government's hasty cancellation last November of the petroleum contracts with 13 firms --including 9 US companies-- is deterring new foreign investment. The government continues to give assurances that a satisfactory settlement will be negotiated, and thus far the companies believe time is on their side.

The government is probably in its greatest quandary about how to meet the increasing pressure of the Peronists and the CGT without jeopardizing its chances for attracting Peronist support in the March elections.

Organized Labor

The conciliatory gestures of the last three governments toward the Peronists in organized labor have met with both setbacks and some success. An increasing number of Peronists have been won over to the idea that the CGT should confine itself strictly to labor affairs, but the leaders of the Peronist unions--known as the "62 bloc"--persist in using the CGT as a political weapon.

In January 1963 the CGT was formally reconstituted with half of the six positions on the executive committee allotted to the "62" bloc and half to the "independent" bloc, which

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COMPOSITION OF ARGENTINE CONGRESS

SEPTEMBER 1964

CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

PARTY OR BLOC	OCCUPIED SEATS (Elected Seats in Parentheses)
People's Radical Civic Union (UCRP)	68 (72)
Intransigent Radical Civic Union (UCRI)	38 (40)
Split into two blocs: Alianza (17 seats)	20 (20)
Frente 21 (19)	18 (20)
Justicialist Bloc (neo-Peronist)	17 (17)
Composed of:	
Popular Union (Cordoba)	3 (3)
Popular Union (San Juan)	1 (1)
Popular Union (Corrientes)	1 (1)
Three Flags (Mendoza)	2 (2)
Three Flags (Entre Rios)	1 (1)
White Party of the Workers (Tucuman)	2 (2)
National Labor Party (Salta)	2 (2)
Neuquen Popular Movement	2 (2)
San Luis Popular Action	1 (1)
White Party (Mendoza)	1 (1)
Social Justice (Tucuman)	1 (1)
Union of the Argentine People (UDELPA)	15 (15)
Progressive Democrat (PDP)	12 (12)
National Federation of Center Parties (FNRC)	12 (12)
Composed of:	
Conservative Democrat (Federal Capital)	1 (1)
Conservative Union (Buenos Aires)	3 (3)
Democrat (Cordoba)	2 (2)
Liberal (Corrientes)	2 (2)
United Democrat (Entre Rios)	1 (1)
Democrat (Mendoza)	2 (2)
Liberal Democrat (San Luis)	1 (1)
Christian Democrat (PDC)	7 (7)
Argentine Socialist (PSA)	6 (6)
Democrat Socialist (PSD)	5 (5)
Confederation of Parties of the Interior (neo-Peronist)	5 (5)
Composed of:	
Defense of the Provincial White Flag (Tucuman)	1 (1)
Democratic Federal Movement (Salta)	1 (1)
Provincial (Santiago del Estero)	1 (1)
Civic Union for the Renovating Crusade (San Juan)	1 (1)
Radical Civic Union Bloc (San Juan)	1 (1)
Autonomous (Corrientes)	0 (1)
TOTAL	185 (192)

NATIONAL SENATE

PARTY OR BLOC	SEATS
People's Radical Civic Union (UCRP)	25
Justicialist Bloc (neo-Peronist)	
Composed of:	
Popular Union	2
White Party of the Workers	2
Neuquen Popular Movement	2
National Labor Party of Salta	1
San Luis Popular Action	1
Social Justice	1
Intransigent Radical Civic Union	5
Christian Democrat	2
Federation of Center Parties	1
Composed of: Liberal	1
Autonomous Party of Corrientes	1
Conservative Party of the Chaco	1
Union of the Argentine People (UDELPA)	1
Radical Civic Union Bloc	1
TOTAL	46

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includes neo-Peronists. The secretary generalship fell to the Peronists and the assistant secretary general was an independent.

Peronist leaders have always recognized the importance of the CGT in meeting strategic needs. The CGT fulfills an organizational lack, since it has in all provinces affiliates which are more cohesive and extensive than the Peronists have been able to organize. Secondly, the Peronists have exploited organized labor's economic grievances to further partisan Peronist demands. The CGT also offers protection since the government authorities are hesitant to crack down on labor.

Such Peronist exploitation is apparent in the "battle plan" which the CGT launched early this year. It included intensive propaganda and sit-downs in factories in May and June. The "independent" labor leaders themselves endorsed the plan in the belief the sit-downs would not be carried out. Their goal was to press for government action on such worker complaints as high living costs and unemployment. The demands included not only price controls and steps to counter the industrial recession, but also two political riders favorable to the Peronists and the Communists. These sought "full political amnesty" and the removal of all political proscriptions. The Peronists and the CGT are now giving priority to both.

The political motives behind the plan finally became obvious to the independents when the Peronist labor leaders insisted on carrying out the 24-hour sit-down strikes after the government had met the major CGT economic demands. The Peronists also rejected overtures for conciliatory talks with the government. Lack of enthusiasm on the part of the workers as well as restraint on the part of management and the government prevented serious violence. Some incidents did occur, however, and generally the maneuver served to damage worker discipline and relations with employers.

The architect of this plan was August Vandor, leader of the "62" bloc. He calculated that this action would win over some supporters of Andres Framini, his chief competitor in Peronist labor and political circles. When Vandor did defeat Framini in the July race for head of the Justicialist Party in Buenos Aires Province, Framini protested that Vandor was promoting "Peronism without Peron." Framini announced that he was forming a "Peronist Revolutionary Group" to promote Peron's return. On the other hand, Vandor has just returned from a meeting in Madrid with Peron, who placed him in charge of organizing plans for "the return." Some usually reliable sources, however, believe that Peron may be preparing to undercut Vandor, possibly by blaming him for failing in these plans.

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Peron's disavowal of Framini's "revolutionary group" --as well as another one connected with Hector Villalon, a pro-Cuban extremist--is probably an insincere attempt to tidy up the Justicialist Party's reputation in a bid for legal status. Framini's "group" is new and may have been announced specifically for purposes of denial. In an effort to present an appearance of "democratic structure," the Justicialist Party held an organizing convention on 26 July. Most of the officials are little known, in accordance with the Peron dictum for choosing party leaders and presidential candidates. Neither during nor since his regime has Peron permitted other Peronists to develop a national standing which might become a challenge to his leadership. Vandor thus far has offered the greatest challenge. Peron's assignment of his future political action plans to the "62" group indicates further his primary position and the lesser importance of his Justicialist Party.

Peronist Plans

The Peronists plan three campaigns to promote their political aims. One already in progress is the so-called "third stage" of the CGT battle plan. This consists of rallies in front of provincial government houses, and propaganda through various media, to condemn current economic conditions. A

CGT communique issued on 2 September, for example, says that there is no work, that food is scarce, and that industrial firms are closing their doors. It also denies government statements that full freedom exists in Argentina. The CGT will highlight this phase with a massive rally in front of the presidential palace on 17 October, the chief Peronist holiday honoring Peron.

A second project, announced on 2 September, is the formation of a "National Committee for the Return of General Peron" to organize subcommittees throughout Argentina within 10 days. The "62" labor bloc is in charge of the committee, which will include members of the Peronist political organizations.

