CIA-RDP91M00696R000100060001-9__CIA-RDP91M00696R000100060001-9.pdf

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BRIEFING OF CHURCH COMMITTEE: QUALITY AND UTILITY OF ESTIMATES ON SOVIET STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES

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D:20161216021250Z

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BRIEFING OF CHURCH COMMITTEE: QUALITY AND UTILITY OF ESTIMATES ON SOVIET STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES

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SECRET Approved For ReleWe 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000060001-9 DRAFT: NS 23 June 1975, MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution SUBJECT: Briefing of Church Committee: Quality and Utility of Estimates on Soviet Strategic Capabilities I. Outline -- see annex II. Case Studies -- These should each consist of not more than four doublespaced pages of briefing notes, accompanied by a backup discussion of the case including relevant excerpts and documentation, together with illustrations recommended for use in direct presentation and backup. The materials should summarize (a) the intelligence problem, (b) the main elements of evidence and analysis, (c) the USIB findings and how they treated uncertainty and differences of view, (d) the resolution (or, where appropriate, the current status) of the problem. A. III. Briefing Notes -- total of not more than 16 double-spaced pages including two of the case studies: 0 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000100060001-9  SECRET Approved For Reld a 2004/05/13 : CJ RDP91M00696ROOQ,100060001-9 SUBJECT: Briefing of Church Committee: Quality and Utility of Estimates on Soviet Strategic Capabilities IV. Illustrations -- 30 x 40 briefing boards, not more than 12 including those selected for direct presentation on case studies: Howard Stoertz, Jr. National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : 'CIA-RDP91 M00696R000100060001-9 25X1 SECRET  ` ' Approved For Rele a 2004/05/13 CFI1M00696 A Proposal - 23 June 1975 Step 1 - Develop succinct papers with analysis, alternatives, "pros and cons," and recommendations'on the following six topics. (Papers to be written as if to be read by the President.) DCI Role in Community. What should role be? Substance? Resources? Operational management and tasking? How should the Community be defined? Organizational implications for CIA. To what extent should such a role be defined in law? Executive Order? Intelligence Community Organizational Arrangements. Applicability of ExCom arrangements to other Community programs: clandestine collection, SIGINT. The Need for Secrecy. Putting "teeth" into the DCI's responsibility to protect sources and methods. How Much "Openness?" Declassification of the "fact of" overhead photography. Open budgets, External Controls on the Community, the Agency. Executive Branch controls, congressional oversight and controls, other. /9 C Intelligence and the Congress. To what extent and in what ways can or should Intelligence Community information be made available to the Congress? Effect of changes in this area on intelligence relationships within the Executive Branch. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000100060001-9 ' bc/ C 7 ILLEGIB  Approved For Rel' a 2004/05/13 : - F17 00696R0~r100060001-9 Step 2 - Consideration by you and members of the Management Committee of the proposals developed above. Step 3 - Development of a specific proposal for consideration by the President setting forth our recommendations for action in each of the above areas, taking account of proposals already made, the Rockefeller Commission recommendations, etc. SECRET Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000100060001-9  Approved For Rel2aeee 2004/05/ ~C191M00696R09"00060001-9 Paper 1 - What is the Intelligence Community? A descriptive piece explaining the various components of the Community; the production, collection, processing, R&D roles of the various components; and describing the management interrelationships between the various components including the DCI's resource management responsibilities as set forth in the November 1971 letter. 5 pages ultimately. Paper 2 - CIA Within the Intelligence Community. A more detailed factual piece on CIA, focusing particularly on the production, collection and R&D responsibilities of the Agency and on the various mechanisms available to the Agency and the DCI to exercise leadership in the Intelligence Community including control over covert activities abroad, control of the estimates process, the various USIB committees with policy making responsibilities in functional areas, the November 1971 letter, etc. 5"pages . Paper 3 - The Future of Intelligence. Purposes of intelligence in the next 10-20 years including but not limited to peace keeping, supplying policy makers with critical advice on wide variety of subjects, etc. Arguments for and against an independent production capability independent of policy makers within the Intelligence Community (State, Treasury, etc. ) and Approved For Release 2004/05/13 00696R000100060001-9 L..  