A third plan is to try to turn the celebration of President De Gaulle's visit to Argentina from 3 to 6 October into a simultaneous demonstration for Peron. The French ambassador in Buenos Aires has commented that his government is aware of such intentions and is planning De Gaulle's schedule in a way to minimize opportunities for Peronist exploitation. The Peronists like to portray De Gaulle as the leader of a third force which is similar to Peron's concept of a third position between capitalism and Communism.

Speculation concerning Peron's intentions ranges from

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a secret deal with the illia government--which military leaders deny--to plans to promote a revolution. One strategy included in a document circulated in Peronist circles early this year was to provoke the armed forces into carrying out a coup, because the military leaders would then have to turn to the Peronists for a base of popular support. The document also stated that actions such as the CGT battle plan were

part of Peronist plans to promote disorders. Extremist Peronists have also been reported to be engaged in revolutionary plotting along with other leftist elements, but there has been no report of a group with disruptive capabilities equal to those of the CGT. Whatever the Peronists' strategy, their new campaigns will add to unrest and complicate the process of national conciliation. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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COUNTRY ARGENTINA

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TDCS DB-315/01268-64

DATE OF INFO. 2 NOVEMBER 1964

par 058375
date 29 NOV 1976

DISTR. 3 NOVEMBER 1964

SUBJECT

PLAN BY COMMUNIST TERRORIST GROUP TO ABDUCT
AMERICAN OFFICIAL IN CORDOBA

PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 15983

SOURCE
AND
APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

TO ARMY STAFF COMM: EXCLUSIVE FOR ACSI, GENERAL DOLEMAN; NAVY DNI,
ADMIRAL TAYLOR; AIR FORCE AFCIN, GENERAL THOMAS
TO DIA: EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARROLL
TO STATE: NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO MR. THOMAS L. HUGHES

1. A TERRORIST GROUP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ARGENTINA (PCA) HAS
PINPOINTED THE HOMES OF ALL UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL IN CORDOBA
AND IS PLANNING TO ABDUCT AN IMPORTANT OFFICIAL LIVING IN AN ISOLATED AREA
SOON. THE GROUP PLANS TO HOLD THE OFFICIAL ABOUT 48 HOURS.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE REPORTED THAT ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT KNOW
WHAT THE PARTY'S PURPOSE IS, HE BELIEVED THE ABDUCTION WOULD BE FOR
PROPAGANDA REASONS. SOURCE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE GROUP PLANS TO
HARM THE OFFICIAL, BUT ADDS THAT IT WILL BE ARMED AND IF THE OFFICIAL
RESISTS "ANYTHING MIGHT HAPPEN".)

3. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THIS IS UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION

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Title 18, Sec. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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IDCS DB-315/01268-6

IN 15983

PAGE 2

FROM AN UNTESTED SOURCE, IT IS BEING DISSEMINATED BECAUSE OF EARLIER INFORMATION ON COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT IN GUERRILLA ACTIVITY CONDUCTED IN THE PROVINCE OF CORDOBA AND IN NORTHERN ARGENTINA.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (CORDOBA AND BUENOS AIRES), CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

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3. ACCORDING TO THE PLAN, THE CONSUL IS TO BE ABDUCTED, THE PRESS WILL BE INFORMED, AND THE CONSUL WILL THEN BE RELEASED IN HIS UNDERPANTS. PROPAGANDA FLIERS ARE TO BE DISTRIBUTED EXPLAINING THAT THE ABDUCTION WAS CARRIED OUT TO "REPUDIATE YANKEE ACTIONS AGAINST CUBA AND OTHER FREE NATIONS."

4. INFORMATION ON THE LAYOUT OF THE CONSUL'S HOME IS TO BE SUPPLIED BY HIS GARDENER, OR FORMER GARDENER, WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE PCA.

5. THE SECOND TARGET OF THE GROUP WILL BE THE COCA-COLA PLANT, WHICH WILL BE SABOTAGED AS A SIGN OF PROTEST "AFTER THE UNITED STATES INTERVENES IN THE AFFAIRS OF SOME FREE NATION."

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (CORDOBA AND BUENOS AIRES), CINCSO (GENERAL O'NEARA ONLY).

END OF MESSAGE

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COUNTRY ARGENTINA
DATE OF INFO. 18-19 MAY 1965

Content UNCLASSIFIED
par 058375
date 29 NOV 1976

TDCS -314/06778-65
DISTR. 20 MAY 1965

SUBJECT

POSTPONEMENT OF PLANNED COUP ATTEMPT
IN ARGENTINA

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

REF TDCS-314/06762-65 IN 71433
FIELD REPORT NO.

1. A COUP ATTEMPT PLANNED BY GENERALS ENRIQUE RAUCH AND CARLOS JORGE ROSAS FOR THE NIGHT OF 18 OR 19 MAY 1965 WAS POSTPONED AT THE LAST MINUTE BECAUSE OF A "LACK OF COORDINATION." THE PLAN HAS NOT BEEN CANCELLED.
2. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. RAUCH, WHO WAS IN A RETIRED STATUS AT THE TIME, WAS DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMY ON 28 DECEMBER 1964. HE HAD PUBLISHED A SERIES OF LETTERS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND SOME OFFICERS OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND. HE WAS DECLARED "IN REBELLION," AND AN ORDER FOR HIS ARREST WAS ISSUED. ON 22 DECEMBER ROSAS WAS REMOVED FROM HIS POST AS

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COMMANDER OF THE SECOND ARMY CORPS, AT ROSARIO, FOLLOWING A MEETING WITH RAUCH. ROSAS WAS ASSIGNED TO THE WAR SECRETARIAT, IN BUENOS AIRES.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCLANT, CINCSO

END OF MESSAGE

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ROUTINE

COUNTRY ARGENTINA
DATE OF INFO. MID-MAY 1965
Content UNCLASSIFIED
REF 058315
date 29 MAY 1976
TDCS-314/07551-65
DISTR: 29 MAY 1965

SUBJECT
GENERAL (RET) PEDRO ARAMBURU'S ASSUMPTION OF "GOLPISTA" POSITION

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF IN 78650

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

1. GENERAL (RET.) PEDRO E. ARAMBURU, FORMER PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT OF ARGENTINA, HAS DECIDED THAT IN VIEW OF THE INABILITY OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA TO MAKE DECISIONS, THE TIME HAS COME TO ABANDON THE ROAD OF LEGAL POLITICAL ACTION AND TO SEEK THE NECESSARY CHANGES BY MEANS OF A CIVILIAN-MILITARY COUP ALONG THE LINES OF THE BRAZILIAN COUP WHICH UNSEATED THE GOULART REGIME. THE GOVERNMENT THUS FORMED WOULD

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IN 78653

TDCS-314/07551-65 PAGE 2

ALSO FOLLOW THE BRAZILIAN EXAMPLE IN COMBATING INFLATION. THE PRESENT ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IS HAMSTRUNG BETWEEN THE PRESSURES OF POLITICS AND THE NECESSITIES OF GOVERNMENT. THUS, EVEN THOUGH HE MAY PUBLICLY CALL FOR LEGAL POLITICAL ACTION, ARAMBURU HAS BECOME CONVINCED THAT SUCH ACTION "ONLY FAVORS THE DEMAGOGUES IN A DISORGANIZED DEMOCRACY" SUCH AS EXISTS IN ARGENTINA TODAY. ARAMBURU HAS TOLD HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY THAT THE LATTER WILL HAVE TO "PREPARE HIMSELF FOR A DIFFERENT TYPE OF ACTION."