Approved For Rely 2004/ : DP91M00696ROGWO060001-9 operational 'departments like Defense; and arguments for and against some control over collection and R&D programs by the independent production entity. 5 pages. Paper 4 - The Management of Intelligence/ CIA Leadership in the Community. Paper 1 described existing arrangements; Paper 3 outlines some basic assumptions about a future CIA; this paper must grapple with the question of alternative management arrangements for the Intelligence- Community. Here we will need to describe the DCI'.s. current responsibilities and how they have developed over the years (both with respect to substantive and to resource matters). We will then have set the stage for whatever critique we care to make of existing arrangements and for defining a set of problems we think should be solved. A tentative list of these might include the facts that the DCI has a Community resource review responsibility but no authority; the DCI has a Community "sources and methods" responsibility but no authority; the DCI lacks full access to DoD collection and resource information, despite the law and a Presidential letter; etc. Having defined a brief series of fundamental problems, we will then be able to set forth some analysis of possible alternative arrangements. In concept, these seem to fall into about four basic categories: 1. No Community resource management role for DCI at all, return to pre-1971 and focus only on a Community Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000100060001-9 2  Approved For ReleVWe 2004/05/1 QU91 M00696RO 0060001-9 production role for Agency. (Comment: A step back- ward and probably undesirable. ) 2. Consolidate all "national" (what are they?) programs under the DCI's command and control. (Comment: Politically unrealistic and probably not sensible in any event. ) 3. Take certain minimum steps to expand DCI's effective authority to do better what he now does. (Example of such steps: Segregate out within Defense all resource decision making related to intelligence and establish a parallel review procedure involving the DCI. Comment: Worth considering further.) 4. Examine the joint management arrangements between CIA and NRO, isolate reasons why this arrangement is considered "successful" and consider whether the model could or should be applied to the SIGINT world, to the CS with State, to communications with State, etc. (Comment: A Colby favorite, with possibilities. Paper 5 - Secrecy and Intelligence. The principal task is to explain what must always remain secret (if we are to do our job) in the Intelligence Community and to explain our legislative proposal on protection of sources and methods Approved For Release 2004/05/13 :A (T~00696R000100060001-9 . .,  SECRET Approved For Rele'Fade 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP91M00696R0(#p.1?0060001-9 in this context. The "open budget" issue will need to be explored as well, though our position on this is quite clear. On the other side of the coin, the DCI has asked that we pursue the issues surrounding secrecy of the "fact of" overhead reconnaissance, with the hope that certain basic: activities in this area could be declassified. Probably there are other similar issues. Basic to this paper is the need to reconsider where the line ,must be drawn on revelation of our activities, to examine critically whether that line must be drawn where it is now, and to see if clear guidelines can be drawn for the future. 5 pages. Paper 6 - External Controls on the Agency and Community. a. What are these controls and how do they work (with respect to covert action, clandestine and technical collection, and so forth)? b. What additional controls did Rockefeller Commission recommend? c. What additional controls might Congress recommend? d. Recognizing Rockefeller Commission recommendations and probable congressional demands, what would we recommend, both within Executive Branch and with respect to Congress? Paper 7 - Intelligence and the Congress. (Paper to deal with substantive intelligence issues, not oversight and controls which should be treated above. Approved For Release 2004/05/13: M00696R000100060001-9 "VT-  Approved For Rel a 2004/05 3': 0 AI FR P91 M00696R01fi+100060001-9 What use is now made of intelligence by the Congress? Do we react to requests or do we have a conscious program? Where might Congress--if it could keep secrets--benefit from more intelligence information? What could we do to make more information more widely available to Congress? What problems would this cause? Is Congress likely to legislate a request that we make substantive information available to relevant members on a periodic basis? If they did, what ground rules for handling this should there be? 5 pages. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA,~RDP91M00696R000100060001-9 SECRET

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