2. ARAMBURU RECENTLY DISCUSSED THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ARGENTINA WITH GENERALS JUAN CARLOS ONGANIA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY, AND JULIO ALSOGARAY, COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL GENDARMERY. ALL THREE ARE AGREED THAT THE VACILLATING ATTITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS IS PLACING THE ARMED FORCES IN A DIFFICULT SITUATION. (SOURCE COMMENT: ONGANIA COMMANDS THE RESPECT AND SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF THE MILITARY, AND HE STILL PREFERS TO FOLLOW THE PATH OF LEGALITY. HOWEVER, HIS PATIENCE IS WEARING THIN, AND GOVERNMENT VACILLATION ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ISSUE HAS TRIED IT SORELY. HIS ATTITUDE IS BOUND TO BE AFFECTED BY ARAMBURU'S "GOLPISTA" POSITION. IF ONGANIA AND ALSO GARAY WERE TO JOIN FORCES WITH ARAMBURU, SUCH A COMBINATION WOULD OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT WITH EASE.)

3. IN RECENT WEEKS ARAMBURU HAS ALSO HAD A SERIES OF CONFERENCES WITH GENERAL (RET.) JOSE LUIS BUSCAGLIA, WHO HAS

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IN 7833

TDCS-314/07551-65 PAGE 3

BEEN ARAMBURU'S CONTACT MAN WITH FIVE UNIDENTIFIED CHIEFS OF THE ARMED FORCES.

4. ARAMBURU SAYS THAT AT THE MOMENT THERE ARE AT LEAST THREE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN FORMATION: ONE LED BY GENERAL (RET.) ENRIQUE RAUCH; ONE LED BY ADMIRAL (RET.) ISSAAC ROJAS AND GENERAL (RET.) TORANZEO MONTERO (WHETHER CARLOS OR FEDERICO TORANZO MONTERO WAS NOT SPECIFIED); AND A THIRD BY GENERAL CARLOS J. ROSAS, WHICH PLANS ON USING VICE PRESIDENT CARLOS H. PERETTE TO REPLACE A "SICK" PRESIDENT ARTURO ILLIA AND THUS GIVE THE ILLUSION OF JURIDICAL CONTINUITY. IN THE FACE OF THESE MOVEMENTS, ARAMBURU STATED: "WE MUST GET THERE FIRST." (SOURCE COMMENT: WHILE THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE CONTINUE TO STICK WITH ONGANIA, THE NAVY IS INCLINED TO THROW IN ITS LOT WITH EITHER THE ROSAS OR ROJAS GROUPS. RAUCH IS NOT LIKELY TO FIND MUCH SUPPORT. IN THE EVENT OF AN ONGANIA-ALSOGARAY-ARAMBURU COALITION, HE WOULD FIND HIMSELF ON THE OUTSIDE LOOKING IN. PERETTE SERIOUSLY BELIEVES THAT HE COULD SURVIVE A COUP AND BE INSTALLED AS PRESIDENT, BUT THIS IS A COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC DREAM. IF THE GOVERNMENT FALLS, HE WILL GO WITH IT.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

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• ROUTINE

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PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

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TDCDB-315/01570-66

DIST 2 JUNE 1966

COUNTRY ARGENTINA/SPAIN

Content UNCLASSIFIED

DOI 22-28 MAY 1966

per 058375

date 29 NOV 1976

SUBJECT REMARKS OF GENERAL JULIO ALSOGARAY ON MILITARY

PLANS FOR TAKEOVER OF ILLIA GOVERNMENT IN JULY 1966

ACQ 1 JUNE 1966

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

1. DURING THE WEEK OF 22 MAY 1966 GENERAL JULIO ALSOGARAY, COMMANDER OF THE FIRST ARMY CORPS, STATED THAT THE HIGH-RANKING ARGENTINE MILITARY OFFICERS, INVOLVED IN THE PLANNING OF A MILITARY COUP IN ARGENTINA, HAVE DECIDED TO IMPLEMENT THEIR PLAN FOR THE REMOVAL OF PRESIDENT ILLIA IN JULY 1966. THE JULY TARGET DATE DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THEY MAY

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ACT SOONER SHOULD A MAJOR CRISIS ARISE.

2. THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS INVOLVED IN THE PLANNING OF THE COUP ARE: GENERAL JUAN CARLOS ONGANIA, FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY; GENERAL PASCUAL ANGEL PISTARINI, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY; GENERAL JULIO ALSOGARAY, COMMANDER OF THE FIRST ARMY CORPS; GENERAL ALEJANDRO LANUSSE, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF; AND GENERAL OSIRIS VILLEGAS, COMMANDER OF FIFTH ARMY CORPS IN BAHIA BLANCA. THEY HAVE CONCLUDED THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE REMOVAL OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT BECAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S COMPLETE FAILURE TO SOLVE THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS FACING THE COUNTRY, ITS FAILURE TO COMBAT INCREASED COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND INFILTRATION, AND BECAUSE OF ITS FAILURE TO ARRIVE AT AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT WITH THE PERONISTS, WHICH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY RESULT IN A VICTORY FOR THE PERONIST CANDIDATES IN THE MARCH 1967 ELECTIONS. THEY DO NOT WANT THEIR TAKING OVER OF THE GOVERNMENT TO BE CONSTRUED AS AN ANTI-PERONIST ACTION. THEY REALIZE THE NECESSITY TO BRING ABOUT THE INTEGRATION OF THE PERONISTS IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE COUNTRY AND THEY INTEND TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO REACH AN ACCEPTABLE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PERONISTS.

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3. FOR THIS REASON THEY HAVE HELD CONVERSATIONS WITH LEADING PERONIST PERSONALITIES IN ARGENTINA. THEY HAVE ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN THEIR ASSURANCES THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM CAUSING DIFFICULTIES FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT BY NOT CALLING STRIKES AND INSTIGATING OTHER DISRUPTIVE ACTIONS, IN ORDER TO GIVE THE NEW GOVERNMENT A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME IN WHICH TO IMPLEMENT ITS PROGRAM. IN ADDITION, AN EMISSARY WAS SENT TO JUAN PERON IN MADRID IN AN EFFORT TO OBTAIN HIS ASSURANCE HE WOULD NOT ORDER HIS FOLLOWERS IN ARGENTINA TO CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT. PERON AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS THAT:

- A. HIS RANK OF GENERAL BE RESTORED;
- B. HE BE PROVIDED WITH AN ARGENTINE PASSPORT WHICH WOULD PERMIT HIM TO GO TO SWITZERLAND;
- C. THERE WOULD BE NO PERSECUTION OF THE WORKING CLASS BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT; AND THAT
- D. CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN FOR HIS RETURN TO ARGENTINA SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE.

4. GENERAL ALSOGARAY SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN PROVIDING A PASSPORT TO PERON; CONSIDERATION CAN BE GIVEN BY

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THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO RESTORING PERON'S RANK OF GENERAL; THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAS NO INTENTION OF PERSECUTING THE WORKING CLASS, SINCE IT IS HOPED THE NEW ECONOMIC PROGRAM WILL BE OF DIRECT BENEFIT TO THE WORKING CLASS; AND THE MILITARY LEADERS DO NOT PRECLUDE TOTALLY THE POSSIBILITY OF PERON'S RETURN SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE. ALSOGARAY CONCLUDED THAT AS THE RESULT OF THE CONVERSATION WITH PERONIST LEADERS IN ARGENTINA AND PERON, THE MILITARY PLANNERS HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THE PERONISTS WILL NOT CREATE ANY IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

5. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE TO:

- A. RESTORE ECONOMIC STABILITY,
- B. NEUTRALIZE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES,
- C. MAKE ARGENTINA AN ACTIVE RATHER THAN A PASSIVE ALLY OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES,
- D. RESTORE THE CONFIDENCE OF FOREIGN INVESTORS,
- E. BROADEN AND STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES,
- F. IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO RESTORE NATIONAL UNITY, AND TO
- G. REORGANIZE THE POLITICAL PARTIES.

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6. WITH REGARD TO THE REORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES, THE NEW GOVERNMENT PLANS TO DISSOLVE ALL POLITICAL PARTIES AND TO SUBSEQUENTLY DRAW UP SPECIFIC REGULATIONS FOR THE FORMATION OF NEW POLITICAL PARTIES. THE REGULATIONS WILL BE DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE FORMATION OF A MULTIPLICITY OF PARTIES AND TO PREVENT THE FORMATION OF ANY UNDEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PARTIES.

7. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN FOR REMOVAL OF PRESIDENT ILLIA WILL BE CARRIED OUT AS FOLLOWS: THE THREE COMMANDERS IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES, WHO ARE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH THE PLAN, WILL ADVISE ILLIA HE IS BEING REMOVED AND THE ARMED FORCES ARE TAKING OVER THE GOVERNMENT. THE COMMANDERS IN CHIEF WILL INVITE GENERAL ONGANIA TO BE HEAD OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT. GENERALLY, MILITARY OFFICERS WILL OCCUPY ONLY THOSE HIGH GOVERNMENT POSITIONS NORMALLY ASSIGNED TO THE MILITARY. CIVILIANS CONSIDERED TO BE EXPERTS IN THE FIELDS OF ECONOMICS, FINANCE, AGRICULTURE, MINING AND PUBLIC WORKS WILL BE NAMED TO THE CABINET. THE PLANNERS DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION. THEY HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE ANY COMMAND GROUP WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES WILL OPPOSE THEIR MOVE. THEY DO CONSIDER IT POSSIBLE THAT

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GENERAL EDUARDO CASTRO SANCHEZ, THE SECRETARY OF WAR, MAY TRY TO RALLY SOME SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT ILLIA FROM WITHIN THE ARMY, BUT THEY ARE CONFIDENT CASTRO WILL NOT BE ABLE TO GENERATE ANY SIGNIFICANT RESPONSE. NEITHER CASTRO NOR THE SECRETARIES OF THE NAVY AND THE AIR FORCE ARE AWARE OF THE COUP TIMING.

7. ALSOGARAY SAID MEMBERS OF THE PLANNING GROUP ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE TREMENDOUS RESPONSIBILITY THEY WILL BE ASSUMING IN TAKING OVER THE GOVERNMENT. THEY SINCERELY BELIEVE THAT IF THE ILLIA GOVERNMENT WERE PERMITTED TO REMAIN IN POWER, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHAOS WOULD BE UNAVOIDABLE. THEY BELIEVE THEY HAVE CARRIED OUT THEIR PLANNING THOROUGHLY AND WITH A SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE AND DEDICATION WHICH THEY THINK WILL PROVIDE ARGENTINA WITH A GOVERNMENT CAPABLE OF DEALING EFFECTIVELY WITH THE SERIOUS PROBLEM FACING THE NATION AT THIS TIME.

8. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT

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TDCS -314/07034-66

DIST 6 JUNE 1966

COUNTRY ARGENTINA

Content UNCLASSIFIED Z

DOI

per 058375
date 29 NOV 1976

SUBJECT INCREASED TENSION IN RELATION TO A POSSIBLE COUP ATTEMPT
BY THE ARGENTINE MILITARY: SITUATION APPRAISAL AS OF
3 JUNE 1966

ACQ

SOURCE

1. APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION

IT IS NOT AN OFFICIAL JUDGMENT

IT REPRESENTS THE OBSERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS

BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT THE TIME OF ITS
PREPARATION. PREPARED FOR INTERNAL USE AS A GUIDE TO THE OPERA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENT, THIS COMMENTARY IS DISSEMINATED IN THE BELIEF
THAT IT MAY BE USEFUL TO OTHER AGENCIES IN ASSESSING THE SITUATION
FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES.

2. FOLLOWING THE 29 MAY ARMY DAY SPEECH OF THE COMMANDER
IN CHIEF OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY, LT. GENERAL PASCUAL PISTARINI;

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WHICH MANY OBSERVERS CONSIDER TO BE A DIRECT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT, TENSION AND RUMORS HAVE REACHED AN UNPRECEDENTED PEAK IN BUENOS AIRES. SINCE PISTARINI'S SPEECH, MANY NEWSPAPER HEADLINES HAVE STRESSED THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT ILLIA. RESPONSIBLE AND CONSERVATIVE JOURNALS ARE REPORTING IN DEPTH ON ALL INCIDENTS WHICH MIGHT REFLECT UPON MILITARY-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS. EXPERIENCED POLITICAL OBSERVERS WHO HAVE UNTIL NOW MAINTAINED CONSIDERABLE SKEPTICISM, BELIEVE THAT THE PROCESS WHICH WILL LEAD TO A MILITARY TAKEOVER OF THE GOVERNMENT IS NOW IN MOTION AND THAT A COUP COULD TAKE PLACE AT ANY MOMENT. WHILE RUMORS OF A POSSIBLE MILITARY COUP HAVE BEEN WIDESPREAD IN THE PAST, AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE APPEARS TO BE CONSIDERABLE BASIS FOR A REAL AND MARKED CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE OF THE ILLIA ADMINISTRATION.

3. THE MONTH OF APRIL BEGAN RATHER QUIETLY WITH THE LEGALIST COMMUNIQUE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR EDUARDO CASTRO SANCHEZ. THIS COMMUNIQUE, PLUS A SERIES OF MEETINGS BETWEEN CASTRO SANCHEZ AND DEFENSE MINISTER LEOPOLDO SUAREZ, EASED TENSIONS AND WERE FOLLOWED BY AN UNOFFICIAL "TRUCE" BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMED FORCES IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE ADMINISTRATION TO RESOLVE PRESSING

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS WHICH THE ARMED FORCES DEMANDED BE ACTED UPON.

4. THE TRUCE, HOWEVER, WAS SHORT-LIVED. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT APPEARED TO BE CONSIDERING CABINET AND POLICY CHANGES, ILLIA FAILED TO MAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

5. DURING THIS SAME TIME PERIOD, THERE WERE RECURRING RUMORS AND SENSATIONALIST PRESS COMMENTARY WHICH INDICATED AN ALLEGED EXISTENCE OF A PLAN ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT TO ATTEMPT TO COUNTER THE PRESSURE OF THE ARMED FORCES BY DIVIDING THE VARIOUS GROUPS WITHIN THE MILITARY. SUPPOSEDLY, THESE PLANS INCLUDED AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE REMOVAL OF GENERAL PISTARINI. ARMY LEADERS WERE REPORTEDLY VERY IRRITATED AT THIS ALLEGED PLAN, STRESSING THAT ARMY UNITY AND INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY ARE SACRED.

6. AT THE SAME TIME, MILITARY LEADERS BELIEVED THAT CASTRO SANCHEZ, WHO HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO ACT AS A PEACEMAKER IN THE CIVIL-MILITARY CONFRONTATION, WAS INVOLVED IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN TO FORCE THE REMOVAL OF PISTARINI WHILE POSING AS THE ARMY'S PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPOKESMAN.

7. IN THE OPINION OF MILITARY LEADERS, THE SACRED RESERVE OF THE MILITARY INSTITUTION WAS FURTHER VIOLATED IN THE RECENT

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CASE OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN DEFENSE MINISTER LEOPOLDO SUAREZ AND AIR FORCE GENERAL HUGO MARTINEZ ZUVIRIA, THE FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE, OVER THE USE OF AN ALLEGED ANTI-GOVERNMENT PAMPHLET AS AN EXAMPLE OF PROPAGANDA IN ONE OF THE SCHOOL'S COURSES.

8. THUS, THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO CHANGE COURSE AFTER A FIRM WARNING RESULTED IN A FURTHER REFINEMENT BY THE ARMED FORCES OF A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A POSSIBLE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT. IN ADDITION, THE FAILURE OF THE PRESIDENT TO HEED THE SUGGESTIONS MADE BY THE ARMED FORCES INCREASED ITS CONVICTION THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NEVER IMPROVE NOR MEET THOSE CONDITIONS WHICH THE ARMED FORCES FELT WERE ESSENTIAL IF THE NATION IS TO ADVANCE. THESE FACTORS PRODUCED AN INCREASED SENSE OF TENSION BY THE END OF MAY.

9. SEVERAL OCCURENCES DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF JUNE HAVE ADDED TO THE PRESENT ATMOSPHERE OF TENSION. PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT WAS THE 29 MAY, ARMY DAY SPEECH OF PISTARINI. THIS SPEECH WAS MADE IN THE VERY PRESENCE OF ILLIA AND HAS BEEN

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WIDELY INTERPRETED AS BEING BOTH CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND POSSIBLY A PROVOCATION TO LURE THE ADMINISTRATION INTO A PUBLIC POLEMIC. THE SPEECH ITSELF WAS CERTAINLY INTENDED TO DISPEL ANY DOUBT AS TO THE ARMY'S POSITION AND TO ITS DESIRE TO HANDLE THOSE MATTERS WHICH IT CONSIDERS TO FALL UNDER ITS OWN MANDATE. PISTARINI'S SPEECH MAY WELL HAVE BEEN A FINAL, PUBLIC WARNING TO THE PRESIDENT AND HIS FOLLOWERS.

10. FOR ITS PART, THE GOVERNMENT CLEVERLY REPLIED TO PISTARINI'S SPEECH THROUGH DEFENSE MINISTER SUAREZ WHO POINTED OUT THAT THE ARMY COMMANDER'S ADDRESS WAS IN COMPLETE ACCORD WITH THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT. THIS STATEMENT MOST LIKELY CAUGHT THE MILITARY OFF-GUARD AND OBVIOUSLY FRUSTRATED ANY ATTEMPT TO USE PISTARINI'S SPEECH AS A POSSIBLE MOTIVE FOR ACTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THE ADMINISTRATION'S REACTION TO THE ARMY DAY SPEECH IS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THAT MOST OBSERVERS FELT THAT THE GENERAL WAS DIRECTLY CRITICIZING THE GOVERNMENT.

11. AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR IN THE PRESENT SITUATION WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IS THE REMOVAL OF ZUVIRIA MENTIONED IN PARA SIX ABOVE. AIR FORCE OFFICERS HAVE PUBLICLY STATED THAT THEY STAND SOLIDLY BEHIND ZUVIRIA AND WILL REQUEST THAT HE BE

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REINSTATED. THE ZUVIRIA CASE BEGAN DURING MID-MAY AND REACHED A CRISIS WHEN ZUVIRIA WROTE A STRONG LETTER TO THE DEFENSE MINISTER CRITICIZING CERTAIN POLICIES OF THE ILLIA ADMINISTRATION. THE TIMING OF THE REMOVAL OF ZUVIRIA HAS SERVED AS ANOTHER REMINDER TO THE MILITARY OF THE POLITICAL MANEUVERING OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND OF AN ALLEGED CIVIL ENCROACHMENT UPON THE MILITARY.

12. RECENT REPORTING HAS INDICATED A WIDENING BREACH BETWEEN NOT ONLY THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY, BUT ALSO BETWEEN CASTRO SANCHEZ AND ARMY LEADERS. THE PISTARINI SPEECH COUPLED WITH THE DISMISSAL OF ZUVIRIA MIGHT WELL HAVE ADDED TO THE SOLIDITY OF THE MILITARY VIS-A-VIS THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT. EARLIER REPORTING FROM RELIABLE SOURCES HAS INDICATED THAT THE AIR FORCE HAS PROMISED TO REMAIN NEUTRAL IN THE EVENT OF ANY ARMY MOVE. THE NAVY HAS REPORTEDLY ALSO AGREED TO ASSUME A PASSIVE ROLE SHOULD THE ARMY MOVE.

13. THERE HAVE BEEN CONTACTS BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE PERONIST MOVEMENT AND IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT THE PERONIST LABOR SECTOR WHICH FOLLOWS AUGUSTO VANDOR HAS AGREED NOT TO RESIST OR OPPOSE A COUP. PERONIST PARTY LEADERS HAVE ANNOUNCED THEIR INTENTION TO ASK FOR THE IMPEACHMENT OF THE PRESIDENT.

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14. IT IS APPARENT THAT FIELD GRADE ARMY OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT THE NATION IS PASSING THROUGH A PERIOD OF DETERIORATION WHICH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IS INCAPABLE OF STOPPING. VERY LITTLE IS HEARD ABOUT THE ARMY'S FEAR OF ASSUMING THE DIRECTION OF THE GOVERNMENT WHICH AT ONE TIME MARKED THE MILITARY'S RELUCTANCE EVEN TO ATTEMPT A COUP. IT APPEARS AS IF THE MOUNTING FRUSTRATION HAS BEEN STIRRED BY THE RECENT EVENTS REPORTED ABOVE WHICH HAVE BEEN FURTHER IRRITATED BY SUCH FACTORS AS THE PERONIST VICTORY IN CATAMARCA PROVINCE, THE NEW DEVALUATION OF THE PESO, AND THE CONTINUED FAILURE TO VOTE ON A NATIONAL BUDGET. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE GIVEN UP ANY HOPE OF SERIOUS POLICY CHANGES BY THE ADMINISTRATION AND HAVE REACHED THE STAGE OF ATTEMPTING TO PROVOKE THE GOVERNMENT INTO PROVIDING THE ARMY WITH A REASON FOR A COUP ATTEMPT. FOLLOWING THIS LINE, IT HAS BEEN REPORTED AND CONFIRMED THAT IF THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ATTEMPT TO REMOVE PISTARINI, THE MILITARY WILL OUST ILLIA.

15. THE GOVERNMENT OBVIOUSLY RECOGNIZED PISTARINI'S SPEECH AS A PROVOCATION AND WAS REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH ITS DEFT RESPONSE. THE PRESIDENT FEELS THAT HE STILL IS IN FULL CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. HE RECENTLY DECIDED NOT TO MAKE ANY CABINET

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CHANGES AS REQUESTED EARLIER BY THE MILITARY. HE HAS SAID THAT HE WOULD ONLY GIVE IN TO MILITARY PRESSURE IF HE WAS CONVINCED IT WAS THE ONLY CHANCE TO SAVE HIS ADMINISTRATION. AT THE PRESENT TIME, IT IS NOT KNOWN IF ILLIA WOULD RATHER GO DOWN FIGHTING FOR HIS PARTY AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS OR WOULD GIVE IN TO THE MILITARY DEMANDS. IT APPEARS THAT GIVEN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT MAKE AN AGRESSIVE STAND AGAINST THE ARMY WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE A MOTIVE FOR A COUP. ALTHOUGH IT INITIALLY APPEARED AS THOUGH THE ADMINISTRATION DID NOT SHOW ANY SIGNS OF PANIC, THE PRESIDENT FOUND IT NECESSARY ON THE EVENING OF 3 JUNE TO ATTEMPT PUBLICLY TO ENLIST POPULAR SUPPORT BY STATING THAT HIS ADMINISTRATION HAS POSITIVE GOALS WHICH ARE AIMED AT BENEFITING THE ENTIRE NATION. IT WAS A STRONG SPEECH WHICH MAY WELL BE INTERPRETED AS AN ATTEMPTED BRAKE AGAINST ANY EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE MILITARY TO CARRY OUT A COUP AS WELL AS A RESPONSE TO THE MANY REPORTS OF UNREST AMONG THE ARMED FORCES.

16. AT THIS TIME, THE ODDS APPEAR TO FAVOR THE POSSIBILITY OF A MILITARY TAKEOVER IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE GOVERNMENT IS FACED WITH MANY PROBLEMS THAT HAVE ACCUMULATED OVER THE PAST

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YEARS THAT MAJOR CONCESSIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE AND PROBABLY NOTHING SHORT OF A MAJOR OVERHAUL WOULD HAVE ANYTHING MORE THAN A DELAYING EFFECT. IN ADDITION TO THE ACUTE MILITARY CRISIS, THE GOVERNMENT FACES A GENERAL STRIKE ON 7 JUNE, IT HAS NO BUDGET, THE UNIVERSITY SITUATION IS BECOMING SERIOUS, AND THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT YET ARRIVED AT A SOLUTION TO AVOID A PERONIST VICTORY IN THE MARCH 1967 ELECTIONS.

17. THE MILITARY CRISIS CAN ONLY DETRACT FROM THE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO DEVOTE AS MUCH ENERGY AS IT WOULD LIKE TO SOLVE THE OTHER BASIC PROBLEMS AND IT CAUSES INTERNAL FRICTIONS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF WHEN UNITY IS GREATLY NEEDED.

18. MANY IMPORTANT CONDITIONS FOR A MILITARY TAKEOVER HAVE ALREADY BEEN MET TO A GREAT EXTENT. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT LT. GENERAL ONGANIA NOW SUPPORTS THE ARMY'S DESIRE FOR A COUP AND IS CONVINCED OF THE DESIRABILITY OR AT LEAST THE INEVITABILITY OF A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT. THE QUESTION OF A MOTIVE FOR A COUP STILL REMAINS UNSETTLED, ALTHOUGH MANY OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT THE SIMPLE LACK OF AUTHORITY ON THE PART OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT IS REASON ENOUGH TO MOVE. A MOTIVE COULD DEVELOP AT ANY TIME AS A RESULT OF A RESPONSE TO A MILITARY PROVOCATION OR OVER AN INSTITUTIONAL

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QUESTION SUCH AS THE REMOVAL OF ZUVIRIA. IF NO SINGLE MOTIVE DEVELOPS IN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE MILITARY WOULD CONSIDER THAT THE GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DETERIORATION HAD REACHED THE POINT WHERE THEY WOULD SIMPLY STEP IN AND TAKE OVER WITH THE JUSTIFICATION TO FOLLOW THE EVENT. THE GOVERNMENT COULD CONCEIVABLY PULL THROUGH BY IMMEDIATELY MAKING CHANGES IN THE CABINET AND PROVIDING A REASONABLE SOLUTION TO THE 1967 ELECTION PROBLEM IN THE PROVINCE OF BUENOS AIRES. HE IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE-- BUT NOT LIKELY-- THAT ILLIA, WHO HAS ADEPTLY MET MANY CHALLENGES IN THE PAST, COULD MANEUVER HIS WAY OUT OF THIS SITUATION. FOR EXAMPLE, THE RESIGNATION OF CASTRO SANCHEZ HAS BEEN RUMORED. SUCH A RESIGNATION COULD POSSIBLY FURTHER DELAY ANY POSITIVE ACTION BY THE ARMED FORCES SINCE IT WOULD, IN FACT, APPEASE PISTARINI. ON THE OTHER HAND IT COULD ALSO LEAD TO GREATER DIFFICULTIES BY DEMONSTRATING THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS WILLING TO SUBMIT TO MILITARY PRESSURES.

AE-19 MOST REPORTING HAS POINTED TO THE PERIOD OF 6-25 JUNE AS THE MOST LIKELY PERIOD FOR THE OVERTHROW. SPECIAL ATTENTION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO 20 JUNE, ARGENTINE FLAG DAY, AND IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT ARMY COMMANDERS WILL MAKE STRONG AND PROVOCATIVE

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SPEECHES TO THEIR TROOPS ON THAT DAY.

20. IN ADDITION, IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE MILITARY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE GAINED POWER AND CONSOLIDATED THEIR POSITION FAR ENOUGH IN ADVANCE OF THE 9 JULY NATIONAL CELEBRATION. IF A TAKEOVER IS DELAYED MUCH BEYOND 20 JUNE, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE POSTPONED UNTIL SEPTEMBER. IT IS EXPECTED THAT EVEN IF IT IS POSTPONED, THE TENSE SITUATION WILL CONTINUE UNLESS ILLIA IS ABLE TO TAKE MORE EFFECTIVE ACTION.

21. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCSO, CINCLANT. \

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
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DIST 29 JUNE 1966

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

per 050376
date 29 NOV 1976

DOI: 28 JUNE 1966

SUBJECT: OPINIONS OF THE COMMANDER OF THE FIRST ARMY CORPS,
MAJOR GENERAL ALSOGARAY,
CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE COMPOSITION OF THE NEW
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

ACQ:

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1. ALVARO ALSOGARY, MINISTER OF ECONOMICS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF FORMER PRESIDENT ARTURO FRONDISI, SAID ON 28 JUNE THAT HE AND HIS BROTHER, MAJOR GENERAL AULIO ALSOGARAY, WERE NOT ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH THE WAY THE OVERTHROW OF THE ILLIA GOVERNMENT ORIGINATED. ALVARO ALSOGARAY SAID THEY BELIEVED THAT IF THE ARMED FORCES HAD WAITED A LITTLE LONGER THE COUP COULD HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT WITH LESS OF THE APPEARANCE OF A CLASSIC LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY TAKE-OVER.

2. ALVARO ALSOGARY SAID HE WILL MEET WITH PRESIDENT JUAN CARLOS ONGANIA SOON AFTER ONGANIA HAD BEEN SWORN IN AS PRESIDENT. THE FORMER REQUESTED THE MEETING TO DISCUSS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. (SOURCE

COMMENT: ALVARO ALSOGARY SAID HE WAS AFRAID THAT ONGANIA, WHO IS ACCUSTOMED TO THE ROLE OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF, MAY WANT TO "COMMAND" THE NEW ECONOMICS MINISTRY, AND HE WOULD TRY TO ENSURE THAT THIS DOES NOT COME ABOUT.)

3. ALVARO ALSOGARAY SAID THAT IF ONGANIA FOLLOWS THE PLAN ONGANIA APPROVED SOME TIME AGO, THERE WILL BE ONLY FOUR GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES: ECONOMICS AND LABOR; FOREIGN RELATIONS; INTERIOR; AND THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. UNDER THIS PLAN THERE WOULD BE MORE SECRETARIES RESPONSIBLE TO THE MINISTERS THAN IN THE ILLIA GOVERNMENT. THE THREE COMMANDERS IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES WOULD ALSO PERFORM THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SECRETARIES OF THE SERVICES, THUS OBTAINING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE KINDS OF CONFLICTS

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THAT HAVE ARISEN BETWEEN THE TWO KINDS OF OFFICES IN THE ILLIA GOVERNMENT. ABOVE THE CABINET MINISTERS THERE WOULD BE A DELIBERATING BODY, CALLED A COUNCIL OF STATE. THERE WILL ALSO BE AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL. (FIELD COMMENT: ANOTHER SOURCE WHO HAS REPORTED ACCURATELY SAID ON 28 JUNE THERE WOULD BE ONLY THREE MINISTRIES: FOREIGN AFFAIRS; INTERIOR AND DEFENSE; AND ECONOMICS AND LABOR.)

4. ALVARO ALSOGARAY SAID HE WAS NOT CONFIDENT THAT ONGANIA'S PROBABLE CHOICE FOR MINISTER OF ECONOMICS, J.M. SALIMEI, HAS THE ABILITY OR EXPERIENCE FOR THE JOB. (SOURCE COMMENT: HE DESCRIBED SALIMEI AS AN INDUSTRIALIST AND FINANCIER WITHOUT EXPERIENCE IN A PUBLIC POST OR ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION. HE SAID SALIMEI WAS ONCE HIS PROTEGEE AND AN ECONOMIST OF HIS (ALSOGARAY'S) SOCIAL MARKET SCHOOL, AND THAT SOON AFTER ONGANIA HAD PROPOSED THE MINISTRY TO SALIMEI, THE LATTER VISITED ALSOGARAY AND ASKED FOR HELP IN THE FUTURE. ALSOGARAY SAID SALIMEI APPEARED TO FEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE POST.) (FIELD COMMENT: THE SOURCE SAID HE THOUGHT ALSOGARAY WANTED THE POST BADLY HIMSELF AND IS UPSET THAT HE WAS NOT CHOSEN.)

ALSOGARAY SAID THAT SALIMEI DOES, HOWEVER, REPRESENT THE TYPE OF PERSON ONGANIA WANTS IN TOP POSITIONS IN HIS GOVERNMENT: YOUNG, RELATIVELY UNKNOWN, AND COMPLETELY APOLITICAL.

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5. REGARDING LABOR, ALSOGARAY SAID THAT ACCORDING TO THE PREVIOUSLY APPROVED PLAN, THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR (CGT) WILL NOT BE DISSOLVED BUT WILL BE CAREFULLY OBSERVED AND CONTROLLED. (THE SOURCE OF THE FIELD COMMENT IN PARAGRAPH THREE, ABOVE, REPORTED ESSENTIALLY THIS SAME INFORMATION, ADDING THAT LABOR HAD AGREED, THROUGH AUGUSTO VANDOR AS SPOKESMAN, TO TWO YEARS WITHOUT LABOR TROUBLES IN EXCHANGE FOR A GUARANTEE THAT NO FORCEFUL MEASURES WOULD BE TAKEN AGAINST LABOR BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT.)

6. ALSOGARAY SAID THE PROVISIONAL JUNTA FORMED BY THE THREE COMMANDERS IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES WOULD NOT BE DISSOLVED WHEN ONGANIA ASSUMES THE PRESIDENCY ON 29 JUNE, BUT WOULD BE DISSOLVED LATER WHEN A NEW CABINET HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED.

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSO CINCLANT.

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
ARGENTINA

REF. 058315

DATE 29 NOV 1978

Juan Carlos ONGANIA

Reportedly appointed Provisional President of Argentina following a military coup d'état against President Arturo Illia on 28 June 1966, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Juan Carlos Onganía was considered the strongest and most influential military figure in Argentina at the time of his unexpected retirement as commander in chief of the army on 24 November 1965.



Known to be opposed to the policies of the Illia government, he apparently confined himself to verbal opposition prior to the coup.

With respect to international affairs, Onganía is staunchly anti-Communist and pro-United States. In both the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 and the 1965 Dominican Republic insurgency, he backed the actions of the US Government fully. A longtime advocate of an inter-American security force, he was apparently deeply chagrined when the Argentine Government refused to participate in the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) sent to the Dominican Republic. During a July 1965 trip to Europe he was reportedly somewhat swayed by the "Third World" philosophy, but after a subsequent trip to Brazil, he was said to have abandoned these ideas. While in Brazil he was reported in the press to have negotiated a pact with the Brazilian military establishment in which they and the Argentine Armed Forces agreed to intervene in Uruguay in the event of a Communist takeover in that nation. (He later denied the existence of such a pact.)

Born 17 March 1914 in Marces Paz, Buenos Aires Province, Juan Carlos Onganía is of Basque heritage. A graduate of the National Military Academy (1931-34), the Superior War School (1945) and the Cavalry School (1946), he served variously with both the cavalry and armored branches of the army, notably as director general of remount and veterinary services (1960), commanding general of the First Armored Division (1961), and commanding

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Juan Carlos ONGANIA (cont.)

General of the Cavalry Corps (1962). He was appointed commander in chief of the army by Interim President José María Guido in September 1962 after he had successfully led the "azul" faction of the army, which wanted restoration of constitutional government, against the "colorado" faction, which sought military rule.

Described as a reserved, modest, austere individual.

Onganía lacked the sparkle and lustre of fellow staff officers during his active military career but reportedly gained their respect by his energetic handling of his commands and his common sense approach to problems. Somewhat difficult to engage in conversation, he is slow to anger but reputedly has a strong temper once aroused. A Scotch drinker and hard-driving polo player, he is said to enjoy living the life of an English country squire. Married to the former María Emilia Green, he is the father of three daughters and two sons who are studying for nonmilitary careers. He is not known to speak any foreign languages.

PK:bjh

June 1966

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FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS IN BOLIVIA

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FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS IN BOLIVIA *



The Bolivian Junta de Gobierno, which assumed power following the angry popular revolt against the Villarroel regime on 21 July of this year, now regards as accomplished its self-imposed mission to restore constitutional democracy in Bolivia. It has, accordingly, scheduled a general election for 5 January, and given assurances of its intention to step aside, as soon as the votes are counted, in favor of a popularly chosen president, vice-president, and congress. The achievements of the Junta caretaker government and the issues in the elections are discussed in the Enclosure hereto.

Junta President Tomas Monje Gutierrez, a respected member of Bolivia's judiciary, has pledged that the 5 January elections will be the freest in Bolivia's history. We believe that this pledge will be kept. This is indicated by the success of Monje Gutierrez' drive to eliminate Villarroel sympathizers from all strategic posts in the armed forces and the civil service, by the fact that he is not himself a candidate in the elections, and by the energy and impartiality with which he and his colleagues have maintained the indispensable electoral freedoms of expression and assembly throughout the campaign. Moreover, it is highly improbable that any disaffected elements will attempt to prevent the elections by an appeal to arms, since the Monje Gutierrez caretaker government today enjoys the support of all the important organized groups in Bolivia save the Miners' Federation.

While a detailed forecast of the voting pattern is complicated by the fact that the strength of Bolivia's political parties has not been tested in a fair election for many years and by the elimination of a major political party (the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario, which supported the Villarroel dictatorship), we believe that:

(a) The predominantly non-Communist left-wing PIR (Partido de Izquierda Revolucionaria) commands a notably larger popular following than any other party participating in the elections, and will therefore win at least a considerable plurality of the seats in the lower house of Congress. (Under Bolivia's electoral law, no single party can win a top-heavy plurality in the Senate.)

(b) For the Presidency, ex-Ambassador to Washington Louis Guachalla, supported by a loose four-party coalition organized by the PIR, will defeat ex-Minister of Labor Jose Enrique Hertzog, who is supported by a three-party conservative coalition.

* This report has the concurrence of the intelligence agencies of the War and Navy Departments and the Army Air Forces. State Department comment is not yet available; substantial dissent, if any, will be reported when received.

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(c) Guachalla will not be assured of easy control of Congress because, although his coalition will probably win a majority of the seats in both houses, each party therein is presenting and will control its own congressional candidates.

(d) Bolivia's 40,000 organized miners, who insist that the elections are being held prematurely, may yet decide to run their own candidate or, failing that, to support neither Guachalla nor Hertzog.* Their decision, however, is not likely to exert a decisive influence on the electoral results, since they account for less than 10% of the electorate.

4. While the resultant government will, because of Bolivia's dependence on Argentina for essential food supplies be under great pressure to join Peron's projected economic bloc (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru), it will resist this pressure to the utmost and show a marked preference for a pro-US economic orientation. The US, in view of its interest in a hemisphere source of tin, will derive great long-run benefits from any increase in tin production, and any improvement in relations between capital and labor in the tin industry, that the new government may be able to achieve on the basis of a moderately leftist approach to the nation's economic problems.

* US Embassy La Paz, by telegram dated 24 December 1946, reported that the Partido Obrero Democratico Boliviano has nominated for President ex-General Felix Tabera, said to be associated with the leader of the Miners' Federation.

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ENCLOSURE

FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS IN BOLIVIA

Achievements of the caretaker government. The Bolivian economy is a chronically "sick" economy, because of (a) the cumulatively disadvantageous position of Bolivian tin in the world tin market, (b) inadequate and ill-distributed natural resources, (c) a capital famine which renders impossible the development of the country's transportation system, and (d) the constant pressure of population upon an insufficient food supply.

Besides these continuing problems, the Monje Gutierrez Junta inherited from the Villarroel dictatorship a monetary inflation, a foreign policy whose orientation towards Argentina had caused many of the country's neighbors to withhold recognition from its government, and a tense internal economic and political situation which had been aggravated by more than two years of police-state exploitation and oppression. The monetary inflation remains a problem; but when the newly elected President takes over next month, Monje Gutierrez will be able to point to such solid accomplishments as (a) the at least temporary withdrawal of Bolivia from the orbit of Argentine political influence, (b) the achievement of diplomatic recognition by all the American Republics, (c) a series of modest but long-overdue economic readjustments that have stemmed the rising tide of discontent among the masses of the population, and (d) the return of control over Bolivia's destinies to its 80,000 qualified voters.

The issues in the elections. Both candidates for the presidency have pledged themselves to carry out the program of reconstruction, democratization, and social reform which the Monje Gutierrez caretaker government has initiated during its five-month tenure of power. This program includes as minima a wide measure of government intervention in economic affairs, "progressive" labor and educational policies, and popular control over government. Adoption of these objectives by the new government is to be expected no matter who wins the election. Bolivia must therefore be added to the growing list of South American countries -- Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Venezuela -- in which the traditionally conservative elements have evidently found themselves without their popular following. This does not mean, however, that there are no issues at stake in the election. Hertzog, while he makes his appeal for votes in the name of "moderate socialism", has avoided specific and detailed promises of rapid change, while the PIR, mentioned above as the largest of the parties supporting Guachalla, promises the Bolivian masses higher living standards, a less "regressive" tax system, a generous social welfare and public health program, and redistribution of land ownership. The other large party in the Guachalla coalition, the Liberal Party, while supporting some of the PIR proposals, stresses its faith in free individual enterprise, and can, if Guachalla wins, be counted upon to exercise a moderating influence on PIR extremists in Congress. Both the PIR and the Liberal Party direct attention to the crisis in the tin industry as a

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major Bolivian economic problem, promising "modernization" of production methods to offset the difficulties attendant upon (a) the inferior quality of Bolivian ore, and (b) the fact that the mine owners have already "creamed off" the country's richest deposits.